



DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES from the SOUTH

Troubling the Metrics of [Under-]development in Africa

EDITED BY
Munyaradzi Mawere

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Development Perspectives from the South:

Troubling the Metrics of
[Under-]development in Africa

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Munyaradzi Mawere**



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Beyond Africa's Underdevelopment Gridlock: In Search of a Productive Future

“Beauty is dangerous! It makes one vulnerable, and since everything that is vulnerable is easy prey to predators so is beauty” (Munyaradzi Mawere 2016).

Introduction

“Development” has been a buzz word since the end of the Second World War. Yet, while other parts of the world such as Asia, particularly the three tigers and China have managed to come out of the shell of underdevelopment, others like Africa have remained entrapped in the matrices of underdevelopment. Why Africa has failed to frog-jump from its underdevelopment nightmares when in fact in terms of natural resources it is one of the richest continents in the world remains a concern not only for the African governments alone, but for many concerned theorists, researchers, organisations and civil groups. Many propositions to explain the African development predicament have been conjured in an attempt to pronounce “death” over the endemic presence of Africa’s underdevelopment but all in vain. Interestingly, many of the causes, explanations, dynamics, consequences and solutions for Africa’s problem have largely been offered from outside especially from the Northern scholars and theorists, ignoring the voices of Africa corporate and those experiencing underdevelopment first hand and on daily basis. It is no doubt that such theorisation has met with serious criticism especially by scholars from the South who question the credibility of solutions that might come from the “causers” of a problem. How can Africans trust solutions from people who once colonised them? How can Africa be sure that the theories and models

that the Global North¹ is proposing in view of Africa's development concerns are genuine and given in good faith? These have often been the questions raised either implicitly or explicitly by audacious and critical scholars from Africa.

As a matter of consequence, most of the theorisation and rethinking of Africa's underdevelopment jam and development efforts from the North have been received with scepticism and some sometimes labelled "Martian" especially on the backdrop that most of them are exclusively out-of-context, alien, and philosophies applied in the blunt name of "one size-fits-all." What is even worrying is that most of these theories such as modernisation and integration have been applied in many societies of Africa but with dismal consequences. The theories, thus, have fallen short in their attempts to provide remedies for the African development conundrums. This invites two if not three grand questions: "Why is Africa so underdeveloped? Could the continued underdevelopment of Africa a result of deliberately flawed theories and models imported from the North? Is it possible for Africa to rise and build herself to the level at par with the so-called developed countries of the world? What actually should be done for Africa to rise above her knees development-wise?"

The questions raised here cannot be answered in a word. They are both complex and elusive. Nevertheless, in view of the first question, I have found part of the answer through logical reasoning from which I proposed a theory I have named "the beauty theory of underdevelopment" (cf. Mawere 2016). With theory, I have argued that Africa's underdevelopment, though a result of a compound of

¹ While I acknowledge that the Western scholars have come to label the Africans as the "Global South," even without acknowledging the pillaging and plundering done during slave trade and colonialism, I emphasise here that in this book I use the terms "Global South" and "Global North" neutrally to mean Africa (and all other continents in the southern hemisphere that suffered colonialism) and the countries in the northern hemisphere (including North America) that participated in the enslavement and colonisation of Africa. I thus use the terms "Global South" and "Global North" chiefly with respect to their geographical locations and their respective roles and positions during colonialism. Also, sometimes I use the terms North and South to refer to the Global North and Global South respectively.

factors, it is largely attributed to its beauty that has attracted predators over time to prey on it. In fact, I have reasoned thus:

Beauty is dangerous! It makes one vulnerable, and since everything that is vulnerable is easy prey to predators, so is beauty. Why am I saying this with reference to the continent of Africa? My answer is very simple! After pondering for a long time about why Africa is so underdeveloped when in fact it is one of the richest continents in the world in terms of natural resources, I found part of the answer to this puzzle in Africa's beauty. I found out that Africa is full of rich reserves of beautiful natural resources ranging from minerals to plants, from wild animals to plenty of sunshine, and from abundant tracts of land to beautiful beaches. Human capital of quality and strength cannot be left out on the list; the major reason why Europe was so attracted to the people of Africa during slave trade. Now how the beauty of Africa has made it vulnerable and an easy prey to predators? (Ibid: 41).

As could be seen, I have argued that the unique and resilient beautiful resources that exist in abundance in Africa have attracted so much the eyes of the predator, in this case, the Global North (or the northern imperialists-cum-capitalists) that have been watching in admiration from above like an eagle. For a long time, the predator has set an eye of admiration and envy on Africa, prompting the former [predator] to put in place all mechanisms and structures to prey on the continent's beautiful resources – both natural and human. These mechanisms range from the historic slave trade to colonialism and neo-colonialism; mechanisms which have all underdeveloped and impoverished Africa in varying degrees. It is most unfortunate that a good number of these mechanisms continue unabated, employed even more brazenly in modern day Africa, where their effects seem to be indubitably more salient and histrionic than ever before. My thinking and observations here resonate with those of Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013: 331), who in recognising a continuous resistance of the various forms of domination of Africa by the West and North America argues that “while Africans have actively contested Euro–North American hegemony throughout these periods, they have not yet succeeded in breaking the strong global technologies of colonality that continue to prevent the possibilities

of African agency.” As Ndlovu-Gatsheni (Ibid) urges, there is need, in view of these observations, for a “deepening [of] the decolonisation and deimperialisation of the international order in the twenty-first century” if Africa is to move out of the underdevelopment shell it is currently locked in. The grand question is: How can Africa rescue itself given that a large number of its former “masters” continue showing interest on the continent as exemplified by phenomena such as neo-colonialism, among others?

While a lot has been observed about some of the different modes of underdevelopment in terms of causation, the dynamics and even the consequences, a lot more interrogation is still needed to rill in and understand the nature of and to counter-[under-]development trends and forces, their linkages with global loop-sided politics, as well as proffering lasting solutions to this enduring problem that has pervaded the African continent for decades now. In post-colonial Africa, arguably, underdevelopment is traceable to the trans-Atlantic slave period when the resources (both natural and human) were plundered and looted to enrich territories of the global north. In the contemporary times, whilst the prominence of underdevelopment continues to take its toll especially in sub-Saharan Africa, with deleterious effects as witnessed by the widespread poverty, there have been acrimonious debates on whether Africa’s underdevelopment is a plight of its own making or an externally engineered problem or both. To this extent, the unfolding of [under-]development in its various forms and dimensions remain camouflaged by insinuations of elusivity.

As a result of my consciousness of the highlighted obtaining reality and the passion to initiate dialogue between the North and the South, I have decided to undertake a book project that focuses on the trajectories of underdevelopment, development and the future of Africa under the general theme: underdevelopment, development, and the future of Africa. Based on the fervent hope that crumpling the clichés, stereotypes and realities of Africa is long overdue but never too late a process to begin, I have invited scholars from the continent and beyond, drawn from across disciplines, to add their voices to the enduring quandary and nerve-chilling problem – [under-]development predicament – that affects not only Africa but the

larger socio-economic and political well-being of the world as a whole.

Drawing on his researches, Nkwazi Mhango's provocative but thoughtful chapter 2 catechises and challenges the so-called Africa's underdevelopment. He argues that arguments surrounding development as exported from the Western milieu are 'maliciously concocted in order to make Africa believe that it is naturally dependent'. Basing on this argument, Mhango questions 'the legality-cum-rationale of those who assign such a tag' as "underdevelopment" with reference to Africa and the role that Africa is playing in the world economy without underscoring some other vital elements in reaching such a conclusion. For him, such people unduly cosset their ignorance and lack all the necessary tools to faithfully and honestly research Africa. Thus, Mhango assumes the audacity to critically explore some aspects used in defining Africa as an underdeveloped continent while ignoring its contribution to the world economy through resources 'such as rivers, people, market minerals, gas, oil, fertile land, humans and forests, among others'.

In Chapter 3, Munyaradzi Mawere and Gertjan van Stam audaciously interrogate within the purview of remittances accretion and expatriation, 'the pillaging and plundering of resources (both human and material) that have taken (and continue to take) place in Africa, in terms of how these have downscaled development on the continent'. Basing on their research findings around issues of development and underdevelopment in Africa, Mawere and van Stam argue that 'Africa's underdevelopment has for a long time been instigated and perpetuated by the West and such other players as North America, countries which continue exploiting Africa in the name of globalisation and international trade. On this note, the duo warns that if remain unchecked, the exploitative relationship between Africa and the Global North is likely to worsen 'the underdevelopment of Africa in the next few years, and this time, to a level where Africa would need a "crane" machine to take it out of the crevasse'. Mawere and van Stam's observations and findings are therefore critical for the continent of Africa and indeed for development discourse on Africa.

Artwell Nhemachena's chapter 4 critically focuses on 'the processes of (post-)development and the ways in which they relate to emerging epistemological contentions in the emerging field of "agnotology," which surfaces how ignorance is produced for some societies'. Nhemachena critically dissects and wades into development debates from a highly sophisticated but critical point of view. He argues that development so far, particularly as applied to Africa, has been marked by facades and 'the *farming* of ignorance, that is, the Western social, cultural and epistemic production of ignorance on the continent of Africa'. For Nhemachena, this farming of ignorance on the Africa soil is causing more trouble and underdevelopment than it is purported to be intending to solve. It is in fact falls short of the sustainable dialectics of development given that it follows the age old false gospel of civilisation, which while it was preached to be bringing light to Africa it instead brought darkness. Thus, for Nhemachena, 'the fact that Africa has not developed for centuries should not be construed, as is conventionally the case, to imply Africa's failure'. Rather, the underdevelopment of Africa should be looked at from the denial of the West to pay reparations, retribute and/or compensate all that it robbed and looted from Africa. Nhemachena unflinchingly challenge the Western scholars of development, who are fond of comparing Africa and the West as a step to demonising the continent. For him, what is necessary for these scholars is to note that there are fundamental differences between them Africa and the West, most especially that the West still retains not only its resources – including its laws, cultures, monarchies, and religions – but also it has the resources of Africans. Overall, Nhemachena's chapter is critical in that it promotes critical analysis of and level-headedness among scholars and theorists of development in a way that abjures production of ignorance.

In a creatively research fashion, Ngonidzashe Marongwe and Tasara Muguti's chapter 5 cross-examines Community Share Ownership Trust in the context of developing societies such as Zimbabwe. Using the case study of Shurugwi District, particularly the Tongogara Community Share Ownership Trust (TCSOT), Marongwe and Muguti examine the extent to which Community

Share Ownership Trust could be ‘an effective vehicle for community participatory development for the socio-economic transformation’ of rural areas that happen to find themselves in the countryside of many African societies. On the basis of their findings and critical theorisation of development, the duo problematises the link between the community share ownership trusts and the larger developmental goals of Zimbabwe to argue that ‘despite the good intentions and sound paper policies, CSOTs represent failure in the government efforts to decentralise rural development’ and indeed promote and foster development in the rural areas. Thus, for Marongwe and Muguti, CSOTs can only become vehicles of development in the rural areas only if development is faithfully and honestly decentralised.

In chapter 6, Afolabi Opeyemi Glory meticulously looks at the relationships between the so-called First World countries and the so-called Third World countries, which she consider as asymmetrical and exploitative, in view of how the latter is conditioned to economically dependent on the former. Having observed such, Glory convincingly argue that ‘the main purpose for granting foreign aid to Nigeria, investing in key sectors of the country’s economy, and trading with Nigeria, is mainly for the economic exploitation of the country’. While Glory acknowledges the merit of foreign aid and investment as long as they are done in good faith and the relationships between the two countries are symmetrical, she notes that the effect of foreign aid and investment to the Nigerian economy is that it [the Nigerian economy] ‘continues to be dependent on the economy of the Western capitalist countries’. Consequently, this dependency has either caused or perpetuated poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria, particularly from the 1960s when the country started receiving several forms of aid from the Western world. On this note, Glory proposes a diversified and sustainable development framework to deal with the gory political, social and economic effects of economic dependency on Nigeria’s socio-economic and political development.

Similarly, Munyaradzi Mawere and Costain Tandi’s chapter 7 tackles heads on the existence of foreign aid in Africa. However, while Glory mainly looks at the motivation behind the West granting

foreign aid to Nigeria and invest therein, Mawere and Tandi wade into the aid debate by interrogating the interplay between aid and poverty resilient in Africa. They pose the critical question on whether foreign aid to Africa could be described as a messianic resuscitator or the implantation of the seed of underdevelopment. Specifically, the duo explores the various ‘reasons why foreign aid since its inception in Africa has failed to achieve development goals and wean the continent from underdevelopment and poverty’. Drawing on their findings, Mawere and Tandi take a swipe against the public interest theory, which opines that foreign aid is necessary to developing countries such as those of Africa because it fills up a financing or investment void which will lift the countries in question out of the poverty trap. Instead of going the direction of the public interest theory, the duo advances the argument ‘that foreign aid, though sometimes acceptable, is more of a menace to African countries,’ not only with the potential to derail but foil development efforts in Africa.

In chapter 8, Gertjan van Stam critically focuses on engineering that targets development for Africa but within the framework of orientalism. Specifically, van Stam, in what he calls a longitudinal study of technologies in the African rural areas, examines ICT4D from an African positionality. Using data harvested from his field site, particularly the rural Namacha (in Zambia) and rural Murambinda (in Zimbabwe), van Stam sheds ‘some light on how an orientalist outlook fuels an *othering* that the suffix for development masks’. He argues that for even and sustainable development to prevail in Africa, there is need for a symmetrical relationship between the North and the South both in practice and in theory.

Chapter 9 by Costain Tandi and Munyaradzi Mawere ‘explore why and how African development has remained deeply entrapped in the matrices of Euro-centric perspectives’. In the light of this exploration, Tandi and Mawere discover that Africa has, for a long time, been a victim of oppression, human degradation, and exploitation where pillaging, plundering and looting of resources have occurred unabated. For Tandi and Mawere, this obtaining reality, ‘coupled with some endogenic factors, has had dramatic effects on the continent’s development agendas and direction, with

development for Africa, becoming a theme fraught with a multiplicity of Western recycled ideas, models, and research paradigms, all with the purported goal of alleviating poverty' and reverse underdevelopment. The duo therefore argues that the exploitative relationship between Africa and the Global North 'has downplayed the emergence of alternative development paths to counter the unproductive current Western-centric neo-liberal development perspectives'. Tandi and Mawere's chapter, thus, is an attempt to decolonise development in Africa. It advances the important argument that while theories and models of development exported to Africa from the North are important in so far as they help development technocrats with insights, they derail development efforts on the continent in a number of ways.

Munyaradzi Mawere and Mescort Nenduva's chapter 10 grapples with issues of education policy and exclusion by sex, gender, disability, and language, in view of socio-economic development in Zimbabwe. They observe that 'although inclusive education is echoed in the Zimbabwean Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education Mission statement, there is firm propagation that there is a mismatch between policy and implementation which seems to work without particular benchmarks and timelines'. Basing on this critical observation, the duo interrogates the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education of Zimbabwe's stance towards inclusive education policy in terms of implementation and the impact thereof on socio-economic development at national level. In view of their findings, Mawere and Nenduva argue that exclusion in Zimbabwe has continued to underplay the loftier goal of development in the country while on the other end inclusive education is far becoming rhetoric on paper which is never implemented to inform equity and development at levels of society.

Chapter 11 by Semie Memuna Sama critically examines 'the trajectories of underdevelopment, development and the future of Africa by drawing on a literature review and qualitative case studies in Cameroon, Nigeria, and Tanzania'. Sama's choice to look at these trajectories is partly influenced by her observation that the African continent 'is the most vulnerable to large-scale agricultural development that most often subordinate fundamental human rights

of rural Africans, including the right to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural, and political development that is enshrined in Article 1 of the *Declaration on the Right to Development*'. Informed by her researches, Sama observes that large-scale agricultural investments by multinational corporations and some rich governments in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world is steadfastly growing, both in frequency and magnitude, yet their impacts remain sketch and little understood. While making an effort to close this gap, Sama challenges other scholars to produce 'a body of evidence-based knowledge that could be useful in discerning between those large-scale agricultural developments that can infringe the rights of local communities' and thwart local development efforts that aim to instil and foster development.

In the creative and innovative chapter 12, Munyaradzi Mawere and Marshal Madambura trouble the triadic relationship of gender, development and underdevelopment. The chapter interrogates Africa's development challenges from a gender perspective recognising that gender disparities do not only disadvantage women but also reduce growth potential of the whole world. While speaking to global development concerns, Mawere and Madambura's chapter, thus, explores the causes of Africa's development challenges from a gender perspective, Zimbabwe being the case study. Using both quantitative and qualitative data, the duo argues that gender inequality perpetuates Africa's underdevelopment predicament. In the light of their findings and theorisation, Mawere and Madambura advocate the need for prioritising the advancement of the status of women to development.

Chapter 13 by Tendai Chibaya looks at Zimbabwe's third and most significant industry namely, tourism and hospitality sector. Realising that the tourism and hospitality industry sector contributes immensely to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and job creation of many economies and Zimbabwe in particular, Chibaya examines to how the sector can possibly amplify its contribution to the national economy and development at large. She focuses on human development-based managers' perceptions on travel incentive. Basing on her harvests in field, Chibaya argues that travel incentive will help the sector and even other organisations to promote self-

motivation and moral in employees – important aspects that will boost production while fostering development in the long run. On this note, Chibaya's work is not only critical for the tourism and hospitality sector but also for many other sectors that contribute to socio-economic development at national level.

In chapter 14, Munyaradzi Mawere and Costain Tandi provide a nuanced, meticulous and complicated analysis of China-Africa relations and development prospects in Africa. The duo teases out, explore African motivations in allowing and increasing Chinese engagement, and interrogate the complicated politico-economic relationship between Africa and China, especially in the past five decades. From their analysis of the relationship between China and Africa, Mawere and Tandi urge that African countries need to encourage Chinese investment into more labour intensive sectors. This is because Africa's population is growing faster than anywhere else in the world, and job creation is a top priority. On another note, Mawere and Tandi are concerned with the general unwillingness of China to coordinate its aid programmes with other donors and how it engages Africa's technological world. For them, 'while the Chinese are engaged in large infrastructure projects across Africa, there is little transfer of technology. There is also little local job creation; Chinese projects typically employ Chinese workers'.

In the 15th and last chapter, Fidelis Duri tussles head on with the environmental issues surrounding the controversial Chiadzwa diamond commercial mining company. For Duri, while 'the efforts by governments and civic organisations to achieve sustainable development are unquestionable, environmental activism (environmentalism) of ordinary people (those from below) should not be underestimated.' He is in fact concerned about the top-bottom approach that the government is using, particularly in its execution of mining activities and environmental management in Chiadzwa considering that mining can be a threat to sustainable development and the environment in general. Overall, Duri recommends that there be a mutual collaboration between the government and the locals in Chiadzwa in the management of the environment in view of the activities taking place therein.

This is a *must read text* for policy makers, development practitioners, students and professors interested in development discourses in and on Africa!

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Troubling the Myth of Africa's [Under-]development

Nkwazi Mhango

Introduction

In trying to tackle the above heading, I will start with a question as the foundational hunch and a window into the issue at hand. The question I'm asking is: Is Africa truly and desperately dependent, poor and underdeveloped as its detractors have always ridiculously defined it? This question is crucially mind boggling so to speak. However, the answer to the question why Africa is underdeveloped may differ from one person to another, of all; Africa needs to provide not only an answer but also an accurate answer. While many academics have tackled the problems resulting from the so-called Africa's underdevelopment, much remain to be seen vis-à-vis providing the accurate and pragmatic answer that will be employed to do away with such a manmade impasse. The move to move Africa out of the Western-defined underdevelopment academically speaking needs to start theoretically then pragmatically all based on dynamic human nature. Mawere (2010) argues applying the theory of evolution to pin down the fact that the purpose of life for any human has never been static (p. 276). Again, if this is the real situation, why has African been vacuously deemed, unfairly categorised and permanently been viewed as static continent while human nature dictates that human life is always dynamic whether consciously or otherwise? Why do Africa's doomsters and prophets of doom contradict this logically, simple, clear and understandable human nature? Is there any malice against Africa all geared by the quest of exploiting it forever as it has been the archaic and colonial view of it? Arguably, Mawere's argument apart from being powerful is true and provocative, especially for those who have always underrated Africa so as to relegate it to their manmade underdevelopment. This is where the importance of formulating a definition that reflects the

reality of things is needed. This is where the quest of questioning Western framework and their thinkers who formulated the current definition of development is important especially for Africans who, in a sense, are the victims of this very categorisation based on colonial standards and criteria as espoused by Western thinkers.

It is, therefore, from this milieu that this chapter seeks to challenge the so-called Africa's underdevelopment. The chapter will show how such a conclusion is maliciously concocted in order to make Africa believe that it is naturally dependent. In so doing, I question the legality-cum-rationale of those who assign such a tag and role to Africa without underscoring some other vital elements in reaching such a conclusion which, in all honesty, lacks credibility; especially for the victims of such international conspiracy against Africa. Hereunder, I explore some aspects of defining Africa as an underdeveloped continent while it is richly endowed and sits on immense resources such as rivers, people, market minerals, gas, oil, fertile land, humans and forests, among others.

Troubling the predicament of [under-]development

Whether Africa is underdeveloped, thus dependent or not, all depends on the definition, lenses and means one uses to reach at such a conclusion. So, too, it depends on who is making such an evaluation. Therefore, in evaluating Africa's underdevelopment, one can get many different answers depending on what is included or excluded in the evaluation. Arguably, the question whether Africa is truly underdeveloped or not is more a dichotomous matter—that needs us to look at both sides of the coin—instead of wholesomely making such a wanting conclusion. For those who maintain that Africa is comparatively underdeveloped know the reason[s] among which is the one that Rodney (1972) maintains that it is exploitation, but not evolution (p.77). Indeed, Africa was made poor—something that has pointlessly gone on up till now—so as to be deemed as underdeveloped.

However, when we critically and honestly interrogate the components, criteria and true meaning of development based on human basic needs (Maslow 1943, and Burton 1990), sometimes, we

see very different realities (Yang 2002) that need to affect our conclusions and answers altogether. For, despite sharing needs, human beings have diverse needs all depending on their cultures, time, priorities and above all choices. Even the way they make sense of things is totally different. For example, one of the basic human needs is security. Despite security being a self-explanatory concept, when it comes to how to achieve it, culture plays a very important role. We achieve and understand security differently based on our orientation and assumptions. For example, people from collectivistic societies expect to get the guarantee of their security from the society while for people from the individualistic societies, security is a personal matter as opposed to collectivistic societies in which the same is more societal than personal. Even the way the two perceive security is totally different. This concept of security is invoked in order to show how people from two societies above evaluate security and thus, development, very differently. For the member of hunters in Kalahari Desert in Namibia, security means everything that contributes to the survival of the entire group while in the Western societies, security can be guaranteed by having a gun that an individual purchase. So, while security is the quest for all groups, its realisation is completely different. In a group of hunters or collectivistic society, security depends on interdependence while in the latter it depends on one's independence. Likewise, development can be viewed differently whereby in the former moral attachment, social capital, trust, sharing, connectivity and interdependence are guarantees to development just as they are in the realisation of security.

More so, development, for the former, is more a moral issue while in the former it is a material matter. Therefore, the angle this chapter takes vis-à-vis the underdevelopment of Africa will fundamentally be based on its history and the archaic nature of the international system governing development and the realpolitik of the current world that tend to ally with individualistic culture as opposed to collectivistic culture. Victims of such bias or the so-called underdeveloped countries need to question with all determination the yardstick that is used to define and assess development among others. The need to question the logic of choosing some components

of development while ignoring or excluding others is vital shall we aspire to treat one another deservedly. The dialogue resulting from such questioning and negotiating how the process is conducted will eventually help us to get a fitting definition for whatever concept we apply in the process of ranking countries almost in everything. There is no way Africa and other countries categorised as underdeveloped can get out of the manmade impasse they are in without deconstructing the definitions, rationales and systems by which categories, conclusions and ranks are reached. For development or underdevelopment to make sense, all stakeholders need to be involved in the process by deciding the terms and parameters to be used in analysing and defining what they would all want to call [under]development. We need to know what people know about these two concepts instead of letting Western think-tanks and policymakers decide for all others. As you will see later, I wonder to find that in rating development even materially why untapped resources such as minerals, lakes, rivers, and wildlife are excluded in rating countries in development. This is a material side. Again, it also baffles to find that nonmaterial assets such as cultural richness are excluded in development rating. Rogoff (2003) observes that generally and historically, “development is a cultural process,” (p. 3). Rogoff (Ibid) goes further warning that “human development has been based largely on research and theory coming from middle-class communities in Europe and North America” (p. 4) under the current dominant grand narrative that has undeservedly self-appointed to be the diviner of the modern world.

Although we tend to take the concept of defining things for granted without interrogating them, the definition[s] plays a vital role in conceptualising and thereby getting things rightly or wrongly pinned down. Definition as a concept, dictates how we understand or misunderstand whatever thing or concept that is defined. Therefore, it is crucial to interrogate the definitions we use, who defines what, why and how such a thing or concept is defined so. We need to have a sort of negotiation about the definitions we use without privileging some to do this for others. The definition is a roadmap for us to conceptualise whatever concept we come across. Therefore, before accepting the definition[s] we need to subject it to

some tests to see if it meets and suits what it defines. As well, when we make a claim that Africa is [under-]developed, we must specify in what ways; and how did we reach such a conclusion[s]. It does not make any sense, especially for the victims of the current paradigm of [under-]development, for example, to say that a car or house owner is more developed than the person who owns a herd of 100 cows. Development is like beauty which is always in the eyes of the beholder. It is evaluated based on somebody's needs, understanding and culture. This is why African traditional fishermen view modern trawls as useless—due to causing environmental harms—compared to their canoes. What is viewed as development or advancement and better in the eye of one person can be viewed detrimentally different in the eyes on another.

Furthermore, you can see in the concept of taking care of elderly people between the so-called underdeveloped and developed countries. While it is squarely the duty of their children to look after elderly people in Africa, for example, it is different in the so-called developed countries where elderly people are provided with almost all material amenities minus spiritual or moral ones while in Africa is vice versa. All systems of looking after the elderly person have its, flaws, strength and shortfalls. However, when it comes to assessing which society is doing better than another, the latter is ranked higher than the former. What is evident here is the ignorance of the fact that in the two groups, the former provides less material support though it provides more moral support while in the former it is vice versa. The elderly persons living in an air-conditioned house with all amenities minus visitations or human attachment from her their children are materially better but morally worse. So, too, the elderly persons living in a shack with less material support but with abundant social support are morally better but materially worse. In other words the duo is equal save that in ranking the former is seen as doing better than the latter. The bottom line here is simply that, we need to negotiate these difference based on both aspects of human needs based on the culture, desire, needs and whatnots of the person in question instead of generalising everything as it if the lenses from the culture we use are the identical and analogous.

When it comes to development, the incorporation and inclusion of human needs and understanding of the needs and concepts is essential. A simple example can be drawn from two people namely a doctor who gets much money because of his professionalism and the artist who makes much more money than the doctor especially in the so-called developed world due to his skills. This claim shows how different things can bring material things however when it comes to rating countries, art and culture are excluded. Arguably, there is no way a people can be [under] developed in everything; otherwise such a conclusion is arrived by/through what Escobar (2011) refers to as the ‘colonisation of reality’ in which some representations become dominant; and thereby shape indelibly the way in which reality is imagined and acted upon,” (p. 5). This is where the complexity and relativity of development lies. On this note I propose the inevitable decolonisation of the way the world has been doing things under the current dominant grand narrative in order to do away with the effects of intellectual colonisation and domination. I see the current dominant grand narrative as a culprit for many ills and evils the so-called underdeveloped countries have suffered. He concurs with Rodney (Ibid) arguing that the so-called underdevelopment of Africa is basically historical but not real or evolutionary. There is no way Africa’s former colonial masters could entertain historical factors while they know doing so will expose their ploy that they would like to have internalised by their victims so as to keep on depending on them pointlessly. In others words, we need to ‘decolonise reality’ based on today’s actuality; and the tools we can use *inter alia*, is the decolonisation of education which I argue elsewhere (Mhango 2016) that it is toxic so as to need the process of detoxification. When reality is [mis-]construed depending on hidden agenda by the one representing it, chances are that hegemonic views are likely to dominate others just as it has been the case in defining the [under] development of Africa. It does not make sense to refer a continent with ancient civilisation as underdeveloped while to the contrary young civilisations whose – successes resulted from crimes such as slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism they committed against those they categorise as underdeveloped – are referred to as developed countries. This is developmental injustice that the victims

need to fight. Allowing such tendency whereby development and underdevelopment are defined and rated by the culprit is so detrimental to the so-called underdeveloped countries. It is like allowing a convict to decide what should happen to those he or she offended. The safest way for such a person to be free is to condemn his victims. And all this is possible due to the propaganda machinery colonialism has always put in place to safeguard its interests as opposed to those of others in this othering (Said 1985) practice. As it is in international commerce, the West has always acted as one group against the so-called underdeveloped countries due to this othering tendency championed by neo-liberal policies and neo-colonialism.

In essence, arguably, development or underdevelopment is a relative term. Furthermore, development is supposed to include many aspects such as history, civilisation, culture, aspirations and achievements in many areas. It does not make any sense, for example, to say that the United States of America (USA) is more developed than Egypt, Sudan or Zimbabwe whose civilisations are older than the USA itself as a country. Development is supposed to be dichotomous, linear and perpendicular by nature in order to accommodate various variables of human society. And the job of defining development is supposed to be inclusive by nature whereby all stakeholders should negotiate and agree upon which definition to be used based on their understanding, culture, mores, needs, and intentions. For example, while South Africa under former Apartheid regime was viewed as economically and technologically more advanced than its neighbours such as Zambia, the latter was more advanced as struggles for liberation and human rights were concerned. Again, the West that supported such criminal regime ignored such aspects simply because it had the wherewithal to define the duo based on its alliance and interests. To achieve this, we can apply Self-determination Theory (SDT) which Deci and Ryan (2000) define as “an understanding of human motivation requires a consideration of innate psychological needs for competence, autonomy, and relatedness” (p. 227). As you can see, relationship and autonomy appear in tandem. Therefore, in defining and making sense of development, we need to accommodate this natural human drive

towards self-preservation in their environment. Deci and Ryan (Ibid) make a good observation by emphasising psychological human needs as opposed to physiological ones to indicate how psychological needs are more prominent to the human. Whether this is true or not, depends on how one looks at these two aspects of needs namely psychological and physiological. So, too, it depends on the culture one is coming from. This is obvious that we are talking of qualitative or more inner needs than outer needs. We are talking of nonmaterial as opposed to material human drive all based on one's choice and motivation of doing so.

There can be development in different aspects and areas vis-à-vis a particular country or society. Therefore, it misleads to make generalisations as far as development is concerned as is currently the case whereby some countries that are well off materially are deemed developed even when they are poor in moral and nonmaterial aspects as I will further indicate. Sometimes, you wonder to find a country with many suicides or death resulting from obesity in the high ranks in development! Before putting such a country in high ranks of development, we need to know what is causing such a trait. To add insult to injury some of these countries are rich economically. Again, when it comes to rating the levels of development, malnutrition is considered while obesity—that results from overfeeding—is not. What is the consequence of the two? I would argue that countries with the absence of suicidal traits should be viewed as doing better than those grappling with the phenomenon even if these countries are economically poor. For, however developed countries boast of having advanced medical services, developed countries facing suicidal problem need to think twice due to the fact that suicide is mental health matter that many poor countries do not have. Their culture that prevents suicide is their asset just like any other material assets like money and medication.

Economic development should also accommodate justice development. For example, currently, South Africa is viewed as an economic highly developed country in Africa. However, the same South Africa has a big gap between the haves and the have-nots compared to Zimbabwe. What makes South Africa underdeveloped as far as human equality and economic justice are concerned is the

fact that the enjoyment of its natural resources revolves around colour whereby the majority indigenous South Africans are poorer than their white minority counterparts. May and Govender (1998) note that poverty is not confined to any one race group, but is concentrated among blacks, particularly Africans: 61% of Africans and 38% of Coloureds are poor, compared with 5% of Indians and 1% of White (p. 2-3). The situation is the same in the so-called most advanced nation on earth the United States (US) at the same period where systemic bigotry is on the rise thanks to having rigid and archaic system of apartheid. Dlakar and Neifeh (1997) note with concern that the poverty rate for Blacks in 1999 was still about three times the poverty rate for White non-Hispanics. In terms of economic development, there are some countries which are materially developed but morally underdeveloped or morally decayed. In addressing the dichotomous nature of development, Weingast (1995) observes the paradoxical nature of the government arguing that the same governments might be strong in protecting economic rights of its people. Yet, the same may be strong in confiscating properties from their citizens (p. 1). This is the nature of many governments in the world that are built on Western philosophy. You can see this in the 2007 US credit crunch when the government spent public money in bailing out lossmaking private companies despite opposition from the citizens who ended up becoming losers simply because the government used its muscles to rob them. Bailout is nothing but corruption based on capitalistic cronyism. Rosas (2006: 175) observes that “the hefty costs shouldered by taxpayers and the obvious moral hazard incentives that accompany bank bailouts make it important to understand the conditions under which politicians rescue banks, whereby corporates reciprocate by sponsoring politicians during the campaigns. This has been going on for many years. Again, when it comes to defining corruption by countries or government, the so-called developed countries are not blamed for such a vice. The reason is obvious that they are the ones who dictate the terms and definition of the vice. Therefore, they play holier than thou as it has been since neoliberal policies swamped the world. In whatever aspect of social science, it is wrong to generally categorise countries as developed or otherwise by excluding or ignoring some

other vital aspects such as the effects of whatever categorisation on human wellbeing. Human beings are not like machines which need only repair and supply of energy such as electricity or gas. Instead, humans naturally and equally need more than material needs. What differs is the degree of appreciating such things. For example, collectivistic societies of which many are found countries ranked as underdeveloped put more premiums on moral things than the individualistic societies whose premium is more on material things than moral ones. Wong and Aaron (1998) argue that such societies are not homogenous in that cultures are not homogenous. Thus, individuals from such societies present a very different self-conception depending on independence and interdependence (p. 426). Such an argument can show how two different societies namely collectivistic and individualistic conceptualise development. For example, for individualistic societies, freedom and security depend on the power an individual has in consumption while the latter freedom is not as important as interdependence. So, too, in an individualistic society, personal freedom and security has more importance than in the collectivistic society in which the freedom and security of the person depend on other members of the society. Therefore, it holds water to argue that in defining and rating development such differences need to be reconciled instead of allowing one society to define everything to its advantage which is the detriment to the other.

To well provide humans both material and moral aspects need to be accommodated in formulating the definition or categories of advancement, development and underdevelopment. Luck and d'Inverno (2001) note that "an object comprises a set of actions and a set of attribute" (p. 12) which factors every definition has to abide with; and thereby accommodates in order to avoid biases. Arguably, in defining anything, this must be a general rule without any exception. For example, you cannot define the behaviour of the governments that act controversially as indicated above lineally or vertically only without interweaving all aspects of its behaviours in order to come up with a balanced and inclusive definition. Such a take invites us to interrogate the development of the developed world

and the underdevelopment of underdeveloped countries critically and equally.

You can take a leaf from Africa. While Western countries have almost everything any human needs, the situation is contrary in many African countries. As well, when it comes to, for example, the prevalence of happiness, the so-called underdeveloped countries outshine the so-called developed countries. According to the BBC (13 July 2006), “the Pacific island nation of Vanuatu is the happiest place on earth, according to a new ‘happy planet index.’” The BBC went on noting that while Vanuatu claimed the leading in happiness, the UK was languishing in 108th place, below Libya, Iran, and Palestine. Given that humans need and seek materials in order to live happily, how come such an aspect is excluded from evaluating the development of any country? We are talking of happiness. There are many more things to talk about that must be included in defining and evaluating the level of [under] development of any country. For example, why should those define development or otherwise consider the peaceability of countries of the world so as to discourage wars resulting from struggle for controlling resources in poor countries in which governments and warlords seek the opportunity to supply the resources to the West and other rich countries in order to become rich quickly? Researchers found that the causes-cum-secrets behind Vanuatu’s happiness were rooted on the culture of the people based on harmonious coexistence and interdependence things that lack in the so-called developed countries. Vanuatu’s lead turns Western misleading assumption that happiness is about making choice based on economic muscles (Sen 1995) to its head. Even in development, people have different priorities. For example, while individualistic-cum-materialistic Western countries consider material wellbeing, some countries, especially collectivistic prioritize moral wellbeing before material wellbeing. It baffles to note that a country like the US—with such cities and communities sharply segregated along races—to feature high in the list of the so-called developed countries.

We need to consider non-material things in the logic of development definition due to the fact that African countries cannot compete economically under the current regime of economies in

which rich Western countries created an exploitative system that only benefits and serves them. Apart from this, African traditional economy was butchered when neoliberal policies became the policies of the world championed by the so-called International Financial Institutions (IFIs). How can we expect Africa to provide sound health services while its Traditional Medicinal Knowledge (TMK) was butchered and replaced by Western one? African depends on medicines from abroad after losing its own. The consequences of this can be seen in the so-called modern life whereby Africans are dying of obesity—which seriously affects life expectancy—resulting from bad habits they copied from Western countries. Refer to the coming of MacDonald and other fast foods. Traditionally, Africans would not become obese due to the fact that their lifestyle was itself a cure. Caballero (2005) argues that “the high energy demands of manual labour and daily-survival activities make it difficult for people to achieve a net positive energy balance and therefore to gain weight” (p.1514). Again, the situation has now changed dramatically after African ways of life were destroyed. Caballero (Ibid) observes that:

In more urbanised developing countries with a higher GNP, food scarcity may no longer be the driving factor behind energy intake. Instead, the availability of cheap, energy-dense foods (including those from street vendors and fast-food restaurants) may facilitate the consumption of more calories.

The floods of cheap and fast food are not an accident. As indicated above, Western companies such as MacDonald, Subway, KFC, Chicken Chef and many more are now making inroads to Africa to make quick bucks at the expense of Africans. Thanks to corruption, dependence by African leaders and intellectual domination by the West, despite knowing the danger of fast foods, nothing is done. Many Africans are blindly taking fast food and Western lifestyles as modernity while it actually is not, but poison. The danger of this trend is even higher than anybody can expect due to the fact that Africa has—ever since the introduction of cultural and political colonialism—always copied from the West. Due to this toxic and exploitative relationship, Africa has never produced anything the

West could copy. Ironically, such is the same that rate world countries in development. Do you think can there be anything good from Africa apart from its resources and consumption market?

The example given above can clearly show how many terms we use tend to be controversial and wanting. Considering this fact, therefore, I may argue that Africa's underdevelopment is an inflicted-cum-self-inflicted wound due to the fact that Africa allowed others to define it; and in so doing, there are many crucial factors on human development seem to be—either purposely or out of ignorant—left out in the definition of [under] development. Allowing Africa the development of Africa to be defined by others offers an opportunity for them to ignore many important aspects that are supposed to be included in the definition of development. Sometimes, I wonder to find that a dazzlingly multicultural society like Africa to be referred to as under or undeveloped. Essentially, this is what colonialism and hegemony are all about. What do you expect when you play in your enemies hands expecting her or him to [re]define you? It has never made any sense for me as a thinker to concur with those who draw a propagandist conclusion that Africa is poor and underdeveloped. How if Africa sits on hugely vast resources? Again, when you allow somebody else to define you, he or she will define you according to his interests, terms and wishes. Achebe (2000 cited in Mhango-coming volume) puts it that “until the lions [prey] produce their own historian, the story of the hunt will glorify only the hunter” (p.73). It is sacrilegiously scandalous for Africans to keep on believing that their continent is poor and underdeveloped after over fifty years of shedding colonial chains. You do not need to be an economist to note that Africa has always been mistreated almost in every sphere in order to be easily exploited due to its disunity and divisions as the colonial masters superimposed; and thereby reinforced them so as to be internalised by Africans either through ignorance or manipulation carried out by their own governments run by their own people. Before concurring with any definition we need to ask many questions such as what is the definition all about, what agreed-upon criteria have been used and why. Being at home with being defined by somebody else is as good as committing suicide. It is the only dog and other pets that allow human to define them but not humans.

As argued above, Africa suffers from a twofold cause of what is defined as underdevelopment in which there are some external and internal factors leading to a misleadingly generalised conclusion that Africa is underdeveloped. Thus, it is our aim to address both causes namely external and internal ones. Englebert (2000a, 2000b cited in Nunn 2007) observes that “imposed post-colonial institutions explain a significant proportion of the underdevelopment of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa” (p. 2). This is why the fact that there are some inadequacies that are arbitrarily applied on defining Africa based on the imposition makes more sense. It is true; especially if we underscore the fact that Africa’s successes and failures have always been defined by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) among others imperialistic tools of reinforcing modern imperialism (Mamdani 1996: 10). Instead of drawing the conclusion on whether Africa is truly poor and underdeveloped or not, we need to underscore the causes and reasons of such a predicament-cum-impasse. Everything that happens must have the reason[s]. As argued above that development is a relative term. So, too, the causes of Africa’s predicaments are relative in that some are internal while others are external. Henceforth, it is our duty to trace the causes of Africa’s underdevelopment even though the said underdevelopment is controversial. This take is important one as it is aimed at avoiding romanticising everything the West has produced as it has been for the so-called modernism as opposed to the traditionalism that has always been romanticised as a magic bullet even where it is a stumbling block. There is some underdevelopment and development under whatever lens is used just like in any mortal society. Importantly, we need to consider such causes of poverty, thus underdevelopment in real terms but not on factious ones whereby other crucial aspects of the society—that would hugely contribute in defining true development; and thus true ranking—are ignored or purposely excluded. Bertocchi and Canova (2002) note that despite the elimination of “colonial drain,” ex-colonies kept on paying for the consequences of their history even after gaining independence (p.1854). In other words, it does not make any sense to rate any victim country in development without considering the

consequences of its history in the first place. So, too, for whoever that wants to appropriately address the underdevelopment of Africa, must first and foremost address this external factor based on historical and current concocted realities as far as relationship between Africa and its former colonial masters is concerned especially on defining development. This is crucial due to the fact that many so-called developed countries got their development by robbing the so-called underdeveloped and poor countries. Essentially, it takes two to tango. The question we need to ask ourselves is: What has Africa done; and still does to do away with such suffering from historical consequences? As urged above, the first and foremost suitable step out of this impasse is for Africa to define itself instead of allowing its exploiters and enemies to define it as it has been since the introduction of colonialism. Furthermore, Africa needs to ask its former colonial masters to open their closets full of skeletons resulting from the crimes against humanity that they committed to Africa through colonialism and slavery. This is important given that the same culprits—instead of being brought to justice of whatever form under international laws—have been given another opportunity to get away with murder by setting terms of defining who is developed and who is underdeveloped. Africa needs to get its ducks in a row very; very well shall it aspire to get out of the quagmire it is wantonly in.

What makes Africa's situation impossibly untenable is the fact that the "globe north" has always sought to impose their formula of development; and make Africa believe it can attain it without underscoring historical realities of Western development. Many thinkers espouse for Africa to follow the same pattern and pathway to development while the real situation on the ground says differently. For example, some thinkers have proposed for Africa to follow the so-called stages of development namely the traditional society, preconditions for take-off, take-off, the drive to maturity and the age of high mass-consumption (Rostow 1990:4) without underscoring the fact that many so-called developed countries accumulate the capital by colonising and robbing others. To show how misguidedly this chicanery is, Lipietz (1987:2) insultingly compared the so-called underdevelopment to children to adults (the

so-called developed countries representing adults). As argued above, how do you equate countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan or Zimbabwe to children while they are the oldest civilisations on earth? As indicated above, the final stage of development is the age of high mass-consumption. How can Africa develop by highly consuming massively while all it consumes comes from abroad? I would argue that we need to industrialise based on our home needs before thinking about mass-consumption. Even lions in the wild consume massively due to the fact that there is massive preys to consume. Telling Africa that it needs to highly consume massively without producing what it produces is as dangerous as telling the lions to massively consume goats or cows. Where will they get the cows without being in conflict with humans?

As if it is not enough, almost all prophets of copycat development preach production as the first means to achieving development. Well, Africa has never stopped producing. However, despite producing sufficiently, it has always been robbed ever since colonialism where produces were stolen up to neo-colonialism in which prices are fixed not to mention conditions attached to the trade regime at the time. The aim of production is to accumulate capital. Again, how can Africa accumulate capital under exploitative international trade regime?

As argued above, there cannot be any notable development for Africa:

- a) By following Western pathway and formula;
- b) Without deconstructing, restructuring and reconstituting the current international trade regime which is exploitative and racist by all standards;
- c) Without reinvesting in profitable areas such as stopping producing for the external market without addressing home needs. For example, former-colonial masters duped African countries making them believe that through producing the so-called cash crops namely crops that African countries do not consume, they would accumulate much money. Such a ruse ended up destroying Africa economically even more. For, due to the fact that African countries do not consume the so-called cash crops, consumers in the West

decided how much they must pay while the producers have no say in price setting.

Mhango (2016) calls cash crops “crash crops” due to the fact that they have never ushered development in except crashing the economies of African countries.

Accumulating capital is not a bad idea save that it becomes bad when you tell a continent to do the same the way the West did. There are no more countries or world to conquer, colonise and rob currently. This would make sense of the countries that robbed Africa would be forced to redress it and then talk about capital accumulation. I do not think African countries can currently accumulate as big capital as Britain or France did when they colonised Africa. Even the hype-touted countries in Asia tigers namely Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan did not make it through without being given money by the same countries that looted Africa. We can, therefore, say that one of the major capital accumulation means for countries to develop is the capital that former colonial masters robbed Africa. There is need for those countries that robbed Africa to pay reparation.

Furthermore, Africa needs to cultivate a culture of self-reliance and self-valuing to also include self-defining. Mhango (2016) underscores the importance of reunifying Africa at “the tune of how it was before 1884” when it was partitioned at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 (p.307). Arguably, without reuniting Africa, there is no way Africa can make any headways without being frustrated and sabotaged by the current colonial-created superstructure in whatever form be it IFIs or unequal cooperation. It becomes hard to understand how Africa can get out of the impasse it is in without doing some things such as the reunification and thereby having the same policies and strategies as a single and united front facing the same enemies and problems altogether. Such anathema-cum-anomaly—that Africa has always faced—interweave external and internal causes so as to work together in making Africa what it is today whether you term it as underdeveloped or arrested developmental wise. Sometimes, it becomes hard to separated external and internal causes of Africa’s ‘underdevelopment’ due to the fact that the two forces reinforce each other purposely or

accidentally. For the sake of clarity, this chapter discusses such factors separately. It is like ketchup in which is difficult to separate eggs from mushrooms, oysters, mussels, walnuts, or other foods that make ketchup what it is.

Chauvinistic development

No doubts that some of Africa's quandaries resulting to the so-called its underdevelopment can, *inter alia*, be divided into two categories. The first causes can be attributed to colonial legacies almost in all spheres namely economic, political and social in which Africa is culturally, geographically, historically and racially discriminated against so as to be easily exploited (Mhango 2015). Since 1884 when Africa was divided into small and weak states, its traditional economic became extinct. Africans who used to live in collectivistic society were exposed to individualistic ways of life whereby every new country created in at the Berlin Conference 1884 started to act alone. And whenever such a country needed partners in whatever encounter, it looked at its colonial masters but not neighbours and sister states. You can see this in the economic and political models African countries employed after acquiring freedoms. All African countries were divided into two camps namely the West or East camp which were at what was later known as the Cold War. Even after the end of the cold war, Africa is not out of woods yet. Dunning (2004) argues that "The end of the Cold War could make threats to withhold development assistance to African states more credible" (p.412); thus, Africa seems to suffer even more economic and political setbacks under the unipolarity that it was under the cold war period in which the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and China used to support some countries in deterring the influence of the West that supported countries on its fold and vice versa, currently, such aid is no more however hazardous they were. Goldsmith (2001) refers this as a 'moral hazard' especially when he deals with how aid has cost Africa greatly. Presently, Africa is under multiparty democracy that its former colonial masters superimposed on it. Economically, Africa's economy has always depended on Western countries in the

relationship in which Africa plays the role of natural material supplier and consumer of processed goods from the same countries it supplies its natural or unprocessed resources. To make matter worse, China and Russia that used to support some African countries simply because they were in their camps, are now scrambling Africa with the West all aimed at going on enjoying its cheap resources.

As argued above, despite Africa playing the role of raw material supplier and processed goods consumer, is it really underdeveloped or poor? How so with such abundant resources? Why those defining development do not include untapped resources or vibrant culture that Africa boasts of having? For, development or underdevelopment is the product of socio-economic and political culture of the people or society. Porter (2000) observes that “economic geography in an era of global competition involves a paradox. It is widely recognised that changes in technology and competition have diminished many of the traditional roles of location” (p. 15). This means that traditional roles that have been felled by global competition based on hegemonic neoliberal policies guarantees the exclusion of such roles in defining development. Such a take is obvious in that development is mainly defined based on geographic locations in that the West is seen as more developed than the East. This take is not empirical due to the arguments above but socially constructed as it is aimed at reinforcing hegemony and colonial understanding as realities while they actually are not. For, if you look at the so-called Western countries you find that some are in north others in West. To get away with murder, such countries are either defined under the axis of North-South or West-East if not the First, Second and Third worlds. There cannot permanently be first, second and third world in everything. Somebody can be first in something while another can be second or third and vice versa but not orthodoxly first or last as it is currently.

Wake-up call for Africa!

This section is intended to act as a wakeup call for African countries to wise up and take their destiny in their hands by becoming self-reliant as they divorce the tendency of dependency as far as real

and true development is concerned. The first step for Africa to do away with being labelled as underdeveloped continent must start with cultivating the culture of intellectual self-defining as opposed to allowing others to define Africa. Thereafter, Africa needs to question and interrogate whatever definition those defining it propounded either about Africa or about world issues. Therefore, this section intends to put a finger on the crux of the matter. Since attaining their political independence, over fifty years ago, African countries have pointlessly over and above believed in and lived on aid that rich countries—mostly Western—have extended to them. Most of the African countries have their budgets, elections and other development projects—apart from being defined by the outsiders based on their criteria and targets—always been supported by these countries. To begin with we need to interrogate if the aid does help economies to grow in economic terms (Rajan and Subramanian 2008: 643) in order to gauge if the economies of African countries have grown due to receiving aid or what is likely to keep on happening if the manner and trend of offering aid to these countries continues. This is important in order to show how the so-called development may, sometimes, be elusive for such countries especially when emphasis is put on material things; and thereby ignore nonmaterial things such as culture, morality and the environment. I do not think that countries renowned for polluting the earth are truly developed compared to those that do not pollute in addressing this development paradigm, knowing what will happen will help African countries to start thinking about the less travelled way out of their predicaments. Lensink and Morrissey (2000) invoke endogenous theory to show how aid has never brought any development to African countries saying that it even affect growth determinant even on investment (p.1). This is obvious due to the fact that even when it comes to assessing, defining and gaging—if there is growth or not—the same donors have an upper hand vis-à-vis the modalities of research and the results obtained thereof. You can see this truth on the connection between aid and corruption. Mathiason (2005) and Blanchflower (2008) cited in MacGinty and Williams (2009) note with concern that in the year 2007 worldwide overseas development assistance was \$103 billion whose big chunk ended up being paid to Western

consultants (p.14). Again, how much does Africa lose in such corruption spearheaded by Western companies? Ribadu (2009) answers the above question noting that The African Union (AU) has reported that corruption drains the region of some \$140 billion a year, which is about 25% of the continent's official GDP (p.2). Ironically, despite such corporations being sponsored by Western countries being involved in such mega corruption, they and their countries are not declared as corrupt. It takes two to tango. Here we are talking about Western corporations. What of African venal rulers such as Joseph Mobutu (former Zaire now the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Sani Abacha (Nigeria) and Omar Bongo (Gabon) among others? Wrong (2005) discloses that:

In 1999, the Economist estimated that African leaders had stowed \$20bn in Swiss bank accounts. Investigations in Kenya after President Daniel arap Moi left office indicated that, at the very least, \$1bn had been sent overseas by former officials. University of Massachusetts researchers have estimated that from 1970 to 1996, capital flight from 30 sub-Saharan countries totalled \$187bn, outstripping those same nations' external debt.

It is obvious that countries whose rulers involved in this mega theft were categorised as underdeveloped due to being pauperised. Who is holding, for example, Switzerland whose economy is openly known to have advanced and grown based on looted monies from the so-called underdeveloped countries? Ironically, despite being the accessory to the crime, you will hear the same Switzerland offering aid to Africa. Actually, what many Western countries offer to Africa as aid is but the surplus resulting from robbing Africa either, as indicated above through bogus consultancy or syphoning raw materials. Despite such criminality, Switzerland is defined as a highly developed country. This is because the moral aspect that ties it to robbery is excluded in defining development.

Additionally, The Global Policy (12 December, 2013) notes that:

Robert Pollin, an economist at the University of Massachusetts, estimates that developing countries have lost

roughly \$480 billion in potential GDP as a result of structural adjustment. Yet, Western corporations have benefitted tremendously. It has forced open vast new consumer markets; it has made it easier to access cheap labour and raw materials; it has opened up avenues for capital flight and tax avoidance; it has created a lucrative market in foreign debt; and it has facilitated a massive transfer of public resources into private hands (the World Bank alone has privatised more than \$2 trillion worth of assets in developing countries).

Due to material drive and the exclusion of moral and cultural aspects in defining and rating countries in development, such figures above are not addressed. You can see how such huge amounts of money stolen from Africa are not considered in categorising or rating countries vis-a-vis development or underdevelopment. I cannot understand the rationale behind such ignorance and exclusionary tactics the West has always applied on Africa almost in everything sensible and meaningful are concerned. What is clear is the fact that Western countries are maltreating Africa in order to make Africans internalise such anomaly so as to subscribe to the belief that they cannot live without depending on aid.

Essentially, what is reported, in the main, depends on how donor countries want it which in many case favour their verdict even if it is wrong. Hyden (1980) provides an answer that when it comes to defining development and underdevelopment, Western countries—apart from having an upper hand—are privileged; because they are the birthplace of the school of thought that dominates official debate about the issue in question, namely [under-]development (p.1). Whether aid is a causal force behind growth to African economies is subject to discussion. There are arguments that when it comes to [under-]development at an individual country level, the case is always differently positive and negative depending on how the country abides with the conditions donor countries stipulate. Dollar and Easterly (1999) note that “getting down to individual countries, a 1996 report on Uganda argued any aid reduction ‘could be harmful for medium-term growth in Uganda, which requires external inflows...” (p.4). However, if we consider how Uganda at the time

report was issued was the darling of the West, chances that such findings were aimed at showing how donor money has performed its miracles to the country. Oloka-Onyango (2004) tells why Uganda in the cited report seems to be an exception to the general rule noting that “The United States counts Uganda among its closest allies in the GLR” (p.8). The US does not fail their ally in anything be it legal or illegal, acceptable or unacceptable. So, sometimes, the so called development or underdevelopment depends on the personality instead of the actuality. Oloka-Onyango goes on lucubrating on how Museveni was able to garner leverage from Western bigwigs due to maintaining close ties “from Margaret Thatcher through John Major and up to Tony Blair” (Ibid). More on why Museveni became a shining star can be found in Hauser (1999) who argues that “In Uganda, a high level of donor support for the Museveni government has been compatible with the Ugandan government’s reluctance to introduce multiparty democracy. Donors have opted for ‘dialogue’ rather than coercive methods” (p. 621). Try to compare this with what happened when Gaddafi decided to become a good boy of the West and what transpired after he did the opposite that led to his toppling and later demise. Put in mind; the US—that leads the West in this business of safeguarding their interests in Africa—has neither a permanent friend nor a permanent foe except permanent interests. Easterly (2009) notes that development goals are unfair to Africa due to the strings attached to aid that Africa receives.

In addressing the major question, we will, *inter alia*, explore the conditions or strings attached to aid and the role it plays in realising development in Africa, we must explore what donors expect to get out the aid extended to African countries; and above all, how the aid is used. Examining the nature, role and intentions of aid becomes important due to the fact that almost every powerful country has interests in Africa while Africa does not have any interests in these countries. Under such unequal relationship devoid of inequitable reciprocity, the outcomes are obvious that whoever complies with the conditions of aid will be deemed successful however temporarily as it was in the case of Uganda. When it comes to having interests to be protected in Africa for foreign non-African countries, it goes without saying, the West is not alone. Currently, China and India are

seeking leverage in Africa, all aimed at safeguarding their interests too at the detriments of Africa. To do so, the duo are extending aid in order to gain leverage by winning hearts and minds of African rulers who are the only ones who decide who should have sphere of influence on them or not. This is why we call this “the second scramble for Africa” after the first that ushered in colonial rule in Africa. Our assumption is that if there is no equal and equitable reciprocity, chances are that the donors are likely to benefit while the recipients lose in the name of aid as it has been the case for Africa. Current example of how aid has never benefitted Africa can be drawn from Tanzania, among many other African countries. After suffering for a long time in the hands of donors, Tanzania’s Government recently urged its people to end donor dependence. This happened when the Millennium Challenge Corporate (MCC) cancelled aid. The Reuters (March 29, 2016) reported that “Tanzania won a five-year package of grants in 2008 worth \$698 million from MCC, an independent U.S. government foreign aid agency, but the award of a second round of grants has now been shelved.”

Although we do not condone election fraud that Tanzania is accused of to have occurred in Zanzibar, essentially, what Tanzanian government thought it was aid from the Millennium challenge Corporate (MCC), an independent U.S Government foreign aid agency, seems to have been more verbal than practical just like the project that gave birth to all this namely, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGS) which Pronk (2003) says they are not global and they have become “vague or unbalanced” (p. 3) to show how such inducements can work on the favour of donors even when their terms are not clearly stated or promises kept.

We can argue that donor community wanted to use such inducement to have sort of unchecked powers to control Tanzania something that is replicated almost in all Africa countries. For the country that produced tanzanite, gold, and other precious minerals in tonnes, what is \$698 million if it manages its resources well? Tanzania—that was slammed with such a denial of already promised aid—produces natural gas; and it is the home of Lake Victoria, the largest national park Serengeti and many more among resources that the country is endowed with. Yet, in categorising and defining

economic development of the country, such economic bases are ignored or left out of the equation. The Guardian (April 1, 2016) quoted Tanzanian president John Pombe Magufuli as saying, “We have to stand on our own [...] Tanzania will persevere,” after the MCC denied his country the monies. If this was not out of anger, many African leaders need to think this way so that they can responsibly and creatively thwart such dependency in order to pull their countries out of wanton dependency and beggarliness and thereby define their levels of development based on their own criteria. Ironically, when donor countries default on their promises no punitive measures are taken against them simply because ‘blessed is the hand that giveth than the one that taketh’ one may argue. So, too, recipients have no authority to question their donors which emanates from colonial legacy. Africa needs to radically and systematically change this anomaly-cum-anathema. More fundamentally, Africa, if indeed wants to become free and prosperous, needs to think out of aid-dependency box; and stop living on handouts while it is sitting on immense untapped resources. One would wonder why such huge reserves of minerals and resources are not included in the formula of rating development. Yes, it baffles to find a country that has no resources such as Switzerland—whose economy, *inter alia*, depends on stolen money—to be ranked higher in development than countries like the DRC with all huge land mass and resources.

Besides defaulting, donors apply various ruses to dupe poor countries. An ideal example is the whole project known as the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) that the World Bank (WB) initiated in 1996 aimed at cancelling debts for some highly indebted countries of which many are in Africa. If you look at HIPC’s *modus operandi*, you find that it was more a hoax if not a ruse to pull poor countries in more debts than a serious commitment to alleviate or fight poverty in poor countries. Cohen (2001) notes that:

Present value calculations, however, do not scale down the service of the debt by the probability that it will be honoured, nor (which almost amounts to the same thing) by the likelihood that the debt will have to be refinanced (either through new loans, explicitly rescheduling or arrears) (p. 9).

Is there any relief that the cancelling of debt brought to African countries? How many countries were pulled out of poverty; thus, out of underdevelopment? Moyo (2009) notes that death cancellation by adding more debts—not to mention serving the debts—creates; and thereby perpetuates vicious-debt circle for Africa (p. 16). Such a situation has over and above enhanced corruption and visionless regimes that have ruled Africa for a long time. What do you expect when you sink millions of dollar in such a hole? The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) under Mobutu's kleptocratic regime provides an ideal example of how debts become a burden to many African countries. This does not mean that donor countries do not know this danger. Theirs has always been the rip off of poor countries provided that there are guarantees that such countries will pay in the future. Reno (1997 cited in Wright 2008) observes that Mobutu's regime in the former Zaire fell from 17.5% of government spending in 1972 to 2% in 1990, and agricultural spending (mostly subsidies) fell from over 40% of the budget to 11% in 1990. Meanwhile, during that time, the president's share of the budget increased from 30% to 95% (p.974). While Zaire was cascading to poverty hence underdevelopment, the countries that conspired with Mobutu to rob Zaire were rated as developed. Had moral aspect being included in the elements used to rate countries development – it is obvious –such countries would not feature high in development. What such blind rating does is like rating a thug as a richest person on earth without underscoring the fact that the wealth the said thugs purports to own belongs to others. As argued above, countries such as Switzerland and other heavens for illicit money are not supposed to be rated without incorporating moral aspect in the whole process. This is the argument Africa and the so-called underdeveloped countries should rise in order to partake of the process of analysing and rating development.

Conclusion

Suffice it to say, whether Africa is underdeveloped or otherwise is like a myth that needs to be troubled and demystified especially for the Africans whose role in reaching such a conclusion is amiss. As

indicated in this discourse, nothing makes many—especially those who do not subscribe to such a conclusion—is the fact that many criteria used to define development are wanting. So, too, those who appointed such criteria have ignored so many more important elements that would make sense had they been considered in reaching the conclusion. Therefore, the demystification of the said myth is looming and crucial to be done in order to get a fitting definition resulting from a dialogue on what should be excluded and what should be included and why. And there is nobody who can do this job except African academics who need to address the matter academically and courageously. To do away from being referred to as an underdeveloped continent, Africa needs to face those defining and ranking it to have a say in the process so as to be part of it. Africa is inhabited by humans not animals. Therefore, it is an insult to keep on defining Africa as if Africans cannot propound their own definition of whatever they are part of. I can say that at this point and time Africa needs to reorganise itself to see to it that it changes the way it has been doing things after the results proved that the ground is tilted and things have never worked to its favour. Suppose Africa redefines its economy model based on its needs by producing what it can locally consume before embarking on producing for the external market. It is obvious that Africa is not as technologically developed as Europe is. Again, still heavily depends on agriculture for consumption and for export which takes a big chunk of Africa's agro-outputs. Given that Africa has never had any say in price setting, it needs to produce what it can have a say on and consume altogether first. Many farmers produce cash crops to end up spending a little money they get on purchasing foods of which some are pointlessly imported.

Furthermore, Africa needs to markedly stop trusting whoever comes to it with whatever from definition to models of production or economy. For, “despite nearly two decades of reforms, much of Africa remains impoverished” (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999 vii) thus, Africa effectively needs to come up with its own economic model and policies in order to get out of elusive and manmade underdevelopment as defined by the West. We can say that, to begin with, we now know where the confusion-cum-problem of rating

Africa as underdeveloped emanates. It is upon the victims to see things in their true colours so that they can urgently and quickly do something about it. Complaining is our right. Again, it is not the pretext of staying side and look as if we are not victims who have been negatively affected for over five decades. The way towards really and sustainable development lies on Africa's awakening to see to it that it takes its destiny into its hands. And doing so is nowhere except in taking charge of defining the terms of whatever Africa is part of. That is it!

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Pillage, Plunder and Migration in Africa: On the Expatriation of Riches and Remittances

Munyaradzi Mawere & Gertjan van Stam

An introduction to a protracted defilement of Africa

The development of Europe, and subsequently other countries in the region now being described as the Global North, has been aided by an unabated extradition of resources from the African continent. There are six distinct phases in the interaction of Africans with dominating foreigners from the North (Sabela Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013):

- Post-1492, a date set as a start of the modern world-system and its shifting international orders, with Africans being abducted, transported and sold as human commodities, in the age of slavery;
- Post-1648, after the conceptualisation of the nation-state, set in the Westphalian peace agreements, and the subjection of African areas to foreign rule, in the age of colonialism;
- Post-1884–1985, after the scrambling and constituting at the Berlin conference, with institutionalisation of African lands according to foreign concepts through academic and missionary conquest;
- Post-1945, subjecting the international community to the normative interactions within the United Nations, in the age of neo-liberation, capitalism;
- Post-1989, after the German Wall fell, and the Cold War ended, in the age of globalisation;
- Theneo-liberal dispensation and post 9/11 anti-terrorism in the age of securitisation.

On top of these six distinct periods of Africa-North interaction, we add the seventh one, namely, super-colonialism.

It must be noted that all these ‘turn of events’ happened outside of Africa, without any constituting role for Africans, worse still without seeking their ‘voice’. This makes it crystal clear that all these turn of events were meant to ensure subjugation and domination of the African people. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (Ibid) recognises a continuous resistance of these subsequent forms of domination, but deduces that “while Africans have actively contested Euro–North American hegemony throughout these periods, they have not yet succeeded in breaking the strong global technologies of coloniality that continue to prevent the possibilities of African agency” (p. 331). Therefore, he urges that, there is a need for a “deepening [of] the decolonisation and deimperialisation of the international order in the twenty-first century” (ibid) if Africa is to wean itself from the prejudices of the North.

The pillage of human capital of value and strength from Africa took its initial shape in the form of slavery. The unprecedented wave of plunder and preying of natural resources followed suit. During the so-called colonial era (from the 16th century to the mid-20th century), initial mercantilism turned into outright ravaging. With Africa carved up at the Berlin Conference; France, England, Germany, Italy and King Leopold strove to put their marks on the continent firmly. They enforced Western-centric strictures to structure governance, finance, medicine, culture, religion, and education. Colonial administrations assured the former and the latter were guided by a mixed religion, education, and racist theology (du Toit, 2000).

After the ushering in of independences of African nation-states, colonial behaviour continued, only that it shifted its goal posts. Imperious meddling of nation states continued, but coloniality was extended by collusion and influence of international organisations. International unions, like the European Union, were ominously influenced by colonial joggling and jiggling. Mirjam van Reisen (2009: xx), for instance, describes how President Gaulle actively blocked England’s entry in the European Economic Corporation (EEC), in an effort to keep discussions on England’s colonies at bay.

Against this backdrop, this chapter audaciously interrogates within the purview of remittances accumulation and expatriation, the pillaging and plundering of resources (both human and material) that

have taken (and continue to take) place in Africa, in terms of how these have downscaled development on the continent. We argue, basing on our findings, that Africa's underdevelopment has for a long time been instigated and perpetuated by the North. If remains unchecked, we continue arguing, the underdevelopment of Africa is likely to worsen in the next few years, and this time, to a level where Africa would need a "crane" machine to take it out of the crevasse.

Pillage and plunder: The ongoing expatriating of riches from Africa

Exact figures of the yearly inflow and outflow of funds from (sub-Saharan) Africa to the rest of the world are difficult to measure due to a general paucity of data in and from Africa. Nevertheless, general reports invariably show very large deficits, to the detriment of Africa. For purposes best known to those who record remittances data, many of the outflows are concealed in nature. However, in 2014, Natalie Sharples *et al.* (2014), in collaboration with a whole range of organisations, endeavoured to lift the veil to curb unequal consumption of the data by members of the public. In their sub-Saharan Africa overview study, the researchers reported a yearly **inflow of USD 134 billion** – predominantly in the form of loans, foreign investment and aid – and a calculated **net outflow of USD 192 billion** – mainly in profits made by foreign companies, tax dodging and the costs of adapting to climate change. The figures are characterised as 'conservative', thus the loss for sub-Saharan Africa is, at least, **USD 58 billion per year**. The Africa Progress Panel, assembling ten eminent persons interested in Africa's agency, confirmed these alarming incredible magnitudes (Watkins, 2014).

Studying the so-called developing countries more generically, the 2016, United Nation's (UN) World Economic Situation Prospects (WESP) report, gives an account of remarkably volatile private capital flows in relation to the so-called developing countries. In 2015, the UN records, Foreign Direct Investments fell dramatically. Portfolio investments – buying stocks and shares – went negative, depleting the developing countries of USD 48 billion. Also, other private investments, including interbank loans, did collapse. The

private market expatriated a whopping **USD 827 billion** out of developing countries to the so-called developed countries in 2015. This outflow was a continuation of a persistent outflow, since 2011. In efforts to keep afloat and avert crises, developing countries did sell off national reserves on a significant scale. These “trends were observed in virtually all major emerging economies,” the WESP report notes (UN, 2016: 85). This loss in financial resources on the part of Africa has always been accompanied by loss of human capital of *value* and *strength*, who in the name of “seeking greener pastures” are enticed to leave the continent for the North. We underline the words “value” and “strength” here to clearly show that normally, it is not the “ordinary” people who, like fish attracted to the worm on the hook, leave Africa for the North. In most cases, it is the highly talented and able-bodied – the educated, skilled, and the young generation – who sometimes after being frustrated by their own national governments, migrate to the North, sometimes never to come back again. This trend has been visibly on the track for quite some time, and is likely to continue even long into the future.

Coming back to financial resources, the outflows of (financial) resources are sub-divided and put in a number of distinct categories. These is a listing we deduce from such reports, with a quantification of their estimated financial magnitude at the 2014 levels, quantified by Sharples *et al.* (2014), for sub-Sahara Africa:

1. Debt payments, USD 21,000 mln per year;
2. Repatriation of multinational company profits, USD 46,300 mln per year;
3. Illicit financial outflows, USD 35,300 mln per year;
4. Illegal fishing and logging, USD 1,300 mln and USD 17,000 mln respectively;
5. Brain drain, USD 6,000 mln per year;
6. Climate change – adoption and mitigation, USD 10,600 mln and USD 26,000 mln respectively;
7. Other outflows, in the range of USD 23,400 mln loans to governments outside the continent.

Of course, the outflows are not restricted to actual money flows as even money itself comes in various forms. They can also take the form of illegal trading in ivory, diamonds or the under-pricing of

mineral resources, amongst others (Gordhan, 2016). Nevertheless, even these conservative estimates of the financial outflows show gigantic magnitudes. The Africa Progress Panel labelled this practice as a *plunder of the African continent* (Watkins, 2014: 11). With the availability of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) far-and-wide, the use digital networks and digital services, especially through mobile networks and devices, represent a new toolset to facilitate (illicit) financial flows (Tropina, 2016). New technologies give rise to new forms of illegal finance, for example, Human Trafficking (U.S. Department of State, 2016), and can obscure illicit financial flows at each stage. ICT can facilitate the earning of money illegally, the transferring of funds illegally, and/or facilitate the illegal use of money, culminating to, what South African Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan (2016) characterised when he pronounced: “we have to deal with sophisticated crimes or abuses which can be committed by highly connected people with extensive resources”. In the sections that follow, we make a follow-up discussion of the issues we raised under this sub-heading; only that we will be more focused on natural resources and human capital (in the form of brain drain) other than financial resources per se.

The hustling of Africa’s resources

Imperialism forces Africa to rely on primary natural resources (Galtung, 1971). Therefore, tax evasion and illicit financial outflows in conjunction with mining and poaching are particularly troubling. By hegemonic scheming in world markets, stakeholders in the Global North assure that natural resources are undervalued in a systemic manner (Watkins, 2014) knowing for sure that most of the [natural] resources come from Africa. Various and complex means and tactics are deployed, among which is transfer pricing. All these are the dirty tricks played by the North against Africa and its fellow so-called developing countries, to ensure that the latter remain entrapped in the chasm of underdevelopment and therefore easy to prey on.

The documentary: *Stealing Africa --- Why Poverty?* (Guldbrandsen, 2013) shows how poverty, extensive environmental damage, and under-investments in local agency and oversight sustain very high

financial outflows from copper mining in Zambia. The documentary narrates how Western individuals and their communities profit obscenely from personal and institutional dealings in Africa (cf. Curtis, 2016). The Bank of Zambia (2016), in its Direction of Trade Report, 1st Quarter 2016, confirms that “Switzerland, South Africa, China and Congo (DR) maintained their positions as the country’s four major trading partners”. A critical question comes to mind: Why is landlocked Switzerland the second trading partner of Zambia? The trade report shows that copper to Switzerland is the main reason for the latter’s partnership with Zambia (Bank of Zambia, 2016: 4). Christopher Guldbrandsen’s (2013) documentary mentions further that USD 29 billion is being expatriated from Zambia to Switzerland, every year.

In their report titled: *Copper Colonialism*, Samarendra Das and Miriam Rose (2014) describe the case of Vedante and its dealings with Konkola Copper Mines (KCM). In a video, taken at the Jain International Trade Organisation meeting in Bengaluru, India, March, 2014, Vedante’s Chief Executive Officer, Anil Agarwal can be seen to explain how he bought KCM for USD 25 million and how he receives a profit of USD 500 million per year, with USD 1 bln in change. However, in the same period in Zambia itself, KCM reported to be loss making (Lusaka Times, 2014).

Brain drain

The size and quantities of Africa’s brain drain are difficult to pinpoint as there is no registration systems capturing related data. Besides, some people who leave Africa for Europe do so “illegally” such that their records are never captured. Only between the period of 2000 to 2005, an estimated 440, 000 people per year migrated from Africa, most of them to Europe (World Migration, 2008). It is worth noting that besides mass “exodus” of the African people being enslaved to Europe, mass exodus through migration has been on the record since the 1960s, with main source countries of migration being Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia (Hein 2008), and recently Zimbabwe. The million dollar question, however, is: Why do these people leave Africa *enmasse*? Before we proffer some of the reasons for these

movements, we should underscore that the reasons are inexhaustible that we cannot explain them all in detail only a book chapter like this. We only do so for a few.

The narrative that ‘education outside of Africa is better than inside’ is persistent (Han *et al.*, 2015). This narrative combines with the lure of scholarship opportunities (Teferra, 1997) and continues to entice thousands of Africans to travel outside of the continent for academic development. Touted as a significant expansion of training cooperation, in 2013, in South Africa, the U.S. President Barak Obama announced the Washington Fellowship for Young African Leaders, “a new programme that’s going to give thousands of promising young Africans like you the opportunity to come to the United States and develop your skills at some of our best colleges and universities.”

In the background, since 2007, the US-centric professional engineering organizations The Institute of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) – claiming to be the largest professional organisation in the world – and the Semiconductor Industry Association have been lobbying the American government for the “retention of highly educated immigrants as part of a broader competitiveness and innovation initiative” (Scalise & Meredith, 2007: np). In their narrative, the organisations state that “51 percent of master’s and 71 percent of Ph.D. graduates in electrical and electronic engineering from U.S. universities are foreign nationals” (Ibid). In a US study surveying foreign-born STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) graduates, Han *et al.* (2015) show that most graduates (80%) do not return to their home-countries. Given their status as skilled, they are normally lured with “good” jobs and remunerations, among other things to remain in the U.S. In fact, expressing to have the interests of engineers worldwide at heart, through its US-branch, IEEE lobbies for foreign graduates to remain in the USA for work (McManes, 2013; Patel, 2015). One then wonders if the offering of scholarships to African best brains is done in good faith or it is simply a “clever” way of stealing African talent. Jeffrey Garten answers it all. Garten, under the secretary of commerce for international trade in the former U.S. President, Bill Clinton’s administration, considers a ‘Global War for Talent’ and

states “as the U.S. economy gains strength while other countries face roadblocks to growth, now is the time for America to engineer a massive raid on the brain power abroad and capture the world’s scientists, tech-savvy talent, engineers, and mathematicians” (Garten, 2015: online).

In the health sector, the brain drain of expert health professionals to the Global North accelerates. The World Health Organisation adopted a Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel in 2010. Akhenaten Tankwanchi *et al.* (2014) reviewed 8,260 graduates from sub-Saharan African medical schools appearing in the U.S physician workforce, in 2013. 7,900 (96%) of them were in active medical practice or were active but semi-retired (working shorter than 20 hours per week). Tankwanchi *et al.* calculate an annual growth of 5.4% of graduates from sub-Saharan African medical schools working in the United States between mid-2011 and mid-2013. This is up from 4.5% annual growth between December 2002, and mid-2011. What this means is that Africa is losing talent to the United States, and it is this talent that should have been combining with all other left on the continent to further develop it.

In the meantime, China is carefully testing the waters, inviting African students to the Huawei learning centre, a huge academic and training centre located at the heart of Huawei City. This is part of a ‘Seeds for the Future’ programme which connects global students to China, which may tell us that China could be moving towards the direction of the United States in “trying” to steal away African talent.

In private conversations in 2016, when so prompted, professors from European universities confirmed that they know of colleagues who are interested in “international exchange” in an effort “to get the best brains working for them, in their Western based laboratories”. We argue here that while international exchange itself is positive and progressive to the extent that we cherish and embrace it, the exchange should always be reciprocal and done in good faith. We argue further that it is only when international exchange is reciprocal and done in good faith that we achieve *even* global development.

That aside, we note that, also, there is an internal brain drain, inside African countries. Here, high trained persons are pursuing jobs

in the headquarters of government ministries, try to land jobs with well-paying international Non-Governmental Organisations (INGO), or leave for work in one of the African megalopolis. For instance, in many African countries, high performing medical doctors are sucked up by health departments under respective ministries or INGOs, participating in the workshops and conference with “cooperating partners,” while, in practice do not contribute to the urgent need for productive work in administering health care of individual patients. Health institutes in the rural and semi-urban areas, in the meantime, are depleted of professional staff, either gone or on engaged in a seemingly never ending stream of workshops and training sessions. Besides, some African countries seem to be bargaining more than others. South Africa, an African country that seem to have adopted some of the mechanisms similar to the United States, is fast attracting high profiled skilled personnel from other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Already, Zimbabwe is losing hordes of academics and professionals on yearly basis, especially now that the Zimbabwean economy is cracking.

Rent seeking

Neo-liberal and capitalistic systems put in place systems, set for a ‘rent-seeking behaviour’. Achille Mbembe (2002) lists rent-seeking as part of patterns of predation, neo-patrimonialism, and an urban bias, that exists due to a legitimacy deficit of the African state. This deficit, Mbembe argues, is inherent due to the fact that most of the contemporary institutes and practices were grounded and implemented by colonial powers. For example, Samarendra Das and Miriam Rose (2014) describe how in Zambia the Public Order Act, installed by 1955 to assure continuation of extractive colonialism, is still in Zambian law today and used. In Zimbabwe, the Witchcraft Suppression Act Chapter 9: 19 which was put in place by the colonial government on 18 August 1899 was revised after “battles” with the Zimbabwean government and *only* for the first time in 2001 and then in 2006. The revisions were however next to nothing as they did not change the substantial content of the Act.

Contemporary rent-seeking involves using the (intellectual) outputs of costly technological innovations, which, in turn meshes both producers and users in a dependency from capital. In view of such a vice, to be able to innovate, one is trained to adhere to and comply with the wishes of the capital: the users will always depend on the capital. Monopolists extract their profit from such dependence. This capitalistic system, seemingly takes away the ability of the individual to behave in a humane manner, according to moral positions (Stiegler, 2015). It appears the same with the imperial companies and countries of the North. They continuously leech Africa as an imperative of survival in a manner that perpetuates dependency syndrome. The system instils anxiety and fear in those who do not comply. At the individual level, there appears no means to act against this, and through such dis-empowerment, agency is demolished.

With Africa's plight and indeed development predicament, being the way it is over a very long time now, and due to the sheer magnitude of the depletion of the continent, there is a lack of effort to understand African realities. Worse still, to help the continent move out of the mess it was thrown into by the West. Further, there is little interest in established institutions and businesses to understand the effects from the African intellectual position, nor tangible benefits to augment interventions to cater for social justice, or fix the morally broken systems. As an example stands our interactions with major US-parties, being it Microsoft, Google, Boeing, or University of California. This work showed there was little empathy with African practice and practicalities. In dealings with universities in Western countries, in general there was an atmosphere of incredulity. Even when African realities were presented, seemingly due to pressures of time and what appears to be a constant droning of the master story, the seed planted appear to wither quickly. Also, the sheer high costs of staff in the Global North compared to the 'low cost' of staff in the South, result in cockeyed project proposals, where most funds accrue to Western experts or researchers. Although particularly unique, in over 10 years of writing and with over 15+ large funding proposals filed from an African position, the fail rate of one of the co-author to this work was 100%, none of these

(acknowledged high quality) proposals received funding from (international) research funders.

In the technology sector, Bruce Krogh and Jonathan Ledgard (2016) describe the prospects for Africans interested in playing any sort of role in shaping technologies driven by the tech titans of Silicon Valley. They paint a bleak picture, showing a general lack of interest and attention, the absence of a focus on job creation, and the dilapidating and discouraging environment for non-Westerners in Western settings. Further, they show how the persistent lack of real collaboration is over-trumpeting by constant messaging about training programmes and start-up competitions. Likewise, Linda Nordling (2015) describes the same picture in the health and pharmaceutical arena. Although local research is being supported, the research invariably uses Western epistemology to prioritise research work, and a research centres are managed and supervised strictly by Westerners, in direct or in indirect manners.

The façade of aid

The contentiousness of the discussion about the value of aid was amply discussed by the Zambian born economist, Dambisa Moyo (2009). She argued that aid is often harmful, due to the instigation of dependency and the debt which it tends to create. Mawere (2014) also makes a similar argument. He argues that aid impoverishes and perpetuates dependency syndrome. This creates difficulties for the receiving countries to come out of the underdevelopment box. Aid is mostly portrait as an act of charity. We argue in this chapter that in certain instances, indeed it can be. However, it creates also a façade that conceals that an adding up of all accounts does show that countries like the United Kingdom are the net recipients of resource from Africa. On this, Sharples' *et al.* (2014) observation is apt. They observe that: “While aid to Africa amounts to less than USD 30 billion per year, the continent is losing USD 192 billion annually in other resource flows, mainly to the same countries providing that aid. This means African citizens are losing almost six and a half times what their countries receive in aid each year, or for every GBP 100 given in aid, GBP 640 is given back” (p. 5). Raymond Baker, Director

of Global Financial Integrity, stated that, on average, 10 times more financial assets leave Africa, than the official aid that goes to Sub-Saharan Africa (Guldbrandsen, 2013).

Back to the USD 192 bln case highlighted above, the outflow of USD 192 bln, Sharples' *et al.* (2014: 5) state: "is more than is needed annually to eliminate hunger; provide universal primary, and improved access to secondary education; affordable health coverage for a range of diseases; safe water and sanitation, and sustainable energy for everyone in the world – not just Africa". Western countries are not the net donors as the aids narrative tends to make believe. We argue here that the Western countries are in fact the huge net recipients.

Bilateral and multilateral aid is explicitly or implicitly linked to business interests in the Global North. From their case study in Lesotho, James Ferguson and Larry Lohmann (1994) argued that aid is part of an anti-politics machine that creates new dependencies in an effort to shift enshrined regional patterns of trade preferences to a dependency of donors and their (national) industries. Various writers, both from Africa and abroad, have been vocal about this tendency, labelling it 'the White Man's Burden' (Easterley, 2006), or showing immoral use of undeserved (white) privileges.

Many aid projects from the North involve rules-based approaches that are at odds with local cultures. For instance, their approach to budgeting is perpendicular to the practice of oral budgeting, observed in rural Zambia (van Stam, 2012). With their particular contextual design, its imported procedures, and its imperial methodologies (Mawere & van Stam, 2015), aid projects are constitutive instead of supportive. They are dictators instead of being partners in development. The embedded power of 'the written word' meddles and restricts opportunities for genuine cross-cultural collaboration, inclusion of embodied knowledge, or a reciprocal engagement with local partners (van Stam, 2013). The tools of conferences, workshops, trainings and direct interventions under a banner of 'technical assistance' create a lopsided and disconnected, parallel system of governance that repel the spirit of "good" development. This system relies on 'free money', a belief in quantification, manipulation buried in reports, and a sub-scene of

aid-workers. The system is greased by a system of payments of allowances that pays people to attend meetings and workshops. The Community Foundations of Canada (n.d) have shown that payment of allowances does not allow for the right people to attend. Instead, it in many cases allows people who produce insignificant results to attend, which may be frustrating to others who would feel that meetings take them away their valued time and money rather than adding value to their work.

Aid meshes various discourses as part of its façade, attributing success to Westerners intervening and failure to the African ‘corruption,’ and failure to implement, and monitor the development projects, among other reasons. In the neo-liberal order, macro-economic narratives are the favourite. For instance, Alfred Ndi (2010) reveals they are the panacea of the ‘economic growth’ narrative. Nathan Andrews (2009) shows how the growth narrative crowds out consideration of socio-cultural factors.

Following from the above, we argue that, more often than not, aid is invariably linked to political agendas, who *per definition* are linked with geopolitics ran from outside of the African continent. The effects of these agendas more often than not result in exact the opposite as what is being portrait. As an example, recently aid to Eritrea triggered a war with arch-enemy Ethiopia. And the neo-liberal agenda does not align with the cultural practice and traditional tools available in African countries. Introduction of neo-liberal and capitalistic interventions, therefore, can have disastrous consequences. It is also on the basis of similar observations that scholars like Owen Barder and Theodore Talbot (2014) recognise that aid addresses ‘symptoms of poverty’ and can meet ‘immediate humanitarian needs’, but does not address underlying causes. Therefore they propose to focus on ‘beyond aid’.

The public statements announcing rejection of aid by various African political leaders of countries such as Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, among others, is a signal that aid, as a façade, is more part of the problem of underdevelopment in Africa, than part of a solution.

Ongoing colonial practices by nation-states and businesses

Even although colonialism is said to have been stopped by the independence of African nation-states, colonial practices continue, even more towering, through an intricate and every growing network of rulings, treaties, over assets and opportunities in Africa. National interest, handled by government of nation-states, allow for the continued exploitation and disenfranchisement of Africa. Examples are:

- Frustrating the implementation of Doha Round commitments, lowering the trade barriers for exports from Africa to the rest of the world and addressing the lopsided power-balances in international trade;
- Disallowing or frustrating migration from Africa to the West, disallowing for African populace to harvest some income from the areas that plundered, although (who) showed that immigration is good also for the receiving countries;
- Subsidising the performance of large fishing boats (fishing beyond sustainable yield) (Keijzer, N., ‘Fishing in trouble waters? An analysis of the upcoming reform of the Common Fisheries Policy from the perspective of Policy Coherence for Development’, ECDPM Discussion Paper 120, 2010), with a knock on effects of agricultural directives, and;
- Allowing for the effects of the global warming to hard-hit African countries.

Through extorting agreements, set since independence, France interests, for example, continues to remain the first priority in public procurement, military action, financial planning, monetary instruments in Western African countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, and Cameroon. Christoff Lehmann (2012) called this *modo-colonialism*. No wonder President Mitterrand uttered that “without its colonies, France would be a developing country”. The history of the EU is closely related to President de Gaulle’s wish to continue to benefit from his colonies through a mischievous, dark, informal network of French and African diplomats, businessmen, mercenaries and others, called *‘la Françafrique’*.

On a similar note as that of France, Britain continues to harvest from the coloniality of its (former) colonies. British mining companies alone, control the most valuable resources in Africa, with a combined value of over 1,000,000 mln resources (Curtis, 2016).

However, many countries of the North are actively involved in perpetuating the current colonial practices. Belgium, for instance, negotiated some very unbalanced tax treaties (Van de Poel, 2016). ‘Asymmetric treaties’ are known to allow for tax evasion. There are thousands of such treaties in Africa dating back to the colonial times. However, double tax treaties are known to facilitate other forms of tax avoidance and evasion, which makes in a typical form of corruption. Then another good example is the United States of America. The USA is renowned for not allowing income tax being paid by any American, in any country outside the USA, but only to the USA.

It seems the colonial spirit is not only instigated by some Western imperial countries. Various reports describe how China, in its ‘preferred partnership agreements with Africa’, implements a neo-colonial relationship (van de Looy, 2006; Marks, 2006; du Plessis, 2015). This is however, relatively new, as China did not have colonial relationships in Africa, up to recent times. For China, this coloniality links in with business. In Lusaka, on 6 May 2014, one of the co-author of this chapter witnessed how Chinese ICT Company, Huawei launched its Demo Truck Road show. It was a one-week road show to showcase for the whole week parading ICT solutions in Zambia. At that occasion, the Chinese Ambassador to Zambia, Mr. Zhou Yuxiao, lectured the Zambian Government’s Transport, Works, Supply and Communications Minister, Yamfwa Mukanga, on how Huawei has a turn-over of USD 40 bln, representing 4 times the GDP of Zambia. He explained how efficient this was done, with only 150,000 people. He suggested the Zambian government can learn from such experiences to ensure that they get aboard of the “development chariot”.

Business is renowned for its colonial practices and tenets. Foreign investors in Africa are known to use ‘any trick in the book’, to assure that legislation becomes favourable, that their business is preferred (exclusively, if feasible), and that regulations are liberal.

African national governments are unable to curb illicit transactions, and therefore the South African Finance Minister, Pravin Gordhan (2016), in one of his recent speeches, could only urge that “multinational companies must work on improving their business culture and commit to a code of good tax practice, and take active steps to stop aggressive tax structuring practices, and pay their fair share of taxes in the countries where they generate their profits.” There are numerous reports on how industries in weapons, mining (like diamonds, copper, mobile phone needs), industries in oil and gas, suppliers of aircraft, telecommunications industries, financial industries, and many others, each and collectively, have bend international and national rules to get their way in Africa. As a result, scorching methods of extraction, polluting ways of refining, and unethical ways of dealing with people are reported and potentially commonplace. Further, reports abound on how Africa is the dumping ground for e-waste, mammoth ships and many other products, without concern for decent working conditions, health, or pollutants, and pollutions.

Crunching the numbers for half a year, at the end of 2014, Jesse Griffiths, director of the European Network on Debt and Development concluded “for every dollar developing countries have earned since 2008, they have lost \$2.07. In fact, lost resources have averaged over 10% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP)” (Griffiths, 2014: online). This represents only “the lost resources: money that should have been invested to support their development, but instead was drained out. Twice as much is leaking – or rather flooding – out than the combined inflows of aid, investment, charitable donations, and migrant remittances” (Ibid).

The age of super-colonialism

The age of super-colonialism finds its roots colonialism and the so-called post-colonialism. Colonialism is generally the policy or practice of acquiring either full or partial political control over another country, through the establishment of settlements in it while exploiting it economically. Colonialism results in the creation of what is known as the colony (plur: colonies) – the countries being

controlled by the colonisers. On the other hand, post-colonialism is generally understood as an analysis, explanation and response to the cultural, social and political legacies of colonialism. Post-colonialism therefore talks about human consequences of external political control and economic exploitation of the “indigenous” peoples and their lands. It seeks to critically question and address, in varying ways, the injustices planted by the hegemonic process of colonialism. But while a country graduates to a post-colony, neo-colonialism may remain inherent, directly or otherwise. Neo-colonialism, is the general use (direct or indirect) of political, cultural, economic or any other form of force to control or influence other countries, most especially the former colonies or dependencies. Thus, sequentially, what begins is colonialism before post-colonialism takes over. It is worth noting that neo-colonialism may remain resiliently planted within systems of the former colonies or dependences even while the process of decolonisation and post-colonialism are taking place. What is clear in both colonialism and neo-colonialism is that there is always a set of unequal relationships between the colonial (or the former colonial) power and the colony (or the formerly colonised) and likewise between the colonialists (of former colonialists) and the colonised (or the formerly colonised). This is what post-colonial studies would always attempt to address, giving birth to processes such as decolonisation and reconstruction.

However, these definitions are all from positionality in the West, a Western point of view. In that view, colonialism is ‘gone’, and projects an agency on the ‘previously colonised’ areas to set its own pace and direction, in a post-colonial era. For example, when we talk of decolonisation, one observes that the former colonialists are always at the forefront of the whole process. One wonders how a “hyena” can all of a sudden turn itself into a “sheep” and befriend the latter to the extent of now wanting not to eat it anymore but to help it leaking its drying “wounds!”

It is from this penetrating analysis and from the positionality of African communities that we argue, colonialism has never ended. Possibly, it had a ‘hick-up’ directly after ‘independence’. However, in our view, this was just a time of ‘resetting’, where all parties had to get ‘around’ the new hurdles. Therefore, we recognise the existence

of a ‘super-colonialism’, when observing a continued subjugation of African peoples. This super-colonialism, we define as “the scaled-up colonial practice of subjugation of other people and groups for gain of colonial agents”. Super-colonialism is perpetrated by countries, but more and more so by companies or international organisations. Examples of such colonial practice are the global monetary system, international trade treaties (with contemporary examples being Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the list is long.

The economic spoils of super-colonialism are well shown in the first section of this chapter. However, super-colonialism also involves the rejection and replacement of customary laws, implementation and resourcing of neo-liberal institutes, a parallel running of international Non-Governmental Organisations to cater for health care, education, and other services that are under the mandate of national governments. Colonisers of today are, therefore, nations, institutions, businesses. The intervening agents are business persons (flying in and out), technical assistants, meetings, collaborations, and so forth. The colonised are countries, communities, individuals, but also systems, technologies, and others that continue to be exploited in the new ways. Any of the colonising interventions, often executed under the banner of business or ‘technical assistance’, hollows out the agency of people groups in the local, national and regional and continental environments.

Therefore, not only did independence of the African states not bring the decolonial situation as wished for, a continued colonisation did take place, especially facilitated by the global village narrative, and the growth of international travel, and international communications networks – what generally could be referred to as globalisation. The super-colonialists do not have to travel physically anymore, they can just send their memes through and over the Digital Highways, or travel into the continent, overnight, meet, and leave again within a few hours.

Super-colonial practices can be observed when sensitised to the fact that we (still) live in colonial times. The major drives in education, health, government, economy and industry are well known and documented. Galtung (1971) listed such practices as

imperialistic actions in the economy, politics, military, communications, culture, and linguistics. These actions gain colonial domination as in the means of production, political framings, handling of means of destruction, the setting the priorities in communications, knowledge and research, viability of specialisation, in skills and education, and influence contemporary social structures with many psychological effects. From further research, however, in super-colonial times, based upon unprecedented means of transport and communications, we deduct new colonial means. Among these are:

- Meetings *about* ‘the periphery’ take place ‘in the centre’. Outside of the (economically colonised) megapolises, no meetings take place;

- The ontological, positional and contextual embedding of information and knowledge is invariably in the west, all other forms are systematically suppressed and, in the current times, crowded out;

- Data is being dis-embodied, commoditised (for processing in the Global North), and ‘rhythms of life’ are being discarded;

- The creation of all-consuming ‘digital bubbles’, taking away the attention of people (by means of ICT).

The obvious colonising organisations are Google and Facebook, but there are underlying colonising initiatives like ‘open data’.

Therefore, not only are the practices of the colonial negation of multi-consciousness, embodied/oral knowledge being continued, a new wave of colonial regulations (based upon neo-liberal framings) and brainwashing (through means of communication) are added to the mix.

Dependency in super-colonial times

With the current financial systems, and the debt prison of most African countries, relying on external financing, makes the countries’ economies highly volatile. Any change in exchange rates, or in the opinion of international investors, has a major influence, and can spell disaster. With much of the industries privatised, even domestic financial markets are depending on foreign investors. Yilmaz Akyuz (2015) reports “a very large proportion of private external debt is in

foreign currency” and “international banks [...] market share has reached 50 per cent compared to 20 percent in OECD countries”. Therefore, financial stability in many African countries is contingent on the behaviour of foreigners. This form of colonialism in Africa has been privatised, as Akyuz notes “the sovereign debt of is held by fickle investors abroad rather than by foreign central banks as international reserves”. This “increased presence of foreign investors and financial institutions in domestic as set and credit markets of [developing countries], together with dismantling of controls over international capital flows have made them highly vulnerable to global financial boom – bust cycles generated by policy shifts in major financial centres.”

Of course, there are many conflicts arising out this, but super-colonialism attacks African cultures by valuing relationships based upon (positivistic) calculations that crowds-out relationship based upon humaneness (as in the case of Ubuntu), and continuous a narrative of superiority of the Global North. Lastly, super-colonial times negate the value of religion, by denying a moral nature of the universe.

As the major super-colonial struggles take place at the level of nation states (which were implemented by the colonial powers in the first place), its activities are in full glare in the formal economy. Here it crowds-out anybody but the elite, whom is lured recognising a ‘harmony of interest’ in imperialistic relationship. Nevertheless, super-colonialism is also felt in the informal economy, which is where the non-elite is crowded into. Besides, social capital is not available. There is no ability to gain funding of research, both on the local and national level.

Thus, capital and funding is caused to come from abroad. Foreigners set the agenda for deployment of capital in a mix of opportunistic grabbing of resources, as long as they can get away with it, or in institutional programmes of development, which are drafted by technical experts from outside of the country (e.g. in Washington, from think tanks, and so forth, but always from a Western positionally and epistemology).

This deployment of capital, whether social or financial, does what it is supposed to do: to yield returns for the owners of that capital.

As these owners are foreign-based, the yields/benefits/profits are flowing to the outside, depreciating even more the abilities and agencies to participate in the global economy. This is a systemic situation, once in a while (a bit) alleviated by, for example, clearing of debts, but aggravated by a growing equality and thus power of these systems. The system does not allow for tax collection with less and less money going around.

The growing inability of voicing local and national ideas for developments is due to the droning out of those thoughts by a forceful marketing of ideas for development in Western settings. In those settings, these ideas compete with a cacophony of other ideas, plans, and infotainment. However, in ‘the South’, such cacophony does not exist. There the ideas are proposed as ‘the only way to salvation’. There is no cacophony, as the development of local agency, through the process of local and national debate, with inputs from cultural practices, academic scrutiny, and entrepreneurial enterprise are not heard due to a suffocating underfinancing of such efforts. There is no opportunity for local and national research and development.

Turning the tables upside down: The “Hunted” becoming “Hunters”

As mentioned before, migration raises overall living standards for people from developing countries and the receiving countries alike. Migration, unlike aid, directly adds value to rich countries’ economies (Barder, 2014: 5). Immigrants are complements to, not substitutes for - existing workers (ibid).

In his book: *“C’est L’Homme Qui Fair l’Homme” Cul-de-Sac Ubuntu-ism in Cote D’Ivoire*, Francis Nyamnjoh (2015) provides a review of the African value and cultural trait of Ubuntu with respect to mobile Africans. In the short book chapter: *Treasure Hunting Beyond Familiar Shores*, he introduces a perturbing view on African migration deduced from an anthrophonic observation of a popular TV series *C’est L’Homme Qui Fair l’Homme* in Cote d’Ivoire. From this series, he dramatically positions migration in an African perspective of an Africa being looted by hunters from far-away lands. The loot, being

treasures such as resources or labour, has been abducted from Africa continuously since the middle of the second century (around 1.500 AD).

Nyamnjoh shows a meddling of Western powers in Africa as a continuous reaching beyond geographical borders. He depicts this as a hunt, initiated from the Global North in an uninterrupted period of domination in Africa up to the present time. In the present times, such continued domination is what others call neo-colonialism.

In an antithesis of such hunting on African grounds by foreigners, Nyamnjoh (2015) positions a counter-narrative of migrating Africans. He paints them as hunters in far-away lands. He reviews an African TV series from the position that regards African migrants as being hunters in distant villages and towns, hunting in the areas of the hunters of yesteryears. And he shows how opportunities and opportunism can co-exist where the spoils of the hunt are sent off to Africa.

The turning around of the victims becoming victors is a theme that resonates with the renowned Ugandan academic, author, and political commentator, Mahmood Mamdani's (2001) sinister recounting of the genocide in Rwanda, *When Victims Become Killers*. Mamdani's recounting depicts the stories of those victimised in a wretched identity, in a fight on paper and to settle old scores, to prey on each other. The psychology of victims becoming perpetrators is a theme in psychology.

Ubuntu and remittances

The analysis of Nyamnjoh (2015) is contingent to the African value of Ubuntu. Ubuntu is an ethical, epistemological and metaphysical value-laden approach emerging from an African paradigm (Mawere & Mubaya, 2016). Ubuntu challenges systems that frame personal or self-interested forms of success as an end. It asks for collective success and dignity. From previous works, we learn that Ubuntu is crystallised African philosophy in a metaphor, embodying the significance of group solidarity expressed in their ability to love each other, share, and relate reciprocally with one another. It encapsulates a key to African values, involving collective personhood

and collective morality. Ubuntu spells out the principle of caring for each other's wellbeing in a spirit of mutual support. Ubuntu shows how people are people through other people, recognising that an individual's humanity is expressed through that person's relationship with others and theirs in turn through recognition of an individual's humanity. Ubuntu provides for the acknowledgement of the rights and the responsibilities of every citizen in promoting societal and individual well-being. In short, Ubuntu captures the African essence of what it means to be human (cf. van Stam, 2014). Ubuntu is illuminated by the African philosopher John Mbiti's (1976) dictum that: "I am because we are. If we are therefore I am". Nelson Mandela, an epitome of Ubuntu, defined Ubuntu as "that profound African sense that we are human only through the humanity of other human beings" (Crwys-Williams, 2010: loc.1652). Desmond Tutu popularised the African conception of the relational ontology around Ubuntu.

Artwell Nhemachena and Munyaradzi Mawere (2016) draw out how Nyamnjoh meticulously shows how Ubuntu plays out, not only in Africa but also at a global level, both as abstraction and as being part of day-to-day experience. In his book, Nyamnjoh allows for the convivial and reciprocal treats of Ubuntu to fuel the question of (the paradox of) Africans being "treated as scum or pests including by nations that have formerly exploited them during trans-Atlantic slave trade and colonialism. On this note, Nyamnjoh calls for the need to observe the exigencies of reciprocating and sharing on 'common grounds' of justice what empire accumulated, often illegally and unscrupulously" (Nhemachena & Mawere, 2016: 533).

Remittances and the counter-narrative

Focusing on the counter-narrative of the hunt as shown by Nyamnjoh, in this text I propose a designation of remittances to signify the transfer of the spoils of the hunters that went out. This description counters the generally held erroneous view that remittances principally link to self-centred motives of the remitter (cf. De *et al.*, 2016).

In our daily research in the lived, African societies, we recognise that the process of remittances aligns with existing, contextually embedded socio-economic support systems. These systems are built upon the long-term traditions and care-taking of life in communities and family relationships. For example, we observe that remittances align with the local processes for negotiating of resources. These involve oral communications, now extended by means of Information and Communications Technologies like the mobile phone and Over-The-Top services like WhatsApp. Financial communications align with the processes of oral budgeting (van Stam, 2012).

In many African societies, especially in the rural areas, the fluidity of the economy is regulated by the relational dimensions of resource allocation described as *relatio* (VanStam 2011e). Through *relatio*, remittances are part of an African, relational system for addressing basic questions of choice and resource management, appreciating both social and material forms of capital. In this view, remittances have both private and public implications. For instance, its various forms (for example, a digital/mobile form) make resource allocation efficient by providing for fluidity of mediums of exchange and bolstering participation in the local economy. In that respect, remittances provide for 'ways out' of an economic system that is dominated by extra-local agents, hindered by low money supplies and neglected social capital.

Remittances can be seen as a continuation of the long term, local behaviour that assures that investments benefit "wealth in people" over "wealth in things" (Guyer1995).

In his book, Francis Nyamnjoh recognises the philosophy of Ubuntu as constructing the case "for the need to observe the exigencies of reciprocating and sharing on 'common grounds' of justice what empire accumulated, often illegally and unscrupulously" (Nyamnjoh 2015a). He develops the argument that such reciprocating has not yet occurred, by providing a comprehensive listing of numerous past and current disempowering behaviours, singling out cases of unscrupulous power meddling by France and referring to its European neighbours.

Although there appears an unwillingness of the West to address the underlying systemic injustices while continuing its abuse of powers, Nyamnjoh continues to show the importance of a continued engagement with counter-narrations and explanations of realities from a non-Eurocentric positionality in history and culture. Such pursuits can cater for new understandings and new words to inform and sustain a more diverse, albeit unified, future.

Of course, in a battle, the story of the hunter is being celebrated. In the current geo-politic world, the hunter is located in the Global North while the hunting ground for the Northern imperialist, as Nyamnjoh tells us, remains the Global South where they constantly continue exploiting resource-wise. Therefore, subsequently the story from the African position and epistemology has been relegated to sub-alternity. It is in this dominated setting that a narrative of the hunter's area being hunted inspires a poignant perspective from the subaltern, unknown by the dominating hunter. In this story, remittances are an indication of remarkable success in a setting where globalisation is providing for a hegemonic and enforced narrative, disabling and disempowering for Africa. In effect, due to its Euro-narcissism – emanating from a view of 'Europe' being equal to a superior civilisation – from the African perspective globalisation can be seen as just one set in the hunt of the West in the Rest.

As a result, the putting up of barriers for migration could be seen as an effort by the hunted to control and contain the amphitheatre for the hunt, possibly indicating success of the hunt! The intended message of deterrence – from the perspective of the Global North – therefore, might not be received as such, but be regarded as a natural and consecutive act in the ongoing hunt. In that view, also, the payment of authorities to 'keep migrants in the country of origin' can be regarded as another success of the hunt. Paradoxically, enforcing barriers, therefore, strengthens a perspective of the West being a beneficial hunting ground for those outside of Fort Europe.

The picture of the hunt that Nyamnjoh paints is appealing, as it frames migration as part of mobility with a political, practiced and mediated meaning (Adey, 2010). Nyamnjoh (2015: 26) argues "anyone's mobility can only be accommodating to the extent it is

accommodating”. He reminds his readers that the Western form of mobility has not been accommodating for an African agency.

The view of African migration being a counter movement, responding to ongoing plunder of Africa by foreign agents and being positioned as a hunt into the area of the hunter, is, of course, only one of many perspectives of this highly convoluted and complex endeavour. However, in this view, repressive measures only serve to feed this narrative, as it reinforces the disparate views in the current clash of paradigms (Mawere & van Stam, 2015).

Unfortunately, it appears that only Western voices are being recognised, resulting in a single narrative of a West being violated by migration. This voice continues to animalise Africans by narrating their conversion in terms of ‘scavenging’ for material means of survival but also for “empire’s identities, cultures, social, legal, political and economic institutions” (Nhemachena 2016: 22). These dominant stories drone out the history of the past, and from contemporary deflections to assure “indigenous people with the dignity of repossessing their resources or getting restitutions and reparations from colonists” (Ibid: 28), in effect creating a differentiation in humanness, with some – those aligning to Western thought – being more human than others. Further, the single (Eurocentric) story deflects attention from the ongoing leeching of resource and labour from Africa, and the forcefully implementing of ‘good practices’ that the West does not implement for itself. The experiment of reading reports stating ‘what should be happening in Africa’, while exchanging of words depicting entities in the Global South by entities in the Global North and vice versa, show biases (for such an exercise, see Mwenda Ntarangwi: *Reverse Gaze: An African Ethnography of American Anthropology*). The stories keeping afresh memories of border-violations, geo-political meddling aiming at continuation of inequalities in power bases, and the barriers to allowing multiple versions of realities to co-exist continue to be told by those in sub-alternity. A disrespect of other voices disempowers, for instance, incorporation of a contextualised knowing.

In the meantime, the hegemonic (Western) voice aims for the institutionalisation and capitalistic use of remittances, in effect aiming to appropriate the benefits of (neo-liberal) control and aggregation

of this resource stream. However, this view overlooks over the complex nature of the African methods of resource allocation, and how traditional ways of providing for economic liquid markets are unreconciled with a western, capitalistic schema. Therefore, a pure capitalistic approach to remittances misses the real picture and is prone to be detrimental. The impressive levels of remitting, we suggest, show how Africans in the Diaspora are committed to Ubuntu. They cannot be explained through capitalistic financial models that look through the lenses of neo-liberal thought and individualism. Reports that are unable to incorporate such contextual and embodied knowledge are missing the point.

Nyamnjoh's analysis of the TV programme *C'est l'Homme Qui Fait l'Homme* paints the gloomy picture of the toxic mix of opportunism provided for by an opportunistic (urban) marketplace, in paradoxes that come into play within Ubuntu and its relation-economy. It is only in the understanding of both economic frameworks – the one facilitating individualistic choice through (predatory) markets and the other facilitating communal systems in an empowering and convivial gifting/sharing relationality – and the underlying worldviews, that understanding can be gained and efforts of reconciliation of the two could be attempted. Only when both systems are understood with respect, equality and reciprocity, can there be a trust base for communication and an intimacy for cooperation and collaboration. In Ubuntu, trust links in with authority, embedded within human relationships (van Stam, 2011; 2014), but does not reside in power-planting and abstract systems.

Nyamnjoh's (2015) observations provide a welcome and alternative view of the variety of causes for resource transfers. The narrative of a hunt provides a platform for discussions about resource flows (which, in certain instances are called 'remittances'). It indicates that there is need to make room for discussions allowing for various worldviews, with an outcome that aligns with the adagio 'your success is my honour', aiming for sharing of the outcomes in commons.

Conclusion

With the outright plunder of the African continent, it is quite natural that 'development' is not possible. Any asset in the continent is systematically under siege of expatriation. Necessarily, any system, and asset, and any (whatever) is fragmenting, so, it cannot be apprehended and expatriated. In the meantime, the African is looking how to deplete some of the resources which cannot be accessed. This is taking the form of remittances.

Nyamnjoh (2015) notes that "the current dominant approach to studying and relating to mobile Africans is problematic: it needs serious rethinking. Further, he provides a poignant picture that in itself is an African narrative that frames a certain kind of mobility: going to far-away places to gain resources and remit back. The metaphor of a hunt links in with an African past, constitutes a response to the ongoing plunder of the African lands, and conveys a recognisable African agency. In this narrative, we propose, the level of remittances can be seen as an indication of achievement.

Here, we link remittances to the hunt by Africans in far-away lands that Nyamnjoh describes. It provides an African reality check as to how to look at the existence and utility of remittances:

- The existence of remittances shows a successful hunt.
- The use of remittances by the local community aligns with Ubuntu's relatio-economy. Remittances are a source of fluidity of mediums of exchange in a system devoid of such.

The counter-narrative of Africans hunting beyond the African lands, where the hunters are hunting in the previous hunter's territory, and the recognition that this view is not promoted, raises questions about cognitive and cultural paradigms beyond the dominant Western, Euro-narcissistic narratives. This counter-narrative continues to spotlight pertinent questions regarding colonial history and how the current legacy structures from colonial and violent histories have created barriers that impede change and equal participation in political, geographical and interference manners. Nyamnjoh shows how the narrative is sustained from an African society due to the disrespectful and non-distributive way that the West harvested and kept its spoils from Africa.

We present a contribution that appreciates variety and multiple, located, partial perspectives that must be part in processes of debate to understand remittances. As the meaning is subject to its locality in geo-graphically diverse environments, the meanings of remittances are encapsulated in a variety of narratives that depend on the positionality of the narrator. Harvesting of such embodied knowledge asks for conviviality and mutual respect and a respect of the agency of all hunters. From such an understanding of epistemology, multiple meanings represent various forces. In “true” globalisation, we must review our multiple and collective identities and mediate our individual agencies while finding new language and vocabularies to describe our emerging and truly collective self.

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(Post-)development and the Social Production of Ignorance: Farming Ignorance in 21st Century Africa

Artwell Nhemachena

Introduction

Ben-Yehuda (1986) and Marsh *et al* (2011) have written on moral panics and the ways in which [groups of] people in the world that are called moral entrepreneurs launch moral crusades against others on the basis of exaggerations of social problems. Though they wrote in the framework of criminal statistics, their ideas are not only applicable to the discipline of criminology but they are also relevant in analysing how moral entrepreneurs in general, by exaggerating social problems, generate ignorance of the size [and presence or absence] of problems Africans face. Thus, when during the early period of contact between Africa and the Westerners, Africans were described as savage, barbaric creatures with eyes on their chests, human eating and beastly beings indistinct from animals and nature (Magubane 2007), these Western portrayals of Africans need to be understood in the context of the creation of moral panics by Western moral entrepreneurs who sought to use the panics to justify their interventionism and colonisation of Africa. In the contemporary era, Western media and academics continue to portray Africa as having immense [fabricated and exaggerated] problems that they would never be able to surmount without Western “messianic” interventions. Often the problems are so exaggerated that they leave the impression in readers that if there is no immediate intervention, Africans concerned would immediately run into extinction, in cataclysmic fashion. Through such moral panics, Africa that has survived for centuries before colonisation without relying on aid, and loans and the interventionism of Westerners has been psychologically conditioned to dependence by deliberately underplaying the

creativity, innovativeness, will to sovereignty and autonomy of Africans. The gospel of extinction of African species including African beings, which revolved around Western social Darwinism constructs [that have been relied on by the West to legitimise colonisation and plunder of Africa], has for a long time been at the centre of missions of civilisation, development and colonisation. The result has been that the entire world has been conditioned to worship the Western Darwinist god of destructive competition in the realms of development, economics, politics and education, but of course as far as Africa is concerned, the foregrounding by the West of the Darwinist god of destructive competition tells less than half the story of the continent's reality. Foregrounding the Darwinist god of destructive competition, as Westerners do, foreshadows the fact that Western economies were founded not necessarily on competitiveness but on plunder, looting, robbery, disinheritance and exploiting others on a world scale. Sadly, these distinctions between being competitive and being planetary looters, thieves, robbers, exploiters and plunderers often escape the attention of development studies scholars that continue to presume that Western development depends on productive and smart competitiveness.

In terms of moral panics by Western moral entrepreneurs writing and reporting on Africa, there is incessant generation of frightening statistical figures about levels of underdevelopment, corruption, violence, malnutrition, starvation, unemployment, morbidity and mortality of various kinds in postcolonial Africa. However these frightening figures of want in Africa are never juxtaposed with the frightening figures of colonial and enslavement plunder which the West continues to hope Africa will forget. However, Western moral entrepreneurs, some of whom are also former slaveholders and colonial plunderers who now own and control the global media including publishing houses, should properly be understood as immoral entrepreneurs presenting facades of morality, for purposes of global public relations. A paradox is highlighted here, that the same colonial plunderers who at the eve of independence in many African countries destroyed colonial archives bearing information on colonial plunder (Schmidt 2013; Chigwedere 1991) are returning back

to Africa supposedly with information and statistics about the developmental faults of postcolonial African nation states.

I also show that colonists relied on suppressing pre-existing African industries including farming, mining, smelting, weaving, long distance trade and so on (Bhila 1982; Palmer 1977; Schmidt 1992) which they could not compete with, yet precolonial Africans have been subsequently erroneously constructed as having had only subsistence economies. Having imbibed and believed the ignorance from the gospel that Africans have only had subsistence economies; some Africans have become foremost in castigating fellow Africans as inherently incapable of setting up commercial industries.

In the interest of foreshadowing historical looting, disinheritance and exploitation that continues on the continent, the West has devised various (post-) development models many of which render primacy to competitiveness and the need for Western development experiments. Thus, Africa is a continent that has become a field for endless Western (post-) development experiments which have so far been as sterile as the old story of the colonial mission *civilisatrice*. Much like the old story of mission *civilisatrice*, the notion of (post-) development has been paraded even as Euro-American enterprises and institutions continued to exploit Africa; looting African resources, exploiting African labour power, introducing various forms of austerity measures in Africa. Though contemporary scholars tend to focus on critiquing recent neoliberal conditionalities by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, it is imperative to note that austerity measures on Africans began as far back as the enslavement and colonial eras when Africans lost their sons and daughters as well as their resources that were colonially plundered. Even as the Western transnational corporations continue to siphon African public resources, much as colonists looted resources from the African publics, scholarship on development and corruption continue to write about corruption as if it is only and mainly African leaders that are corrupt in the world. Erroneous colonial presumptions that the only public sphere [which has ever existed in Africa] is in the form of colonial institutions of politics, economies, and so on continue to be privileged notwithstanding the fact that Africans have always had their own forms of public sphere

that were unfortunately corrupted to the points of devastation by colonists. This chapter interrogates assumptions of (post-)development in the light of contemporary critiques of Euro-modernist epistemologies. It casts (neo-)colonial enactments of what is called development in terms of processes of farming or cultivating ignorance among Africans. The question is whether the recent shifts towards indigenous knowledge in (post-)development studies are not *de facto* admission that the projects of development have ever since its inception constituted ignorance and a chimera.

This chapter focuses on the processes of (post-)development and the ways in which they relate to emerging epistemological contentions in the emerging field of “agnotology,” which surfaces how ignorance is produced for some societies. The chapter argues that development so far, particularly as applied to Africa, has been marked by the *farming* of ignorance, that is, the Western social, cultural and epistemic production of ignorance on the continent of Africa that sadly remains trapped in quicksand, despite the age old gospels of civilisation and development. The chapter argues that the fact that Africa has not developed for centuries should not be construed, as is conventionally the case, to imply Africa’s failure; rather the point is that development should not be the primary agenda before restitution, reparations and compensation. While Western scholars are fond of comparing Africa and the West as a step to demonising the continent, it is necessary to note that there are fundamental differences between them such as that the West still retains not only its resources but also it has the resources of Africans; the West also still retains its cultures including religions, laws and monarchies and thus the Westerners are not as prone as are disinherited Africans to identity crises that are inimical to progress. A closer look at the problematic of development reveals how the evangelism on Western development constitutes production of ignorance.

Problematics of development and the gospel of development as a problem for Africa

Scholars have focused on a number of shortfalls of development ranging from its elusiveness, the ways in which development and underdevelopment are in fact forms of labelling and Western mechanisms to domesticate and condition Africans. For instance, Ferguson (1994) decried the fact that development projects have consistently failed to achieve their stated objects not least because they are based on a “construction” of the countries that bears little relation to prevailing realities. There are observations from such scholars as Ferguson that development agents including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund portray [oftentimes inventively picturing them as isolated] developing countries in terms that make them suitable targets for their development packages (Ferguson, 1994: 176, 178). Indeed African countries that historically have been self-sufficient prior to colonisation were suddenly portrayed as poor, as dependent on and needing Western assistance for development assistance; and sometimes such countries were portrayed as on the verges of starvation even as early colonial settlers depended on the African societies for grain and other kinds of food (Wilson and Thompson, 1969 cited in Ferguson, 1994). Pre-colonial African societies that had great civilisations were pilloried and deemed to be backward even as Western explorers combed their worlds collecting and looting artefacts, knowledge, mines, weaving looms and skills that evidenced great pre-colonial African civilisations (cf. Ellert, 1984; Mokhtar *et al*, 1990; Fontein, 2016; Collins *et al*, 2007; Gayre, 1972). Even as the Western colonists demonised Africans as backward, traditional and uncivilised; the same colonists did not hesitate not only to loot from the cultures, epistemologies and materialities of Africans but they also went further to dig up graves of Africans in search of ancient jewellery belonging to, and buried together with, the deceased Africans (Ellert, 1984). So, even as the (neo-)colonists dissuade, up to the contemporary era, Africans from keeping to their cultures and traditions, the same Westerners continue to hang onto looted African cultural artefacts that are still in their [Western] museums; some

Western governments have even declared [and retained their 16th century laws legitimising that] looted African artefacts as inalienable “Western public heritage” (The Guardian, 3 November, 2014).

The preceding arguments underscore that (neo-)colonial researches are done not in order to develop African economies, societies, cultures, epistemologies and religions but in order to appropriate them, to distort them, and to obliterate them to oblivion. So there has been disappearance and looting of the ancient Egyptian civilisation that was marked by high intellectual, scientific knowledge, art, literature, agriculture, tool making and iron smelting, mathematics like geometry, medicine, architecture, astronomy, and calendar, social and material standards compared to other parts of the world (Mokhtar *et al*, 1990). As far as Great Zimbabwe was concerned, there have been strenuous efforts by colonisers who financed research of the monument, since 1891, to deny that it was evidence of African civilisation (Fontein, 2016: 5). Consequently, Collins *et al*, (2007: 167) write: “Rhodes took a personal interest in popularising the antiquity and exoticism of the ruins. He supported research into the history of the site and initiated its first archaeological investigation. Rhodes recognised the considerable propaganda value that evidence of ancient foreign settlement, preferably “white” and successful Biblical origins, would have. It would give precedence and acceptability to the conquest and a promise of similar prosperity to the settlers and investors in the new colony”. The point here is that (neo-)colonial [funding of] researches are meant not to generate knowledge *but to generate ignorance* by massaging and distorting African realities so as to disinherit Africans of their knowledge, artefacts, skills, materialities and civilisations. Colonists like Cecil John Rhodes knew very well that they could only legitimise their crusade of bringing civilisation if they first of all destroyed, distorted or appropriated existing African civilisation in their colonial zero-sum game.

While Africans have been historically portrayed [for propaganda purposes] via pictures in nakedness, there is evidence that Africans had weaving looms and that they actually wove cotton cloths using their looms that were subsequently looted by colonists (Schmidt, 1992; Ellert, 1984; Gayre, 1972; Taiwo 2010). Though Western

scholars continue to portray Africa as a dark continent that receives civilisation from the Western enlightenment, there is evidence to show that Africans had their own modernity (Chirikure, 2010) which is seldom recognised by scholars, including African ones that have suffered brainwashing and Western production of ignorance about Africa. Chirikure's (2010); Ellert's (1984) and Posselt's (1935) observations are sadly being ignored even by the contemporary scholars on decoloniality [modernity/coloniality] who erroneously assume that modernity is inherently associated with colonists, and therefore that modernity has not existed in Africa until colonist came. In fact, there is a misnomer in that the Western "civilisation" that was regressive and destructive has been celebrated at the expense of real progressive civilisations that have sadly suffered the barbarism and savagery of Western "civilisation".

Sadly, Africans have been educated in Western institutions to view destructive and barbaric Western "civilisation" as development and as real civilisation and conversely to conceive their own progressive civilisations as backward and barbaric (McDonald, 2014: 73-4). In this vein, Churchill (2004: 87) argues that Native American aboriginal children were removed from their families, community and culture at earliest possible ages to be in American state sponsored education so that they could be indoctrinated. Churchill (2004: 91) proceeds to quote the Indian Commissioner Thomas J. Morgan as stating about American Indian children thus:

It is of prime importance that a fervent patriotism be awakened in [the children's] minds [...]. They should be taught to look upon America as their home and the United States government as their friend and benefactor. They should be made familiar with the lives of great and good men and women in American history, and be taught to feel pride in all their great achievements. They should hear little or nothing of the wrongs (done) the Indians, and of the injustices of the white race. If their unhappy history is alluded to, it should be to contrast it with the better future that is within their grasp.

The result for Indian children as Churchill (2004: 92) observes, was that: “The children came to identify far more with the mythic legions of noble ‘white’ men populating their textbooks and classroom lectures than they did with the grotesquely distorted caricatures of their own ancestors and traditions presented therein”. One can add to this observation the fact that such portrayals and indoctrination made it possible for (neo-)colonists to also desecrate African cultures and ancestral graves even digging them up in broad day light, in the false name of archaeology, without attracting the “notorious” indigenous label of them [(neo-)colonists] being brave witches hunting for African corpses and skeletons. In many African societies and cultures, no witch would dig up graves and exhume corpses and skeletons without risking African court proceedings or trials. However, Westerners legitimised their broad day light witchcraft activities, opening of graves and exhumation of African corpses, even looting jewellery buried with and belonging to the dead, by first of all demonising Africans colonial victims and their ancestors as [backward] witches. In the process, this generated the ignorance among Africans about the fact that to really develop, Africans needed their African cultural, social, metaphysical, spiritual, economic and political identities that were sadly being trampled upon by colonists who paradoxically kept their own institutions intact and free from desecration. African students sadly continue to be taught in academies to identify their own societies, cultures, economies, polities, parents, ancestors, communities as research problems (Nhemachena *et al* 2016) even when it is clear that African problems also originate from Western colonisers that would ideally need to be also researched, by African scholars.

The duplicities of Westerners are that while for instance the British sought to sit on African Kingly and Queenly stools in ways that would desecrate African polities and African sovereignty (Brempong, 2000; Wachter, 2010; Jackson, 2009), the same Westerners have for centuries kept their own monarchies – of the likes of Queen Elizabeth – up to the contemporary era (Mailonline, 2 June 2014; Pravda, 12 October 2012; Hindley, 2000; Al Jazeera, 30 January 2013). So, monarchs such as those of Spanish King Juan Carlos, Queen Beatrix of Netherlands; Belgian King Albert; British

Queen Elizabeth; and Swedish king Carl XVI Gustaf still exist and therefore out of 15 members of the European Union 7 are monarchies (Mailonline, 2 June 2014; Hindley, 2000). While the Queen of England appoints government, delivers speeches to set government agenda, can dissolve parliament and no bills passed by parliament are considered valid without her ratification, paradoxically as far as Africa is concerned, absence of development is often explained in terms of absence of democracy and in terms of the persistence of African traditional cultural institutions. The Western monarchs often guzzle the equivalence of tens of millions of United States dollars (Al Jazeera, 30 January 2013). Obviously, some of the Western monarchs' incomes are obtained from global exploitation of postcolonies like in Africa via transnational corporations, yet such Western traditional institutions are often glorified and are not as condemned as are African traditional institutions. The fact that Westerners still take pleasure in contesting and meddling in African politics, societies, cultures, religions and economies even though Africans do not in turn meddle in Western politics and other institutions, underscores the existence of vestiges of Western desecration of African institutions in the twenty-first century. In the words, Westerners still crave to sit on African institutions much as they hankered to sit on the Ashanti Kingly stool so as to desecrate it in the 19th century.

Western economies are able to sustain their monarchs often costing over \$50 million annually, not only on the basis of Western taxpayers' money but on the basis of exploiting Africans and others in the "Global South". Westerners who are unwilling to see African monarchs resurge paradoxically finance their own monarchs via the exploitation of Africans, African epistemologies, cultures and traditions. Western transnational pharmaceutical organisations, for instance, profit from African traditional plant knowledge which they exploit and many biotechnology and pharmaceutical inventions from northern countries are derived from plant genetic materials taken from Africa where they exploit African traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples (Koopman, 2003; Sullivan, 2004). What is worse is that, often these Western corporations exploit African states to pay low royalties and avoid paying taxes often through illegal means

(Abbas, 2009), yet they are happy to pay royalties to their own traditional Kings and Queens back in their [Western] countries.

The above arguments underline the ignorance which is the scheme of Westerners through the global deployment of the term development. Firstly, the notion of development presupposes that Africa's problem or challenge is lack of development whereas in fact Africa's problem is one of exploitation and looting by the West. Secondly, the notion of development in its emphasis on matters of poverty presupposes that Africa's major problem or challenge is simply that of poverty when in fact Africa's major problem is looting, exploitation and denial of compensation, restitutions and reparations. Poverty has existed and still exists everywhere in the world but what makes African problems peculiar are the colonial looting, robbery, exploitation and plunder. To define Africa's major problems merely in terms of poverty naturalises, by foreshadowing, exploitation, looting and robbery; it is intended to sidestep and generate ignorance about historical exploitation and looting that are central to Africa's past and present predicament. As a result, once development and poverty are foregrounded as Western scholarship does, looting, robbery, exploitation are foreshadowed, naturalised and normalised de facto. But Western development also facilitates the privileging of questions of equality instead of privileging the right questions about looting, exploitation and reparations of Africans. In fact, when Western academics privilege issues of development, poverty and inequality, they need not be understood merely as being philanthropic but privileging these issues [rather than looting, exploitation and robbery] is in fact a mechanism to hide the real problems and challenges of Africa and this diverts attention away from the real problems and solutions for the continent. So, instead of fighting legal and other battles against colonial looters, robbers and plunderers, African attention is diverted such that they end up fighting inanimate things such as poverty, inequality, underdevelopment and so on that are in fact symptoms of what (neo-) colonial plunderers did to the continent. In global Civil Society and Non-Governmental Organisations and even in United Nations parlance, fighting poverty, inequality and underdevelopment have thus assumed prominence over fighting (neo)colonial looters,

robbers and plunderers who sadly continue their business of siphoning resources out of the African continent.

The popularisation of notions such as development, poverty, equality, human rights minus the imperatives of reparations, restitution and compensation has succeeded in ensuring that Western exploiters of the continent and its peoples are viewed as saviours, even as they continue on the looting and exploitative trajectory that they set during the colonial era. Westerners who are erroneously portrayed as “developed” and “first world” instead of as looters, robbers and corrupters of the African continent’s economies, politics, cultures, spiritualities, epistemologies and societies have sadly come to be glorified by some uncritical minds. They have come to be seen as “developed” but this perception is without cognisance of the theft, corruption and looting which they continue to perpetrate on the Africans. Africans who have been robbed, looted and disinherited are erroneously labelled as underdeveloped, developing and therefore backward. Some in the West have even come to label the Africans and their looted and robbed colleagues as the “Global South,” a term seemingly neutral but hiding the looting, robbing and exploitation that Western colonisers wish to neutralise and efface by deployment of terms like “Global South” and “Global North”. The key issue here is how looters, corrupters, robbers and exploiters can simply be understood as “developed,” even “first world”; equally the key issue is how the victims of looting, theft, corruption, robbing can be simply portrayed as “underdeveloped,” “backward” and “developing”. Thus, these terms such as developed and developing, Global South and Global North hide more than they reveal. What enslavement and colonial history have created are not categories between developed and underdeveloped nations, developed and developing nations, first world and third world or Global South and Global North; rather enslavement and colonial histories have actually created on one hand, groups of the looted, robbed, plundered and exploited and on the other hand, groups of exploiters, looters, plunderers and robbers. These are the categories that development studies scholars have always sadly feared to face and research on, yet these categories are not mere fabrications but products of [global] history that need attention if the depth of African challenges is to be fathomed.

In the light of the above observations, I argue that disciplines and some courses and modules in African academies are meant to literally “discipline” Africans, to divert their attention from real, true and objective issues that matter for the continent. Some academic disciplines and modules as well as interventions in Africa are meant to dress up terrible evils, such as colonial plunder and looting, so that they appear as sensually pleasant images, if one is to borrow insights from Hill (2006: 69). While African academies have uncritically embraced the disciplines and modules on development, I argue that the notion of development much like that of civilisation has never been meant to really develop Africa. Similarly the disciplines and modules on poverty as exported from the West are not really meant to address the specificities and realities of Africans on the continent, whose poverty is more of a symptom of looting, robbing, exploitation and enslavement that are seldom addressed or even mentioned in the disciplines and modules on development and poverty in the academies on the continent and beyond. The West knows very well that it developed not because it had good economists, smart governments and states, good human rights records, leaders with rectitude or deep senses about equality; rather it knows very well that it is where it is because it looted and is looting resources from Africa; it knows that it is where it is because it enslaved Africans, exploited them, corrupted them and their institutions, disinherited them and killed them. For this reason, notions of development and poverty, equality and human rights are terms designed for evangelisation and for Western public relations designed to generate amnesia about the root causes of Africa’s troubles. If scholars are to accept the idea that the West is “developed” and “first world,” then it logically follows that they are putting precedence on corruption, chicanery, looting, robbery, barbarism and enslavement of others. There is therefore cause for scholarly wonder why many African academies, whether Western sponsored or not, have disciplines on development and poverty but absence of comprehensive disciplines on looting, robbery and exploitation of the African continent. Why looting, robbery and exploitation have been peripheralised in the academies even as they constitute the major problems and challenge for the continent both

historically and currently is cause for wonder. Obviously, Western funders of development studies are happy to see African academies excelling in irrelevance, which is, excelling in missing the real challenges of the continent. In the light of the above arguments, interventions such as the “Global Call to Action Against Poverty” (GCAP), Make Poverty History, United Nations aspirations to halve poverty by 2015 (Bond, 2006: 115) are as flawed as they have failed because they privilege poverty and not the historiographies and milieus of looting, robbery and exploitation by Western corporations on the continent.

Privileging development and poverty on Africa, hides and trivialises the exploitative, looting and robbing nature of transnational corporations that post-independence Africa is exhorted in conventional economics to attract. The exploitative and looting underside (or dark side) of transnational corporations conventionally touted as foreign investors, to be attracted, is hidden such that the fact that foreign investors are and have always been internal exploiters is lost sight of. The fact that transnational corporations and businesses have since the colonial era constituted and been the vanguard of Western imperialism is lost sight of. Privileging development and poverty underplays the looting, robbery and exploitation by (neo-)imperialists and *a fortiori*, it legitimises their continued interventionism on the continent in the guise of saviours. In a book entitled: “*Looting Africa*” Patrick Bond, (2006: 1) has therefore critiqued a number of development interventions. He, for instance, notes that former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair’s Commission for Africa’s report stated that: “... Africa is *poor*, ultimately because its economy has not grown. The public and private sectors need to work together to create a climate which unleashes the entrepreneurship of the peoples of Africa, generates employment and encourages individuals and firms domestic and foreign, to *invest*. Changes in governance are needed to make *investment climate* stronger. The *developed* world must support the African Union’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) programme to build public/private partnerships in order to create a stringer climate for growth, investment and jobs”.

Tony Blair's salvational statements repeat erroneous arguments in standard economics textbooks that circumvent Africa's real challenges while glorifying Western exploitative relations as salvational and worth for Africans to be resilient for, notwithstanding the continent's long history of struggles against (neo-)colonial exploitation, looting and disinheritance. Imperative to note is that Western economies did not grow or develop merely because they applied the economic principles that they prescribe for Africa. Rather, Western economies grew because they retained and fought for ownership of their resources and even looted and robbed the resources of others in the world. Western economies developed not because they had investors but because they had enslaved others and exploited the labour power of others. Consequently, Western economies grew not because they had partnerships but because they have always had exploitative relationships with the rest of the world. The challenge here is that the discipline of economics, in so far as it does not engage with realities of exploitation, looting, robbery and disinheritance of indigenous Africans, is a discipline designed to convert Africans to be Western underdogs and stooges. It is a discipline that disengages from continental realities and historiographies even as it grafts itself on the continent that it seeks to model on the basis of Western subjectivities and fantasies that are perpetuated via African academics and the so-called international policies.

Noting the weaknesses of Tony Blair's salvational and sweeping statements about Africa, Patrick Bond, (2006: 1, 5) argues thus:

Africa is poor, ultimately, because its economy and society have been ravaged by international capital as well as by local elites who are often propped by foreign powers. The public and private sectors have worked together to drain the continent of resources which if harnessed and shared fairly should otherwise meet the needs of the peoples of Africa [...] the central processes are associated with exploitative debt and finance, phantom aid, capital flight, the brain drain, unfair trade distorted investment and the ecological debt the North owes the South, in the context of profoundly undemocratic global power relations.

The fact that Western corporations and institutions generate ignorance among Africans when they are touted as bringing development and salvation is not only evidenced by colonial era imperially chartered companies that served as the vanguard of imperialism. This fact is also evidenced by the recent World Bank and International Monetary Fund prescriptions of neoliberalism that devastated African economies while also ensuring that African states became more dependent on Western corporations and states. Imperative for scholars to note is that the formal withdrawal at African independence of Western colonial governments and states did not necessarily result in substantive decolonisation since Western corporations and institutions continued to operate on the continent. Much as in the early colonial era when colonial companies such as New Guinea Company, German South West Africa colonial Company, British South African Company, East India Company and Dutch East India Company were established and chartered to control and govern territories on behalf of Western monarchies and rulers (Henderson, 2006; Kitamura, 1969; Mommen, 2003; BBC, 17 February 2011), the postcolonial order has retained Western corporations and institutions that are beholden to their imperial headquarters and home countries governments. By first pretending to be interested only in establishing businesses including trading enterprises, Westerners have had initial opportunities for surveillance on Africans who they eventually fought in order to colonise (BBC, 17 February 2011) and it is through companies that German, for instance, retained its colonialism even after it had formally lost colonies. Kitamura (1969: 3) writes thus: With German colonialism, a series of companies were organised playing an important part in the activity of German imperialism. “After World War I, notwithstanding loss of all the colonies, 85 companies were newly organised or reorganised and shouldered the task of continuing colonialism without colonies”. The challenge here is that Western spies often pretend to be business investors or NGO humanitarian officials (see for instance Amutabi 2006) when in fact they intend to depose African political leaders and to destroy other African social, cultural and economic institutions providing genuine avenues to African autarky and sovereignty.

The upshot of the above is that struggles for foreign investors are in effect often also struggles for attracting foreign domination and (re-)colonisation even if these are sometimes in the form of indirect (re-)colonisation similar to that which characterised the early colonial eras in the continent. Thus, (re-)colonisation has been hidden under the cloak of development and attracting foreign investments some of which are currently involved in grabbing of African land [in the guise of investments and development] from the peasants across the continent. Although in popular scholarly parlance, the foreign investors are deemed to deserve privileged status because they are deemed to have funds to invest, often there is hardly any interrogation of some of these corporations' benefits from enslaving and colonisation of Africans, who they have not restituted, repaid or compensated. Little effort is made to interrogate whether instead of featuring as investors some of these corporations must rather come to retribute, repay and compensate. In other words, in so far as disciplines hide more than they reveal, they create and legitimise ignorance particularly about the conditions that explain Africa's avarice and sad histories. The fact that reparations, restitution and compensation are popular among citizens, across the continent that seeks not only to recover reparations for enslavement and colonisation but also recover heads and skulls of their ancestors that were plundered by the West (BBC, News 4 October 2011; Namibian, May 6 2010 Opoku, 22 March 2012) underscores divergences between popular expectations and scholarly tinkering with development, poverty and equality discourses that circumvent and trivialise the consequentialism of historical looting, robbery and exploitation and disinheritance of Africans. The fact that the Herero are currently pursuing claims against Deutsche Bank and Woermann Line that financed German colonial administration and participated in German colonial enterprise (Anderson, 2005) underscores the awareness of Africans that their problems and challenges are irreducible to the so-called lack of development and the presence of poverty as mainstream scholarship would have it. While some scholars and Civil Society Organisations in Africa are swift to condemn African states and governments as having failed, being corrupt and so on, it is clear that scholarship has failed to reflect real

African challenges and problems such as reparations, restitution and compensation. The focus and privileging of development and poverty discourses by scholars and Civil Society Organisations in Africa does not reflect concerns by the generality of Africans whose conceptualisation of justice including restitution, reparations and compensation cannot be easily extinguished on the basis of Western temporal facades of effluxion of time, and colonial looting as constituting the past. This entails that the discourse on failure that focuses exclusively on African states as failures generates ignorance about the failure of scholars and academics [that paradoxically demonise African states alone for failure] to be of relevance to African popular aspirations. African academics and scholars have as Nyamnjoh (2012) argues, excelled at intellectual irrelevance on the continent often by acting as zombies and clearing agents for Western discourses [in this case, including those that privilege development and poverty and exclude matters of reparations, restitution and compensation] that hijack African popular agendas. Similarly, Western style Civil Society Organisations that proliferated onto Africa after independence have not only failed to civilise their Western corporations and states that continue to loot, rob and exploit Africans and to ignore imperatives of restitutions, reparations and compensation. Like the old missionaries, the Western Civil Society Organisations continue to believe that it is Africans that need civilisation when in fact it is the (neo-) colonial Western order that is in dire and urgent need of development, civilisation and salvation.

If Africans lived together peacefully, in pre-colonial era, characterised by compliance and obedience of African laws (Posselt, 1935), notwithstanding the absence of physical elaborate architectures of jails or prisons, the implication is that they were civilised and developed enough not to deserve the architectures of prisons as in the West. The fact that the West expects its colonial and enslavement victims to sue it as the Herero are currently doing, taking it to courts before it pays reparations and restitutions is not necessarily a sign of civilisation and development but it is more of a sign of deficit in the ethics, morals and legal sensibilities even as Westerners have for long taken pleasure in demonising the Africans as underdeveloped and uncivilised. Thus while Civil Society

Organisations and the United States of America have ensured that Nazi Jewish victims who suffered the holocaust including confiscation of property that was then nationalised by Nazi German (Keane, 2006; De Greiff, 2008), Civil Society Organisations working in Africa have failed to ensure that African victims of enslavement and colonisation were restituted and compensated, even if retroactively like what happened to the Jews.

The biggest error that Africans have made is to assume that Western civilisation and development are inherently just, fair, objective, ethical and moral whereas the reality is that they are not fair, moral, objective ethical and just because they were imposed on other societies via colonisation. In this sense, to interpret development and civilisation in terms of good governance is to lose sight of the inherent duplicities and dirtiness of these notions that hide more than they reveal. While Western development and civility [civilisation] are often construed in relation to human rights, dignity, equality and so on, little attention is paid to the fact that they have entailed the loss by Africans of their cultures, epistemologies, social, economic, political and legal institutions that have been condemned and demonised by colonists for centuries. If it is the possession of one's human institutions that makes one human then it follows that Western development and civilisation have dehumanised Africans by making them lose their human institutions. Western notions of "civilisation" and "development" were meant to generate amnesia and ignorance among Africans about their own institutions, be they families, ancestry, epistemologies, laws, polities, economies, academies, heritages, moralities and ethics. Western civilisation and development missions needed to delete African institutions including knowledge and skills so as to legitimise the creation and existence of a single unchallenged Western story about the world and the continent of Africa.

Writing about the social production of ignorance, Gross *et al*, (2015), Kourany, (2015); Danelon, (2015) and Sullivan *et al*, (2007) point out that ignorance is intertwined with epistemic, social and spatial processes such that knowledge and ignorance are imbricated. It is contended here that ignorance is produced when certain issues are foregrounded and sometimes such production of ignorance

emanates from deliberate foreshadowing of certain knowledges. There is the creation of knowledge and also the creation of geographies of ignorance (van Schendel, 2002) by the circulation of misinformation calculated to mislead (Legates *et al*, 2015). For Sullivan *et al*, (2007), racial oppressors creatively and actively create ignorance for purposes of domination and exploitation: this takes the form of those in the centres refusing to allow the marginalised to know, erasing the achievements of people of colour and erasing knowledge about the atrocities perpetrated on them by “white” people. Sullivan (2007: 162) uses the example of Puerto Rico where in the name of “doing good” overseas, the United States colonised Puerto Rico by attempting to foster women’s rights, increase literacy and better educate children, develop the island’s economy, improve public health via scientific progress. The intended result [which was partially achieved] of this was that the education system used would erase Puerto Ricans’ knowledge about themselves, their history, and their island.

Africans who have become ignorant of their ancestry and ancestral knowledge have become increasingly dependent on Westerners whose ancestors they are taught, in academics, to always reference in bibliographies as a way of showing some modicum of respect to their contribution to scholarship. Africans have become increasingly dependent on Western ancestors some of whose names Africans have proudly taken over while paradoxically demonising their own ancestors (Nhemachena, 2016). Africans including academics that have become ignorant of their own histories have increasingly taken recourse to Western history that narrates the world as a single story in Adichie’s (2009) sense. Africans that have lost their ancestral skills and knowledge to mine, smelt ore, weave baskets, weave cloths, build huts, heal the sick, farm crops and keep animals have become dependent on Western controlled knowledge and skills. Similarly, Africans that have lost knowledge about the complexity of time have become amenable to Western control via temporal assumptions of linearity of time which assume *a priori* that Africans are backward, perpetually living in the past and that assume erroneously that African ancestors belong to the past. Africans that have been captured by Western erroneous assumptions that African

ancestors belong to the past have disowned their ancestry and foregrounded Western ancestors touted as forward looking and pure saints in Western scholarship (Nhemachena, 2016). Africans have become ignorant of the fact that when ancestors were invoked before journeys and other sojourns, they [ancestors] were deemed to be leading and therefore were neither simplistically in the realm of the Western past nor in realms of temporal backwardness.

The Western caricaturing of African ancestors as backward and belonging to the past were merely meant to be instruments with which to control the psyche of those Africans that believed in such Western temporal configurations. The fact that Western colonisers [including missionaries and scientists] who wanted to appear civilised, forward and divorced from backwardness also appropriated and looted pre-colonial African artefacts, and jewellery that they looted from the African dead. The fact that they looted and robbed the heads of African ancestors shows that they actually coveted African ancestors who had pre-colonial civilisations that spanned across the continent. In this vein, the refusal by some Western states to repatriate African artefacts and skulls of African ancestors indicates that the African past has always been the valuable future for the West; if the African past is as antidevelopment as Westerners have always argued one wonders why the West that professes to be developed has made all efforts to retain looted African artefacts and skulls. The issue here is that while Westerners have condemned Africans that kept to the ways of their ancestors as backward and uncivilised, the Westerners are still paradoxically busy appropriating not only skulls and artefacts of African ancestors but also the indigenous particularly herbal and plant medicinal knowledge that continues to suffer exploitation by Global Western pharmaceutical corporations. Therefore, Western pronouncements of the linearity of time were meant to discipline Africans so that they would be more willing and ready to hand over their ancestral skulls, jewellery and ancestral knowledge to colonists who strove to exploit them. Time, even as it is used in development and civilisation discourses, is a psychological leverage to control and manipulate others that happen to be defined as backward. Time has become, since the colonial era, a tool for evangelisation about civilisation and development as much as it has

been deployed by missionaries to uproot Africans from their ancestral ways that had enhanced their self-sufficiency. Western temporal constructions were meant to generate psychological dependence by the colonised that would make easy the Western missions on development and civilisation.

Time constructs have continued to be used by the West to gain leverage in all African institutions including family, politics, economics, religion, education, rituals and health. Terms such as change, transition, development and civility all construed in Western senses, have temporality as their central plank and they are mobilised and used mostly to whip-up Africa to toe the Western lines. The West uses these terms to ensure that the periphery is compliant to Western dictates. Rarely are these terms applied to Westerners who in any case portray themselves as already developed rather than developing, as civilised rather than requiring civilisation, as stable rather than in transition and requiring change. Time in this sense is a political, economic, psychological and cultural tool that the West uses to effect their desired changes and transitions in other societies even as it [the West] retains its age old traditions [as well as looted traditions from other societies around the world], retains its age old practices including dominance over others, at a planetary level. The problem of dominance over others which is narrowly used to explain African failures to development is in fact a Western problem *par excellence*, since it is the West that dominates over the planet while it pretends to be averse to domination on smaller scales. The subsection below takes us through the problematics of Western traditions of dominance even as it paradoxically evangelises on equality, human rights, democracy and development. The section explores the problematic relation between time and Western pretensions of civilisation, development.

Time, Development and Civilisation

The picture below shows some of the skeletal Herero people of Namibia who suffered and survived genocide at the hands of German colonisers that killed over 70 000 Hereros and also Namas in 1904 (Curson 2012; Friedrichsmeyer *et al* 1998). They were driven

by the Germans into the Kalahari Desert to starve and die of thirst merely because their “crime” was to be owners of their coveted land and other natural resources. Although German has recently reluctantly offered apologies only in this twenty-first century, it has refused to compensate or pay reparations to the Herero and Nama Namibian survivors of the genocide on the pretext that it is providing *development aid* to Namibia. This refusal to repay by the Germans [that have paradoxically made reparations to German Jewish victims of the holocaust] has not been subject to popular referendum or vote by the Namibians. It is therefore a dictatorial high handed decision by German to refuse to repay even as the Herero survivors are pushing for reparations. Even as the Herero prefer reparations, the Germans dictate that development is a better choice for them even if much development is often in the form of tied aid where the donor country dictates where, and how the aid is to be used. Western development has become such a single story that it is deemed, including by Western “democracies,” as worth of dictating to African victims of Western civilisation even if they prefer alternative choices. It is worth drawing the attention of readers to the fact that while the driving of the Herero into the Kalahari Desert to starve and die of thirst is portrayed in scholarly works to be a thing of the past, Western states continue to [officially and unofficially , informally and formally] impose sanctions on other countries in the looted and coveted global periphery in ways that share logics with the Herero desert experiences of mass starvation. As far as time is concerned, Westerners claim to be champions of human rights even if paradoxically they have not made right their enslavement and their colonial disinheritance of others. The key issue here is why scholars must accept the crusades on Western human rights and democracy as developmental and civilisation if Western colonial barbarism and savagery such as the Herero genocide were presented falsely as civilisation and progress. The question is whether Western leopards have changed their colonial spots.



Picture Number 1; *Source: Daniel A. Gross, 28 October 2015.*

Hereros of Namibia were driven by the German colonisers into the desert to starve and die of thirst.



Herero Executions in German South West Africa -- 1907
© Hulton Archive / Getty Images

Picture Number 2; *Source: Herero Executions in German South West Africa; African Archives, 16 May 2015.*

The above picture allows one to glean Western temporal, cultural and jurisprudential continuities of these hangings of the Herero and other contemporary Africans who resist (neo-)colonisation and Western hegemony. If as far back as 1907, Westerners arrogated to themselves the right to hang African colonial resisters, what parallels exists between these centuries old Western practices and the recent International Criminal Court (ICC) biases against African leaders who are preferred for prosecution in The Hague? (see for instance, Murithi, 2014; Arieff *et al*, 2010). The targeting of African leaders for prosecution at the ICC coupled with the paying of blind eyes to Western leaders who are accorded freedom to kill not only in their countries but across the whole world, such as in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in Libya and so on, underlines repetition of history of colonial execution of Africans. The executions have little if anything to do with impunity in the world because Western leaders have enjoyed impunity since the enslavement and colonial era and they continue to enjoy impunity for planetary crimes even as the ICC watches. The assumption that the ICC was created to resolve matters of violence crimes in the world is in fact a result of ignorance about the inherent [structural, symbolic and systemic] violence in Western institutions, including jurisprudence, that are often imposed on African institutions. History could therefore be repeating itself in the “developments” such as the International Criminal Court, that in its focus on prosecuting Africans, erroneously presumes that Africans are the [only] international criminals in the world that are worth the guillotine at the ICC. To move forward, Africa needs leaders who are as intrepid as they are incorruptible by vacuous promises of civilisation, development and equality that emanate from the West that in its very looting and exploitation of others negates the civilisation, development and equality that it paradoxically dangles.



Eine Kiste mit Herero-Köpfen wurde kürzlich von den Truppen in Deutsch-Süd-Westland beschlagnahmt und an das Pathologische Institut zu Berlin geschickt, wo sie zu wissenschaftlichen Forschungen verwandt werden sollen. Die Schädel, die von Hereros durch Blattschneiden vom Hals abgetrennt und verpackt gemacht wurden, stammen von gehängten oder gefallenen Hereros.

Picture Number 3; *Source: Trip Down Memory Lane; October 26 2012*

The picture above raises issues about the centuries old Western affinity for the heads and skulls of Africans in both literal and metaphorical senses. The Western decapitation of African institutions by dethroning African Kings and Queens, Prime Ministers and Presidents so as to deny African territorial sovereignty is exemplified here by the colonial decapitation of Africans and the packing of their heads in boxes for shipment to the West. The contemporary Western scholarly crusade against African assertions

of sovereignty comes to mind here in the light of Western taste for decapitating Africans and their institutions. Equally, the decapitation of African leaders via trials at the ICC referred to above that has been depicted by some scholars as biased against Africans underscores Western temporal continuities in hunting for African heads. As the Herero experiences with German colonisers show, Westerners have had for a long time intense affinity for African heads some of which they got after summarily executing Africans using alien laws and then shaving the heads, boiling, and packing them into boxes for shipment to the West. The Westerners are still refusing to return heads of early African colonial resisters that are being kept in Western museums away from African territories. The critical question is why scholars must continue to portray the West as having brought civilisation to Africa when they in fact came to harvest African heads and skulls for shipment back to their metropolitan countries. Ordinarily, practices such as digging up, cutting off and packing heads and skulls would attract the labels of witchcraft practices. The practices would be abhorrent among Africans that have more respect not only for human life but also for the sanctity of the dead. For instance, in African Shona indigenous childhood games and songs, it was only witches that were known to pluck heads of human beings, as they were asleep, in order to take them away to play them with other witches, as if the heads were balls. The point here is that although Western colonisers believed their own story that they were bringing civilisation to Africa, the colonial practices including genocides, the chopping down of African heads and the digging up of African graves to collect heads, skulls and the dead's jewellery were all abhorrent, uncivilised and barbaric acts in the eyes of indigenous Africans. Similarly, while Westerners believed their own stories that they used rational knowledge, practices such as genocide, and the looting of heads and skulls of African are hard to legitimise with rationality and morality.



Picture Number4; *Source:*

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herero_and_Namaqua_genocide; See also *Jofie Lamprecht Safaris*, 27 April 2015.

Meetings like this, where only people of one race deliberate and plot on the rest of the humanity in the world are not merely historical. Such meetings are paralleled by the United Nations Security Council where certain races dominate and exclude the majority of the world, in the former colonies, even as the United Nations purports to be representative of humanity and the world. Meetings such as those at the United Nations where certain Western countries are dominant in the world are paralleled by meetings of dominant Western corporations in the world to deliberate on matters that affect the majority of humanity, in former colonies, that are excluded from the meetings and plots. When dominant Western countries and corporations meet to plan and plot sanctions on other former colonies in the periphery of the world, the majority of the affected citizens are not invited to deliberate and decide, much as what happened during the colonial era. Resultantly, there are temporal continuities between past Western colonial logics of absurdity and contemporary global Western logics of exclusion where Africans are excluded from meetings in the world that affect them and their continent.



Picture Number 5; *Source: Jofie Lamprecht Safaris, 27 April 2015*

The above picture raises questions about whether postcolonial Africans have, in physical and ideological senses, lost their chains. In the light of Western ideological and intellectual traps that often zombify Africans in the academies, scholars like Nyamnjoh, (2012) have argued that, sadly some Africans including the educated ones now view their chains [of servitude] as ornamental. Western defined freedom, development, democracy, rights and civilisation have therefore been argued to imprison Africans such that Harri Englund, (2006) writes about Africans in terms of “Prisoners of Freedom”. Thus while Englund writes in terms of “Prisoners of Freedom,” Pignarre and Stengers, (2011) also argue that capitalism is an apparatus of capture. The fact that humanity is still under the global control of Western colonisers underlines that they are still in bondage even though Westerners have since the formal end of colonialism proliferated their discourses and alluring notions about freedom, human rights, democracy, development and progress. Africans still continue to be in bondage because they have not had reparations, restitution and compensation for colonial disinheritance and exploitation, which sadly continue unabated in the twenty-first century. They continue to be shadows of their colonisers, who have continued to deny them their heritage, promising instead to fight for development and poverty; this circumventing the historical lootings and pillage of Africans.

Democracy, human rights, equality and development in so far as they are currently deployed constitute Western soporific efforts to neutralise African struggles for ownership and control of their heritages. As Hill (2006: 68) argues, words and terms divorced of content are often used to conceal the reality:

[...]Words whose actual meaning may actually be shocking, offensive, stupid, or horrible, or which may have no meaning at all, can be artfully manipulated to provoke a reaction quite alien to the reality of what is being expressed [...].By capitalising on form divorced from content, by pursuing pleasing formal perfection, radiant words, images, resonant, sonorous syllables, bewitching lyricism, appealing rhythms and rhymes, sexual pleasure, delight, enjoyment at the expense of content, language can effectively belie what it ordinarily means or efface the reality of what is being said.

It is necessary to explore here the ways in which words especially catchphrases such as the terms “development” and “poverty” are used to conceal reality and the implications of such concealments of reality. During the colonial era and the enslavement era, words that depicted Africans as animals or subhuman were used to conceal the reality that Africans were also human beings, indeed more human than those who labelled them. Such words legitimised exploitation, disinheritance and looting of Africans and they were meant to legitimise the perpetration of evil on Africans; they served to camouflage what was naturally offensive thereby making the perpetration of evil possible on a massive scale. Such evil was legitimised in these ways in the 1800s when colonisation occurred in many parts of the world, and when scholars like Nietzsche wrote about the seductiveness of evil, the need to dissociate evil from the ugliness that moralisers enveloped it, beautifying doctoring, camouflaging what is naturally offensive, repulsive, horrible, dangerous so as to make it presentable, palatable, digestible, appealing, tempting to entice people into the realm of a new logic (Hill, 2006: 85). In post-independence Africa, the West has made the evils of continuing looting and exploitation palatable and digestible

by deploying and creating endearing notions often devoid of material content such as human rights, development, and democracy. The West has retained African materialities such as land, minerals and forests while it simultaneously endeared Africans in notional terms devoid of material content. In this sense, Africans have neither recovered their material resources and reparations nor have they achieved development as conceived by Westerners. The reason, it is argued here is that Western notions of development, human rights, equality are meant to be mere endearments to facilitate the Western ambitions of putting the African cart before the horse.

Contemporary scholarly theoretical arguments that claim the absence of reality, absence of objectivity, absence of truth, absence of good and evil have the effects of denying the truth that Africans were looted, disinherited and exploited. By denying the existence of reality, the theoretical explications have the unfortunate effects of denying real harm to Africans and thus they have the effect of generating ignorance among the disinherited about their conditions, reality and truth about their history and state of being exploited. Euro-modernist development and civilisation missions that were premised on binaries between, on one hand African culture/tradition and on the other hand modernity, were complicity in the marginalisation and demonisation of Africans in ways that produced ignorance. However, in so far as postmodernism denies the existence of reality and truth, it by extension implies that there is no distinction between the robbed Africans and the Western robbers and looters of the continent; it implies that there is no distinction between African owners of resources and colonial Western looters, robbers and exploiters; it implies that there is no difference between a real Africans and settler looters who came to colonise and dispossess indigenous Africans. In other words, postmodernism and interventions premised on it generate ignorance of distinctions between robbed African owners and the colonial robbers/looters; it generates ignorance about the reality of looting and exploitation in African history; it generates ignorance about real historical ownership of African resources by Africans. Also, it generates ignorance about realities and truths about such things like the genocide perpetrated by colonial settlers on indigenous Africans. It also generates ignorance

about the reality and truth of distinctions between bondage and freedom. For this reason, I concur with Hill's (2006: 69) argument that generating confusing and ignorance [in the way some contemporary theorists do] about what is meaningful and meaningless, objective and subjective, real and imaginary, truth and falsehood, good and evil is meant to drive people on journeys beyond morality. Much as Locke and Mill (Parekh, 1995) denied, as far back as the 16th century, the notion of ownership of resources to indigenous people, Western notions of development and (post-) development continue to deny Africans ownership of their resources. Therefore, both development and (post-) development discourses marginalise imperatives of reparations, compensation and restitution of resources to Africans. A closer look at (post-)development thinking reveals the continuations of the Western spots that deny African ownership of their resources.

(Post-)development discourses and other contemporary tinkering

While (post-)development at least as it is understood by some scholars (Andreasson 2010; Gibson-Graham 2005; Escobar 1992), appears to take into cognisance indigenous knowledge, that is indigenous culture, the challenge is that it does not take into cognisance indigenous notions of ownership of resources that were devastated by colonialism. While mainstream Western scholarship denies individual ownership of resources among pre-colonial Africans, the situation, for instance, among the Shona presents a different picture. Among the Shona people, the terms *rangu* (mine); *changu* (mine), *zvangu* (mine), *vangu* (mine) and *yangu* (mine) as distinct from *redu* (ours), *chedu* (ours), *zvedu* (ours), *vedu* (ours), *wedu* (ours) and *yedu* (ours) underscore the existence not only of collective ownership but also individual personal ownership. Thus, although a close reading of (post-)development literature (Andreasson, 2010) skirts questions of ownership of resources by indigenous people, choosing rather to focus on indigenous cultures that were made invisible in modernist development, there is evidence that indigenous people have always had notions of individual ownership which they have

been consistently denied in Western scholarship. If (post-) development is understood in terms that underplay and ignore indigenous ownership of resources, the consequence is that restitution, reparations and compensation for looting of indigenous lands and other resources will be ignored even as indigenous people crave for such reparations and restitutions, which are in any case part of indigenous epistemologies.

Some (post-)development scholars like Andreasson (2010) write against the African states that they portray as having failed. However, such scholars are in oblivion of the fact that failure has been by all concerned parties including Western states and corporations that are supposed to pay reparations and compensation, Civil Society Organisations in Africa that are supposed to launch effective activism for reparations and compensation to Africans, and scholars that have misrepresented Africans for centuries. So, arguments by some scholars to the effect that African states must exit out of the continent for the reason that they have failed should also be understood to presume by extension that Western states and corporation, scholars and civil society organisations that have failed to assist Africans must necessarily also exit. Non-Governmental Organisations and Civil Society Organisations directing their campaigns and activism solely or mainly against African states need to do some self-introspection to reflect on their own failures and those of Western states, corporations and institutions. In a context where, in countries such as Zimbabwe, colonial settlers and corporations have relied on their Western states to loot, exploit and rob Africa, Africans would naturally need their African states to reclaim their ownership of African resources and therefore the (post-)development scholarly arguments for statelessness in Africa after the exit of the states, are misplaced. Furthermore, the contemporary international legal architecture only recognises state parties in suits for international reparations, restitution and compensations. To argue for the exit of African states or for statelessness is in effect to argue against reparations, restitution and compensation suits by indigenous Africans. It is for these reasons, as well as for the fact that statelessness in Africa would facilitate contemporary Western

scramble for African resources, that Westerners are staunchly opposed to African states and nationalism.

The contemporary emphasis and crusades on human rights, to the exclusion of mention of correlative duties, by Civil Society Organisations, Western states and NGOs need to be contextualised within the movements to unseat and immobilise African states and cultural institutions that are invariably the targets of the crusades. The crusades paradoxically intensified during the era of neoliberalism when state power was undercut by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank neoliberal prescriptions. At a time when NGOs and Civil Society Organisation scaled-up their human rights vis a vis the African states, crusades in Africa, the paradox was that at the same time neoliberal reforms were implanted and implemented with the effect of reducing and whittling down the Africans' power and rights vis a vis international capital. International capital was accorded by IMF and World Bank neoliberal reforms, free reign over the continent through sweatshops and export processing zones for the super-exploitation of African labourers that no longer enjoyed state protection and some crucial labour rights. So, while human rights campaigns vis a vis African states increasingly were privileged by NGOs the Bretton hood institutions' neoliberal reforms eroded African labour rights vis a vis international Western capital. The emphasis on rights against African states without sensibilities about duties, and conversely the emphasis on duties to international corporations or capital in exploitative sweatshops and export processing zones speak volumes about the duplicities of the Western human rights crusaders. The paradox underscores the fact that human rights crusades are not meant to free Africans from all forms of barbarism, exploitation, looting and robbery [by Western capital] but rather they are meant to serve as Western leverage to fight for the exit and demise of African states whose sovereignty over African resources is detested by covetous Westerners.

Notions such as human security and human development [as opposed to state security] that are emphasised by organisations like UNDP since 1994 need also to be contextualised within a world that is increasingly becoming antithetical to the assertion of African states' sovereignty over African resources. Whereas there are erroneous

assumptions that one becomes more human and gets more security if one is freed from human duties including to one's states, cultures and institutions, the reality is that one is animalised by absence of humanely duties.

When rights are emphasised to the exclusion of duties to African culture, family, states and other institutions, there is reason to be suspicious of the crusaders of such pure, absolute and unfettered rights. African citizens or human beings need to expect to realise their rights to human security and human development within the context of their duties to their governments, states, cultures, societies, religions and economies. Human security and human development should not be construed in the case of Africa to amount to necessity for excision of African states. African development and democracy can only thrive where citizens and states are both conscious of their rights and their duties; to ignore duties and favour one's rights amounts to corruption and subhumanity. The point here is that to be weeded from one's state, culture, family, religion, society and economy does not amount to freedom, civilisation and development. In fact, the statuses of the enslaved were characterised by divorce from the protection, paternalism and social security provided by one's state, family, culture, society and religion. So, crusades against African states that are often summarily viewed as antidevelopment, corrupt, failed and so on, are not in reality emancipating for Africans because to be removed from the African states, cultures, families and cosmologies is in effect to be enslaved by the predatory West that has always thrived after decapitating African institutions.

The challenge for scholarship is that the notion of development has been applied to Western states that have exhibited no senses of duty to restitute, pay reparations and compensation. The unfortunate implication of this application of the label "developed" to some (neo-)colonial Western states has been that development can be achieved by ignoring one's duties in the world. Whereas in African indigenous knowledge, rights are always balanced against one's duties not only to the living but also to the dead, Western development discourses presuppose that development can be recklessly duty-less and without sensibilities for reparations and restitution to those that are harmed and exploited. For this reason, I argue here that the notion of

Western development is inherently corrupt and corrupting in so far as it creates and legitimises emphasis on rights without correlative duties. Equally the term development is meant to create ignorance among the generations of survivors of enslavement, looting, robbery and exploitation on the African continent, who would otherwise be predisposed to demand reparations and restitution from the West.

Conclusion

The simplistic assertions, as have become fashionable in Western scholarly discourses, that Westerners who enslaved, exploited, disinherited and expropriated African resources [including labour power] are “developed” miss the important point that development has to come with cognisance of duties to restitute, compensate and reparations. Equally, to state simplistically that those who have suffered looting are merely developing, underdeveloped or in need of (post-) development is to miss the key point that they have and are being preyed upon by colonial settlers. To conceive Africa, that has been looted, robbed and exploited, as merely underdeveloped is to be ignorant of the realities of looting and exploitation that the continent is going through. The upshot of this realisation is that corruption in Africa begins with corruption of terms and of African reality. Just as colonisation has thrived on the basis of hiding its reality and by presenting itself as civilisation, the contemporary notion of development hides more than it reveals.

Development cannot be merely measured on the bases of GDPs or GNPs, human development, human security, resilience, freedom, human rights, democracy or educational attainments. Development for disinherited, looted and exploited Africa has to be a consequence of reparations, compensation and restitution, and these premises need not be circumvented and clouded by scholarly conceptual inventions that serve more to hide than to reveal African reality, authenticity and truth. So, development interventions that simplistically focus on addressing poverty in Africa are inadequate because they address symptoms rather than causes. They put the cart before the horse in that for Africa that has been looted and disinherited for centuries, the critical issue is not merely that Africans

are poor but rather that they have been looted, robbed and disinherited. These matters of reality, truth, authenticity are sadly sidestepped by theorisations designed to hide the coloniality and depredations of contemporary global power and that foreground rights without duties to restitute and pay reparations.

The contemporary postmodern and poststructuralist celebrations of absence of reality, truth, authenticity are in fact celebrations of the ignorance that western epistemologies have created among Africans who have had their historiographies, their cultures, religions, epistemologies, politics and economies distorted since the colonial era. Notions that are designed to distort African realities, truth and authenticity perpetuate the looting and disinheritance [including at an ideological level] of African minds. Such terms are as symbolically and ideologically violent as they perpetuate and perpetrate coloniality on African minds. In this, sense scholars that celebrate “hybridity” [as opposed to authenticity and originality] in Africa need not be blind to the violence through which the West has for centuries used in its efforts to create African “hybrids”. The notion of “hybrids” should necessarily invite scholars to consider not merely states of “hybridity” but also the historicity of violence attendant to the processes of “hybridisation”. The authenticity, reality and truth of looting, exploitation and robbery of Africans need not be lost in the contemporary efforts by some scholars to erase the crimes of the West on the African and other continents that have suffered colonisation and enslavement. The ongoing production of ignorance about African realities, for which African students and governments are unfortunately made to bear the burden of funding, need to be revisited and addressed if African academics are not to continue being beasts of burden for irrelevant Western conceptual and disciplinary baggage.

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Problematising the Developmental Potential of Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOTS) in Zimbabwe: The Case of the Tongogara CSOT, 2011-2014

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Introduction

The launch of the Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOTs) from 2011 has become a major issue of contestation in Zimbabwe. The debate has focused mainly on the efficacy of CSOTs as vehicles for rural development, particularly participatory rural community development. The polarising question broadly has been: to what extent are CSOTs a genuine indigenisation and economic empowerment programme meant to benefit rural communities of Zimbabwe? Alternatively, to what degree are CSOTs constitutive of the vote-buying tactics of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)? The purpose of this chapter is to wade into this debate by broadly attempting to address the larger question: What potential do the CSOTs have for uplifting developmental needs, and in raising the socio-economic conditions, in Zimbabwe's rural areas? Put differently, do the CSOTs represent an effective empowerment vehicle? Taken specifically for Shurugwi District, the chapter interrogates the extent to which the Tongogara Community Share Ownership Trust (TCSOT) is an effective vehicle for community participatory development for the socio-economic transformation of rural Shurugwi? At the broader national level, this question also seeks to problematise the link between the community share ownership trusts and the larger developmental goals of Zimbabwe. Lastly, the chapter asks: what has been the place of minerals in the political economy of Shurugwi? Largely, the chapter advances that despite the good intentions and sound paper policies, CSOTs represent failure in the government efforts to decentralise

rural development. The chapter is divided into three sections, the first of which attempts to theorise development and to place the CSOTs in their historical genealogy of the post-colonial government efforts to indigenise the economy and simultaneously empower the previously disadvantaged “blacks”. The second part problematises the two meta-narratives around the CSOTs and attempts to proffer a third discourse that considers CSOTs as part of the state induced ‘passive revolution’. The basic premise for this chapter is that while there is a growing body of literature on the CSOTs, this literature is not conclusive and it needs to be built further. As such, the purpose of this chapter, utilising the case study of the TCSOT, is to enter into the polarising debate on the efficacy of the CSOTs as vehicles to spur rural communities’ development.

Location, methodology and choice of the TCSOT

Shurugwi District is one of the eight districts of the Midlands Province. Administratively, Shurugwi is divided into two, urban and rural. Of the two, the rural part is larger and spatially covers almost 98% of the district and a population of 69 954, with Shurugwi urban area consisting of the small Shurugwi town with a total population of 16 866 people. Shurugwi rural is administered by the Tongogara Rural District Council (TRDC) housed at Tongogara Growth Point. It is a district that is divided into twenty-four wards, with a councillor representing each ward. The district is also divided into two political constituencies, Shurugwi North and Shurugwi South. In terms of traditional administration there are three chiefs namely Nhema, Ndanga and Banga who are supported by twelve headmen (Marongwe, 2013).

This study employs a case-study approach. As a research design, the case-study approach assisted the researchers to deeply probe many aspects of the respondents’ life histories as they intermingled with the beneficiaries of the TCSOT. The case study approach significantly contributed to a deep understanding and appreciation of the social realities confronting the communities by allowing the researchers to draw from hard empirical evidence through direct interactions with community stakeholders and through paying

particular observations to the specific processes, patterns and structural features that dominate the scheme. The interviews and participation observation also allowed the researchers to share the lived experiences of the people in these communities. We also complemented the case study findings with relevant literature obtained from other primary and secondary sources on community share ownerships in particular, and indigenisation in general, in Zimbabwe.

The TCSOT in Shurugwi District was selected for this study because it was one of the first CSOTs to be launched nationally. Inaugurated on the 23rd of November 2011, it was the second CSOT to be launched in the country by President Robert Mugabe after the Mhondoro-Ngezi-Chegutu-Zvimba CSOT. It was also financially capacitated on its launch unlike the subsequent CSOTS that have struggled for funding. To this extent, it is instructive to note that at the launch of the TCSOT, Unki Mine availed ten million dollars to the TCSOT as seed money for the Shurugwi rural community development projects (*The Sunday Mail*, 7-13 July 2013). The TCSOT also earned a further one million dollars as interest from the Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ) where it deposited the seed money from Unki, which brought the total cash available to the trust to eleven million dollars (*The Sunday Mail*, 7-13 July 2013). As such, the TCSOT offers a good case for evaluating the role and efficacy of CSOTs in rural community development.

Theoretical framing of CSOTS as participatory development

This section discusses the efficacy of CSOTs as a component of participatory community rural development. It does this by discussing the conceptual framework of participatory rural development as espoused by John Makumbe (1996). First, this is to situate and trouble the connections between the ethos of community share ownership schemes and lived experiences with the TCSOT for the residents of Shurugwi rural. Second, while the theory offers important insights into participatory development, it has not been applied to community share ownership trusts. Third, from the official Zimbabwean government perspective, community share ownership

schemes are couched as designed to improve the participation of rural communities in their development programmes. As such, this section affords an opportunity to trouble this narrative.

Makumbe (1996) discusses the notion of participatory development and he makes a serious attempt to link this concept to post-colonial development programmes in Zimbabwe. According to Makumbe, participatory development encapsulates tenets of deliberate democratised community active involvement in projects that bring positive changes to people's livelihoods (Makumbe: 1996:13). For Makumbe, this is based on the following pillars: "mass sharing of benefits of development, mass contribution to the development effort, and mass decision making in development" (p. 6). Chambers (1983) underlines the centrality of participatory development in its quest to engage local communities in developmental strategies through the metaphor that "it is the donkey that knows how hot the ground is not the rider." Taken in this way, participatory development is supposed to address the central concerns of the communities because the initiatives are supposed to come straight from the beneficiaries. Makumbe goes further to separate active or direct participation from passive or indirect participation by noting that "active participation goes beyond mere choice-making from among pre-determined alternatives while passive participation largely pertains to such choice making and even manipulation of the masses by those who will have made the critical decisions in the first place" (Makumbe, 1996: 7-8). The United Nations, cited in Makumbe (1996: 8) argues that direct participation in decision making "involves physical interaction between those persons in whom society has invested authority to make decisions and the people affected by those decisions." However, physical interaction may not necessarily result in direct participation, as there may be "physical contact without the opportunity for people or their representatives to make meaningful and informed decisions" especially in the rural areas where leadership is venerated (Ibid). On the other hand, indirect community participation happens through elected representatives (Ibid).

Critically, Makumbe discusses the pros and cons of community participation. To him, the advantages include: promoting the efficient

utilisation of resources, including labour and local knowledge; promoting self-reliance and self-sustenance; supplying useful feedback to planners and administrators; empowering local communities with decision making, which leads “to the democratisation of development”; minimising state interference in community affairs; helping in generating sound project designs; and, eliminating resistance to projects among the locals as it aids in the acceptance of new ideas (Makumbe, 1996: 18-23). Among the cons are that community participating may be time consuming; funders may largely draw on already existing socio-political structures, which helps in widening the gaps (socio-economic and political) in society and the choosing of projects that are selected by leaders and not by the community; conflicting interests between individuals and socio-economic classes may hinder community participation and increase societal conflict; women involvement is limited; may be perceived as undercutting political leadership; may worsen the tensions between local area needs and national interests; and, some community members may have an indifferent attitude to the project (Ibid: 24-326). In the section below, the discussion focuses on the intersection between the CSOTs and indigenisation policy in Zimbabwe. This allows a window into the efficacy of CSTOs, and the TCSOT in particular, as vehicles for participatory development and affords us a broader evaluation of the potential community empowering efforts in post-colonial Zimbabwe.

Perhaps, it is important at this juncture to note that community share ownership schemes are a global phenomenon and did not actually originate in Zimbabwe. Many other countries across the globe have embarked upon different home grown initiatives to develop their economies. According to Marowa (2013), the United States and Australia have earlier on in their development embraced the idea of what is referred to as Employee Share Ownership Trusts. Following the failure of the Brettonwoods institutions – the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank – to span development through Structural Adjustment Programmes in Asia, China and the four Asian Tigers: Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore resorted to home grown solutions which emphasised

the participation of local communities in developmental initiatives (<http://www.kubatana.net2012>).

Situating the CSOTs in indigenisation

CSOTs in Zimbabwe “were established under Section 14B of the Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations of 2010 which provide that local communities whose natural resources are being exploited by any ‘qualifying business’ must be guaranteed shareholding in such business” (*The Herald*, 18 September 2013). Under the Act, large foreign-owned mining companies with five million dollar equities and above operating in Zimbabwe were to cede 51% of their equity to indigenous Zimbabweans under the ratio of 10% for the community share ownership trust, another 10 per cent for the employee share ownership and a further 31 per cent for the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Fund (NIEEF) or the sovereign fund. The ten percent shares allocated to the local communities were to be controlled by traditional and local government authorities in trust of their communities (IEE (General) Regulations 2010).

In terms of the governing structure, as outlined above, the CSOTs were to be run by traditional and local government authorities in trust of their communities. To this end, “[t]he Community Share Ownership Trust shall have the Chief as its chairperson and the chairperson of the Rural District Council (RDC) shall be a Trustee. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the RDC shall be the Secretary of the Trust whilst the rest of the Trustees shall not be from the RDC but instead, from the community having representation of the youth, women and disabled” (Kasukuwere, 2011: n.p). Other members of the CSOTs were to be a lawyer, an accountant and a mining company representative (*Newsday*, 29/11/2012). Furthermore, “the Community Share Ownership Trusts shall have a Deed of Trust registered with the Deeds office” (Ibid). As noted by Gwatiringa, the Chief Executive officer of the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board, CSOTs would be subject to external auditing in order to provide a

check on financial operations of the CSOTs and to avoid the embezzlement of funds (*The Newsday*, 29/11/12).

In accordance with the structure of CSOTs outlined above, the TCSOT is headed by three chiefs, namely Nhema, Banga and Ndanga, who chair the trust rotationally. The daily operations are superintended by the TCSOT Administrator based at the Tongogara Rural District Council (TRDC) offices situated at the Tongogara Growth Point. Other members of the TCSOT include the District Administrator for Shurugwi. The chairperson of the Tongogara Rural District Council sits on the TCSOT board as a Trustee. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the TRDC is the Secretary of the TCSOT. The other trustees are the District Youth Officer who represents the interests of the youths, District Social Welfare Officer who represents the special interests of women and the disabled. Other members of the TCSOT are a lawyer, an accountant and a representative of Unki Mines.

CSOTs should be taken as constitutive of the basket of controversial indigenisation and economic empowerment schemes in post-colonial Zimbabwe meant to extend the access to, and ownership of, the means of production to the black majority in the country. These schemes include, *inter alia*, the land reform programmes that started from the 1980s and intensified in the 2000s under the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). There were also some indigenous pressure group schemes like the Indigenous Business Development Centre (IBDC) formed in 1990, the Affirmative Action Group (AAG) of 1994, and the Indigenous Business Women's Organisation (IBWO) of 1994 that sought to pressurise the government to democratise the distribution of national assets to the previously disadvantaged blacks. In collaboration with these pressure groups' initiatives, and also as a government initiative for the greater participation of blacks in the national economy following the failure of the privatisation of parastatals under the dictates of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) of 1990's to stimulate economic growth, the government came up with the Policy Framework on the Indigenisation of the Economy in 1998 leading to the creation of the National Investment Trust (NIT) (Machinya, 2014). The NIT was supposed to be the vehicle to offer

financial assistance to the emerging black entrepreneurs (Ibid). The Revised Policy Framework for the Indigenisation of the Economy of October 2004 later became the cornerstone for the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (IEE Act) of 2008 (Chowa and Mukuvare, 2013:7; Machinya, 2014). To further refine the IEE Act, the government passed the IEE General Regulations in 2010 to include the aspect that compels the foreign companies to cede fifty-one per cent of their shareholding to locals (IEE (General) Regulations 2010).

The IEE Act (2008) defines indigenisation as “a deliberate involvement of indigenous Zimbabweans in the economic activities of the country, to which hitherto they had no access, so as to ensure the equitable ownership of the nation’s resources”. Indeed, at the attainment of independence in 1980, the ZANU-PF led black government inherited a structurally differentiated and polarised economy which was heavily skewed in favour of the whites. Furthermore, while the urban sector was relatively well developed, the rural economy which ironically provided livelihoods to 70 to 80 percent of the Zimbabwean population, was predominantly impoverished (NIEEB 2013). This was due to the fact that, in colonial Zimbabwe, as elsewhere in Africa then, the “white” administrators deliberately and systematically discriminated against the black majority from meaningful participation in the national economic enterprise. In order to deal with the socio-economic disparities created by colonialism, various indigenisation schemes as those mentioned in the preceding paragraph were embarked upon to promote the empowerment of the indigenous groups that were previously disadvantaged by colonialism. In this regard, and as defined in the IEE Act (2008) empowerment is taken in the act to mean “the creation of an environment which enhances the performance of the economic activities of indigenous Zimbabweans into which they would have been introduced or involved through indigenisation”. What is discerned from the above is that indigenisation is intended to bring sanity and the greater economic rewards to hitherto colonially disadvantaged blacks that should spur greater sustainable socio-economic development, which, on the one

hand, lends the indigenisation process to the neo-classical thinking that links development to economic growth.

Drawing from the above, it can be posited that the indigenisation and economic empowerment schemes have over the time sought to play a dual role. As Sibanda (2013: 1) argues, these were: first, to expand the participation and empowerment of the previously marginalised blacks in the mainstream economy. Secondly, this was to right historical racialised imbalances in the ownership of resources in an effort to stimulate economic growth and development. However, as Sibanda (2013:1-2) asserts, CSOTs differ from the earlier programmes that focused more on the development of an indigenous-based private sector, in which there was an active participation of blacks in industries, the promotion of indigenous blacks into senior management positions or as captains of industry and the promotion of the awarding of government tenders to indigenous or indigenous led small to medium enterprises. Divorced from the above, the CSOTs, as Sibanda continues to argue, had a specific mandate to deliver that dovetailed with, and complimented, the broader target of indigenising the Zimbabwean economy. This, according to Dube (2013: n.p), was to “enable communities to benefit from their God-given resources; involve rural communities in the mainstream economy – the national economy; reinforce the role of communities in economic development by enabling them to make decisions on their development priorities; enable rural communities to hold equity in qualifying businesses or companies” (see also Kasukuwere, 2011: n.p). Thus, generally speaking, the CSOTs were hoped to facilitate redistributive economic justice to Zimbabwean indigenes whose justice had been denied by colonialism. After this important discussion on indigenisation and empowerment, the chapter turns to analysis of the value of the development wrought in by the CSOTs.

Development narrative, community participation and the CSOTs

From the start of this section it is necessary to provide a working definition of development to help to estimate the effects of the

CSOTs to the broader socio-economic-cultural-political impacts in Shurugwi District. According to Sharpley (2002: 27), development:

is a complex, multidimensional concept which not only embraces economic growth and 'traditional' social indicators, such as healthcare, education and housing, but also seeks to confirm the political and cultural integrity and freedom of all individuals in society. It is, in effect, the continuous and positive change in the economic, social, political and cultural dimensions of the human condition, guided by the principle of freedom of choice and limited by the capacity of the environment to sustain such change.

What is clear from the definition is that development incorporates many dynamics including economic growth as measured by the gross national product (GNP), the need to fulfil human social, political, cultural, physiological and psychological needs that helps to bring better livelihoods in which citizens enjoy basic needs, enjoy self-esteem and there is the widening of basic freedoms (Sharpley, 2002: 24-27). Thus, as Todaro and Smith (2011) suggest development must therefore be conceived as a multidimensional process involving major changes in social structures, popular attitudes and national institutions as well as the acceleration of growth, the reduction of inequality and the eradication of poverty. In the end, one must see the essence of development as located in the attainment of positive change that enhances the enjoyment of life that accrues at both the personal and community levels in which the different facets to the enjoyment of life are increasingly satisfied.

The question that instructs this section is therefore: to what extent does this understanding of development explain the programmes and the place of the CSOTs that are couched in indigenisation and economic empowerment framework? As enunciated in the IEE Act (2008), indigenisation purposefully targets the greater participation of the colonially disadvantaged black Zimbabweans in the national economy, which creates conditions for the equitable ownership of Zimbabwe's resources. Through this

conscious policy, it is also intended that an atmosphere is generated that facilitates the economic empowerment of these previously marginalised citizens in certain specific economic fields and economic endeavours. What is discernible from the above is that indigenisation aims to bring greater economic rewards to the Zimbabwean blacks that should spur greater development. On the one hand, this argumentation lends the indigenisation process, as already alluded to, to the neo-classical thinking that equates development to economic growth. Simultaneously, and on the other hand, there is an attempt to correct the Marxian historic colonially induced structural injustices that prevented the black rural communities from accessing the means of production. At another level, however, the CSOTs promise other developmental goals, as mediums through which communities are empowered, both, with [monetary] resources to help improve the conditions in their areas and are also invested with decision making powers to choose the projects that have to be taken based on the needs of the community.

The latter ethos that the CSOTs espouse dovetails with those that underlie participatory community development. As Machinya (2014:21) argues, community development involves letting locals, especially the previously disadvantaged, to assume greater management of the major means of production in order to reverse “the root causes of structural discrimination, marginalisation, and exclusion”. In the light of this understanding, CSOTs should be viewed as an attempt by the central government to instigate development in marginalised and underdeveloped rural communities with an abundance of natural resources but are characterised by unbridled poverty. The exploitation of these rural areas, human capital and natural capital by foreign companies compelled the government to intervene on behalf of the local communities. For decades, such rural communities had been exposed to incessant poverty and underdevelopment. Marginalisation from the mainstream economy, inconsistent government policies and exploitation of the rural communities by multi-nationals operating in the localities and the failure of various developmental initiatives including the Structural Adjustment Programme of the 1990s had condemned these communities to live in perpetual poverty.

However, while the philosophy behind the CSOTs is sound, there remains one huge challenge of the diversity within the communities that have to benefit from the same CSOTs. Looking at Shurugwi rural, the range is, *inter alia* in terms of the gendered differences; different levels of education and occupation; political diversity; ethnic and, differences between large, small, resettled and communal farmers. As such, the almost rhetorical question is: who constitutes ‘community’ in Shurugwi? Are political borders that place people of diverse backgrounds, based on age, gender, class and political affiliations, into Shurugwi District create a Shurugwi community that has to benefit from the TCSOT? Breeding from the above, as Machinya (2014:1) asks: “who participates, to which level and who benefits?” from the CSOTs remains the challenge to address. Attainment of CSOTs goals are seldom disrupted by inherent solemn conflicts which are found within the participating beneficiaries. As argued by Cooke and Kothari (2001), communities are often times a mere juxtaposition of individuals with divergent and unrelated or even confrontational livelihood strategies. They further conceived communities as sites of both solidarity and conflict, shifting alliances, power and social structures. The diversity of interests within the districts that have to benefit from the CSOTs potentially breeds wide ranging developmental needs which pose challenges to the selection of projects to finance, which may possibly breed conflicts over the resources that are supposed to help develop the areas (Matunhu, 2012). Some of the conflicts on similar projects in other parts of the continent such as Nigeria include the fight over how to utilise the spoils of the oil earnings that has led to some quarrels in the Niger Delta (Ibid:13) and also locally, in the Communal areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) projects (Sibanda, 2013). Thus, in addition to the provision of the money there is need for capacity building in the communities. This may be through empowering these communities “ideologically to deal with the complex rural development matrices” because “without a properly co-ordinated mix of skills, knowledge and attitude, no amount of money will bring about true development in our rural communities” (Matunhu, 2012: 13).

Below we focus on two polar views on the contestations over CSOTs that is CSOTs as vehicles for development and CSOTs as a vote buying gimmick. It is necessary here to foreground these major debates around the CSOTs in the country in order to capture the controversies that have dogged the CSOTs since their launch and to sketch some groundwork for a deeper analysis on these polar contestations on the CSOTs. We also, in the same section introduce our own consideration, as another potent lens, that of the CSOTs as ‘passive revolution’.

CSOTs as vehicles for development

We describe first the indigenisation and economic empowerment narrative that explains CSOTs as vehicles for community participatory economic development. In an effort to articulate this developmental discourse and to separate CSOTs from corporate social responsibility programmes, the former minister of Youth and Indigenisation, and also the chief ideologue of the CSOTs, Saviour Kasukuwere, argued that CSOTs would through the “10% equity in the mining businesses” “capacitate the communities [where mining was taking place] to take responsibility in developing their areas” (Kasukuwere, 2011). This would be through utilising the “income generated” “for the development and maintenance of socio-economic infrastructure such as dip tanks, roads, schools, hospitals and clinics, water works and conservation practices.[And] communities could [also]come up with programmes for special interest groups like ... women, youths and the disabled” (Ibid). In addition, Kasukuwere pointed out that CSOTs “shall be independent bodies responsible for making their own decisions and shall negotiate their relationship with exploiters of natural resources on their own (Ibid). Thus, CSOTs were supposed to broaden the country’s economic base by involving and capacitating locals in the mainstream economy (*VOAZimbabwe*, 1/3/13). In this regard, CSOTs would then be a key driver of the indigenisation of the economy alongside the land reform programme in the rural areas.

To underscore the developmental potential of the CSOTs, Kasukuwere asserted that they would be different from corporate

social responsibility (CSR), in that “rather than Corporate Social Responsibility [CSOTs would] represent genuine empowerment of local communities ... [which] historically ... have been marginalised and patronised by mining business through the so called Corporate Responsibility programme[s]” (Ibid). This perception was taken further by President Mugabe who contended that the CSR programmes run by the big companies had “promoted dependency syndrome among communities reducing them to mere observers and charity receivers,” which had resulted in “no meaningful revenue accru[ing] to the local authorities responsible in these areas, let alone the vast majority who fall under the traditional leadership in the communal and resettlement areas (President Mugabe cited in *The Patriot*, 06/03/2014). Therefore, CSOTs would act like “structured corporate social responsibility” that guarantee the long term availability monies/dividends for the development of rural communities (Sibanda, 2013). In the end, the CSOTs would then put brakes to “the curse of natural resources” in which there is a “negative correlation between natural resource abundance and economic growth” (Kronenberg, 2002:3) evident in scenarios where resource rich rural areas were often left bereft of meaningful development despite producing valuable minerals that were in demand all over the world. For Zimbabwe, the rural development projects spurred by the CSOTs would be key not least because of the rampant collapse of the infrastructure during the Zimbabwean crisis, but also because up to 70 per cent of Zimbabweans live in rural areas (Matunhu, 2012:13) and are largely unemployed at least formally.

In this regard, the indigenisation through the CSOTs in which there would be the “deliberate involvement of indigenous Zimbabweans² in the economic activities of the country, to which hitherto they had no access, so as to ensure the equitable ownership of the nation’s resources” (Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act, 2008) would help to reduce poverty. In this

² According to the IEEA, 2008, indigenous Zimbabweans were “any person who, before the 18th April, 1980, was disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the grounds of his or her race, and any descendant of such person, and includes any company, association, syndicate or partnership of which indigenous Zimbabweans form the majority of the members or hold the controlling interest.”

regard, when President Mugabe launched the TCSOT at Unki Mine, Shurugwi in 2011, he underscored that “this (black economic empowerment) is our policy. We do not hide it. We want empowerment for our people... (those who don’t want), we say go now, if not yesterday” (*The Herald*, 24/11/11). This was in view of the fact that the indigenisation of the economy was supposed to empower the black majority and to help in creating conditions that would incentivise rural development. As Matunhu (2011: 9) contends, this perception on reducing poverty emanates from a thinking that indigenisation “carries the notion of creating an opportunity for the poor communities to walk out of poverty” that was manufactured by colonial structuralism and that this empowerment creates opportunities for rural development. An illustration of this kind of thinking is demonstrated clearly in the case of the Mhondoro-Ngezi-Chegutu-Zvimba Trust, which had by 2014 “completed 40 projects which include[d], among others, [the] refurbishment and construction of schools, borehole drilling, construction of an arts and crafts centre, acquisition of a brand new ambulance for the community and computerisation of the Mashayamombe Vocational and Training Centre” (*The Patriot*, 06/03/2014). In the process, as Faber Chidarikire, the then Resident Minister of Mashonaland West, argued, the Mhondoro-Ngezi-Chegutu-Zvimba CSOT had led to “the upliftment of rural communities” (*The Patriot*, 06/03/2014). Elsewhere, in Matabeleland South Province, Chief Mbiko Masuku of Matshetsheni communal lands, commented that his community had benefitted from a CSOTs in his area through the “several projects such as the rehabilitation of irrigation schemes, construction of clinics, and refurbishment of schools,” (*VOA Zimbabwe* 1/3/13). Specific projects that were funded by the CSOTs in Gwanda Rural District included the Guyu-Chelesa irrigation scheme, construction of Silikwe clinic, construction of roads, construction of Sitezi and Mapate clinics and the fencing of Sibhula secondary school (Mabhena and Moyo 2014).

TCSOT as vehicle of development in Shurugwi

In this section we turn to addressing the developmental impacts that the TCSOT has had in Shurugwi. This is meant to measure the efficacy of the developmental discourse against the case of the TCSOT. Broadly, one could say that for Shurugwi, the TCSOT has had a tremendous developmental impact in the two years of its launch as various projects have been financed by the funds from the CSOTs. Out of the eleven million dollars (highlighted already), a new school³, Musasa Primary school in ward 18, with an enrolment of 408 students was constructed and opened its doors to students in the third term of 2013 (*The Herald*, 18 September 2013). It comprised of eight classrooms and teachers' houses (*The Sunday Mail*, 7-13 July 2013). In addition, Musasa School also benefitted from the sinking of a borehole and the building of ablution facilities at the school (Ibid). The construction of the school by the trust was a welcome relief for the children of the resettled farmers at Musasa who since 2009 had been using a donated old store with dilapidated facilities as a school (*New African*, 2013).

The trust also drilled boreholes at the three Chiefs' Banga, Nhema and Ndanga's homes. The primary aim was to help to revive the traditional chiefs' food stores (*zunde ramambo*) (*The Herald*, 18 September 2013) where food reserves would be generated at the chiefs' plots for use in crises or to be distributed to the needy. In addition to the drilling of the boreholes, and in an effort to ensure the success of the *zunde ramambo* and to empower the chiefs, drip irrigation facilities had also been installed at the chiefs' homes (Ibid). There was also mention of extending the borehole drilling and *zunde ramambo* to all the headmen in the district (Interview with, District Administrator's staff members, 08 October 2014, Shurugwi). The efficacy of the revival of the *zunde ramambo* could not be estimated properly by mid-2016. Central to this was that it was still too soon to be evaluating accurately the programme less than two years into it.

³ It is considered as a new school for the new blocks that were erected. However, the school is not necessarily new because it had been operating from an abandoned shop building.

Further developments were also witnessed in the latter half of 2013 in Shurugwi. To this extent, there was a major project that was undertaken to revamp the roads in the district beginning with the two major artery roads linking Chachacha to the growth point at Tongogara and Chachacha with Pakame High School at a cost of one and half million dollars (*The Herald*, 18/09/2013). According to *The Herald*, the renovations were carried out by J. R. Goddard Contracting and Fruitstone Investments (*The Herald*, 18/09/2013). On the whole, the rehabilitation of the roads was expected to increase accessibility in the district and also result in increased public transport operators. In an interview, a Councillor of ward 10 (Chanaiwa Township, 10 July 2015) stated that:

in the past, up to the end of the 1990s, the Chachacha to Tongogara road used to have many public transport operators, including Marongwe, Ganyani, Tauya and Intercity Express. On the whole, the road was well-served as there were about ten buses that plied the route on a daily basis connecting Tongogara Growth Point with many parts of the country including Gweru, Bulawayo and Harare. Of late, and leading up to 2013, however, only a handful of buses operated on the route because of its bad state. Most of the buses were also in a dilapidated condition. Some *kombis* (commuter taxis) tried to fill the gap but they too quickly withdrew because of the bad state of the road. However due to the 2013 road revamping exercise there was an upsurge of transport between Tongogara Growth Point and Chachacha.

In furtherance of the developments above, the funds from the TCSOT had also been utilised to renovate Chirume Dam in ward 14 that had been washed away some twenty years ago (*The Chronicle*, 11/10/2012). The dam's reconstruction, was expected to avail up 96 000 cubic metres of water to benefit up to 200 families (*The Sunday Mail*, 7-13/07/2013). There was also the construction of a Mother Delivery Centre in ward 10 with an estimated 2 743 direct beneficiaries (*New Africa*, 2013: 62). Furthermore, plans were also afoot to set up an irrigation scheme that would help foster sustainable development in the area utilising the huge water reservoirs. However,

up to the middle of 2016, the planned irrigation scheme had not been realised. Some officials who worked for the Tongogara Rural District Council (TRDC) alleged that some consultations were still going on with the community members and local traditional and political leadership regarding the viability of the project. The officials alleged also that more discussions were still ongoing with the other stakeholders such as the Environmental Management Authority (EMA) and Ministry of Agriculture and Mechanisation's Agricultural Rural Extension (AREX) officials over the siting of the project (Separate Interviews with TRDC officials, May 2016).

In the first phase of the trust projects, funds from the TCSOT had also been used to build a mortuary at Zvamabande Clinic and to drill more than 200 boreholes across the district (*Zimbabwe situation*, 23/01/14). The trust also bought a grader that is currently refurbishing roads in Shurugwi" (*Zimbabwe situation*, 23/01/14). On the whole, the TCSOT was considered as one of the most successful (*Newsday*, 28/07/15). By the end of 2013, a remarkable 17 out of the 20 projects valued at around U\$3.4 million had been completed by the trust scheme since its establishment in 2011. In addition to the above, there were also reports of the TCSOT planning to invest more than U\$2 million in phase two projects that included a U\$500 000 million shopping mall in Shurugwi town (Gwaunza 2014). According to Chief Ndanga, the TCSOT had allocated \$25 000-00 per the 24 wards in the TRDC in 2014 for developmental projects and the councillors and village heads were tasked with identifying and leading developmental projects in their areas (Gwaunza, 2014). This was collaborated by the Trust's legal advisor, Advent Tavenhare who informed the parliamentary portfolio committee on Youth, Indigenization and Economic Empowerment that phase two projects included the construction of a shopping complex in Shurugwi that would generate income for the trust and the purchase of 2 – 30 tonne trucks that would be used to transport platinum from Unki mine to South Africa. He further underlined that the trust was going to issue interest bearing loans to fund businesses operated by youth and also provide funding for at least one project in all the 24 wards in Shurugwi (Gwaunza, 2014). Nevertheless, Tavenhare lamented lack of cooperation from government departments such as

the District Development Fund and ZINWA in the smooth implementation of the community projects (Gwaunza, 2014).

CSOTs as ‘*politricks*’

On the other polar end, is the view that is proffered by the critics of CSOTs who have tended to portray them as a ZANU-PF election stunt which would ultimately also scare away foreign investors. This section deploys the term ‘*politricks*’ to denote and combine the two features of politicking and tricking of the electorate that the major critics consider to have been behind the government’s launch of the CSOTs. In this way, therefore, the commentators posit that the CSOTs were designed as a political campaign tool for ZANU-PF to trick the rural electorate at a time when the land redistribution was losing its purchase. By then, the popularity of the controversial fast land reform programme had been largely waned in spite of the widespread allegations that accompanied it in terms of its effects in decongesting and empowering rural communities as there were allegations of the programme being viewed as partisan by some critics. Zimbabwe continued to face a myriad of socio-economic challenges in the new millennium which inevitably alienated ZANU-PF from the people. Thus, on the whole, the use of *politricks* is meant to explain the potential negative deployment of CSOTs as part of ZANU-PF electioneering. Mabhena and Moyo (2014: 84) opined that “challenge to the mainstreaming of the CSOTs into the RDC development programmes and structures are the hidden political hand which may manipulate a truly developmental programme and turn into a political campaign tool.”

More precisely, the legal framework in which the CSOTs were grounded was highly contested with some critics questioning the legality of the schemes. For instance, the then Secretary-General of MDC-T, Tendai Biti, and a lawyer by profession, who at the time was the Minister of Finance in the Unity Government charged that the legislation governing the schemes was dubiously crafted with no legal force. In the eyes of the critics, the establishment of the schemes was mere political gimmicking by ZANU-PF to win support of the masses and placate public opinion (Raftopoulos, 2013). Besides the

above, there is a feeling that the CSOTs (together with the IEE Act) would negatively affect the economy by helping to scare away foreign investors. This position is succinctly captured by late prominent Zimbabwean economist, Eric Bloch who argued that “schemes may create negative ripples in a country desperately in need of foreign direct investment, which currently accounts for 3% of gross domestic product. At peak production, foreign direct investment accounted for 25% of the economy. We have lost the potential to attract investment. The indigenisation policy is ill-advised and damages the economy”. In the end, as Bloch further posited, investment in the country suffered because as he rhetorically asked “which investor would want to invest where half of his investment will be taken and wouldn’t have a say in the running of their businesses?” (*Newsday* 29/11/12).

More to the above, CSOTs have been perceived as being shrouded in secrecy meant to economically advantage a few. Thus, besides being perceived as ZANU-PF projects meant to win it support, they were also been taken as favouring the well-connected elite, including ZANU-PF leaders, ZANU-PF supporters and chiefs. As correctly alluded to by Zhou and Zvoushe (2012), policy making during that time had a partisan, temperamental, exclusionary, hurried and short-term bent largely designed to meet political ends. *Inter alia*, some residents of rural Shurugwi pointed out that for TCSOT, they had never been officially invited to its meetings and neither had they had access to minutes and/or financial statements (Anonymous respondents, 20 June 2015). Furthermore, other respondents proffered that the issues pertaining to the community scheme were discussed at ZANU-PF rallies which obviously were not attended by all community stakeholders because of the polarised nature of Zimbabweans politics. The secrecy had helped to create suspicion and negative sentiments on the intentions of the CSOTs. The sentiments were to the effect that this could have promoted a parallel economy of rent-seeking, corruption and patronage. Ironically, this had left many community members sceptical and ignorant of the work of the CSOTs when they were supposed to be active participants and beneficiaries of the work of the CSOTs. The association of the CSOTs with a specific political party also had the

indirect effect of hindering effective communication of information about the centrality of the schemes in promoting sustainable rural development among Zimbabwean rural communities. Perhaps, it is prudent to reiterate that while the government may talk of a community among the beneficiaries, there are several communities or communities within the society with conflicting interests, aspirations and expectations from the share ownership schemes. These communities are defined by their political affiliation and connectivity, level of literacy, gender, age, elitism, among other conflicting variables. As such, the heterogeneous nature of the communities in which the schemes operate militate against their level of success in realising common community goals.

On the whole, the above concerns raised fears that the CSOTs would go the same route of abuse by the well-connected as happened in the IBDC and AAG of the 1990s and the Fast-Track Land Reform Programme of the 2000. Similar sentiments were raised for the TCSOT by Chief Banga who posited that “on certain hot issues of debate, people who are not trustees tend to dictate and even claim that they have got instruction from higher authority, which is either the ministry, or some political figures within the ministry” (in *Zimbabwe Independent*, 17/04/2014). The foregoing discussion resonates with similar narratives that emerged from South Africa following the launching of the Broad Based Economic Empowerment wherein senior governing African National Congress elites and their fronts had abused the scheme for personal aggrandisement (Marongwe and Mawere, 2015). In addition to the above, and in reference to the TCSOT, political interference in the operations of the trust was witnessed when certain projects were diverted on political influence. This pertained to the placement of the rehabilitation of Banga School ahead of Chekenyu School because of the influence that Chief Banga had in the TCSOT (*Newsday*, 28/07/15). Saunders (2007: 9) raised the cases of elite capture by postulating that “Zimbabwe has seen the emergence of elite-driven, opportunistic asset grabs.” Below, we quote some of the concerns community members had for the CSOTs. Although not all pertain to Shurugwi, the sentiments are representative of the worries the residents of Shurugwi had of their CSOT.

Regarding the Marange CSOT, the Chiadzwa Community Development Trust (CCDT) vice-chairperson, Malvern Mudiwa argued that he did not foresee any meaningful development being spearheaded by the CSOT in Marange community as it was partisan and exclusionary. To him, this was because “at [its] launch, only people aligned to ZANU- PF were invited and they didn’t have the courtesy to invite us as CCDT, yet that trust is our brainchild.” Furthermore, he claimed that “in all developmental issues, people should be consulted on how best they can be helped. We don’t know how much has been deposited in the trust so far and who the signatories for that money are. That on its own shows that there is no transparency in this trust” (Quoted in *Newsday*, 29/11/12). These views were corroborated by the Councillor for Ward 28 in the Marange community, Moses Zvinoira of Madondo village, who said “this whole thing could just be a political strategy of campaigning by ZANU-PF,” and that “there are a lot of unexplained issues in that trust. Since its launch, not even a single meeting was called to discuss the way forward. (*Newsday*, 29/03/12).

Academics have also their misgivings about the CSOTs programme. To Raftopoulos, “by implementing this controversial programme, ZANU-PF has managed to recover some ground it lost to the MDC parties in the 2008 disputed elections and increase its support base ... It is unfortunate indigenisation has exposed the state itself as being some kind of a possession of a particular political party which is using this process to spearhead its elections campaigns” (*Zimbabwe Independent*, 28/03/13). In addition and in support of the above, the verve and strong hand methods (Sibanda, 2013:4) with which the programme was launched had somewhat waned after the 2013 elections, which gave further credence to the fact that it was part of ZANU-PF electioneering.

CSOTs have been perceived as a vehicle to allow a few well-connected to amass wealth and fame. This perception was ‘confirmed’ by the greediness that some chiefs in the Midlands Province, key players in the administration of CSOTs, displayed. In this regard, the government had to intervene to prevent the allocation of huge CSOTs sitting allowances of \$5 000-00 each in Zvishavane and Shurugwi to the eight chiefs in 2013 (*Zimbabwe Independent*,

28/03/13). Specifically for Shurugwi, according to *Newsday* 28/07/15, the board members of the TCSOT received an annual board allowance of \$5 000-00 and a sitting allowance of \$100-00 for each meeting they convened. These were considered hefty and had even the then Minister of Indigenisation, Francis Nhema castigating them. They were also too high compared to the sitting allowances for the TRDC where councillors received a paltry monthly allowance of \$100-00 and a sitting allowance of \$35-00 (Separate interviews with councillors, June to July 2015). More than anything, this visibilised the potential for abuse that the CSOTs funds were subjected to.

It also put to serious contestation and scrutiny the role and place of chiefs in the CSOTs. While not doubting their duties as traditional leaders of their areas, questions have been raised about their suitability in the administration of the CSOTs. More often than not, they do not have the request qualifications and other justifications to run these projects, which further raise questions as to why they were made to lead these rural empowerment schemes. The same can be said for the leaders of Rural District Councils (RDCs), who, as argued by Kasukuwere (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2012) “are the major authorities in planning and they know the geographical order and the homogeneity of the people in the geographical area”. What has, however, emerged over the years is that the RDCs have perennially struggled for corporate governance with perennial cases of financial misappropriation levelled against many RDCs. As such, the question that goes unanswered is: could it have been part of the patronage regime that traditional leaders have been enjoying? (Marongwe, 2007).

Besides corruption, there have also been lingering questions posed on the legal basis for the establishment of the CSOTs in the country. The views expressed by Tendai Biti, the former minister of finance in the Government of National Unity (GNU) from 2009 to 2013, in a huge sense summarises these perceptions. To Biti, “on what legal basis are companies being made to part with US\$10 million or US\$15 million? ... There is nowhere in the Indigenisation and Empowerment Act that compels companies to donate money to a community share scheme or to any farm or to anything, so what you are actually seeing is coercion; companies being forced to part with

US\$10 million or US\$15 million” (*Zimbabwe Independent*, 28/03/13). Further, he averred that “in the Indigenisation and Empowerment Act, you will not find the word community share trust, you will not. Then you come to the regulations, statutory instrument number 30 of March 2010 that was passed or enacted, again, you will not find the name community share trust ... So the issue of community share schemes is actually an after-thought which is not backed by the law ... such that community share schemes do not actually have legal existence *vis-a-vis* the Indigenisation and Empowerment Act” (Ibid)).

In addition to the above, the actualisation of some CSOTs may be difficult to achieve. There have been many situations where some communities had not received the seed monies from the large corporations operating in their areas. For example, the five diamond mining companies in Chiadzwa had availed only \$400 000 out of the fifty million dollars they had promised to the Marange-Zimunya community share ownership scheme at its launch in July 2012 (*Zimbabwe’s Largest Online Classifieds*, 12/04/15). To an extent, this failure stemmed from the difficulties in the enforcement of the IEE Act provisions because there are no provisions in the Act to criminalise non-compliance. Companies are rather supposed to present their indigenisation plans for approval (Matunhu, 2012:16).

At another level, one also sees that regarding the Zimunya-Marange CSOT, there may be other factors to consider including rivalry politics. There are also issues to do with the differing personalities of the ministers responsible for the parent ministry, where, for example, Kasukuwere pushed for a hard bargain while Nhema was for pro-negotiations with the companies involved. Indeed by March 2015, the residents of these communities were expressing a lot of disgruntlement about the non-fulfilment of the financial pledges by the mining companies in their area. The locals were even threatening to stop all mining activities in the area until the companies met their earlier financial pledges to the trust scheme. The local chiefs Marange and Zimunya also weighed in by indicating they could not stop the local people from interfering with the companies’ activities as the people’s grievances were genuine since the companies were extracting minerals day and night with the communities receiving nothing from the proceeds. Broadly speaking, the

Zimunya-Marange community share ownership scheme failed to take off because of non-funding as the government failed to force the companies to comply (Zimbabwe's Largest Online Classifieds, 12/04/15). The ministries of mining and indigenisation could not agree on common ground on how to move the trust scheme forward. Shifting the blame to the Ministers of Indigenisation, the Minister of Mines, Walter Chidhakwa argued that, "there is so much confusion and there is need to correct some of the things which were not done properly as miners maintain they were not consulted, hence non-movement for the community share trust" (Zimbabwe's Largest Online Classifieds, 12/04/15). What then can be discerned from all this is bickering and lack of political will by the leadership to move the trust schemes forward which can be associated with the familiar the ZANU-PF *politricks* especially in view of the fact it was then firmly in the driving seat after its resounding election victory over the MDC-T in 2013.

CSOTs as a 'passive revolution'

This section considers the operations of the CSOTs as constitutive of the Gramscian passive revolution. This seeks to add a third dimension to the two commonly discussed narratives (above) on the CSOTs in Zimbabwe. The concept was developed by Gramsci (1971) to depict the form of unification that occurred in Italy under the Risorgimento. As Morton puts it, passive revolution is change that "involve[s] a relatively small elite leading to the creation of state power and institutional framework consonant with capitalist property relations" (Morton, 2007: 66). Neil Davidson, cited in Morton (2007: 65), also posits that passive revolution largely describes a "revolution from above." In this regard, the agency driving the change is provided by a few leading individuals and organisations, largely in a process characterised by "dictatorship without hegemony" (Gramsci, cited in Raftopoulos, GPA as a PR). In the French revolution, for example, it was provided by the Jacobins, the enlightened bourgeoisie and rationalists who were backed by the army (Gramsci, 1971: 59), while in the *Risorgimento* it was from the so-called moderates led by Cavour, the big southern

landowners and northern bourgeoisie (Morton, 2007: 63-64). The majority of the people's interests and "active participation" were largely ignored (Morton, 2007: 65). Buci-Gluckman (1979) further propounds that periodic changes in production relations in specific societies influence the politics of a passive revolution and that the state may initiate comprehensive changes in the economic base of the country through legislative interventions (Gramsci 1982 cited in Raftopoulos, 2011). Drawing on this perspective then, a passive revolution is usually embarked upon by the bourgeoisie as a measure to undertake excruciating socio-economic restructuring which may result in fundamental changes in the political economy of the country with little or no reference to democratic participation.

The relevance of the passive revolution lens primarily stems from the fact that the community share ownership trusts in particular just like the other state propelled redistributive measures before them such as the Fast Track Land reform Programme (2000) and the broader struggles for indigenisation in general seem to have been imposed in Zimbabwe with little or no input from the communities which are supposed to benefit from their operations. To begin with, the CSOTs have made use of the existing administrative local government structures in the rural areas. These structures, as already alluded to, include the District Administrators, traditional chiefs and rural district council officials. Except for the youth, disabled and women representatives, all the other members of the CSOTs hierarchy represent state configurations, which serve to underscore the top to bottom structures of the CSOTs. More still, the question remains, who chose these representatives into the CSOTs committees or what selection criteria was deployed in choosing them? The existence of the structures of power and authority, primarily, those that represent the interests of the governing party, ZANU-PF, render them elitist and potentially excluding of the views and wishes of the majority of people particularly those who belong to the opposition. It is significant to highlight that the same structures that dominate the CSOTs, including traditional chiefs, are the same structures that have been accused of promoting the interests of ZANU-PF in rural areas of Zimbabwe. Moreover, as Minister Chidhakwa observed above, the miners seemed also to have been

coerced into agreeing into providing the seed monies for the CSOTs (Zimbabwe's Largest Online Classifieds, 12/04/15). The above resulted in some mining concerns not providing the monies needed to operationalise some of the CSOTs. This was corroborated by Chief Musarurwa of Mashonaland East who lamented that "they were made to sign symbolic cheques for Mashonaland East Community Share Ownership, but up to now no money had been disbursed despite claims on the ground that the money was disbursed (*The Herald*, 22/11/2013). What is therefore staggering is that even chiefs who sat in the CSOTs committees raised concerns over their operations, which also raises questions regarding the intentions and actual beneficiaries of the schemes. In the end, a consideration of the fact that some chiefs were in the dark regarding the operations of some CSOTs provides further evidence on the suspicions, secrecy and lack of transparency which have characterised the administration of the CSOTs.

Mining as a resource-curse in Shurugwi

This section discusses the significance of mining to the [lack of] development of Shurugwi in order to demonstrate, in the long *duree*, the resource-curse scenario political-economy of the district and to argue on the theoretical basis for supporting the establishment of the TSOT. Commercial mining has a long history in Shurugwi District. Shurugwi District is literally bisected by the Great Dyke, which is endowed with a lot of mineral riches. Stretching from the South West, around the Mberengwa regions, the Great Dyke extends all the way to the North East of the country into regions of Mashonaland Central. It is on the Great Dyke that Shurugwi Town was established in 1899 (Matsa and Muringaniza, 2010: 110) after the discovery of chrome and gold. Commercial gold and chrome mining remained the mainstays of the colonial economy of the town and the district at large providing differing opportunities to the residents. This growth and significance of these minerals has been established by Phimister (cited in McGregor, 1991:76) who points at the huge demand for grain in the emerging town as early as 1900. In the new millennium, large reserves of platinum have been discovered in Shurugwi along

this belt (Great Dyke) leading to huge mining investments by Unki and Todal corporations.

While there is this long genealogy of the commercial extraction of minerals from the district, the district has remained relatively undeveloped. As already pointed out, the majority of the residents of the district continue to eke out livelihoods from the increasingly threatened subsistence farming which happens against the backdrop of the infertile parent granite rock, diminished land sizes, erratic prices of the staple crop, maize, and low rainfall. It is also necessary to point out that while the commercial mining at Selukwe (during the colonial era) did not cause widespread deforestation (McGregor, 1991) it left a trail of other environmental effects such as water and land pollution. It (mining) together with white commercial agriculture, led to increased congestion in the communal areas that led to the selection of the district to be one of the lead districts in the centralisation programme that resulted in a lot of deforestation as the newly erected homes required lots of wood to set up, including for building houses, for making wood-fired bricks, timber for roofing, fencing and kraal pens, among others (Ibid). This congestion had particularly serious effects on the district as it's largely sandy soils drawn from the parent granite rock (Madebwe and Madebwe, 2005: 229) were easily exhausted (McGregor, 1995: 262). Thus, in a way, the greater development of the district was to be hinged on mining than on agriculture.

Notwithstanding the above, agriculture has remained as the backbone of the majority of the households in the district, especially in the communal peasant areas. While in the colonial period, the agricultural practices were divided between the large scale commercial farmers, the small holder black farmers and the communal farmers, in the present post-colonial dispensation it is divided into four major zones namely communal, resettlement, small scale and large scale farming areas (Marongwe, 2013). However, as result of the challenges in the agricultural sector, as already discussed, other economic activities have remained more significant in the livelihoods of the majority of the residents, especially in rural areas. Among these economic activities has been the search for employment at mines and in other major urban areas of the country

and an exodus to the diaspora (Marongwe, 2013). The major reason has been that these activities have been better rewarding than peasant agriculture.

Another economic activity, related to official mining which has helped to sustain the district is artisanal mining of gold (gold panning). Largely done around the Boterekwa Mountains and in the nearby Mutevekwu River, it grew into prominence in the new millennium that was associated with huge economic and political challenges that at one time up to 15 000 artisanal miners were said to be operational in the district (*The Daily News*, 01 March 2000). In addition to the above, there have been a lot of small-scale chrome mines in the district. These small scale miners operate open pit mines in their 'claim' areas and sell the chrome ore to ZIMASCO or to some Chinese merchants who resell it abroad. Generally, therefore, the effects of these two latter activities have been to cause deleterious environmental degradation to the district. Open pits and the accumulation of chemicals used in gold panning in water sources have been rampant (Marongwe, 2013). What has emerged is that the open pits pose dangers to livestock that has to graze around the pits and which have to drink water from some of the pits that may be contaminated with chemicals that are used in the purification of the gold (Ibid). Additionally, the pits scar the aesthetic beauty of the Shurugwi landscape and have reduced the agricultural space. Some of these problems that were wrought by the pits have also generated conflicts between agriculturalists and the miners, which created disharmony (Ibid).

Conclusion

From the foregoing discussions, it can be concluded that the raging debate regarding the efficacy of CSOTs in engendering participatory community development is still far from being won. More analytical frameworks and studies are still required. The structural challenges within the CSOTs need to be addressed though it may not be an easy task to resolve them in the end as they are deeply entrenched within the benefiting communities and the legislation governing the CSOTs. These inherent challenges have

been the source of unrelenting conflicting interests and expectations among the belligerents. Besides, CSOTs are also associated with lack of implementation clarity, inadequate legal backing, lack of community involvement, doubts on sustainability, among others factors. Be that as it may be, there are serious pointers in the TCSOT that if given the chance, CSOTs have a huge stake to claim in rural community development. While *politricks* is associated with the CSOTs, there is no doubt that projects such schools, clinics, boreholes and roads will benefit everyone in the communities regardless of one's political affiliation. Nonetheless, what has also emerged is that the debates are still coloured by the political polarisation in the country. This then puts into question the chances of objective researches under conditions of the domination of politics in academic studies.

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Economic Dependency and Third World Underdevelopment: A Case of Nigeria

Afolabi Opeyemi Glory

Introduction

Nigeria is a country in West Africa and it is the largest “black” African country. The name “Nigeria” was coined by Flora Shaw (later Flora Lugard) and it refers to the people who inhabit the Niger Area (Awoniyi, 2015). Nigeria is blessed with bountiful mineral and natural resources. However, despite the large deposits of these resources, Nigeria’s economy has performed below expectation and majority of its citizens are highly impoverished. This could be attributed to the fact that Nigeria’s colonial past left a negative imprint on the economy of the country. During the colonial era, the British colonialists incorporated Nigeria’s economy into the global economy in such a way that Nigeria’s economy became dependent on the Western capitalist economy. That is the origin of the economic dependency which Nigeria has experienced from the 1960s to date. This dependency is what Walter Rodney (1973) meant when he observed that African economies are integrated into the very structure of the developed capitalist economies; and they are integrated in a manner that is unfavourable to Africa and ensures that Africa is dependent on the big capitalist countries.

Economic dependency is predicated on the notion that resources flow from a “periphery” of poor and underdeveloped states to a ‘core’ wealthy state enriching the latter at the expense of the former (Agubamah, 2014). The proponents of economic dependency such as: Paul Baran, Andre Gunder Frank, Walter Rodney, amongst others, observe that the dependence of the South on the North is the main cause of under-development of the former. They hold that the

present economic and socio-political conditions prevailing in the periphery are the result of a historical process which emerged as a result of formation, expansion and consolidation of capitalist system (Udeala, 2010). Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) points out that Europe (the west) used its advantages and gained control over most of the world economy and presided over the development and spread of industrialisation and capitalist economy, indirectly resulting in unequal development. Wallerstein divides the capitalist world economy into core states, semi-peripheral, and peripheral areas. He observe that the peripheral areas are least developed; they are exploited by the core for their cheap labour, raw materials, and agricultural production. The world economy has led to metropolis-satellite chain in which the surplus generated at each level in the periphery is successively drawn off by the centre. As a result of this, the periphery (Nigeria) is impoverished and the centre (West) is enriched.

The history of Nigeria's economic dependency can be traced to the era of colonial rule which began in 1900. During the colonial era, Nigeria's economy was structured to improve the economies of the colonising or metropolitan powers (Shokpeka & Nwaokocha, 2009). Under colonial rule, Nigeria remained an agro-based country, exporting raw materials to Britain and importing from it finished goods. This is because the British colonial administrators put in place measures to encourage the development of agriculture at the expense of the manufacturing sector, with the sole purpose of feeding their industries at home. Therein lay the origin of the dependence of Nigerian economy on commodity markets of the industrialised Western world for its foreign exchange (nationsencyclopedia.com). At the tail end of British colonial rule, sensing that independence was imminent, the British colonial administrators started establishing industries in the country (Njoku, 2001). Their major aim was to hang on the industries such that come independence, they would not be ousted. Neither would the government be able to control them as they continue laying claim on the national economy. Apart from the establishment of industries, Osoba (1972) observe that the British colonialists also put in place some legislative and economic measures to ensure British dominant position in the economic and political

landscape in an independent Nigeria. Britain's neo-colonial presence is a clear pointer to this.

Underdevelopment is deeply rooted in the colonial experience and subsequently perpetuated by a sophisticated set of transnational class linkages composed of political and military elites, powerful economic interests, multinational corporations, and multilateral institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), and the G8. It is pertinent to note that some of the agents of neo-colonial exploitation in Nigeria from 1960 to date are the multinational corporations working in the country for their home countries where they repatriate their profits. Okereke and Ekpe (2002) observe that "rather than re-invest their profits in the economy of the host countries in order to expand the economy, the multinational corporations repatriate profits to their home countries in what is often referred to as capital flight". The activities of the multinational corporations culminate in flow of profit from the periphery (Nigeria) to the centre (West), and the effect of this is the underdevelopment of the periphery. Despite all efforts put in place by the Nigerian government to put an end to neo-colonial exploitation, especially the indigenisation policies, the Nigerian economy continues to be dependent on the Western capitalist economy. However, this is made possible by the active collaboration of majority of the Nigerian elites in the federal government, who at the expense of the country, collaborates with the multinational corporations to plunder the resources of Nigeria because of what they stand to gain.

Furthermore, another catalyst for Nigeria's economic dependency is the country's over-dependence on Foreign Aid, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as well as Foreign Trade. Although, all these are supposed to help in the development of the Nigerian economy, the reverse is the case as the main motive of the Western capitalist countries is exploitation. Foreign Aid could be in form of investment, loan, and infrastructural development. However, Western Aid with particular reference to foreign loan, comes with a lot of conditions which plunges the country into a state of indebtedness. For instance, in the 1980s the West through their International Financial Organisations such as: the World Bank, and

the International Monetary Fund (IMF), encouraged third world countries in general and Nigeria in particular to adopt the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) as a condition for loans. But this programme had an impact of exacerbating rather than alleviating poverty in the country. Also, in some third world countries such as: Mozambique, Malawi, South Africa, amongst others, SAP had very devastating effects on the national economy, thereby leading to the deterioration in the standard of living of the citizens of these countries. Nevertheless, SAP benefited the corrupt public office holders at the detriment of the populace who bore the brunt of this policy.

In respect to FDI, it is truism that the Western capitalist countries invest in key sectors of the Nigerian economy with particular reference to the oil and gas sector. However, this is done only because of the benefits accrued to the sector and not with the aim of developing the Nigerian economy. In respect to foreign trade, although the Western capitalist countries foster trade relations with Nigeria, they benefit more from this trading relationship than Nigeria. This is because while Nigeria exports primary commodities to the Western countries, the Western capitalist countries exports manufactured goods into the country. It is common logic that finished products fetch more than primary or unprocessed goods. However, this is not surprising considering the fact that Nigeria's economy has been structured to service the resources and market needs of the Western capitalist countries since the colonial era.

The main purpose for granting foreign Aid to Nigeria, investing in key sectors of the country's economy, and trading with Nigeria, is mainly for the economic exploitation of the country. However, the effect of this is that Nigeria's economy continues to be dependent on the economy of the Western capitalist countries and this has been the cause of poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria from 1960 to date. Against the backdrop of the forgoing, this chapter examines the political, social and economic effects of economic dependency on Nigeria's political and socio-economic development. Efforts are also made to suggest strategies for a diversified and sustained economic development framework.

Political effect of economic dependency on Nigeria's development

Political independence is normally anticipated to be accompanied by socio-economic and political autonomy. Ironically, in Nigeria from 1960 to date, the reverse is the case as the neo-colonial powers continue to interfere in the economy and politics of the country through the institutions they left behind. There were several measures concocted during the decolonisation period ranging from tax laws, to bilateral agreements between Britain and Nigeria calculated to perpetuate Britain's domination of Nigeria beyond independence. These measures were designed to perpetuate in the post-independence Nigeria, the client pattern relationship which characterised formal colonial relationship between Nigeria and Britain. Bilateral economic and financial agreements were arranged between Nigeria and the British government in such a way that guaranteed profitable conditions for the latter at the expense of the former. One of the implications of most of the arrangements was the reproduction of the colonial type of dependency in a post-independence Nigerian economy (Attah, 2013).

The Nigerian government finds it extremely difficult to establish a viable, stable, and virile democratic polity because the neo-colonial powers have a firm grip on the affairs of the country. This negatively affects traditional political growth and development by debilitating Nigerian legislatures from effecting macro-economic policies aimed at putting the country on a path of sustained economic growth and development. Apart from this, the Nigerian government lacks the capacity and political will for embarking on a genuine autonomous political development. Thus, the Nigerian political landscape continues to be dependent on that of the Western capitalist countries.

It is instructive to stress that one of the major factors responsible for economic dependency in Nigeria is the idiosyncrasy of the Nigerian political elites. Many of the Nigerian political elites place their personal interest over the national interest of the country. Sensing this inherent weakness, the Western capitalist countries capitalise on it to continue their exploitation of the country's resources. This is because any nation characterised by lack of

bourgeoisie committed to national interest and development is always subjected to exploitation and foreign domination (Attah, 2013). The political landscape of Nigeria has been mired with corruption right from the inception of colonialism. Unfortunately, the corrupt colonialists spread the disease of corruption to Nigerian elites and this has been a major factor militating against the development of the Nigerian state. As a result of corruption many Nigerian citizens live below the poverty datum line of \$1 per day.

Furthermore, the post-independence Nigerian government was highly pro-West and despite the fact that one of the principles guiding the country's foreign policy was the principle of non-alignment, they only paid lip service to it. The pro-Western posture of Nigeria continued and that was why despite efforts put in place by the Nigerian government to nationalise some private owned companies through their indigenisation policy in the 1970s, they could not detach themselves totally from the neo-colonial powers. This is because indigenisation only serves to rationalise and legitimate foreign participation as well as redefine spheres of influence and participation between international and indigenous capital. Ake (1983) argues that "indigenisation hardly constitutes a serious attack on dependence." This is not far from the truth considering the fact that despite the measures put in place by the Nigerian government to build a self-sustaining economy, the Nigerian economy continues to be dominated by foreign capital.

In many oil producing countries of West Africa, foreign oil companies exercise monopoly in exploration and exploitation of resources. In Nigeria for instance, despite Nigeria's ownership of the oil, the control, management and regulations are in the hands of foreign firms. Thus, what belongs to Nigeria is just the oil fields in many parts of the country. This is because modern capitalism illustrates that the function of ownership can be separated from management (Attah, 2013). Therefore, the role of the state is reduced to that of tax collector which is nothing when compared to the benefits accrued to those in charge of the means of production (the Western oil companies). However, lacking the indigenous technology, the exploration and exploitation of Nigeria's rich oil wealth is carried out by Foreign oil companies like: Anglo-Dutch

(Shell), the Italian Group, (Agip), United States Based (Exxon, Mobile and Chevron) and the French (Total), amongst others. If it is taken into mind that oil is the commanding height of Nigeria's economy, it permits understanding the extent to which the country's politics and economy is been controlled and influenced by foreign economic and other interests (Ogbaji, 2010).

Furthermore, as a result of the general economic recession and the world commodity policies, as well as corruption and mismanagement of public funds, Nigeria who experienced a period of economic growth in the 1970s as a result of the oil boom, found itself in a state of economic crisis in the 1980s which adversely affected her economy. Consequently, the successive military regime adopted policies that were detrimental to national development but benefitted the Western capitalist countries. For instance in 1986, General Ibrahim Babangida implemented the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) which was introduced by the international financial institutions such as: the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as a condition for further loans. SAP was introduced in Nigeria by the World Bank and IMF as an instrument of achieving the overall capitalist exploitation of the Nigerian economy (Okoro, 2012). However, rather than help to alleviate poverty in the country, the SAP further worsened the economic situation of the country and it led to a high level of impoverishment and underdevelopment in the country. But that is not to say that some people didn't benefit from it, far from it because SAP was introduced to benefit the Western capitalist countries and that was exactly what happened. More so, the benefits that SAP brought forth to Western capitalists were also extended to the comprador bourgeoisie who acted as puppets in the hands of the neo-colonial powers in exploiting the poor Nigerian citizens. The implication of this on the Nigerian society is that the Nigerian economy continues to be dependent on the global economy, in that, the Western capitalist countries use the political elites to further their exploitative course.

It should be noted that any government of the day who failed to do the bidding of the neo-colonial powers always have their self to blame. This is because the Western capitalist countries are known for

rooting out regimes that they find incorporative by influencing political upheavals that will lead to their removal. For instance, the Abacha's regime did not enjoy the support of the Western capitalist countries not only because of his poor human rights record but also because they found him as a thorn in their flesh. Consequently, Nigeria was ostracised by the international community, but Nigeria's ostracism by the international community did not stop the multinational corporations from carrying out their exploitative operations in the country because nothing could prevent them from their goal which is 'maximisation of profit' (Folarin, 2013). However, in 1999 when Nigeria transited into an era of civil democratic rule, President Olusegun Obasanjo sought for ways to redeem Nigeria's image which had been dented during the prolonged military rule in the international arena (Odeh, 2013). In order to achieve this, Obasanjo applied different diplomatic tactics to lure the Western capitalist countries to invest and grant aid to the country, but the effect of this is the continued dependence of the Nigerian economy on the Western capitalist economies.

Politically, dependency negates democratic principles by imposing structural reform on the people without due consideration to the domestic social forces. This contradicts the democratic ethos of consultation, compromise and public consent in decision-making. In addition, dependency creates a near impossible situation for the government to provide social insurance services/benefits, which is one of the essential functions of the government (Okoro, 2012). Dependency also compromises the position of a nation as a sovereign independent state. Notably, the national decisions on economic reforms and adjustment are not taken by the domestic actors but by the external institutions (IMF and World Bank), as it were.

Social effect of economic dependency on Nigeria's development

Economic dependency has left a negative imprint on the social development of Nigeria from 1960 to date. Just like every developing society, the crisis of development is the most serious problem facing

Nigeria. This is because the country remains largely underdeveloped despite the presence of huge mineral and natural resources. Despite Nigeria's enormous resources, she remains wallowing in abject poverty, unemployment, a burgeoning domestic debt, infrastructural squalor, abysmal health and educational services and attendant frustration and unrest (Attah, 2013). However, the factors responsible for these are the activities of the Western capitalist countries, which through their multinational corporations and comprador bourgeoisie siphon the resources of the country.

The multinational corporations, whose main motive is profit repatriation, have greatly exploited Nigeria's resources for the development of their home economy at the expense of the local economy. With particular reference to the oil companies operating in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria, their activities has led to a lot of crisis in the region which has impeded the socio-economic development of the region. The oil companies are expected to spearhead developmental processes in the Niger-delta region because of the wealth they have amassed from their oil exploration and exploitation in the region. However, the reverse is the case. In the Niger-delta region, the multinational corporations perpetuate heinous activities such as: environmental degradation without adequate compensation, gas flaring which has destroyed wildlife, seafood and farmland poisoning, and discriminatory employment remuneration policies (Udosen, 2011). All these have impeded the socio-economic development of the region. However, the government has done little to nothing as regards redressing this situation because the elite leaders are also beneficiaries of the heinous activities of the foreign oil companies. Therefore, it is not surprising that Nigeria continues to be dependent on the Western capitalist economies. Rather than implementing policies aimed at curtailing the excesses of these multinational corporations, the comprador bourgeoisie protect the interest of their neo-colonial overlords because of what they gain from the deals, at the expense of the social development of the country.

Furthermore, the activities of the multinational corporations have been responsible for the mal-distribution of income in the country. The case of oil workers earning in a month what some

Federal Civil servants earn in a year does not augur well with the development of the nation. This step creates a class-conscious society, which does not help development as such (Osugwu & Ezie, 2013).

Another point that needs to be established is that economic dependency leads to the deterioration in the health sector and lack of basic social amenities. This is because the Western capitalist countries have always encouraged the Nigerian government to implement only the policies that will be beneficial to them, and this has a lot of social implications on the standard of living of the populace. For instance, in the 1980s and 1990s the International Financial Institutions through their Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) encouraged the cut on educational and health expenditures and the effect of this was that the budgetary allocation accrued to these sectors reduced. Furthermore, even after the 1990s, the Nigerian government spends more on debt repayments than on Health Care and Education combined. The dire situation represents the negative ramifications associated with the programme. Unfortunately, the general trend of government priorities is not the public health system, but adherence to the IMF programmes and debt repayment. It is pertinent to note that poverty and healthcare go hand in hand. The less healthcare provided to individuals, the more likely it is they will be unable to work, thereby, resulting in poverty and death (Brunelli, 2007).

Decreased expenditures on Education were also another effect of the SAP. Problems with education were exacerbated by the Structural Adjustment Loans. The packages of changes that go with loans often mean fundamental changes in the education programmes for the country. This includes education budget cuts, increased user fees and structural changes in educational institutions. Prior to the introduction of SAP, in 1972, Nigeria spent 4.5% of its total expenditure on education. However, by 1987, such expenditure had reduced to 2.8% (Lynn, 1994). It is pertinent to note that, the adverse effect of SAP on education sparked up a series of protest and riots in Nigeria. For instance, in Nigeria, in March - May 1990, students and faculty on campuses nationwide protested government's decision to accept a \$150 million university restructuring loan from the World Bank, especially conditions requiring closure of many departments

and programs. Military government staged armed assaults and hundreds of arrests were made, with hundreds more expelled from university system. Also, in May 1992, students at universities of Ibadan and Lagos protested against the implementation of SAP, which they accused of being responsible for the deterioration of campus facilities and education programs as well as doubling of transport prices. Police responded by shooting at the demonstrators, wounding at least five students. Riots between young anti-government demonstrators and riot police in Lagos left at least three dead and hundreds injured

(www.whirlbank.org/development/sap.html).

Furthermore, as a result of corruption and incompetence of the Nigerian political elites and the exploitation of the country by the Western capitalist economies through their multinational corporations, there has been infrastructural decay in the country. There is no access to clean water, poor electricity supply, poor roads, lack of adequate nutritious food and lack of affordable public health services, and all these culminates in the deterioration of the standard of living of the Nigerian citizens who wallow in abject poverty. While Nigerians are dying of poverty, the comprador bourgeoisie are enriching themselves in conjunction with their neo-colonial overlords. The effect of this is continued dependency and underdevelopment in the country, because a country that lacks basic amenities cannot be said to be developed. Apart from this, the Western capitalist countries have always encouraged the removal of petroleum and agricultural subsidies, and this has inflicted a lot of hardship on the Nigerian citizens as transport fare has skyrocketed and there is shortage of food due to high cost of importation (Ekpo, 1992).

Dependency also helps to erode the cultural fabric and societal values of Nigerians. During the colonial era, the British colonialists forced their traditional values on Nigerians through Western Education and consequently, Nigerians imbibed the European way of life and abandoned their rich cultural heritage. The naked effect of this was that the indigenous languages were replaced by English language which became the Lingual Franca of the country. Also, the European mode of dressing, food, religion, amongst other things,

were forced on Nigerians and even after the attainment of independence, it continues to be so. This can be referred to as cultural dependence, and its net effect is that the rich cultural heritage of Nigerians is beginning to go into oblivion. For instance, most of the educational institutions in the country discourage the learning and speaking of Nigerian languages and they have structured their curriculums to suit that of British curriculum. This is a high level of dependence and if nothing is done about it the situation will worsen even more. Also today, most Nigerians see their tradition and cultural values as inferior and therefore, they imbibe the Western way of life which has corrupted the societal values in Nigeria. In a nutshell, Nigerians no longer value what is theirs and this is one of the effects of dependency of Nigeria on the Western capitalist countries.

It is also imperative to state that economic dependency has made Nigeria to be technologically poor. This is because the multinational corporations which are supposed to embark on technology transfer, have hidden their technological know-how from Nigerians so that they will keep importing foreign technology rather than develop a self-sustaining technology. The multinational corporations jealously guard their technological know-how by way of refusing to make use of competent staff. They prefer to use mere technicians who are at the last rung of production process and simply assemble together what they knew not how it was produced. This in a way promotes artisnry at the expense of real manufacturing. By implication Nigerians cannot learn from the technicians the intricacies involved in the production of the material or product (Osuagwu & Ezie, 2013). When local entrepreneurs try to establish their own industries, they end up abandoning their plans because of the high level of competition they face in the hands of the multinational corporations who are filth rich. Consequently, the local entrepreneurs are reduced to the minor status of agents of these European transnational corporations (Okoro, 2012).

Another reason for the low level of industrialisation and continued dependence in the country has been the attitude of the Nigerian government towards local industries. Rather than encouraging and helping them thriving, post-colonial governments have more often than not inflicted huge taxes on local entrepreneurs

which sometimes they are not able to pay because of low patronage. This is because many Nigerians and even the Nigerian political elites prefer to purchase imported goods at the expense of locally produced goods. That is reason the Nigerian market is filled with foreign manufactured products from both European and the Asian countries. Almost everything that Nigerians consume is imported and they export only primary commodities. The effect of this is an unequal relationship between Nigeria and the advanced capitalist economies.

It should be noted that, the multinational corporations do not generate much employment since their technology is not labour intensive (Okoro, 2012), thereby increasing the rate of unemployment in Nigeria. Also, economic dependency coupled with corruption and mismanagement of funds further destroyed the economy of Nigeria, such that by 1992, unemployment rate rose at 28 percent, and crime also increased as 31.4 percent of the population lived below the poverty line (nationsencyclopedia.com).

Economic effect of economic dependency on Nigeria's Development

The economic dependency of Nigeria has adverse effects on the economic development of the country. As earlier mentioned, when the British colonialists noticed that independence was imminent, they set up some institutions which act as a tool for neo-colonial economic exploitation after the attainment of independence. Despite Nigeria's enormous resources, the country continues to be underdeveloped and its citizens highly impoverished. It can be argued that one of the factors responsible for this has been the way Nigeria was incorporated into the global economy which has been tilted towards serving the economic needs of the Western capitalist countries. However, the major means through which the Western capitalist countries exploit Nigeria remain via the avenue of Foreign Direct Investment, Foreign Aid and Trade.

In respect to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), the multinational corporations who are operating in the country act as a conduit pipe through which the resources of the country are exploited. The main

motive behind FDI is not to develop the Nigerian economy, but for profit repatriation for the development of the Western capitalist countries, and the effect is that the Nigerian economy continues to be dependent and underdeveloped. Although a country hosting FDI is supposed to enjoy economic as well as technological development, however, in Nigeria and other third world countries the reverse is the case because the Western capitalist countries only implement policies that will be beneficial to them at the expense of the local economy. For instance, the income Tax Ordinance was used by some foreign companies to evade taxes (Attah, 2013) because it was introduced to benefit the foreign companies at the expense of the local economy.

It is important to note that most of the investments of the Western capitalist countries are mainly concentrated in the petroleum sector. However, this is not surprising since Nigeria is the sixth largest producer of some of the finest oil in the world, which accounts for over 80% of her income (Onuoha, *et al*, 2015). In order to get access to Nigerian oil, the oil companies dominate the sector with pretence of fostering the development of the Nigerian petroleum sector through their investments. However, rather than helping in the development of the Nigerian petroleum sector, the activities of the foreign oil firms in the country has further increased the underdevelopment and poverty of the Nigeria (Udosen, 2011). Since oil which is the major source of Nigerian income is dominated by foreign firms, one would be able to deduce to what extent the Nigerian economy is being dependent on the Western countries.

In respect to Foreign Aid, one of the major causes of Nigeria's economic dependency is over-dependence on Foreign Aid. As a result of the availability of enormous resources in Nigeria, the Western capitalist countries grant Aid to Nigeria because of what they stand to gain, and rather than this Aid helping in the development of the national economy, it has further worsened the economic situation of the country. This is because several conditions are imposed on Nigeria by the neo-colonial powers on specific financial assistance sought by the country. However, such conditions and strings usually attached to certain loans and Aids often render Nigeria subservient to the imperialist donor countries. For instance, as a result of the debt crisis that hit Nigeria in the 1980s, the regime

of General Ibrahim Babangida was forced to apply for loans from the international financial institutions such as: the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) and in order to get access to that loan, Nigeria was forced to adopt the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) as a condition for the loan. The programme was based on a strategy called neo-liberalism, also known as the Washington Consensus because both the IMF and the World Bank are headquartered in Washington, D.C. The strategy was geared toward promoting free markets, including privatisation (the selling off of government enterprises; deregulation (removing rules that restrict companies) and trade liberalisation (opening local markets to foreign goods by removing barriers to export and import). Finally, the strategy also called for shrinking the role of government, reducing taxes and cutting down on services provided to the public (Onimode, 1989).

However, the effect of the introduction of SAP on the Nigerian economy was: Firstly, privatization allowed international capital to buy state enterprises at very low cost; Secondly, deregulation of the banking system led to very high interest rates which made most goods unaffordable to the majority; Thirdly, liberalisation of the labour market led to the elimination of cost of living, adjustment clauses in collective agreements, and to the phasing out of minimum wage legislation; Fourthly, elimination of subsidies and price controls, as well as devaluation, led to price increase and reduced real earnings in the formal and informal sectors; and lastly, tax reforms under SAP placed a greater tax burden on middle and low-income groups while foreign capital receives generous tax holidays (Herbert, 2009).

It is pertinent to note that SAP generally required countries to devalue their currencies against the dollar, however, the incessant depreciation of the exchange rate of the Nigerian currency vis-à-vis the world's leading currencies thoroughly weakened the former. The weakness of the currency complicated the burden of planning and created impediments to the procurement of materials required by local industries, leading to closures and under-utilization of capacities (Wader & Akpen, 2011). In addition, devaluation of currency made Nigerian goods cheaper for foreigners to buy and theoretically made foreign imports more expensive.

Privatisation on the other hand helped to transfer the control of key sectors of the economy into the hands of private foreign companies. To further fast-track the process of privatisation, the indigenisation policy was replaced by the Industrial policy of 1989 which allowed foreigners to participate in the economy (Okoro, 2012). This further led to economic dependency because local industries which were supposed to act as a tool for sustainable economic development were replaced by foreign firms whose main motive was profit repatriation.

Furthermore, in terms of loans for infrastructural development, the World Bank and IMF under their Public Investment Programme (PIP) decides what type of infrastructure should be built while an imposed system of international tender ensures that public projects are carried out by international construction and engineering firms (Herbert, 2009). The effect of this on the domestic Nigerian economy is that Nigeria's human resources are not utilised and this has increased the high rate of unemployment in the country. Also, the international firms who carry out these projects, execute it to suit themselves and to exploit Nigeria who still have to repay the loan which was used in building the infrastructures. These situation coupled with the fact that the huge amount of money borrowed by the political elites are often wasted on luxuries and 'white elephant' projects, has further increased the level of indebtedness and underdevelopment in Nigeria. The economic situation has become so bad that Nigeria have to take more loans for the repayment of further loans and this has culminated in debt crises.

Debt crisis is a situation of irredeemable debt. Countries that are faced with debt crisis are heavily indebted and they cannot afford to pay the principal debts they owe. They use a greater proportion of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to service the debts with little left for domestic social services. Consequently, the indebted countries scout for more external finance to meet the basic needs of their people. Furthermore, debt crisis results in debts that can never be repaid, not even by the great grandchildren of debtor-country's current generations, and as such children will be born to continue servicing the debt (Aluko & Arowolo, 2010). The debt crisis which Nigeria is experiencing has made the Western capitalist countries to

have a firm grip on the economy of the country because they place their representatives over strategic financial institutions such as: central bank and ministry of finance. This is done to monitor and ensure that no resources are misappropriated or diverted to anything other than servicing the external loans.

In respect to trade, Nigeria's trade relations with the Western capitalist countries have further increased the country's economic dependence. Rodney (1973) point out that one of the common means by which one nation exploits another is exploitation through trade. When the terms of trade are set by one country in a manner entirely advantageous to itself, then the trade is usually detrimental to the trading partner. The whole import/export relationship between Africa and its trading partners is one of unequal exchange and of exploitation. Moreover, the international division of labour and the pattern of trade/commercial relations between Nigeria and the international capitalist powers are in favour of the latter. This is because Nigeria has no control over the international capitalist markets which operate on a global scale.

In the realm of international trade, when Nigerians sell their commodities below value and at the same time buy commodities from the advanced countries above the value, this provides a veritable means of underdevelopment. For instance, Nigeria's crude petroleum oil is sold at a much reduced price to the multinational corporations who refine it and sell at a more exorbitant price (Udosen, 2011). It should be noted that poor countries lose out when they export commodities (which are usually primary commodities and very cheap) and when they import finished products (which are more expensive due to the added labour to make the product from those commodities and other resources). Also, reliance on just a few commodities makes countries even more vulnerable to global market conditions and other political and economic influences (Herbert, 2009).

Furthermore, the international financial institutions and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) encourages Nigeria to embrace trade liberalisation, that is, opening local markets to foreign goods by removing barriers to export and import. However, the impact of this on trade flows is increase in demand for import, that is, following

trade liberalisation, Nigeria buys more than it sells every year and as a result their trade balance worsens; as import increases, demand in the country for locally produced goods falls because people are buying imported goods instead. Recent evidence from the United Nations shows that poor countries who liberalised their trade most often suffer from increase in poverty (Ayoola, 2013).

Strategies for a diversified and sustainable economic development

For any sustainable economic development to take place in Nigeria, the Nigerian leaders must first and foremost do away with corruption. Corruption is “illegal profiteering,” that is, mismanagement of public funds of a representative of the government. Corruption is a canker worm that has eaten deep into the fabrics of the Nigerian economy and if nothing is done to curb this menace, it will completely destroy the national economy. The irony of the Nigerian situation is that Nigeria is the world’s sixth largest exporter of crude oil, and it is a country endowed with many resources but still has more than 70% of its population living below the poverty line (Ogbeidi, 2012). While it is important to eradicate poverty, depleting corruption is the starting point of rebuilding the Nigerian economy. The effect of corruption on any attempt to develop the Nigerian economy is extremely significant.

Furthermore, for sustainable economic development to take place in Nigeria, the Nigerian government must put in place measures aimed at diversifying the country’s economy. Since the oil boom of the 1970s, the Nigerian government have abandoned the agricultural and manufacturing sectors for the development of the petroleum sector, and this has an adverse effect on the economy of Nigeria. Prior to the oil boom of the 1970s, agriculture was the major source of income in the country and it formed about 80% of Nigeria’s GDP. However, the agricultural sector was abandoned for the development of the petroleum sector and the effect of this is that Nigeria who was the largest exporter of food became the largest importer of food in the 1980s. Despite the measures put in place by the Federal Government of Nigeria such as the introduction of programs like:

the Agricultural Development Programs (ADP), the National Accelerated Food Production Programme (NAFPP), Operation Feed the Nation (OFN), Green Revolution (GR), amongst others, to re-boost the agricultural sector, nothing concrete has been achieved (Akpan, 2012), and foreign firms are not attracted to invest in the sector. This is probably because the Nigerian government did not make the sector attractive to foreign investors. Also, the industrial sector is another sector that can help to boost the national economy if the government put in place measures to develop the sector. Therefore, for any sustainable economic development to take place in Nigeria, it is imperative for the Nigerian government to place emphasis on the development of the agricultural sector, as well as other sectors of the economy, so that Nigeria can achieve a sustainable and diversified economic development.

In addition, the Nigerian government should detach itself from the apron strings of its former colonial masters by implementing only the policies that will be beneficial to the country and not doing the bidding of the Western capitalist countries whose main motive is economic exploitation. Through the instrument of globalisation, the neo-colonial powers have been sapping the resources and controlling the trade monopoly of Nigeria. Although globalisation has reduced the world into a global village, those who are benefiting from it are the Western capitalist countries at the expense of poor developing countries like Nigeria. Globalisation when seen as forceful absorption of Nigeria into world capitalist economy controlled by Western financial institutions, could therefore be considered as a calculated attempt by the Western world to increasingly disintegrate the national economy through privatisation, deregulation and trade liberalisation. These in turn rapes the country's industrial potentials and accounts for the economic inequality that sustains the global capitalist economy (Okoro, 2012). Therefore, for sustainable economic development to take place in Nigeria, the country must make use of globalisation to her advantage. This can be done by borrowing the ideas from a country like China, who despite the odds of globalisation and exploitation by the Western capitalist countries, have been able to move from a poor developing country to a global economic giant.

Lastly, since Nigeria is bountifully blessed with both human and natural resources, the Nigerian government should put in place measures aimed at harnessing these resources for the development of the Nigerian economy. Also, the Nigerian government should develop the education sector as this will help to produce credible elites who will interpret the agenda of the Western capitalist countries, and who will also help to avert the mistakes of the past from repeating itself.

Conclusion

From the above discussion, one can deduce that economic dependency has left a negative imprint on Nigeria's economy since the colonial era to date. Despite Nigeria's attainment of independence on 1st October 1960, the economy of the country continues to be dominated and controlled by the neo-colonial powers through the institutions which they put in place on the eve of independence. However, these have affected the socio-economic and political landscape of the country. The Western capitalist countries carry out their exploitation through the so called "Aid" which inflicts a lot of hardships on Nigerian citizens as a result of the conditions which are attached to these loans. Apart from loans, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) also acts as a conduit pipe for profit repatriation from Nigeria to the Western capitalist countries which in turn leads to underdevelopment in the former. The trade relations between Nigeria and the advanced capitalist countries are also marked by trade imbalance because of the way Nigeria has been incorporated into the global economy.

This chapter also attributes economic dependency of Nigeria from 1960 to date to internal contradictions arising from bad leadership, mismanagement of national resources and elevation of personal aggrandisement and primordial interests over and above national interest, by the public office holders in Nigeria (also known as the comprador bourgeoisie). This means that, for economic dependency to be mitigated, the federal government must implement policies that will prevent the multinational corporations operating in the country from carrying out heinous activities in the country. Also,

the public office holders must do away with corruption so that Nigeria can experience an accelerated rate of development. In addition, the government must implement policies aimed at the diversification of the Nigerian economy away from petroleum which is the major source of Nigeria's foreign exchange.

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“Messianic Resuscitation or Foreign Implantation of the Seed of Underdevelopment?” Interrogating the Role of Foreign Aid in Africa’s Development Agenda

Munyaradzi Mawere & Costain Tandi

Introduction

The question of international aid to developing countries such as those of Africa is one of the most controversial subjects in modern-day development literature since the 1950s. It is worthwhile to make a standing overture that while international aid has for a long time been deployed in the name of fixing or eradicating poverty, evidence of ineffective foreign assistance is widespread in Africa. As observed by the Spectator (2014: 2), “in the meantime, more than a quarter of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa are poorer now than in 1960 with no sign that foreign aid, however substantive, will end poverty”. Consequently, the role of foreign aid in the development of the African continent has not been wholesomely acceptable with foreign aid itself increasingly becoming a topic of intense debate. The debate on how foreign aid can be more effective in eradicating poverty and contributing meaningfully to Africa’s development is, nevertheless, still ongoing without a pellucid way forward.

Meanwhile, the development gap between the so-called developed and developing world has spiralled at a sporadic pace in the recent years. This gap has led to constant capital inflow from the developed countries to those in the Third World countries including Africa, with the purported goal of helping them overcoming their problems and reducing the gap. However, there is evidence that decades of foreign aid have done little in changing the destinies of many African states, most of which are currently experiencing low growth rates. In 2014, Natalie Sharples *et al.* (2014), for instance, in their collaboration with a whole range of organisations, endeavoured to lift the veil to curb unequal consumption of data on remittances

by members of the public. In their important research on sub-Saharan Africa, the researchers revealed an alarming report that a yearly inflow of USD 134 billion – predominantly in the form of loans, foreign investment and aid – and a calculated net outflow of USD 192 billion – mainly in profits made by foreign companies, tax dodging and the costs of adapting to climate change, takes place on yearly basis. Thus, mathematical calculations show that the loss for sub-Saharan Africa is, at least, USD 58 billion per year.

The African continent has struggled with chronic [abject] poverty and under-development since the advent of political independence more than fifty years ago despite witnessing unprecedented growth in aid in-flows to the region particularly south of the Sahara. Questions that remain lingering are: With all the foreign aid that Africa receives yearly, why it remains poor and sometimes even poorer than before? Is foreign aid really a panacea [or what one can call messianic resuscitator] to the African development predicament? Why it appears that foreign aid is hurting instead of healing Africa?

In view of the questions highlighted above, this chapter interrogates foreign aid in view of resilient poverty in Africa. On this note, the chapter explores possible reasons why foreign aid since its inception in Africa has failed to achieve development goals and wean the continent from underdevelopment and poverty. Whereas the public interest theory opines that foreign aid is necessary to fill a financing or investment void which will lift countries in the Global South out of the so-called poverty trap, basing on our findings, we therefore challenge this thinking to advance that foreign aid, though sometimes acceptable, is more of a menace to African countries, with the potential to thwart and derail development efforts in Africa.

Foreign aid and the question of poverty

It is important to note that foreign aid has taken centre stage in international relations most especially after the Second World War and beyond (Ramiarison 2010). While it has been deployed across many societies of the so-called developing countries, the definition of foreign aid remains highly contested in scholarly circles. Moreira (2005) relates foreign aid to official development assistance (ODA),

which for him consists of resource transfers from the public sector, in the form of grants and loans at concessional financial terms, to developing countries. According to Radelet (2006:7), the standard definition of foreign aid comes from the Assistance Development Committee (DAC) of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). It is underlined here that the word aid is used in the strict sense of Official Development Assistance (ODA). In this sense, DAC conceptualises foreign aid as “financial flows, technical assistance and commodities that are designed to promote economic development and welfare as their main objective and are provided either as grants or subsidised loans.” On the same line of thinking, Olson (1991) sees aid as the transfer of money, goods, technology or technical advice from a donor to a recipient, the latter in this case being the needy or the poor.

Anyemedu (2004: 259) differentiates between foreign aid loans and other loans in that the former consists of interests at modestly concessional rates while the latter charge high interest rates. He notes that “aid consists of concessional loans and grants to developing countries to promote development. Loans can only qualify as aid if there is a grant element of concession built into them of more than 25%.” Anyemedu’s definition resonates with Holsti (1988: 230) who opines that, “most bilateral or multilateral loans do constitute aid to the extent that their interest rates and other terms of repayment are more liberal than those available through normal commercial banking institutions.” Chimombe (1986: 132-133) concurs with Anyemedu and Holsti when she reaffirms that “the grace period for a loan can be five years and repayment of the loan can take up to fifteen or twenty years with a very reasonable interest rate charged per annum.”

Nyerere as cited in Mutiso and Rohio (1975:518) divides external aid into two main categories, namely gifts and loans. According to him the meaning of gifts is that, “another government gives our government a sum of money as a free gift for a particular development scheme. Sometimes it may be that an institution in another country gives our government or an institution in our country financial help for development programmes.” The gifts mentioned by Nyerere (*Ibid*) are also known as grants, for which no

economic repayment is expected. Describing loans, Nyerere stresses that:

The greater portion of financial help we expect to get from outside is not in the form of gifts or charity but in the form of loans. A foreign government or a foreign institution, such as a bank lends our government money for the purposes of development. Such a loan has repayment conditions attached to it, covering factors such as the time period for which it is available and the rate of the interest.

Foreign aid loans are thus concessional, meaning that the terms of repayment are more flexible than those offered by commercial banks. Besides, foreign aid loans are normally availed to help the receiving country to deal with a given problem troubling its people.

Genesis of foreign assistance to Africa

According to Ramiarison (2010), the tradition of giving foreign aid to developing or aid-needing country began after the Second World War. During this era, aid was given to the war-devastated countries to rebuild the economies. Much of Europe had been ravaged by war and the United States of America (USA) through the Marshall Plan, was very instrumental in providing aid for the reconstruction of Europe. The USA spent twelve billion US dollars in the European Recovery Programme (ERP). Much of this money was in the form of grants from which no repayment was expected. Bailey cited in Cantor (1986: 379) has hailed this ERP as “the economic blood transfusion which took the Europeans off their backs and put them on their feet.” Cantor (1986: 379) further acknowledges that “the Marshall Plan which was designed to aid recovery in Western Europe after the Second World War successfully achieved its mission of enabling the European countries to expand their postwar economic bases.”

Then in the early 1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union began distributing aid to strengthen the military capability of their allies and spread their political ideologies. Since the end of the Cold

War, in 1989, most aid has been targeted to promote economic growth and improve public well-being in the developing and underdeveloped countries. More aid is now channelled through international financial institutions (IFIs) such as IMF, World Bank, and OECD. During the 1990s, the goal of aid was to foster democratisation and stability in developing countries and to facilitate the transition to free market economies in former communist countries. Since the late 1990s, foreign aid has been given to developing countries to promote economic growth, encourage the development of democratic institutions, and provide for humanitarian needs. Further, the end of the cold war also led to the shift of some aid from bilateral to multilateral aid. It is piteous and nerve racking to note that decades of foreign assistance having done little in turning the fortunes of many developing countries which are still struggling with chronic poverty and underdevelopment.

This living reality attests to the fact that there is more to the African problems, some of which are instigated by the mother countries of the donor organisations themselves, than just sending international aid there as this is not likely to change the continent for the better. Scholars like Akonor (2008) estimate that the Global North has disbursed close to \$600 billion on foreign assistance to Africa to date. Looking at the amount per se, one wonders how and why foreign aid fails to Africa fails to assume the role of a “messianic resuscitator” to rescue African economies and revivify their [African economies] development projects. Paradoxically, underdevelopment remains a common phenomenon while at the same time some countries, for instance, Somalia are considered to have virtually degenerated and collapsed. Under these circumstances, one wonders whether the foreign aid strategy is misguided, misconstrued or mismanaged. It is arguably true that in any given society or community, people have certain fundamental belief systems and practices that influence their perceptions of what development should entail. If these factors are ignored, one cannot have a holistic understanding of the dynamics of aid, politics and socio-economic development in Africa (Andrews 2009). Thus, development strategies that are made in isolation of the community’s philosophy of life, imposed on the people, and totally disregard the traditional

values of the African people, lack the very foundation that is intended to sustain it (see also Matunhu 2011; Chirimuuta & Mapolisa 2011).

Why foreign assistance to the Global South has failed?

To date, Sub Saharan Africa has received over 600 billion Dollars in foreign aid from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development member countries (OECD), Arab countries, China, the Breton Wood's institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) (Akonor 2008). Ironically, the real per-capita income today is lower than it was in the 1970s, and indeed more than 50 % of the population lives in poverty. In fact, the region continues to struggle in a vast ocean of extreme poverty with its concatenation of great despair (high rate of unemployment, high rate of illiteracy, high infant mortality, and poor nutrition, poor healthcare system, poor infrastructure, the list is far from being exhaustive. This heart-breaking paradox brings us to ponder: why foreign aid fails to promote economic growth and development in Sub-Saharan Africa; why it has not been able to move Sub-Saharan Africa from subsistence and survival to a higher living standard.

One of the reasons why foreign aid to Africa has failed over the years is corruption. As Moyo (2009b: np) suggests:

The most obvious criticism of aid is its links to rampant corruption. Aid flows destined to help the average African end up supporting bloated bureaucracies in the form of the poor-country governments and donor-funded and non-governmental organisations.

To substantiate the abovementioned criticism, Moyo (Ibid) further reveals that in a hearing before the United States of America Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in May 2004, Jeffrey Winters, a professor at Northwestern University, argued that the World Bank had participated in the corruption of roughly US\$ 100 billion of its loan funds intended for development. The African Union, in their 2002, has also reported that an organisation of African nations, estimated that corruption was costing the continent of Africa

US\$ 150 billion every year, causing some international donors to withhold their aid to Africa. The question that one raises in view of these revelations is: If the donor funding agents themselves are corrupt, how can transparency and accountability be expected in the recipients?

In the same line with Winters, many other European experts on the subject of Africa and development have not hesitated to point the finger at foreign assistance as being one of the main causes of African under-development. African scholars, by the same token, have questioned Western generosity toward African development (see also Moyo 2009a; Chimombe 1986; Anyemendu 2004; Karikari 2002; Moreira 2005). In fact, whether aid to Africa is indeed being done in good faith or otherwise, is yet to be established. It can be noted that both Europeans and Africans came to the conclusion that foreign aid has created a vicious cycle of dependence, which in itself extinguishes the flame of development. In view of this thinking, Brautigam (2004) sees aid dependence as a situation in which a country cannot perform many of the core functions of government, such as operations and maintenance, or the delivery of basic public services, without foreign aid funding and expertise. He, thus, expresses serious concerns over foreign aid to Africa.

What is important here is to appreciate the fact that the inflow of a vast amount of foreign aid in the foreseeable future forces Global South countries to depend heavily on foreign assistance to support their budgets. This scenario promotes reckless fiscal behaviour on behalf of African heads of states and loose fiscal policies that engender what economists have coined as “soft budget constraints” (SBC). Some of the reckless fiscal behaviour promoted by aid includes corruption by African political leaders. According to corruption watchdog agency, Transparency Agency, Mobutu Sese Seko, Zaire’s (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) president from 1965 to 1997, is reported to have stolen at least US\$ 5 billion from Zaire. Other African leaders such as Malawi’s former president, Bakili Muluzi, have also been charged for allegedly embezzling aid money worth US\$ 12 million. Such corruption by African leaders, more often than not, resulted in soft budget constraints. Soft budget constraint syndrome transpires whenever a country or organisation

gobbles more than its revenues and relies on external subsidies to offset its expenditures and balance its budget. These bailouts allow failed states or ailing economies to continue the same practices that cause them to fail from the outset. From a closer scrutiny, the constant repetition of the same mistakes causes us to ponder the degree to which the Global North understands the dynamic complexities of the Global South reality.

Easterly (2003) makes a very sound remark showing how the Global North therapy of aid has failed to uplift the Global South and how the Global North keeps administering the same medicine over decades without learning from their past mistakes. The truth of the matter remains the fact that aid is more strategically designed to meet the donors' economic and political goals because of the donor's conditionality. There is a strong relationship linking foreign assistance and recipient countries' export. The argument behind this relationship depicts that aid is used to give an advantage to donor countries that ship their goods to aid recipient countries. This form of development aid is what economists and development practitioners refer to as "tied aid". This form of aid implies attaching strings or conditionalities to the financial assistance package for the benefit of the aid provider who requires the aid beneficiary to buy non-competitive goods from the donor country. This practice helps boost the donors' exports and makes aid more costly for the recipients. The value of the aid is substantially reduced. Subsequently, the donors' conditionality becomes detrimental to the recipient countries' ability to formulate adequately their own trade policy that resonate with their contextual needs and afford them the opportunity to jump out of the poverty box.

The economic policies of the donor countries do not promote fair exchange between the Global South and the Global North. Instead they, enact protective measures for certain goods in order to protect their local industries. Paradoxically, the policies they recommend to less developed countries are in so many ways inconsistent with development. For instance, the ill-framed structural adjustment policies of the IFM and the World Bank set as remedies to stabilise the sub-Saharan African economy have had devastating socio-economic and environmental effects in sub-Saharan Africa.

The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) has, for example, resulted in high levels of inflation, retrenchment of workers, uplifting of government subsidies, devaluation of national currency, movement towards high real interest rates, lifting of price controls; all culminating into reducing many of the citizens to destitute. In Zimbabwe, for example, by 1992, a few years after the deployment of ESAP, the national economy had contracted by at least 7.5 % (Saunders 1996). As further revealed by Saunders (1996: 8):

At the same time, price control relaxation saw inflation exploding by as much as 30 %. [...] lifting of prices and decontrol of market prices sent the price of bread soaring 30 %. Also, between 1988/89 and 1993/94, the real value of the national revolving drug fund, allocated to the agency that supplied approximately 80 % of drugs dispensed to public and private health institutions declined by 67 %, resulting in shortages and the growing use of private channels to secure drugs and equipment. [...] in 1992, doctors and nurses began referring to “ESAP deaths,” described as deaths caused by the inability of patients to pay for the minimal length of time in the hospital, or for prescription medicine. [...] while government’s declining investment undermined the quality of education, its imposition of user fees effectively barred easy access to education for hundreds of thousands of students from poorer households. The overall result of fee imposition was a decline by as much as 5 % in enrolments by children in the urban primary schools. [...] economic growth slowed and became more erratic, averaging only 1.2 % (not the 5 % envisaged by the ESAP) over 1991-94, a disappointing performance. [...] the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions estimated that about 55,000 jobs were lost up to 1995, about double the figure estimated by the government.

Owing to the economic turmoil they have been facing, accompanied by a severe drought affecting agricultural activities as the main economic activity, the Global South – including Zimbabwe and the surrounding countries – have experienced enormous difficulties for the repayment of their debts as those highlighted by

Saunders above. The IMF and the World Bank, as their principal lenders have implemented a set of policies directing these countries to liberalise their economies, balance their budgets by undergoing cuts in unproductive sectors and maximise their exports to reduce their deficits. These policies, once implemented, according to the Breton Woods institutions, would “help” highly indebted countries to be able to repay their debts and “stabilise” their economies; but all this has proven futile with the South’s poverty levels even worsening.

However, it is quite important to make a standing observation that the stabilisation and adjustment policies they designed were intended to reduce the twin imbalances of external and domestic accounts, and correct policy biases against trade and market forces, in order to establish the basis for sustainable growth. The adjustment programmes were adopted with more or less effective implementation in many countries almost continuously throughout the 1980s, dominating policy making and displacing most long run development policies. Due to the pervasiveness, dominance and prolonged nature of the stabilisation and adjustment policies, they had wide-ranging medium term consequences not only for the macro-economy’s environment, but also for incomes of the poor and for the social sectors of many developing countries.

The structural adjustment programme (SAP) was intended to relieve debt and induce growth as to stabilise the Global South. Instead it has greatly contributed to the suffering of “thirty six” nations in the Global South in general and sub-Saharan Africa in particular and to unprecedented environmental degradation, as the unemployed and the retrenched turned to the natural environment to eke a living. Sustainable development in the social, economic and environmental areas was the poor godfather of structural adjustment. Budget cuts and privatisation negatively affected all sectors of the economy. The structure of aid itself lacked efficiency mainly because it aimed at a very big project that overwhelmed it before the results of the programme were realised. Instead of focusing on narrow solvable problems such as clean water supply, education provision, or transport improvement, the ESAP donors oriented their efforts toward big projects which often do not meet the urgent needs of the African people. Furthermore, there were coordination issues at many

levels such as programme implementations, policy making, and fund disbursement. It is on the basis of such observations that some scholars argue that aid in Africa will never be fruitful up until it is well planned and coordinated.

Besides, it has also been argued that foreign aid undermines the capacity of Global South governments to engage in serious state-building enterprises (Andrews 2009). Revenue collection is a key indicator of government capacity. The ability of the government to raise taxes is a very determinant factor in democratic institution. It can be deduced that foreign aid cripples state capacity to collect revenues because it makes recipient countries highly dependent on foreign assistance as a means of subsistence. Tax collection is weak because foreign aid reduces tax burden.

Another detrimental effect of foreign aid can be seen in the relation between aid and savings. Proponents of foreign aid (also known as foreign assistance) have argued that financial assistance to poor countries has a positive effect in saving and investment because it raises the level of income. A substantial influx of aid, to the contrary of all evidence, substantially decreases savings. By making additional resources available, foreign aid encourages greater spending. Rather than supplementing domestic saving, it simply replaces it. This resonates with Moyo (2009a) who opines that, as foreign aid comes in, domestic savings decline; that is, investment falls. This is not to give the impression that a whole population is awash with aid money, as it only reaches relatively few, very select hands. With all the tempting aid monies can offer, which is notoriously fungible, the few spend it on consumer goods, instead of saving the cash. As savings decline, local banks have less money to lend for domestic investment.

Walter Rodney in his seminal work: *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, opines that, the pillaging of resources in third world countries created a master-servant relationship between the developed countries and the developing countries. For him, “Africa went into colonialism clutching a hoe and came out of it clutching the same hoe” (Rodney 1985:123). This indicates that Africa did not benefit from colonialism and the trend has continued even after independence. This resonates with Akonor (2008:1074) who criticises foreign assistance to the developing world arguing that, “aid

to Africa is a band-aid, not a long-term solution” since aid does not aim at transforming Africa’s structurally dependent economies. He adds that if donors aim to make long-term sustainable impact, aid should target trans-continental projects such as highways, telecommunications and power plants.

Many studies in the empirical literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid have tried to assess if aid reaches its main objective, defined as the promotion of economic development and welfare of developing countries (cf. Andrews 2009, Easterly 2003). It is worth mentioning that despite a large amount of time and resources committed to development assistance, a lack of theoretical consensus surrounding the effectiveness of this foreign aid remains. Therefore, when foreign aid’s goals are compared with its achievements, the results are extremely disappointing. This has been fully demonstrated in the passages above, where we made reference to ESAP in sub-Saharan countries such as Zimbabwe.

It can be noted that numerous countries in Africa have struggled with chronic poverty and under-development since the advent of political independence, despite witnessing unprecedented growth in aid in-flows to the region particularly south of the Sahara. The central argument is that aid is the fundamental cause of poverty and therefore eliminating aid is critical to spur growth in ailing African states. This is because aid is correlated with corruption, fosters dependency and invariably instils bureaucracy that hinders the emergency of an essential entrepreneurial class. For Africa to grow, foreign aid will have to be dramatically reduced over time, thereby forcing countries to adopt more transparent measures to finance development. Aid is the disease that we must treat to bring us back to full economic health. It makes governments less accountable to their citizens and has led to civil wars, rampant corruption (electoral and otherwise) and has been central to an undercurrent of irresponsibility culminating in increased and self-reinforcing poverty since independence from colonialism. Foreign assistance has been castigated for the continued and seemingly intractable development crisis confronting the continent (cf. Carlsson, Somolokae & van de Walle, 1997). Foreign assistance through governmental and non-governmental development agencies has been provided ostensibly to

enhance real economic development through investment in both infrastructural and social services. The idea of foreign aid was compatible with the central theme of economic development, and was accepted as a possible escape from the chronic underdevelopment that is characterised by undeveloped infrastructure and dualistic economies, if that aid was effectively managed (Easterly 2003; Brautigam & Knack, 2004). The persistence of the deplorable economic conditions in Africa has become the primary reason for the relentless search for realistic and durable solutions to the continent's development woes, even as the need for aid is intermittently reinforced by the fact that Africa's underdevelopment is accentuated by periodic global economic recession. The main objective of aid is to produce accelerated economic growth, combined with higher standards of consumption, but as we have seen, aid is very much influenced by prevailing regional or global political climates.

Foreign aid remains one of the tools being used by the Global North countries such as Britain, USA and others to perpetuate Global South dependency. What is important to note is that aid has done very little to improve lives in Third World countries. According to Davies Blake and Robert Walters (1984: 146), "there is very little evidence that the benefits of aid are serving the basic human needs such as health, education and nutrition." Questions about the efficacy of aid have thus been raised. A radical perspective opines that "Western aid has never been designed to facilitate development of poor states but rather, it is being used as an instrument that ensures the perpetual subordination of states in the periphery to core countries in the Global North" Bauer (2000), as cited in Andrews (2009: 9) stipulates that foreign aid "promotes dependence on others" as it creates the impression that "emergence from poverty depends on external donations rather than on people's own efforts, motivation, arrangements and institutions."

Foreign aid or "dead aid" as some scholars like Moyo (2009a) call it, has negatively affected most African countries in view of dependency syndrome such that without it almost half of their yearly budgetary commitments cannot be fulfilled (Andrews 2009). Under the age-old saying that "you cannot bite the fingers that feed you,"

leaders of these countries are unable to speak out when fake and unwanted goods flood their markets. The truth of the matter is that foreign aid is not meant to ensure that countries in the Global South become self-reliant since if it is the case, powerful states can no longer brag about who is giving more than the other. Instead it has planted the seed of underdevelopment by promoting the culture of dependency in Africa.

It is worth mentioning that Africa's development depends on "African private sector entrepreneurs, African civic activists and African political reformers, not on what ineffective, bureaucratic, unaccountable and poorly informed and motivated outsiders do" (Easterly 2005: 67). Besides, there is constant debt servicing where Global South countries to report to their Global North donors, service donor consultants and try to keep things "normal" thereby neglecting domestic issues and development. According to Karikari (2002) as cited in Andrews (2009: 9), foreign aid has precipitated the dependency syndrome as "it induces a lazy, slavish, dependent mentality and culture across society, from governments to villagers." This, according to him, undermines the peoples' faith in themselves and the fact that they can make it on their own. This resonates with numerous scholars who are of the view that development should be situated within the context of the country concerned. People can best develop from the foundations of their indigenous knowledge which is embedded in their culture. Thus, imposing a notion of "modernity" on Africa will not yield desired results (cf. Prah 2000). Any development strategy in general and foreign assistance initiative that is devoid of the input of a society's needs and philosophy of life, lack the foundation or concrete base that it is purportedly intended to nourish and nurture. Africa's development in general must be premised on African values, belief system and norms that are very building blocks of African life. African life is based on unity, communalism and a shared purpose and this can be a panacea to development. Therefore, there is need for local solutions, pluralism and community based solutions and reliance on local resources and indigenous epistemologies. It is virtually impossible for the African leaders who are "surrogates for Western culture in Africa" to fashion indigenously oriented development plans.

According to Ampaw (2002), as cited in Andrews (2009: 10) the modernisation paradigm is “a historical construct, not fashioned by a critical analysis of Africa’s present condition as a product of history, structural presuppositions and process.” Ampaw argues that even a national economic policy choice that is driven by the logic of structural adjustment program and its neoliberal underpinnings will not make Africa experience autonomous development. And he doubts if this paradigm that propagates the role of foreign capital investment as catalyst to growth is really beneficial since the long term dependence on aid puts the continent in a vulnerable position. This resonates with Moyo (2009a) and Andrews (2009: 10), who opines that, the notion that aid can alleviate poverty is a myth since “aid has been and continues to be, an unmitigated political, economic and humanitarian disaster” for most developing countries. She sees the vicious cycle of aid as one that chokes off investment, encourages dependency and facilitates corruption, adding that this cycle “perpetuates underdevelopment and guarantees economic failure” in poor regions (Ibid).

In her book, Moyo also touches on ‘the paradox of plenty’, insisting that aid instigates conflicts in Africa. If not, how come the same continent that receives the largest amount of aid is the most conflict ridden place in the world? It is quite authentic to make a standing observation that unless foreign aid and development debates incorporate socio-cultural factors, we cannot fully appreciate why foreign aid has failed to deliver ‘development’ in Africa if at all it has always been given in good faith. We propose a return to the culture-development discussions which have been overshadowed by macro-economic ‘buzzwords’ in the development literature. This is against the backdrop that in as much as GDP growth rates matter, one should bear in mind that policies and institutions work in some socio-cultural milieu; a very crucial point that many donors over the years have never afforded to pay adequate attention to.

In search of possibilities to break the poverty deadlock

As has been demonstrated in this chapter, development aid has tended to supplant local capacity, undermine local knowledge and

institutions and render recipient countries more vulnerable and dependent on aid by cultivating what has been known as dependency syndrome. This dependency syndrome has meant that, more often than not, foreign aid projects are planned, implemented and monitored by outsiders. Instead of such scenarios, which we believed has helped in stifling development in Africa, we argue that foreign aid projects, plans and programmes should be derived from aid recipient's development priorities and should not be an expression of an attitude by these donors that they know better, they lecture and recipients listen, they know and recipient countries learn and they take care of the things because poor countries cannot. We stress that aid that undermines a recipient's capacity and sense of ownership of policies and programmes can never support sustainable growth. It perpetuates both dependence and poverty of the recipient.

In addition to the above, we propose that technical assistance programmes should be built on local knowledge, interests, and development priorities. Development inspired by and built on local knowledge and development priorities is likely to endure and impact positively on the lives of the people. This is because such development does not undermine human and institutional capacity. Neither does it perpetuates aid dependency and destroy peoples' motivation to take charge of their own futures. Foreign aid that does not have a clear path to sustainable capacity building and growth is of little or no value at all. Thus, to development that is foreign imposed, Global South governments should say "NO" if at all they aspire to move out of the current development predicament.

On the other hand, the donor countries should encourage African governments to democratise rather than force and impose Western development blueprints on African communities. Such moves are likely to be met with stiff resistance as has always been the case with many of such development projects in Zimbabwe. Respecting the needs and contributions of the people is always crucial given that democracy is a process and in every process there are likely to be positive and negative aspects.

Conclusion

In this chapter, foreign aid has been defined as financial flows, technical assistance and commodities that are designed to promote economic development and welfare as their main objectives. The aid is provided either as grants or as subsidised and is directed at economic development as well as addressing humanitarian issues. The chapter has, however, offered critique of foreign aid in view of Africa's underdevelopment quagmire and development predicament. In this whole attempt, the chapter has unveiled that foreign aid decreases national control and increases donor control over the internal economy of a recipient state and has indeed planted the seeds of underdevelopment in the Global South countries. As noted in the chapter, it is widely agreed that in spite of increasing flows of ODA, recipient countries particularly those in the Global South have continuously shown poor economic performance. This has raised many questions about the relevancy of aid scaling up within the framework of poverty alleviation, while at the same time this obtaining reality has fuelled the debate on aid effectiveness.

It has been advanced that the whole issue of aid, whether for humanitarian or developmental needs, is arguably anchored on the belief on hero worshipping of the donor countries – the belief that the stronger should be free to exercise its strength without moral or legal limitations that protect the poor and weak. This chapter has also concluded that foreign aid can be used as a strategy for exploitation and external control of African countries. The economic inequalities among different actors in the global political economy translate into the uneven distribution of opportunities. Side by side with the social and political inequalities is the inability of the poor and weak to determine how foreign aid should be used since the aid regime is usually a monopoly of the powerful Global North countries.

This chapter has also further shown that the push for democratisation of African states is yet another renewed camouflaging tendency of the foreign aid regime used by the Global North countries to create governance structures that are conducive for the exploitation and external control of African affairs. In the name of good governance and rule of law, modern democracy

crystallises the capitalist social project based on private property, free enterprise and market competition. As such the establishment of Western models of government is an attempt by the Western donors to restore and consolidate what was once achieved through the strong political administration of colonialism; hence our central argument that foreign aid will remain a synonym of foreign implantation of the seed of underdevelopment in Africa unless symmetrical relations between donor countries and the receiving countries are symmetricalised and the needs of the intended populations respected.

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Unveiling Orientalism in Foreign Narratives for Engineering for Development that Targets Africa

Gertjan van Stam

Introduction

When we regard the geopolitical power-plays and the many events that rock our contemporary world, it appears rather strange that the underlying workings of power seem to be oblivious to the functioning of engineering and engineers. *Engineering*, in the words of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO, 2010: 24), aims for “the development, acquisition and application of technical, scientific and mathematical knowledge about the understanding, design, development, invention, innovation and use of materials, machines, structures, systems and processes for specific purposes”. Gerard van Oortmerssen attributes the technological development that has created the ‘modern society’; as the builders of infrastructure, industrial production, mechanized agriculture, modern transportation systems, and technological innovations such as mass media, computers and communication systems to *engineers* (ibid: 7).

In clinical, apolitical narratives, engineers are expected to be neutral in the daily pursuit of providing logical answers “to foster technological innovation and excellence for the benefit of humanity,” as the world’s largest technical professional organisation, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE, 2016), puts it. However, how context neutral and apolitical are these narratives and the discourses in engineering, especially an engineering ‘for development’ and deployment in Africa?

To put this question to the test, in this chapter, we need to put our gaze to the mainstream conversations about technologies for development. These so-called appropriate technologies are often linked to descriptions featuring a disciplinary prefix followed by the

suffix “for Development”. This designation is often written in acronyms with the “for development” represented by “4D”. Examples of such acronyms are Information and Communications Technology for Development (ICT4D) and Human Computer Integration for Development (HCI4D).

Since the year 2000, I have been involved with ICT developments in rural Africa. First, I worked full time with the community in Murambinda, Buhera District, Zimbabwe. Subsequently, in 2003 I relocated and got also involved with local talent in the community of Macha, Choma District, Zambia. Since 2015, I live in Zimbabwe again, augmenting the work with a research component, studying African society and ICTs in rural areas. In my long-term, transdisciplinary research, I use an variance of the extended case method in line with Michael Burawoy (2009) in an effort to theorise the indigenous progress in local African communities and the workings of contextual, African engineering (Mawere & van Stam, 2016a) and engineers (van Stam, 2016), with a focus on the rural areas of Southern Africa. In previous works, individually and collaboratively, I reported on the mismatches between hegemonic paradigms and the realities in Africa (van Stam, 2012, 2013, 2014; van Greunen, & van Stam, 2014a; Ahmat *et al.*, 2014; Mawere & van Stam, 2016). In this chapter, I hope to shed some light on how an orientalist outlook fuels an *othering* that the suffix ‘for development’ masks. The deductions in this chapter are based on extended case studies and literature that link in with ICT4D, conceptualised from my African positionality.

A development discourse unaligned with African practice

As Mirjam van Reisen (2015) alludes to, the dominant discourse on development is one of an extant, Western making. It basically approaches *development* from three different angles:

- from the precept of human equality, in the framings of socialism,
- from the maxim of ‘trickle down development’, in the framings of capitalism,

- set in an arrangement assembled through ‘Monitoring and Evaluation’, in the framings of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), previously called the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Although each school recognises that development not only contains quantitative (economic) components, but also includes qualitative aspects like freedom (Sen, 1999) and morality, each of these schools relies on a belief that outcomes can be created by an appropriate handling of inputs in a structured and makeable society. Furthermore, schools incorporating quantification and the workings of capitalism, within the mantra of (oriental interpretation of) a *fight against poverty*, are heavily promoted and resourced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

In my research, I do not recognise an overlap of these schools of thoughts with a view on a wholesome development that is cognisant of relational African values like Ubuntu, Oratio, Relatio, Dominatio or Animatio (van Stam, 2014b). These values, ‘The Big Five’ as I refer to them, are matters of the relationships and the heart; they are sustained by communal perspectives, which originate from communal love (Mawere & van Stam, 2016b).

When contemplating Africa’s riches – minerals, forests, fishery, animals, birds, water, sunshine – and the well-educated and multi-talented African populace (Unwin, 2008; Mawere, 2014), it becomes clear that we are dealing with a clash of paradigm (Mawere & van Stam, 2015). Therefore, development in Africa cannot be readily understood from a myopic view and paradigm that focus on measurable inputs and (economic) output evaluation, nor from prescriptive and abstract models, but should be regarded from behavioural and relational perspectives, from the processes of interaction between people, sensitivity to scripted interactions and rituals, and ongoing conversations connecting embodied knowledge in people. Development, in an African sense, is to be reviewed from the ‘we-paradigm’, which interrelates progress, community and justice (Mawere & van Stam, 2015).

That such an understanding is possible is described by Mirman van Reisen (2015). In the cited work, and other works, she discusses the legacy of Marga Klompé, an iconic and God-fearing Minister of Social Works in the Dutch Government from 1956 up to 1963 and, with culture and recreation added to her portfolio, from 1966 up to 1971. Van Reisen describes a person that understood that dignity is crucial for all, circumstances should be understood in context, and the opportunity for development primarily relies on the availability of enabling *environments* and is not to be measured by the availability of quantifiable *things* only. Klompé was confronted, and frustrated, by a continuous and haunting narrative of under-development of *the other*. She was a keen observer of the contexts, details and the need for sustainable progress, for example, spiritual, mental, and material. From those observations, she concluded that there exists a need for continuous, holistic and contextual development, everywhere: as much as in the Netherlands, in Europe, as in Africa.

A development narrative fuelled by orientalism

Anything ‘for development’ seems to imply a secure feeling and expects an agreeing nodding of the head. Who can be against such a thing as ‘for development’? As shown in the previous section, the understanding of what development means is highly varied, but, in the discourse I recognise an implicit assumption that any intervention ‘for development’ is inherently positive. However, about *whose* development is it? For instance, when we regard ICT4D, who is actually developing? Who is benefitting from its development?

The heralded progress sustained by Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) rely upon their accessibility, the bandwidth of telecommunication networks, and the number of available services handling useful information. These aspects of ICTs are all developing at a breath-taking pace. However, these developments are mainly taking place in the West, with African bolstering ever growing digital divides, digital exclusion, and a lagging digital equity. In this chapter, I argue this is a result from inappropriate technologies, designed by foreign engineering specialists, informed by an orientalist outlook to ‘the rest of the

world', not grounded in the local context, exposed values and conceptualisation of needs.

The African contexts are consistently labelled as *lagging in development* (The Economist, 2000; Easterly, 2008), or, more recently, as *developing* (Roxburgh *et al.*, 2010; The Economist, 2011). However, Africa is never *there yet*, is always *a problem* (cf. Du Bois, 1903) and is continuously being urged *to catch up*. The plans on how to develop are readily proffered by international organisations, foreign think tanks, and international Non-Governmental Organisations. They frame those plans in the lingua of the Sustainable Development Goals, mostly written by foreign-based consultants from privileged areas, often flown in from outside the continent. In the meantime, the extant parties - labelling Africa as previously mentioned - have easily forgotten the ravishes of slavery, the terrorism of colonialism, and the neoliberal forms of imperialism, and their roles in those dilapidating practices. As a result, African (traditional) institutes are – and continue to be – disrupted, African resources are being plundered, African brains are being drained, and unspeakable miseries are being inflicted (Mawere, 2011, 2014). A Shona proverb describes this selective memory aptly: *chinokanganwa idemo muti haukanganwi* (the offender and not the victim is the one who forgets so easily).

The case of ICT4D

There are scores of academics engaged in the discipline of ICT4D. Its research conference, ICTD, occurs every one-and-a-half years and attracts hundreds of participants. When attending ICTD 2012 in Atlanta, I noticed that most participants I met appeared to work from a base in, or affiliated with, the Global North. Colleagues from Africa were astonished by the questioning of presentations of African success, which they perceived as hostile. Particular examples notes were the reactions to a keynote from Kenya that mentioned its potential contributions for processes in Alabama, USA, and a presentation on the role out of ICTs and the involvement of communities in Rwanda.

Dani Nabudere (2012) and Hester du Plessis *et al.* (2013) argue that African issues are best approached from transdisciplinary

perspectives as it allows for inclusion of all involved – academics, practitioners and stakeholders alike – and for epistemic sensitivity and communal restoration. In such a wide approach to realities, many African researchers encounter and incorporate technologies as they constitute the enabling, tangible infrastructures that facilitate improvisations. However, transdisciplinarity is not yet much practiced outside of Africa; there interdisciplinarity is the flavour of the day.

Contemporary institutes of higher education deliver experts that have a deep though narrow expertise base. As Michael Gurstein (2011) notes, has little traction in a non-Western communal setting. Possibly that is why there appears a mismatch with academic groups pursuing the progress of the ICT4D; it seems there are relatively low numbers of Africans collaborating in its pursuits. ICT4D appears primarily done ‘somewhere else’, in what Johan Galtung (1971) called ‘centres-of-the-Centres’. To be more precise, ICT4D seems synonym with an academic activity done ‘in the West, by Westerners’ (cf. Heeks, 2009; Dourish and Mainwaring, 2012). From the so-called peripheral African perspective, ICT4D feels foreign; an activity done by people trained and based in Europe and the USA or megalopolises like Nairobi, Accra, Johannesburg or Cape Town. They go to their well-resourced university labs regularly and engross in the puzzles of how to facilitate the development of ICTs ‘in deprived areas of the world’. The problem with this is how can one based in Europe and the USA, or even in African cocoons of privilege, and interact fully with the living realm of non-Western indigenous epistemologies, of embodied and contextual knowledge? And, subsequently, how can the resulting out-of-context work *not* lead to use, or even abuse, of a foreign knowledge?

The way in which Africa is overlooked is masked by Eurocentric narratives that cite positive feedback and gratefulness of *Africans*. Of course, there are many form of gratefulness. In view existential challenges, how could one not show gratitude? One does not easily chop-off the branches where one sits on (cf. Holm & Maleté, 2010) or bite the hand that is and has been feeding oneself for years. Without ‘gratitude’, even the benefits of being ‘hunters and gatherers’ of raw data, or so-called ‘native informants’ who collect and provide

empirical data for processing in, and empowerment of, the Global North, might fall away (Mawere& van Stam, 2016a, citing Mamdani, 2011). Used from a Western position, words like *engagement*, or *human-centeredness* shield off the harsh realities of being *othered*, being subject of (neo-)colonialism, of the practice of *being defined* and subsequently *being determined*. In fact, it masks a continuation of being *orientalised*.

Who utters the statement that “Africans are deprived”? The Guyanese Walter Rodney (1983), the Ghanaian George James (2009) and the African-American Molefi Asante in his library of books, with a host of Afrocentric scholars, recorded their serious critiques of Eurocentric scholars espousing such views, like Hegel, Hume, Kant, Lévy-Bruhl (cf. Mawere & Mubaya, 2016). Who labels Africans as *deprived*, and who appends the *ab*-prefixes to originals (Figure 1)?



Figure 1, Prefix ‘ab’ attached to ‘original’, in a museum in Sydney, Australia. (Picture by M. van Reisen, Nov 2014)

Yes, many Africans are devoid of broadband internet bandwidth and have no access to so-called appropriate technologies. However, these realities are the result of constraints in a complex society. For ICT implementations, David Johnson *et al.* (2012) show that ICTs must consolidate with particular environmental, skills, and cultural features. Aligning tests with realities in the African rural context, Johnson and van Stam (forthcoming) show that current, foreign designed internet technologies, are not fit for purpose in the rural Southern African environment. When one looks carefully outside of the limelight, contemporary research (even in ICT4D) sometimes dares to suggest that ICT connectivity could very well reinforce – rather than reduce – inequality (Unwin, 2014)! Therefore, although most of the people in Africa do not have what the elites have access to, there is ample room for disagreement with the sweeping statements of *deprivation*. It needs courage to say so because the powers of those narrating about deprivation – in need of ‘their’ technologies that is - are unyielding indeed (cf. van Stam, forthcoming).

‘For development’ prioritises: Development in centres of techno-power

Orientalism became popular in Europe from the eighteen century onwards. Orientalism has been used to describe realities in non-European areas for a European audience. Exotic places were accessible through sea-faring, and knowledge gained was used to facilitate commerce. The first focus was the Orient; hence it’s naming. After the Scramble for Africa, settled at the Berlin conference in 1884-1885, Orientalism became the fundamental approach in the analysis and study of – and disseminations about – Africa. Theorists like Edward Said (2003) argue that Orientalism is a naturalising activity which essentialises the other. Said, an urban Palestinian, defined orientalism as the “disregarding, essentialising, denuding the humanity of another culture, people or geographical region” (ibid: xx). In its practice, views derived from European Universalism are being contrasted with other views, whether on Europe or not. Of course, those contrasting views could be real,

however, orientalism derives them from just one (Eurocentric) hermeneutic approach. There are, however, many realities and many perspectives, as Social Constructivism teaches us. Social Constructivism regards the generation of knowledge and meaning to emerge from the intelligent interaction between human experiences and human ideas. Lucy Suchman (2002: 96) argues: “our vision of the world is a vision from somewhere – that it is inextricably based on an embodied, and therefore partial, perspective – which makes us personally responsible for it.” As a consequence, a variation in positionality will result a difference in description, much influenced by the positional outlook on histories, values, and world-views.

The result of *being othered* and the internalisation of its message, can lead up to what Bishop Desmond Tutu vividly described in his foreword to the 2011 reprint of Steve Biko’s seminal book: *I write what I want*. Tutu points to what the Black Consciousness movement endeavoured to do. That movement sought “to awaken in us the sense of our infinite value and worth in the sight of God because we were all created in God’s image, so that our worth is intrinsic to who we are and not dependent on biological irrelevancies as ethnicity, skin colour or race” (Biko, 2011, location 86), and I would like to add, ‘or geographical location.’ Tutu goes on to remind the readers that “Black Consciousness helped to exorcise the horrible demons of self-hatred and self-contempt that made *blacks* suck up to *whites* while treating fellow blacks as the scum they thought themselves to be.” (ibid, italics added).

The work of James Ferguson and Larry Lohmann, in Lesotho, gives a glimpse of how current models of development assure that, in practice, benefits accrue to the West. Munyaradzi Mawere (2014), among others like Rodney and Asante, argues that in an unequal global society, contemporary globalisation represents just any other form of imperialism, seeking to replace cultural values, goods and ideas.

In research activities, researchers in major Western centres charge several hundreds of US dollars per hour for their research in ICT4D. In that manner, millions of research funding remains entrapped in Europe to support Westerners to do ‘research for Africa’. One cannot but wonder what development would have been

when such kind of financing would have been available for Africans, in African research institutes, to do research in Africa. There is no reason why Africans cannot perform the necessary research, do the proof-of-concepts, and proof-of-reproductions. Africans should tell the local, national and continental stories first, and should, of course, be best positioned to do so. However, there is an avalanche of texts about Africa from outside the African continent. To be able to engage, Africans are supposed to use their precious time to interact with such reports ‘about’ Africa. Often, these reports are inaccessible for Africans, discussed in meetings outside of Africa, and use formats and technologies that African communities are not used to. However, as the discourse claims, they are supposedly authoritative ‘for development’ such they can best be described as counter and *downplaying* of African development.

Fred Gweme and I (2016) describe a promising technology to connect sites in the periphery to the Internet, utilising TV White Spaces in Zimbabwe. We state that “although the development started in Southern Africa, a parallel development has been appropriated by corporate giants like Microsoft and Google. In a concerted effort, they push for the deployment of their TV White Space equipment, possibly forging out market dominance.” This case of pre-empting African developments - like the South African White Rhino technology (Johnson, 2013) - represents a typical example of technology hustling under the banner of ICT4D and globalisation. In the meantime, sensitive information like the use of very high frequencies on African locations, which cannot be known without (approved) physical presence in countries, can be sensed by this particular type of ICT and can potentially be forwarded automatically to foreign corporate companies for commercial exploitation.

In an online interview, an ICT4D researcher affiliated with institutes like the United Nations University Institute on Computing and Society in Macao SAR, China, and the School of Interactive Computing at Georgia Institute of Technology in Atlanta, USA, can be seen narrating a story of his (foreign positioned) involvement to design and use of an internet website (Smart Monkey TV, 2012). The video shows a story explicating disdain, little or no contextual African empowerment or community integration, and – potential even more

harmful – little or no contextual understanding of how ICTs can sustain collective trauma (van Reisen *et al.*, forthcoming).

Africans run the risk of being overwhelmed and disempowered by intellectual activities from outside of the African contexts. As a result, activities ‘for development’ empower the capacity of those involved *outside of Africa*, primarily. It benefits foreign academics, foreign companies, and the outputs are used to strengthen foreign (geo-)politics of knowledge production and dissemination. It is most tragic when localities and organisations in Africa are positioned as the benefactor or requestor but the sizable funding flows straight to professionals and institutes outside of the African continent, in full or leaving some crumbs for the African picking, for window-dressing purposes. Examples are academic work for Macha Works that flows to the University of California (National Science Foundation, 2012) or the funding requested on behalf of University of Zambia flowing to the University of Groningen en Radboud University (NUFFIC, 2016: entry 186). Of course, these pretensions make sense in a framing of (Western) superiority only.

From my research, I deduce that Orientalism permits the rise of *the Imperium*. As Artwell Nhemachena (2016) shows, the Imperium thinks of itself as God’s indispensable gift to the world. Subsequently, the Imperium engages in a dehumanisation effort of *the other* in the, what Galtung (1971) called, periphery. This dehumanisation, i.e. captured by the word *animism*, is attacking African identity as it denounces and separates Africans from African cultures, epistemologies and resources. Bewitched by its Eurocentric fixture and self-referencing, Naomi Klein (2016) shows that even the contemporary discourse of global warming is entrenched in an oriental outlook. Dissecting that discourse, she debunks the implicit narratives of European (white) supremacy and patriarchy.

Empowering super-colonialism

Paul Dourish and Scott Mainwaring (2012) demonstrate how a colonial narrative is part-and-parcel of the constitution of contemporary ubiquitous computing. In previous work, Irani *et al.* (2010) foresaw that generative models of culture, development as a

historical program, uneven economic relations, and cultural epistemologies must be part of the analytic approach of design of, what they called, postcolonial computing. Up to now, these aspects are not integrated (van Stam, forthcoming). As can be deduced from the examples above, the *techno-powers* exercised through technology for development and the continued practice of orientalism acts to legitimate a growing academic and technological imperialism. This, in turn, activates enshrined colonialities and legitimises colonial behaviour. Current imperial and colonial practice keeps African academic structures disempowered in the world system. As a result, academic students are not equipped to question the status-quo of such a colonial outlook. As a result, university graduates are bootstrapped to colonial thinking (Mawere & van Stam, 2016a). Although rowdy at times, the *#RhodesMustFall* movement and its call for decolonialisation shows there is something to stand up for.

In contemporary reality, I recognise the presence of a morphed sort of colonialists. In this colonialism, the empire reigns in the form of *technical assistance* and as an Euronarcistic academia. The ensuing, contemporary crises are, therefore, a clash of paradigm, where indigenous view and Western views collide (Mawere & van Stam, 2015). Foreign ideologies like neo-liberalism and individualistic capitalism aim to the continuing of the parasitic, colonial practice of expatriating African resources and labour (Ferguson & Lohmann, 1994). Munyaradzi Mawere and I (2016) argue that from an African position, colonialism involves the process of 1) condemnation, 2) brainwashing, and 3) a carrot and stick. This process that uses power-distances coerces Africans to align with foreign narratives ‘for development’. This is an active and constantly expanding colonialism, and not what Kwame Nkrumah refers to as neo-colonialism. Neo-colonialism refers to former colonial powers continuing to determine what happens both economically and politically to the African people over whom, in terms of law, they no longer have any control. However, although neo-colonialism can be recognised, I regard contemporary times as an *Age of super-colonialism*, based upon realities as described in chapter and my other works. They show a form of colonialism that can be regarded as a notch more intrusive than colonialism experienced in the 19th and 20th

centuries. In super-colonialism, I argue, there are the old *and new* parties colonising. These can be, but are not limited to, international corporate business and international organisations with their technical experts. Such colonising is all invasive using digital means of communications combined with every increasing air-transport networks, technologies (for development), global finance networks and aid, and international treaties and other frameworks, and more, to exercise their devious powers and vexations over distant peoples. This is mirrored in the poem below by Ncube:

*Decades ago, I heard life was simple and it was so
Where there was need, a hand would help
Where there was a tear, a heart would ache
Willing hands and hearts would meet the lack
Charity they called it, for it was so
Now an industry of sorts – an insult to the poor*

*Now in my day I see things do change
Experts have risen who have not been poor
Whose studies and surveys bring no change
Whose experiments and pilots insult the poor
Whose terms and concepts, tools always change
An industry of sorts – an insult to the poor*

*What greater insult could there be
When a fellow man calls me just a beneficiary
When our pictures of desperation are used for marketing
When our dignity is insulted just for fundraising
When trainings and awareness are imposed on us
When the life of another is planned by another
When the gift we got is never disclosed
When overheads are deducted before we know
When we smile for pictures we never see
When our children seek to change our ways
When we waste our lives responding to assessments
Indeed an industry sorts – an insult to the poor*
Poem 1, Aid work: an insult to the poor?, Admiral Ncube (2016).

A development narrative set in orientalism

Orientalist theories espouse that contemporary inequalities are the result of geographical, cultural and/or religious particularities. Such racist theories are *rubbish* so to speak. Nevertheless, racist theories are continuing to fuel dehumanising narratives, even today. A contemporary discourse that frame activities ‘for development’ to necessarily come from outside of Africa shows clear signs of such orientalism. In development theories, the associated labels and terminologies most emerge from Western thought. Often, they are derivatives of Marxist conceptions of class, Newtonian natural sciences, and/or Cartesian notions of knowledge. Ramón Grosfoguel (2010a, b) has aptly shown that the current dominant labelling of Africa as ‘being underdeveloped’, or *poor* I would add, is an epistemic racism that originates from an idea that knowledge is only well produced in the West. Implicitly, this racism regards a *white* male person as the ultimate producer of knowledge. Therefore, again using the ICT4D activities, the discourse is full of descriptions of what ‘Africa lacks’: Africa does not have enough bandwidth, Africa misses out on the implementation of available and ‘helpful’ applications, etcetera. The lack of these necessities, such research suggests, should inform the priorities in Africa, to get Africans connected and to bring in ‘appropriate technologies’. The underlying research ‘is done properly’, in the West of course, and technical assistants are available for Africa to help Africans to develop. In the meantime, measurements and evaluations do not include, nor critique, how Western academics doing such research develop their own capacity and how research grants and salaries are benefitting non-Africans. Confirmed through orientalist lenses, foreigners define the academic fields, the lexicons used by the engineering professions, and define and recognise Africa needs and lacks, from positions of privilege in ‘fort Europe’.

To recognise the African state of (under-)development, African academics and practitioners are invited to agree with foreign findings, and to be trained in foreign frameworks. Articles in the oligopoly of Eurocentric journals (Larivière *et al.*, 2015), books, and other texts, represent a coercive force. When talking about the experience of

publishing, African scientists narrate how one must reference from within such libraries to get one's voice heard, inside or outside of Africa. Therefore, for survival, African academics (are supposed to) copy foreign vocabulary, aligning with foreign agendas, and subjugating to foreign definition of realities. In that way, African professionals become 'the Orientals from within', the others, that live out the story, the narrative, that is authored somewhere else.

Due to the (economic) necessity to survive, a large portion of the African professionals conform with foreign narratives (Mawere, 2014; Mawere & van Stam, 2016a). The orientalist narratives of Engineering for Development, therefore, are not openly challenged by Africans. Some in privileged settings are getting uncomfortable and ask questions. Sensitised by their South American and African experiences, Ricardo Gomez and Shaun Pather (2012) did put the qualified question, whether or not in "ICT Evaluation: Are We Asking The Right Questions?". But, such questions and their discussions are far-and-between, relatively vague and uncommitting. There is a general lack of follow-up, or a platform for contemplations. In the meantime, it seems that orientalism is resurging in a world of growing inequalities. With dominant structures becoming more dominant, service monopolies like Facebook and Google crowding out any form of competition especially in and through ICTs, globalisation comes with an implicit demand of standardisation and commoditisation. These standards are invariably set in the West (cf. van Stam, forthcoming).

Opposing voices to the foreign narratives are not appreciated. Daily, lived experience show that the asymmetries of University partnerships between Africa and the (so-called) developed world, that John Holm and Leapetsewe Malete (2010) reported about from Botswana, continue. Accreditation, in Africa, is still conforming to the Western accords (for example, the Washington or Bologna Accords), which accords were set with little, if any, input from Africa. Ali Mazrui's call for a renaissance of African thinkers and the African academy is as valid today as it was when he aired the plea, in 2003. The education in Africa continues to prioritise Western knowledge, formulated by Western academics, who were unaware of anything that one could be label as African (Nyamnjoh, 2012).

Empowering Africa and mediating foreign (techno-)powers

It appears that Western engineers involved in Technology for Development in their effort to work against techno-exclusion of *the other* have, through the testing and strengthening of their own epistemologies, increased their Western techno-power. In an analogy with acquired military power – paraphrasing Reinhold Niebuhr (1932: 232) – this techno-power, and the momentary gratefulness which this techno-power maintains, is certain to be destroyed by the resentments which this techno-power creates. To avoid such confrontation or rejection (see Mawere & van Stam, 2016a), we should engage in listening (Sirolli, 2012) and conversation about worldviews, and change the balance of power of *us* and *them* in a symbiosis through Ubuntu, aiming to ‘be faithfully together’ without suspecting any sense of insecurity and treachery.

How should we respond to an orientalism that undergirds the foreign narrative for technologies for development? The labelling this narratives of Technology for Development as Orientalism does not absolve Africa from being connected to such intrusions and machinations. The (techno-)powers it creates must be mediated by setting up rules of engagement in the international development of technologies. This needs careful thinking, and thought experiments. For instance, by contemplating counter narratives. How would an African engineer, say, from Zimbabwe, be received in, say, Amsterdam, brandishing papers written in Harare about the derived needs and realities in the Netherlands? And, how would Dutch authorities react to this Zimbabwean academic proposing appropriate solutions that were considered ‘successful for French problems’ and were discussed at an international conference about the subject in, say, Lusaka? The likely answer would be: not at all. In the unlikely event that an audience would be granted, the Dutch might respond: “we have our own research institutes in Amsterdam, Eindhoven, Rijswijk and other places, we have our Dutch conferences about the subject, where we discuss how to transfer this Dutch evidence into Dutch policies, and then we take them further to influence the European policies, set in Brussels.” As Francis Nyamnjoh (2012) shows the irrelevance, even poison of framing

one's interactions in a framing imported from other continents, the only way for our Zimbabwean academic to play a worthwhile role in processes in the Netherlands, would be to assimilate and propose insights with respect to the local, Dutch perspective.

Therefore, derived from this analogy, Africa must reject to be brandished as Orientals, that Africans are *others*, the *subaltern*, and *lesser human beings*. First and foremost, as Desmond Tutu, showed earlier, we need to acknowledge the equality of all human beings (cf. Mawere, 2013). Secondly, we need to acknowledge that an orientalist Technology for Development has wronged Africa, it crowded out an African agency and relegated whole communities into the dungeons of the subaltern. Thirdly, practice of ongoing orientalism (and imperialism and colonialism) must be put on the agenda of the technology profession, and it must be denounced, mainstream. In the meantime, any unbalanced relationships in North South relationships must be fought, tooth-and-nail. Visiting academics and engineers, proposing technologies for development that are shown to be grounded in orientalism and/or brandishing imperialistic or colonial agency, must be asked to abscond, to be on the back bench until being asked to express its views, and to engage and show respect for the African position. Of course, when in Africa, one should act in manners that are salient in an African locale, manners that have been established over a substantial amount of time in *cadenza* with the ancestors and the aim to hand over a good world to our children. Of course, every local has its own culture, its own way of doing, and priorities in the African locale can be at various with other locals, in Africa and the world. Therefore, any engagement needs study and preparation in an effort of understanding such behaviour. Subsequent identification can lead to assimilation with the complex network of customary and national rules and regulations.

As shown in this chapter, there is little, if any, epistemic balance in engineering. Worse still, an oriental epistemic violence continues to prevail. For epistemic justice, engineering must avoid the trap of orientalism, therefore, the academy and engineering profession must be cognisant of the multi-contextual world. Such an academy aims for 'virtue epistemology', where reality intertwines with *matters of attitude* and morality, beliefs and values, and sustains a multiplicity of

knowledge systems. Explicitly, this does not subject the human environment to a techno-scientific or economic framing only. There are multiple knowledge systems possible and existing; they grow from the efforts of self-assessment by communities set in various contexts (cf. Mawere, 2015). Therefore, there are multiple forms of rationality, all aiming for an anthropocentric value relevant for the local context. In this setting, scientific integrity means to explicitly confront power strategies of particular epistemologies over other epistemologies, of which orientalism is one. Such an academy addresses issues of local representations of academics in relationship with other societal stakeholders, allowing for the co-existence of paradoxical knowledge, and aims to expose various knowledge systems and studies their integration in local contexts. Such an academy culminates in a post-foundationalism/post-epistemology and post-empirical inclusiveness and their reflections of human nature.

Conclusion

Referring back to Lucy Suchman's (2002) statement on the responsibility of 'a vision from somewhere', Africans, as responsible custodians of culture, ecology, and the present and must assure that African visions on African realities are available, known, and transmitted. Development in Africa can only be understood from a position of embodied and in-depth knowledge indigenous epistemologies (Mawere & van Stam, 2015). Possibly, indigenous epistemologies can interact with Western practices, but such should be studied with Africans in the lead. Orientalism has a total disregard of indigenous knowledge and leads to an abuse of Western knowledge, out of context. This situation has threatened the development of Africa, creating the void in which an orientalist narrative of technology of development can take root, also in Africa. In today's globalising world, we have academics – foreign and local – who disregard both African indigenous mechanisms and statutory laws as they pursue unquenchable hunger and thirst for the harbingers of capitalism. In capitalism, all living beings are being commoditised as if life is up for sale. African communities do not

subscribe to such a greedy economic way of looking at the world. In general, there is a sharing of resources, knowing that the success of others is part of the honour of community and the individual.

In the review of technologies for development, there should be focus to enhance African capacity, instead of building Western capacity. This needs an academy that is not removed from reality, but identifies with it and resides in it. This necessitates identification with *living alongside*, sharing, and *being together* in community (in casu, Ubuntu). Orientalism can be disempowered by levelling playing fields, assure the same remuneration for the same work, and to recognise local authority and the primacy of those who are closest to the action (which are those in African communities). Instead of an orientalist universalism we need multi-cultural pluralism, instead of crippling inequality we need communality, instead of being plundered we need to share. An orientalist technology for development has colonial agency, and such agency must be decolonised by a sustained anti-imperialistic and post-colonial narratives. Technologies for Development are to be defined locally, not exogenously, and the dead end of colonialism must be broken by 1) appreciation of all views of reality, 2) discussion and contribution of all, and 3) communal love (Mawere & van Stam, 2016b).

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Decolonising Africa's Development: In Search of Development Alternative Paths

Costain Tandi & Munyaradzi Mawere

Introduction

The gist of this chapter is to explore why and how African development has remained deeply entrapped in the matrices of Euro-centric perspectives. Africa has, for a long time, been a victim of colonial exploitation, oppression and human degradation. This, coupled with some endogenic factors, has had dramatic effects on the continent's development agendas and direction, with development for Africa, becoming a theme fraught with a multiplicity of Western recycled ideas, models, and research paradigms, all with the purported goal of alleviating poverty. This obtaining reality has downplayed the emergence of alternative development paths to counter the unproductive current Western-centric neo-liberal development perspectives. Threefold question has been raised: To what extent has colonialism affected Africa's development pathway? How to disengage Africa from the colonial hangovers that remain lingering on the development arena some decades after the demise of colonial administration on the continent? What is the best way of decolonising African development which since the colonial era has largely been influenced by Western thinking?

The threefold question above has been raised chiefly because though the call for decolonisation in Africa has been pervasive in areas such as language, education and politics, among others, it has rarely and hardly been the case in the area of development where Eurocentric models and theories remain dominant even today. Part of the reason for this problem has been the fact that *Development Studies* as a discipline in the academy is relatively new. As a discipline, *Development Studies* started after the Second World War, while in many African universities it started as late as the decade 2000. The other

reason that has been proffered so far is that since the call for decolonisation in the 1960s, the decolonisation project has always been led by theorists and technocrats from the Global North with those in the Global South finding themselves in the periphery of the decolonisation agenda.

In fact, it is arguably true that in post-colonial Africa, conceptions of the nature and purposes of development as well as the theories and strategies for achieving them have remained a territory traversed predominantly by non-African social scientists. In this context, social scientists studying Africa's development have proclaimed that at the dawn of the 1990s, a "paradigmatic crisis" that warranted a quest for alternative paths to Africa's development has already been showing (Barrel 2000). The crisis could be traced as far back as the middle of 20th century when African scholars have been battling with rediscovery of African identity after the devastating effect of European slavery and colonialism. Most of the scholars argue that European slavery and colonialism devastated African psyche, rubbished her culture and values, distorted Africa's development pathway, underdeveloped the African continent resources-wise, and left it empty of any coherent world view of reality (see for example, Achebe 1958; Rodney 1972; Asante 2002; Mawere 2014; Ndlovu-Gatsheni; Mawere & Mubaya 2016; Mawere & Gertjan 2016). The travails and backwardness of Africa in social, economic, and political development have been blamed on European colonialism and neo-colonialism. Barrel (2000: 43) opines that fifty years after decolonisation began, the majority of Africans still remain chained in poverty, ignorance and backwardness, by and large poor, ill-educated and living in squalor, mostly because they "lack the skills and capital necessary to prosper". The continent's economic and political marginalisation in world councils also appears to be "more extreme than at any stage since the 1960s." The Global South countries are longing for development which in Falola's (2003) view is linked to the notions of culture and identity. The multi-million dollar question that remains lingering however is: How do these societies map out plans for development in such a way that they are not seen as mere appendages of their erstwhile colonial masters/mistresses? The answer to this question can readily be found in the adoption of

certain plans of action – policies and development frameworks – which political leaders in African societies believe could be grounded on particular value orientations of the people.

What the above entails is that, if ever to be effective, development strategies should always embrace the input from a society's philosophy of life; the foundation or concrete base of which it is intended to nourish and nurture. On this note, we advance that Africa's development in general should be premised on African values, belief system, and the norms and values that are the very building blocks of African life. African life is based on unity, communalism and a shared purpose and this can be a panacea to socio-economic development. This calls for the need to embrace local solutions, pluralism and community-based solutions in the continent's development agenda. Anything short of this would stifle development efforts from within the continent. But what should be done to achieve such an idea of progress that seems to have been long forgotten in many African contexts as a result westernisation and the so-called modernity? It is argued in this chapter that there is need to seriously revisit the dominant epistemological underpinnings of prevalent development research and assumptions, that are always sensitive to the complex realities, predicaments and expectations of Africans as laboratories for negotiating conviviality amongst competing traditions, identities and ideas of progress (Nyamnjoh 2004a&b, 2005a).

It is piteous to note that for close to five decades, Africa has tried to develop herself along the path traced out by Western experience, but all in vain. Owing to this, Nyamnjoh (2005) posited that development has failed to make a positive and sustained impact on Africa in the last five decades. The continent has relied on a borrowed notion of development and on development agendas that are foreign to the bulk of its peoples both in origin and objectives. That has always frustrated development as this has not always addressed the right issues or done so in the right manner. Development practitioners or experts have adopted strategies that respond more to the needs aspirations of the Global North and which do not always suit African cultures or societies. But can a framework of development that disengages from the needs and

aspirations of the African masses ever hope to succeed in application? Isn't it that development strategies that are made in isolation of the community's philosophy of life, imposed on the people, and which totally disregard the traditional values of the African people, lack the very foundation that is intended to sustain it?

We advance that every society has a history and philosophy behind its knowledge resources which guide its development plans and processes. Little or no attention has been paid neither to background or indigenous knowledge nor to the need for active local participation in the conception, design and execution of development projects. The end result for Global South countries borrowing their political, cultural, economic and intellectual cues from the Global North is the risk of losing any political autonomy, cultural identity, economic independence, intellectual and creative genius that they have.

This chapter is an attempt to decolonise development in Africa. It generally argues that while theories and models of development exported to Africa are important in so far as they help development technocrats with insights, the same betray and derail development efforts on the continent in a number of ways hence there is need to harness "the usable past" to construct an "authentic" African episteme. The chapter goes further to suggest possible alternative paths for the full realisation of development in Africa.

Problematising the concept of development

The concept of development is multidimensional, hence it has become "a concept which is contested both theoretically and politically, and *has become* inherently both complex and ambiguous" (Thomas 2004: 1-2). The narrow and received conception of development in economic terms by some scholars (cf. Easterlin 1968; Gore 2000; Smith 1776) that can be measured statistically (or quantitatively) has become obsolete. The contemporary understanding of development links the concept with the value system of various societies; and in so far as there are various value systems, it follows that there will always be different notions of

development. However, Gordon (2006: 83) has observed that development is a relational and teleological term. According to him, “to be developed implies achieving more than an end but an end that ought to be achieved.” From Gordon’s view, it follows that development is often linked with worthwhile goals, which encompass human needs and aspirations. There might be different values which different societies consider as worthwhile, given their belief system and their general ontological, epistemological, ethical, aesthetical and spiritual orientations.

Even when scholars like Sen (1999) identify development with freedom, it can be said that there are different meanings and conceptions of freedom and what freedom means within a tradition of thought will determine what development means in that context. What is important in the contemporary meanings of freedom is that development signifies not only a quantitative change but also a qualitative change from one level of human existence and experience to another. Thus in social terms, development is a process in which an entire social system could move away from a condition of life widely perceived as unsatisfactory and constrained towards another condition regarded as materially, morally and spiritually better. No wonder the Human Development Report (1996: 10), describes economic growth as a means and human development as the end of development.

Despite the increased call for development that is both quantitative and qualitative (Todaro 1992; Mabogunje 1980; Nyerere 1968; Mawere 2016; Theron 1998; Swanepoel 2011), different theories of development have been identified by scholars. For instance, Martinussen (1997) identified such theories to include: development as economic growth, development as human development, development as modernisation process, development as elimination of dependency, development as dialectical transformation and development as history. Different development theorists have applied these theories of development to specific interpretations of human experience. Even when there might not be a Form of development in Platonic terms, there are certain things to which these different theories of development relate to which make

them relevant as ways through which human beings pursue “worthwhile” goals and “positive” change.

The primary cause of underdevelopment in Africa

There is a multiplicity of factors – endogenic and exogenic – that precipitated underdevelopment in Africa. By underdevelopment we mean “a situation that obtains when a nation-state lags behind most others in industrialisation, education, standard of living, healthcare, utilisation of natural resources (unutilisation or under-utilisation), life expectancy and other technological and cultural norms such that access to the basic necessities [needs and wants] is limited and life lived by the majority is ‘undesirable’ (Mawere 2016: 44).

Many development practitioners adduced external factors as the causes of Africa’s underdevelopment problem; the external causes of Africa’s past and contemporary problem, according to them, include the trans-Atlantic slave trade, colonialism and imperialism, policies and practices of international socio-economic and socio-political institutions and so on (cf. Rodney 1972; Frank 1967, 1998, 2005; Mimiko 1999; Shitta- Bey 2014). It is indeed arguably true that most of Africa’s woes are due to external factors such as the lingering effects of slave trade, neo-colonialism, racist conspiracy plots, exploitation by avaricious multinational corporations, an unjust international economic system, inadequate flows of foreign aid, the neo-liberal policies of the World Bank, IMF, and deteriorating terms of trade (cf. Ayittey 2005; Mawere & Mubaya 2016).

It is important to note that slave trade and colonialism (and by extension imperialism and capitalism), constitute the greatest rape to Africa’s development trend such that stagnancy and derailment set into Africa’s development pace leading to adverse underdevelopment of the continent. Disciples of this view include Andre Gunder Frank (1967, 1998, 2005) and the prominent and celebrated scholar of Africa descent, Walter Rodney. Rodney notes that Africa’s under development project is due to European intrusion into the continent. In his celebrated work: *How Europe underdeveloped Africa*, Rodney (1972) opines that the slave traders who came to Africa initiated the protracted process of underdevelopment on the continent because

they stagnated the economic growth by taking away the productive class from African society, thereby laying the foundation for imperialist domination of the continent.

In short, Rodney's conception can be summarised thus: Africa was, by its own standard, developed prior to the 15th century, albeit in a different direction from Europe's conception of development. European slave trade, thus, sow the seed of African underdevelopment and technical stagnation. From this standpoint, Rodney's supposition suggests that as a result of trade in persons carried out in Africa by Europeans, Africa was deprived of both skilled and unskilled human resources required to sustain its pace of development as well as its very development; thus, development in Africa became dilapidated, hampered, retarded, and stagnated.

Furthermore, Rodney links Africa's underdevelopment to the phenomenon of colonialism. In his hypothesis, he posits that Africans contributed significantly to European capitalism during the colonial period, and that Africa's underdevelopment is primarily a result of Western colonialism. Explicitly, Rodney argues that Europe underdeveloped Africa in two major ways: the first is through the operation of the imperialist system which drained Africa's wealth and made it impossible for the continent to rapidly develop resources; the second is through Europe's nefarious deals with those who manipulate the African systems of governance such as Africa's political leaders. Sharing this view in line with Rodney, that slave trade and colonialism are responsible for Africa's underdevelopment, is Femi Mimiko. Mimiko (1999) supports the view that slave trade and colonialism, and their attendant outcomes, imperialism and capitalism, are at the root causes of Africa's underdevelopment. He posits that specifically identified as having the most profound negative impact on the African socio-political landscape are the phenomena of slave trade and colonialism since they served to truncate the developmental process of the African peoples, and by so doing constructed a solid foundation for their present state of underdevelopment characterised by disease, ignorance, poverty, industrial stagnation, civil wars, and acute political instability.

Mimiko further argues that Africa's state of underdevelopment is neither traditional nor natural, that growth and development being

endemic to all human societies were not totally unknown in Africa before its contact with Europe. However, slave trade and colonialism combined to re-order and change this prevailing situation and distorted Africa's steady march to progress. Slavery marked the first act of penetration of the African sub-systems of all spheres of life which subsequently ensured the incorporation of the continent into the expanding world capitalist economy as a satellite, while colonialism marked the most important phase in the incorporation of all colonial people into the global economic system as dominated and controlled by the industrial capitalist states of the West (Ibid). Besides, contemporary scholarship have also added to the list of the causes of Africa's backwardness which include "exploitation by avaricious multinational corporations, an unjust international economic system, the neoliberal policies and practices of the World Bank, IMF, WTO" (Ayittey, 2005: 85) as well as poor governance and lack of political will.

To Mimiko, because colonialism marked the most important phase in incorporating colonised territories into the world system, the colonies were such that they took up positions in the emerging international division of labour with Africa earmarked as the producer of primary product and consumers of foreign industrial manufacturer's product. By so doing, the imperial countries made the colonies and their economies to become externally oriented and lacking as it were, independent internal dynamics of their own (Mimiko, 1999). Thus for Mimiko, this explains the unjust global system responsible for Africa's contemporary problem.

Besides, on the conquest of Africa, the European colonisers embarked on the domination and suppression of African culture. There were no efforts to dialogue with African culture. It was simply discarded as backward, primitive and something that lacked any positive value to warrant serious consideration (Anyahie 2012; Mawere 2014; Mawere & Mubaya 2016). African cultures were disparaged as barbaric, primitive, irrational and debased. Its ancestors and "traditional" religions were declared evil culminating into the classification of the African race as inferior to Europe. European colonialism enthroned eurocentrism in Africa which considered any culture that does not conform to it as inferior and a culture that needs

to be transformed to meet European standard. It disrupted and destabilised African values, beliefs and perception which define Africans as a people. Africa lost her identity. Many scholars have traced the problem of Africa's underdevelopment to the issue of identity crisis.

With the Eurocentric mentality imposed on Africans, the colonisers embarked on the re-orientation project of Africa to perceive the world from the European view point; a programme they called "civilisation of African brutes". It is on the basis of such flawed reasoning that Fredrick Engels advanced the idea that Africa should submit to European imperialism and transformation of her culture if she is to be civilised and avoid being extinct. Similarly, Hegel (1956) declared that Africa has no contribution to human history and that she at best hears only echoes of human civilisation from the North. Religious groups especially Christians and Moslems also embarked on re-orienting African worldview and consciousness in their bid to distance Africans from their own religion. Consequently, the European mission disoriented African psyche, perception, values and beliefs. Kwame Nkrumah (1974) aptly captures this when he observes that African identity has been distorted by Arab Islam, European Christianity and colonisation.

Resonating with scholars such as Rodney and Mimiko discussed above, Dukor argues that African identity is lost because of three major factors of European imperialist activities in Africa which includes slavery, colonialism and racialism. He argues that it was because Africans were considered racially inferior and culturally uncivilised that both Arabs and Europeans felt a moral justification in exploiting them by reducing them to slavery. Therefore, the heart of the whole problem of African identity lies in racism that Africa has suffered over years.

While we agree with Rodney, Mimiko, Dukor and others, that external forces such as slave trade and colonialism are the primary causes of Africa's underdevelopment, we go beyond these scholars to argue that internal forces have also contributed equally, sometimes worse than the external forces, to the underdevelopment of Africa. These internal factors include lack of political will, extolling of macabre virtues such as corruption and poor governance,

unintelligent adoption of foreign development models and theories by African governments, and recurrence of natural disasters, among others. We therefore urge that, when examining the causes of Africa's underdevelopment, one should soberly look at both the external and internal factors, to determine how these have negatively impacted on Africa's development and how they can be handled in order to unlock the continent's development gridlock.

Decolonisation and reconstruction as a panacea to Africa's development predicament

The need to liberate African self-representations from Eurocentrism emphasises the necessity for the decolonisation and reconstruction of Global North concepts and methods. According to Matunhu (2011) the development debate notes with concern that the underdevelopment of Africa is indeed a result of cultural collision between two different development spheres that is, the Global North and Africa. The Global North, owing to its strategic and technological advantage over Africa, was able to choke and subdue Africa's culture, value system, and development framework. In the process, Africa lost its right to determine its way to development. Matunhu further notes that, the journey to Africa's true liberation comes with disengagement with the Global North in political and economic terms. Nevertheless, the journey is long and full of hurdles. Despite the risks ahead, Africa has to unite and fight for a common course. As Mhango (2016) argues in his *Africa Unite or Perish*, the failure for Africa to unite and foster a common goal will always make the continent's development sluggishly staggering and ailing for even longer than might be expected. The radical approach to poverty reduction lies in the African renaissance theory, which takes Africans to be part of the development problem as well as being part of the solution to the continent's underdevelopment. This is no longer the time to cry foul but to act decisively, knowing pretty well that the Global North has become even more sophisticated in its plan to keep Africa on check and under both economic and political bondage of some sort.

One may wonder why such a radical approach to Africa's development logjam is important. We argue that no view of African difference and philosophy can ever be genuine and self-liberating to the African people as long as remain embroiled and tangled in the Global North misrepresentations and biases. The deconstructive standpoint (or what we call here decolonisation) relativises the Global North, just as it unravels the hidden motives and machinations of its thinking. It offers the best possible tools both to critically analyse the colonial discourse on Africa and to approach Africa from a new perspective. Mudimbe, one of the finest and celebrated proponents of the African deconstructionist school, opines that, what currently passes for African philosophy and knowledge of Africa is essentially a product of the Western episteme. He writes:

Modern African thought seems somehow to be basically a product of the West. What is more, since most African leaders and thinkers have received a Western education, their thought is at the crossroads of Western epistemological filiation and African ethnocentrism. Moreover, many concepts and categories underpinning their ethnocentrism are inventions of the Global North (1988: X).

Besides, Mudimbe (Ibid: XI) posits that there are natural features, cultural characteristics, and, probably, values that contribute to the reality of Africa as a continent and its civilisations as constituting a totality different from those of, say, Asia and Europe. On the other hand, any analysis would sort out the fact that Africa (as well as Asia and Europe) is represented in Western scholarship by 'fantasies' and 'constructs' made up by scholars and writers since the Greek times. The main challenge for Africa at the moment is to find an approach free of Western premises and stereotypes before the attempt to reconnect with the past is made. The problem, for Mudimbe, is less the particularity of Africans than the misconstruction of the perception of particularity by the insidious influence of Eurocentric concepts. To underestimate the impact of these Western concepts is a great mistake. Such concepts are no longer what Westerners say

about Africans; they have been internalised to the point of becoming the unconscious references of Africans.

Most interesting is the correlation that Mudimbe establishes between the socio-economic reality of Africa and its mental setup. The colonial system of economic exploitation, for Mudimbe, necessitates the inculcation of a subservient mentality into the colonised peoples, especially into the educated elite. It presupposes a policy of domestication based on the production of intellectual representations and beliefs inducing mental dependency. The missionary's project of disseminating Christianity and civilisation was an important tool for implanting dependency. As Mudimbe (Ibid: X) argues "the outcome of these policies was the process of underdevelopment," which is neither poverty nor backwardness, but the product of domestication. The production of a dependent mode of thinking and producing in colonies shows that what exists in Africa is no longer the traditional society, but a peripherised, marginalised and besieged society.

By showing that economic dependency is a consequence of mental dependency, Mudimbe's theory of underdevelopment improves on the position of the neo-Marxist school of dependency. In its heyday, the neo-Marxist dependency school, as articulated, for instance, by Andre Gunder Frank (1967), associated economic dependency with the tendency to rebel rather than to submit, thereby imbuing the third world with a strong tendency to confront imperialism. The tendency was believed to be so firm that the underdeveloped world was often described as the new birthplace of socialism, in contrast to the weakening of revolutionary spirit among the working class of the West as a result of the corrupting effect of imperialist expansions. To quote Frank (1967: 12):

As the solutions to the problems of underdevelopment become ever more impossible within the capitalist system which creates them, the long exploited people themselves are being taught and prepared to lead the way out of capitalism and underdevelopment.

Clearly, Mudimbe's approach as that advocated by Ngugi wa Thiongo (1986) in his: *Deconising the mind...*, places the colonisation of the African mind at the centre of Africa's problems of modernisation. If the mental is so conditioned as to promote Western dominance, even as Africans seem to contest that dominance, liberation is unthinkable without the complete emancipation from Western categories whose purpose is to marginalise other peoples through the universalisation of the West. Subjective liberation, that is, the decolonisation of the mind, is thus the forced prerequisite to Africa's modernisation. The priority of mental liberation establishes the primacy of deconstruction: when Western concepts are deconstructed, the affirmation of difference without hierarchy or opposition becomes possible. Deconstruction debunks Eurocentrism, and so inaugurates the authentic phase of pluralism by dismissing the antagonism between Europe and Africa.

One major implication of the deconstruction of Eurocentric development is the rejection of the antithesis, so dear to modernisation school, between modernity and tradition. In view of the systematic deformation of the African past by Western concepts, nothing justifies 'the static binary opposition between tradition and modernity, for tradition (*traditio*) means discontinuities through dynamic continuation and possible conversion of *tradita* (legacies)' (Mudimbe 1988: X). The very process of modernisation in Europe and elsewhere gives confirmation of the capacity of tradition to integrate discontinuities by means of a dynamic continuity in a process best known as reconstruction. When Europeans refer to the Greek, Roman, and Christian roots of modern Western civilisation, what else do they underline but the continuity of European history through the integration of discontinuities? If integration is good for Europeans, why would it be retarding when Africans want to achieve a similar continuity by integrating their encounters of the West into their own legacy? When Africans conceive of modernisation as a synthesis of African legacy, communalism, dynamic conception of being, and Western ideas of science and technology, they are attempting to construct a dynamic continuity that centres and protects them from alienation and dependency while opening them to novel encounters and events. This opening to novel and

encounters and events normally leads to inclusive development: a form of development that is tolerant of different development partners and their perspectives, including their diverse cultural orientations. Talking of the need for *inclusive* development that aims at striking a balance between the needs and aspirations of partners in development in Africa, the African Union Conference of Ministers (2008) aptly puts it:

The lack of ‘inclusive’ development has pertained to most of Africa’s history, and necessitates that the continent develop a social policy framework combining economic dynamism (including pro-poor growth policies), social integration (societies that are inclusive, stable, just and based on the promotion and protection of all human rights, non-discrimination, respect for diversity and participation of all people) and an active role for government in the provision of basic social and other services at local and national levels (p.7).

Thus, real development should always aspire for inclusivity, conviviality, cooperation and balance.

Paving way for the decolonisation of Africa’s development

Africa today has the golden chance to play its rightful role in the global arena. But to do so the continent needs to unite; speak with one voice and be competitive in all aspects. This, in turn, demands radical socio-economic transformation. Of course, none of that can happen until Africa’s people lead dignified lives and can take full charge of their development agenda. Above all, African leaders should be prepared to seek solutions from within the philosophies and practices of their societies, and to develop ideas that propel their countries forward development-wise even if it means embracing the “unorthodox” in the Western sense. As Awoniyi (2015) suggests, in order to reclaim the humanity of African communities and to assume the rightful heirs of our founding fathers, there must be a conscious effort to assert African historical traditions and consciousness. We must explore African oral traditions – the

unwritten frameworks and mechanisms – and their prospects for economic liberty, natural integration, and stability. Africans need a psychological and physiological liberation. In doing this, they must draw lesson from Asia to where nature and environment are valued and celebrated. The challenge before Africans as individuals, institutions, government at local, state, national and trans-national is to rededicate to the appreciation, development and patronage of African cultural resources and values.

It is high time, Africans should identify with one another with good knowledge of relics of the endowment and versed in the history of various cultural and historic sites. Africans can only make gains rather than losses by investing resources in individuals with powers of management of the cultural resources. This because African pride as a continent lies in the values placed on her cultural endowment, the inherent system of ideas as well as those values that define peculiar personal and group perceptions and ways of life. We have no doubt that placing premium on African cultural endowment would earn the people of Africa a modicum of respect, global recognition, international co-operation, development, and aid effective dissemination of African culture by projecting the best of her history. It would naturally encourage the preservation and sustainable conservation of African heritage for future generations and for furthering development of the continent.

Besides, development activities that work with and through indigenous knowledge and organisational structures have several important advantages over development projects that operate outside them. Indigenous knowledge provides the basis for grassroots decision-making, much of which takes place at the community level through indigenous organisations and associations where problems are identified and solutions to them are determined. Thus, we argue that solution-based behaviour is based on indigenous creativity leading to experimentation and innovations as well as the appraisal of knowledge and technologies introduced from other societies

On this note, we sharply differ from Hountondji (1983), who arguing for Africa overcoming her predicament advances that Africa should not be sentimental about their culture in appraising their

relevance to the contemporary challenges. While we agree with Hountondji that traditional culture and collective thoughts of Africans should be submitted to a critical assessment and not being unnecessarily apologetic, we are worry with his “scale” to be used to subject African culture and collective thoughts to scrutiny. In fact, Hountondji further argue that those cultural traits that stand the test of critical scrutiny should be appropriated and advanced while those that fail should be modified or jettisoned, but the question that remains is: “Whose scale should we use to subject the African culture and collective thoughts? Isn’t it the Western scale which in any case we are criticisig for being lopsided?” Thus for us, while Hountonji’s attempt to overcome the anachronistic orientation of negritude could be welcome, his argument that Africa should come to terms with the current realities and not try to isolate herself or over lament about her past, needs careful scrutiny. We advance that while Africa should, in no way, address the current picture of things for her to be relevant in the global socio-politics and effectively handle her challenges, there is also need to reinvent her past and foreground her culture in a manner that instils development. Otherwise, we will be wholesomely converted into westernism.

Kwame Nkrumah (1970) in his: *Consciencism* was right when he teaches that African mind has been adulterated with influences from Islam, Christianity and colonialism. It will be almost impossible to decipher traditional African culture from the foreign ones so long Africans internalise the foreign doctrines and ways of worshipping. What should concern Africa now is to understand her current plight and to address issues from their own perspective. She can borrow ideas from other cultures of the world but those ideas should be adapted to serve her interest. This is because, as Nkrumah emphasised, there is nothing particular about the races; what matters is interest and the spirit to foreground and propel development within the armpit of culture.

We need to appreciate with Nkrumah that African culture like every other culture is dynamic. The psyche and worldview of contemporary Africa have changed from that of her forefathers. When people agitate for the revival of traditional African culture the question that comes to mind is whether it is that of ancient Africa

that addressed the challenges of that age. While we admit that many of the solutions of that age are no longer relevant to current problems of Africa, we argue that there is need for a thorough search of the African identity that focuses on how to understand the present mindset of Africans, highlighting her potentials and limitations in tackling current existential global problems. A look at Africa's past history may be informative to her current perception of reality, but the search should go beyond that to analyse her present challenges and attitude towards development of the continent.

Africa is not the only continent that was colonised. The other colonised continents are consistently making improvements and impacting on the world development. Asia, South America and Australia were colonised continents that today are strongly emerging in global affairs. Why not the same with Africa? We note here that driving force for these other formerly colonised continents is that they are confronting their challenges as it suits them not as the West or North America want them to do. Asia aggressively minimised foreign influences on her affairs to constructively position herself for effective development. And, with that informed policy, Asia succeeded in rising above its knees economically. Conversely, Africa always solicits for foreign interferences in handling of her challenges; one reason that makes Africa tethered on one position.

Conclusion

In light of the above analysis, it is logical to conclude that in the African post-colonial experience, Western paradigms have determined the nature and purposes of Africa's development and the theories and strategies for achieving them. These paradigms are sustained by internalist epistemologies that persist in advancing "lies, illusions and mystifications about Africa". The effect of these lies and illusions are the epistemicide and valuecide being perpetuated in Africa's strides towards development. These have culminated in the paradigmatic crisis proclaimed by social scientists at the dawn of the 1990s. The stranglehold of internalist epistemologies, with their attendant universalising tendencies, has resulted in the impasse of rationality. By this we mean that *reason*, apotheosised since the

enlightenment was believed to have as its major goal to drive humanity out of barbarism to “civilisation.” Unfortunately, it has now placed humanity on the brink of unredeemable barbarism. It is precisely at this moment of delirious impasse reached by *reason* that the African ethics-based development paradigm, predicated on humaneness and “life is mutual aid,” can restore Reason to sober rationality and liberate Africa’s development efforts from the intoxicating prison of profit making. Hence, development strategies devoted to Africa the must incorporate salient features of the philosophic ethic emanating from the knowledge and ontological systems of indigenous Africa into visions of the African future. Such an orientation is more sustainable philosophically, as it yields a comprehensive vision of development that disputes the one founded on the ethic of competition. Further, it will position Africa as the subject of the struggle for its liberation from the imperialist and exploitative practices of Western science and technology that lead to epistemicide and valuecide.

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Education Policy, Exclusion and Development: Filling the Gaps in Zimbabwe's Public Education for Socio-Economic Development

Munyaradzi Mawere & Mescort Nenduva

Introduction

Education policy and development in Zimbabwe have been very complex and fluid owing the country's turbulent economic and political terrain. The current policy environment is guided by political, cultural, historical, ideological, sociological and economic aspects as well as current forces of globalisation. Zimbabwe is faced with the challenge not only of redressing the educational qualitative and quantitative imbalances in the colonially inherited system but also that of exclusion.

Although the advent of national independence ushered in far-reaching reforms in education and training based on the development needs and goals of the new dispensation in Zimbabwe, exclusion in education has paralysed development and caused more harm than good to all spheres of life. Serious exclusion in education manifests itself through sex and gender inequalities, disability and language discrimination. Ultimately, exclusion in education has culminated into mistaken identity, underdevelopment, poverty, hatred, social and political strife, gender-based violence, disparity in educational provision, child abuse/labour, hunger, starvation and social isolation. It has also resulted in wide binary divisions and continues to widen the gap between the rich and the poor. People living with disability, minority groups/languages and the "native" population, particularly that living in rural areas, remain permanently vulnerable, marginalised and languishing in abject poverty as a result of continued exclusion they have suffered since colonialism.

Since the colonial era through the present, there has been great ambivalence and scepticism towards implementing inclusive

education in Zimbabwe's public education. There is no doubt that exclusion has been very resilient. Today, perhaps more than ever before, the foundation and apex of education provision and development in Zimbabwe is premised in the advocacy for inclusion other than exclusion. There is a call for the implementation of a vast repertoire of teaching-learning strategies, to respond in a personalised relational way to learners' diversities and backgrounds. However, there is a general tension and sometimes a direct trade-off between the political will to advance inclusivity and the moral imperative to increase it, and also between the educational desire to raise quality inclusive education and its implementation. This means that there is a glaring disparity on Zimbabwe's policy on inclusive education and the commitment to implementation. This disparity has culminated into or at least perpetuated underdevelopment in Zimbabwe and Africa as a whole.

Although inclusive education is echoed in the Zimbabwean Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education Mission statement, there is firm propagation that there is a mismatch between policy and implementation which seems to work without particular benchmarks and timelines. Against this background this chapter interrogates the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education of Zimbabwe's reluctance to assume a complete paradigm shift. It argues that such reluctance can be mistaken for a misplaced priority and a misguided decision which makes the so-called inclusive education more of hoopla with no commitment to inclusivity and national development. On this note, the chapter further examine exclusion in education by sex and gender, disability and language. This choice is informed by the realisation that exclusion has continued to underplay the loftier goal of development in Zimbabwe while on the other end inclusive education is far becoming rhetoric on paper which is never implemented to the full.

Inclusive education

Winter and O' Row (2010) see inclusive education as the kind of education that breaks the barriers of participation by children and adults on the basis of ability, gender, race, ethnicity, language, socio

economic status, disability, sexuality and religion. It is a process of responding to and addressing the diverse problems of all learners by increasing participation in learning and reducing exclusion within education. In fact as Chataika (2014) notes, inclusive education is a strategy for mainstreaming disability and making people living with disabilities (or people we call in this chapter “the differently abled”) concerns and experiences an integral dimension of design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies of programmes in all the political, economic and social spheres so that they can benefit equally and fairly. In this sense, inclusion describes a process of integrating students with special education needs into the least restrictive environments. All children, young people and adults despite of their different cultural, social, and learning backgrounds should have equal learning opportunities in all kinds of schools. It is in view of the same understanding that Murinda (2005) conceptualise inclusive education as a structure or system whereby all the different types of learners learn together. The learners can be identified as slow learners, intellectually gifted, physically challenged, visually impaired, or hearing impaired. Inclusion denotes the acceptance of the differently abled people as an integral part of society implying that they have the same rights like any other person. Inclusion is, therefore, a psychological as well as a socialisation process than it is just a physical integration process.

It is implemented in most learning institutions as a way of promoting living and working together in an effort to: do away with the spirit of segregation; do away with the isolation of learners with challenges and living with disabilities and; promote the sense of working with their peers as is normal in any community set-ups. In this sense, education systems have the obligation to the expectation and needs of children and young people, considering that the capacity to provide effective learning opportunities based on a rigid scheme of integration (placing students with diverse needs in mainstream schools) is very limited. In Zimbabwe in particular, inclusive education is a pairing of philosophy and pedagogical practices that allow each student to feel respected, confident and safe so that he or she can learn and develop to his or her full potential. It is based on a system of values and beliefs centred on the best interests of the

student, which promotes social cohesion, a sense of belonging, and active participation in learning; it is a complete school experience and positive interactions with peers and others in the school community. The values and beliefs centred on the best interests of the student will be shared by schools and communities where inclusive education occurs. Inclusive education is put into practice within school communities that value diversity and nurture the well-being and quality of learning of each of their members. Besides, inclusive education is carried out through a range of learning and understanding of each of their members as well as through a range of public and community programmes and services available to all students. In Zimbabwe, inclusive education is believed and deemed to be the foundation for ensuring an inclusive society; hence the need for its careful implementation and understanding in line with the education policy in question.

Zimbabwean education policy and planning since the colonial era

Every society has a history that will shape the present and future circumstances of its people and development. The day-to-day lives of the people of Zimbabwe, like any formerly colonised society, are defined by their past history as colonised peoples, often in ways that are subtle (Zvobgo 1996). However, their experiences are a result of internal and external influences. Therefore, to fully comprehend and appreciate policies and challenges that educational planners and administrators face, we need to be deeply grounded in the history of education in Zimbabwe, especially understanding how it shapes much of the postcolonial education system in Zimbabwe. The problems that Zimbabwe faces in restructuring its education system are partly embedded in the colonial legacy and the takeover of the colonial system by neo-colonialism. For nearly a century, when Zimbabwe was under colonial rule, the majority of indigenous people had no say in or influence on government policies and political decisions that affected the education system (cf. Zvobgo 1996). For almost a century a dual system of education existed in Zimbabwe, one for the Africans and the other for the Europeans. The two systems derived from the then socio-political philosophy of racism

and racial discrimination which separated establishments by the colonial regime of the time (Nziramanga 1999). The discrimination applied not only to the students but also to the curriculum, its content, scope, provision of infrastructure and financial resources. This educational apartheid facilitated the provision of highly privileged and advanced education for European children geared towards prepare young whites for economic, political and technological dominance and leadership. In contrast to that segregatory education was the inferior African education system that was deliberately designed to produce poorly educated children who could be employed as cheap labourers for the white employers and communities. African education was provided by Christian churches for a long period with most financial and material resources supplied by missionary bodies and parents (Ibid). Since indigenous peoples of Africa were oppressed and not politically empowered to make fundamental decisions affecting their education, it was apparent to blame racism and imperialism as the main causes of the indigenous people's problems including that of underdevelopment.

Boyle (1983) asserts that the inclusion of people in the planning of their learning activities produced a much more permanent learning. In contrast, racial discrimination and exclusion in colonial Zimbabwe was so ubiquitous that no African was allowed to contribute to the planning of learning activities to do with Africans. The *white* minority rule was responsible for total decision making and the planning of learning activities for Africans. Formal education in colonial Zimbabwe was a creation and product of a foreign dominant culture of the West. It was formulated and structured around the nineteenth century British middle-class education system (Rodney 1982). Foreign culture, which had a hegemonic and demonising effect on indigenous education system, was turned into master narratives that were sought by every individual who desired a "good life". The imposed hegemonic culture disrupted the values of pre-settler and pre-colonial notions of learning that were essential in reflecting the social and cultural needs, experiences, and expectations of the concerned communities. The arrival of European colonialism in Zimbabwe, as elsewhere in Africa, led to the perforce imposition of European or colonial worldview, which was largely responsible for

not only the deliberate distortion of the traditional projects of education already in place (Rodney 1982), but also of the indigenously based and comprehensive programmes of development that were achieved and put in place over hundreds of years (Nyerere 1968). Without doubt, colonial education was a larger component of the colonial project to dehumanise Africans by imposing both inner and outer colonisation.

To a greater extent, colonial education led to psycho-cultural alienation, cultural domination and, a built in of inferiority complexity among the African people. Based on cultural imperialisms, indigenous Zimbabweans were defined and portrayed as inferior to Europeans and were deliberately taught to despise their own cultural identities and to internalise the racial stereotypes of the coloniser. The settlers did not seek to understand the culture and education systems of the indigenous people, which they characterised as “informal”. This is because the settlers’ colonial mentality did not appreciate indigenous epistemologies. It undermined the idea that these epistemologies had the potential to provide Europeans with another enriching view of knowledge production in diverse cultural sites. Local knowledge systems were instead rendered invisible or devalued by the “dominant” colonial culture and their importance were never appreciated. The colonial education was therefore responsible for total exclusion of the African virtues, curriculum, and sensitivities.

On the 18th of April 1980 Prince Charles lowered the British Union Jack to herald the birth of the “new” Zimbabwe and the end of 90 years of “black” suffering under the British rule. Although the advent of national independence ushered in far-reaching reforms in education and training, it is inevitable to note that Zimbabwe inherited the British education system which was largely inappropriate to the needs of the majority of the native population. Serious educational discrepancies were apparent for the children and adults with special needs as a result of sex and gender, disabilities, language, economic background, ethnicity as well as religious differences. Chief among these factors was disability which segregated those children and adults with special needs to their own learning environments. Sadly, upon leaving school, such children and

adults were expected to perfectly fit into society with its negative perception about disability. The World Declaration of Education for all (Jomtien Conference 1990), the Salamanca Convention (1994) and the Dakar Framework – Education for All (2000) marked the heyday for inclusive education in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe had already adopted the Inclusive Education policy in the late 1990s. Jomtien Conference (1990) had affirmed the need to uphold the rights of all people while the Salamanca Convention (1994) ostensibly supported Inclusive Education by affirming that inclusive schools are the most potent in “combating discriminatory attitudes, creating welcoming communities, building an inclusive society, and achieving an education for all” (UNESCO Report, 1994).

By being a signatory to the Salamanca Convention of 1994, the government was fully obliged to ratify and implement inclusive education. In this regard there have been many policy pronouncements on Inclusive Education. The Education Act of 1987 alluded to education for all in Zimbabwe. In 2001, through the Director’s Circular No. 1, 2004, it was announced that pupils with disabilities were supposed to be included in sporting activities in their own category whenever those without disabilities participated. Another policy directive in the form of Director’s Circular No. 2 of 2001 directed that sign language be taught in all primary schools in Zimbabwe. Through partnership with Leonard Cheshire Zimbabwe Trust, in 2010 the Ministry of Education, Sports, Arts and Culture launched a campaign named: *Inclusive Education for All*, which was targeting 1000 children with disabilities from government schools (Samkange, 2013). The Leonard Cheshire Zimbabwe Trust also planned staff development of teachers on Inclusive Education. Zimbabwe’s 2013 Constitution, also upholds the rights of all people including the vulnerable groups and those living with disabilities (SIDA, 2012). Zimbabwe committed itself to inclusive education and education for all as exemplified by its ratification of the various conventions noted above.

Despite ratifying and adopting inclusive education, it was however, already too late to destroy the centres of learning such as Jairos Jiri’s school of the disabled and Capota School of the blind, which were designated for people living with disabilities. Amidst the

policy to include children and adults with disabilities in the mainstream education, these institutions continued to enrol children with disabilities. As observed, although the government of Zimbabwe committed itself to inclusive education, there is a glaring disparity between this ideology and the commitment to implement inclusive education in public schools and institutions of higher learning. In fact, the learning environments (infrastructure), the curriculum, the training of trainers (teachers and facilitators), government and nongovernmental organisations priorities in public schools and stakeholder attitudes does not resemble any commitment to inclusive education. People living with disabilities remain excluded in the mainstream society by both physical and psychological barriers, for instance, attitudes are more serious barriers than physical ones.

In analysing the factors that were at play in the policy making processes in Zimbabwe, there are colonial and postcolonial influences to be taken into consideration. At the time of independence in 1980, Zimbabwe's policies were very much shaped by scientific socialism. This was a natural choice, given the fact that the war of independence was aimed at eradicating a capitalist society whose pillars were based on race. In response to the capitalistic policies of the colonial government in Zimbabwe, at independence in 1980, the government declared all primary education free. The result was a dramatic increase in enrolments at all levels including the post-secondary level. By the early 1990s, the government found itself faced with a huge budget for the provision of books, construction of schools, and for the training and salaries of teachers. Consequently, the government had to back-track and allow for the implementation of school levies, which is another form of tuition fees. The high costs of education were also evident at secondary and higher levels. The new government was seeking social equity and the redistribution of resources to achieve its goals. Yet, the government had great challenges to redress the past. In education, the major policies taken were to widen access. The second challenge was to fill exclusion gaps created by the "white" minority government. The government, therefore, aimed at training indigenous people to improve the local labour market.

In reviewing the Transitional National Development Plan in 1983 in Zimbabwe, it is noted that government policies in education focussed on both quantity and quality but neglected inclusion. The National development plan states that government recognises that education is a basic human right. It also recognises that education is an investment in human capital, which sustains and accelerates the rate of economic growth and socio-economic development. In a later report, the Nziramasanga Commission of Inquiry into Education and Training (1999) reported that the government policies to have free education were not sustainable. This means that the government of Zimbabwe had to revise free primary education for all that was implemented in full force at independence in 1980. The free primary education for all policy had resulted in a dramatic increase in enrolments at all levels including the post-secondary level besides an overwhelming budget for the provision of books, learning centres and educators' salaries.

It should be noted that the thinking to initiate the primary education for all policy was influenced by world trends and was in tandem with World Bank policies on financing education. Over the years, as the funding situation became more burdensome, the government started looking at other options such as the private sector, introducing full tuition fees and increases in the loan component. In higher education, the increase in the loan component was meant to create a revolving fund. The charging of fees was important but this was going to be difficult for parents in the current economic environment. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the economic policies shifted from scientific socialism to capitalism, when the government embarked on economic structural adjustment programmes that had privatisation at the core of their philosophies.

The politics of the colonial education project

Missionaries and the colonial administrators introduced an educational system for Africans that was designed to overtly and explicitly marginalise Africans and strengthen and sustain African domination. Throughout colonial Zimbabwe, the education system was racially exclusive, segregated, and disproportionately funded. For

many years, the colonial government paid attention mainly on funding Europeans, while Africans survived on grants-in-aid that were allocated to missionaries (Nziramasanga 1999). The era was characterised by discriminatory policies that marginalised and disadvantaged the majority of the population. While education for the “white” children was made free and compulsory, education for the “black” population remained a privilege. Because African education did not receive as much funding as the European division which catered for a few students, educational opportunities for indigenous children were extremely limited and restricted.

The colonial government got involved in African education so that it could control the African education that had been a preserve of missionaries in colonial Zimbabwe. The colonial government was forced to bring a new emphasis on advancing Africans for political and economic reasons caused by labour shortage (Murray & Riddell, 1980). The underlying factor determining a refocus on African education was consistent with previous policy aims; to safeguard and enhance *white* economic and political interests. According to Zvobgo (1996), educating and training Africans for employment was not for the benefit of Africans but to assist in the development of the economy that protected the European investors’ interests.

As Rodney (1982) points out, education is crucial in any given society for the preservation of the lives of its members and the maintenance of the social structure. The most crucial aspect of pre-colonial African education was its relevance to Africans in sharp contrast with that which was later introduced. The main purpose of colonial school system was to train Africans to participate in the domination and exploitation of the continent as a whole. Thus, colonial education was education for subordination, exploitation, and the creation of mental confusion and the development of underdevelopment (Ibid). It did not only exclude the African other on racial grounds. Its curriculum also did not cater for the people living with disabilities.

Myths and misconceptions about disability: Pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial perspectives

Global Inclusive Education is a relatively new phenomenon in education driven by the philosophy that all children, regardless of their mild or severe individual differences should attend the same school, in the same class with their peers. Inclusive Education owes its foundations to the American Civil Rights movement of the 1960s (Thomas 1998). During the same period, segregated provision of services like health and education on the basis of race and colour began to be seriously questioned if not rejected by those segregated against. In the same manner, those who were segregated on the basis of their physical impairments began to agitate for eradication of stigma especially in education provision.

From a worldwide, historical perspective, people with disabilities have been ridiculed, killed, abandoned to die, and condemned to permanent exclusion in asylums (Pritchard, 1963). Reports exist which indicate that the Greeks, for example, abandoned their disabled babies on hillsides to die, while early Chinese left their people with disabilities to drown in rivers (Anang, 1992). Such negative attitudes towards people with disabilities are still prevalent in Africa as elsewhere in the world. In most parts of southern Africa including Zimbabwe, children born with albinism used to be killed immediately after birth. Further, people with disabilities in Zimbabwe were marginalised and treated as if they were not capable of functioning on their own. Disability was equated with inability such that those living with disabilities felt themselves as second class citizens.

Following the campaign for civil rights in America, it began to be realised that physical impairment did not necessarily mean disability. While traditional thinking looked at children with various forms of impairment as disabled, emerging thinking viewed those with physical or mental challenges as children with special needs (Winter and O'Raw, 2010). This is so because it was discovered that these children were unique and needed unique but specialised treatment to make them benefit from the education system and for them to perform their best. Towards the later part of the 20th century,

disability began to be perceived as a social construct and Inclusive Education sought to demolish socially constructed impediments which society put before those with physical impairments. By the end of the 20th century there was growing consensus that inclusion was an appropriate philosophy and a relevant framework for restructuring education and for achieving an inclusive society.

Inclusion was also in line with the dictates of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948). This thinking marked a clear and indeed a necessary shift in the perception of society towards children with handicaps of different forms. Traditionally, the provision of education for those living with disabilities was met in separate institutions yet, ironically, upon leaving school such children were expected to perfectly fit into society. Furthermore, despite regarding some languages as minor, the deployment of government workers especially teachers continue to be done at random without paying serious attention on the teachers' mother language. This compromises learning and understanding as the teacher and children cannot understand each other as a result of language barrier. It became apparent that institutionalisation was at the core of negative perceptions towards disability and the continued isolation of the disabled from the mainstream society.

In Zimbabwe disability was, and is in fact, attached with so much myths and misconceptions. The traditional pre-Christian way of life was averse to any form of disability. Physical and mental handicaps were perceived as punishment by God or the ancestral spirits for transgressions committed by the disabled child's parents or forefathers. There was need to kill or to throw away the handicapped child since such a child was viewed as an abomination (see also Mawere *et al*, 2013). According to Jenjekwa, Runyowa and Rutoro (2013) if the disability was detected later, the child had to be hidden so that whatever affliction she/he had would not affect those who would see him/her. With the coming of Christianity, a small proportion of disabled persons took sanctuary in missionary institutions as the myths around disability gradually got demystified.

Jenjekwa, Runyowa and Rutoro (2013) assert that in colonial Zimbabwe, the work of the Dutch Reformed Church is a case in point in the beginning of special needs schools. In 1927 in Chivi

District in southern Zimbabwe, a female missionary, Margareta Hugo, for example, pioneered the provision of special needs education to Africans when she took into her custody 3 blind people in a gesture which marked the humble but determined beginnings of what is now Capota School for the Blind in Zimbabwe. Though she did not have specialist skills to help the visually challenged to learn, she was spurred on by her moral religious conviction. By 1934 her school had forty pupils. In 1939 the school was moved to Capota after the church secured land in Zimuto communal area near Masvingo. By 1958 the school had an enrolment of 156 pupils. Capota was able to open a secondary school for the blind in 1976. Driven by Christian moral calling, the Dutch Reformed Church in 1947 was also able to establish Henry Murray School for the Deaf at Morgenster Mission, 30 kilometres from the then Fort Victoria which is now Masvingo (Jenjekwa, Runyowa and Rutoro 2013).

A few other missionary and charitable organisations had to follow suit in years that followed. It is observable that to colonial governments, provision of special education to Africans was simply not a priority since the disabled did not fit in any way in the labour intentions of the exploitative colonial establishment. It is therefore apparent that before independence in 1980, special needs education was uncoordinated and almost chaotic. Churches and other charitable organisations implemented special education in ways they deemed fit without a centrally designed curriculum or policy framework (Hulley, 1980; Peresuh and Barcham, 1998). While the driving force behind missionary involvement hinged on Christian moral values, for charitable organisations, it was more of philanthropy than anything else. As a result of the lack of a national thrust to special education by successive Rhodesian colonial administrations, only twenty schools existed for persons with different forms of disability when Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980 (Hapanyengwi, 2009). In both Missionary and charitable institutions as observed by Peresuh and Barcham (1998), the curriculum was largely made up of religious education and training in practical skills in subjects like leather craft, building, basketry, woodwork, cookery as well as sewing.

To complement the efforts of churches and charity organisations in helping people with disabilities in isolation, the Jiri Association was also founded in 1950, with the major aim of impacting vocational skills in people living with disabilities. People with disabilities who were taken from the streets by Jairos Jiri were trained to do leather craft. Later on, the City Council donated a Beer Hall at Nguboyenja and it was turned into a primary school. The Primary school was later transferred to Mukuwapasi in Rusape which was mainly for children with physical disabilities. Later, Harare Centre and Kadoma Primary School for the blind were also opened for children with physical disabilities. Finally, Gweru Naran Centre for the hearing impaired and Bulawayo Centre was then developed into a Vocational Training Centre where people with disabilities were trained vocational skills. Since 1950, Jairos Jiri Schools were specifically for children with disabilities.

Socially, there is still a lot of misunderstanding and lack of knowledge about disabilities. This mainly stems from cultural misgivings about disabilities. Disability is still an issue that is surrounded with myths and beliefs of varying proportions. In the social setting, people with disabilities are invisible because generally the country's social amenities have not been structured in a way that is inclusive for people with disabilities. As such, people with disabilities are less likely to participate in most social activities. Instead, people with disabilities belong to institutions where specialised activities are developed for them. Society's attitude towards people with disabilities reflects a view that people with disabilities are useless liabilities who have no role to play in society. Although the Education Act (1987) talks of 'Education for ALL,' education in Zimbabwe has not really been for all children with disabilities. Exclusion, thus, remains an issue that requires special attention, study and reconsideration.

Gaps inherent in Zimbabwean education system

The gaps and flaws in Zimbabwean education did not end with the demise of colonial administration in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe inherited most of the flaws in colonial education and in some cases

even widened the gaps in some areas of the system. This has always had a negative impact on the country and human development. In the sections below, we identify some of the gaps and flaws that persist in the Zimbabwean education system:

Exclusion on the basis of sex and gender

One of the most inherent and common types of exclusion in Zimbabwean education system is based on gender and sex. In the majority of cases girls are the first to be taken out of school to provide care for sick family members and to take responsibility of siblings when death or illness strikes down the parents. Such situations which might be a result of HIV and AIDS in the household undermine the ability of girls to afford education. In worst situations girls might resort to prostitution to provide for themselves and the family. According to Haralambos and Holborn (2008) gender equality, poverty alleviation and sustainable development are intrinsically linked. These can only be achieved when there are equal opportunities for both males and females. A girl's quality education is the bedrock of progress enabling ideas and livelihoods to flourish in society. When a girl's education is undervalued the right to self-determination is also taken away and society is robbed of its potentials for sustainability. Sustainable development cannot be achieved when young girls' opportunities are stripped off from them through forced early marriages and other such cultural and religious practices and beliefs. This harmful practice perpetuated by poverty and conservative social norms places value on girl's virtue and fertility at the expense of her individual potential, personal development, and possible contribution to societal development at large.

Barnard, Burgess, and Kirby (2004) argue that it is only in recent decades that gender has been considered as a dimension of stratification yet this inequality has always been evident in all walks of life in quasi all patriarchal societies. Although there are more women than men at the proportion of 52 % versus 48 % respectively in the case of Zimbabwe, they have much less social, economic, political and domestic power than men. Occupationally, women are underrepresented in boardrooms and senior management positions of largest companies as well as in government. Women are vastly

outnumbered in the House of Commons where men make decisions on the availability of contraception, moral acceptability of abortion, and other such decisions. This inequality in power between men and women remains evident in most societies yet it compromises development efforts and processes therein.

O'Donnell (1989) notes that the education system through the school curriculum plays a major role in preparing males and females for their traditionally different social roles and therefore helps to maintain the division of labour based sexual differences. In Zimbabwe, through the official and the hidden curriculum the school transmits culture to its learners in form of knowledge and skills. In the official curriculum in the school system, some subjects are more suitable for boys than girls. Boys are normally encouraged to study academically prestigious and challenging subjects – such as natural sciences – than girls. This is what Paulo Freire (1990) meant when he asserts that in the majority of cases the type of education girls and boys receive shape them according to what society expect them to do. Girls in Zimbabwe receive education which is domesticating in the sense that it only allows them to learn what is considered as good for women. Society does have preconceived perceptions about the roles and behaviour of women. In fact, girls receive education which makes them good mothers and wives while boys are taught more challenging subjects, which make them, stand better chances on the job market, thus, preparing them for future bread winners or better future in general. This will limit the girl's access to professions such as engineering and medical pursuit. Thus, education in Zimbabwe is gender exclusive in nature.

Teacher expectations, school rituals and other rules enshrined in the curriculum are entry points in discussing gender differences in education. While it can be argued that dresses have the advantage of freeing women's bodies, one can also argue that in formal primary and secondary education, the regulations which compel girls to wear dresses or skirts in school forms one of the most obvious ways in which gender stereotyping occurs. The consequence of such kind of dressing goes far beyond mere appearance. As a result of the clothes that girls wear, they lack freedom to sit casually, to join the rough and tumble games played at school, and at times impede their freedom to

run as fast as they can. This can affect the girls' performance in subjects like physical education where girls cannot show their talents making boys dominate all facets of the school system excluding girls.

Gender Mainstreaming in Agriculture and Rural Development Reference Manual (1996) have this to say; in most African societies preference to go to school is often given to boys than girls if the family financial resources are not adequate. In cases where girls have been allowed to go to school, they are usually the first to be withdrawn from school to work and increase family income and also to take care of siblings when parents die. In as much as education is assumed to be a positive force for change and enabling people to find a route out of poverty, it is sad to note that girls are withdrawn from school when the household encounters economic pressure. In some African countries like Zimbabwe, the widely accepted official practice has been to suspend all school girls who are pregnant, to allow them to nurse their pregnancy and come back after birth. This can be regarded as creating an unfriendly learning environment for girls. According to Giddens (2004) women's entry into higher education was very slow and they were not able to gain degree level qualification until 1878. The number of women studying towards the attainment of degrees remained low; a situation which, however, began to change for the better from the 1960s. Yet, although the state of affairs has been utterly transformed nowadays, gender disparities in higher education continue to exist with very few women attaining degrees in medicine and engineering or the natural sciences in general.

In pre-colonial Zimbabwe some gender differences in education were built into the teaching profession. Men and women were trained not to become the same type of teachers. In this instance men and women entered the teaching profession on different routes. They were trained in different subject specialisations and were on different salary scales. In the health fraternity student nurses are not allowed to fall pregnant while on training. Such disparities in education, as in health, have developed men and women for different roles in the society. Education today maintains this status quo to a greater extend through its formal curriculum.

Dekker and Lemmer (1994) propagate that pre-school, primary school, and secondary school text books, especially basic reading books provides children with models against which they measure their own parents. In most books including the Holly Bible, males are the focus of attention with females acknowledged far less frequently. With this obtaining reality, children are bound to get the impression that females are not very important because no one bothers to write books about them. As Dekker and Lemmer (1993) noted, males are usually portrayed in a variety of occupations whereas female occupations are confined either to fantasy roles such as “princes” or to narrow list of traditional female roles such as housewife, mother and nurse. The females depicted in many books are usually concerned with pleasing males, girls sought the favour of their fathers and brothers, and women sought to please their husbands. Macionis (1989) summarises the portrayal of females in books as more like dolls than living human beings. Females in most books are mostly attractive and complaint objects, sources of support and pleasure for males. The stereotyping of girls and women in education helps to perpetuate this this inequality while maintaining the traditional roles of women in the patriarchal society. Thus, education in Zimbabwe is an exclusionary tool for maintaining the status quo on gender roles.

Gaidzanwa (1985) admits that the portrayal of women in colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwean literature mostly by male authors delegitimises their struggle for basic human right like education and health. This testifies to the many subtle forms of silencing perpetuated by the Zimbabwean society, an internalising of male norms, a depiction of conventional marriages as prisons as well as a testimony to the brutal control and suppression of women by traditional patriarchy both in Global South and the Gbolal North. According to Gaidzanwa (Ibid) most women in Zimbabwean literature are portrayed as jilted, sorrowful, and in misery and without any basic rights. Though most of the portrayal of women roles and rights by feminists such as Gaidzanwa is exaggerated, at least from a cultural, epistemological, and critical perspectives, and in as far as they fail to acknowledge that in Africa there have always existed both matrilineal and patriarchal societies, there is some element of truth in

their descriptions of inequalities between men and women in many societies. In many cases, women are portrayed as domesticated, poor and wholly dependent on their male counterparts for survival. According to Dekker and Lemmer (1993) cited in Mawere *et al* (2011) the main change against history books is that women, their history and their achievements are conspicuous by their absence. In this regard, education is used to reproduce the patriarchal society of the Western society by perpetuating the portrayal of females as subordinates of males. According to Flora Veit-Wild (1992), the Zimbabwean literature largely remains a male playground filled with a lot of testosterone and defined by patriarchal values and attitudes. Women are in many ways discouraged to write or speak out by their husbands, families as well as education policies that seek to maintain the status quo. To this effect, education in Zimbabwe is a tool for exclusion of women.

According to Haralambos and Holborn (2004), teachers make guesses about the types of pupils they are dealing with. Teachers are believed to distinguish pupils according to their appearance, how far they conformed to discipline, their ability and enthusiasm for work, how likeable their relationships are with other children and their personality. Blackledge and Hunt (1989) like Haralambos and Holborn maintain that teachers' attitudes influence their expectations of students based on age, sex, race, and home background. In education, female stereotyping is a key determinant in maintaining the status quo. According to Barnard, Burgess and Kirby (2004) stereotyping is a fixed image based on traditional ideas of what someone is or should be like. Such unspoken assumptions about gender roles and the attitudes towards women that are maintained by teachers and the education system in general have a potential influence on the gender role socialisation of male and female students and ultimately on the society's development process. Teachers generally consider girls to be appreciative, calm, cooperative and sensitive but less independent, creative and autonomous than boys (Gordon 1995) such they are either excluded or unrecognised in those areas such as the sphere of development where creativity and innovation are critical. Girls are domestically inclined and are centred in the internal world of the home where they serve men, without

affording them enough opportunity to explore the world outside home. At school, teachers opt for subjects that do not challenge their feminine self-concept and at times making biology their only foray into the scientific domain. Boys being more outgoing and aggressive are expected to be interested in the external world of discovery and adventure in science and engineering subjects that conform their masculinity. Bellotti (1975) has shown how girls are expected to conform to the internal world more than boys. Bad behaviour by girls is not tolerated as much as it is by boys. Girls are assumed to be capable of domestic roles, tidying up the classroom, and doing jobs for the teacher. In fact, girls are couched by their teachers into appropriate feminine behaviour. Whoope (1978) asserts that schooling is especially important in the learning of gender identity since children are in school for much of the period when they are becoming aware of the importance of sexual relationships and thus, learning the definitions of approved adult masculinity and femininity. From the teacher expectations, gender stereotyping and self-fulfilling prophecy, the education system is functioning as a vehicle for reproducing the social and cultural traits in gender as well as excluding women and girls in development process, which considering their larger populations as compared to that of men, is in no doubt compromising their ability to contribute to political, socioeconomic development in society.

Exclusion by disability

In 1982, the National Disability Survey of Zimbabwe provided the working definition of disability as a physical or mental condition, which makes it difficult or impossible for the person concerned to adequately fulfil his or her normal role in society. Similarly, the World Health Organisation (1996) has defined disability as any restriction or lack of ability to perform an activity in a manner or within a range considered normal for a human being (see Saunyama 2016). These definitions by both Saunyama and WHO, however, imply that everyone in the world is disabled given that every one of us lacks the ability to perform at least this or that activity. In fact, there is no single person who is not lacking at least in some kind of activity for we are not perfect: we can't be able to perform all activities assigned to us

even some of the activities assigned to those we refer to as the “disabled”. In view of this critique we offer here and indeed for purposes of this chapter, disability shall be understood as the condition of being differently abled whereby one cannot perform an activity that under normal circumstances s/he is expected to be able to perform. This condition could be a result of either a physical or mental disorder that restricts one from performing as expected. In this chapter, we thus, use the term “people living with disabilities” and “differently abled people” interchangeably to refer to people commonly described as “disabled.” In fact we argue that those people who are commonly referred to as “disabled” are abled in a special way different from what is commonly accepted or known, hence our adoption of the term “differently abled people.”

In Zimbabwe public schools, most pupils living with disabilities are challenged by both the social and the physical environments. The extent to which most schools accommodate pupils with various disabilities is compromised in Zimbabwe’s rural and urban schools from the school administration office, classrooms and toilets. All these structures are observed to have steps and with no ramps to cater for the students living with disabilities. This is a clear testimony of the physical changes and improvements that have to be undertaken to accommodate pupils with disabilities in public schools. Generally, the infrastructure from teacher training colleges to public schools especially the grounds and buildings are meant for pupils and student teachers with no impairments. Although it can be argued that most of these structures were done before the adoption of inclusive education Jenjekwa, Runyowa and Rutoro (2013) argue that in all the colleges investigated in their study, there are very minimal modifications to the infrastructure and these modifications are meant for those using wheelchairs. These modifications also appear as after-thoughts after the original plan ignored the provisions for the handicapped. Jenjekwa, Runyowa and Rutoro, further, exclaim that the passages to critical areas, for example, the library are all very difficult to navigate for those with visual and physical impairments to the legs. In addition to buildings, institutional vehicles in the public in Zimbabwe do not carry any special provision for the handicapped. This is a clear testimony that the inclusive education policy in

Zimbabwe as elsewhere in Africa lags behind in making institutions of learning more inclusive in catering for people with disabilities.

Inclusive education policy is difficult to implement at school level without full appreciation of the society at large. The Disabled Person's Act of 1992 in Zimbabwe does not have adequate provisions to compel building owners to ensure that their buildings have facilities that can allow access to people with disabilities. The public transport, health care centres, banking halls, shopping malls and most of the infrastructure in Zimbabwe need to be made in such a way that people with disabilities can access, a very important aspect that continues as a dream in the pipeline at least for now. There are only a few buildings and public places that have been designed to accommodate people with disabilities. The modest situation would be to advocate for the adoption of universal design in the infrastructure, technology and communication such that it can be user friendly to both the disabled and the none-disabled to afford both with the equal opportunity to function independently. The Regional and Town Planning Act (1998) of Zimbabwe should also be revisited to ensure that town planners take into account the needs of people living with disabilities in approving building plans by engaging architects in dealing with people with disabilities and the responsible Ministry of Local Government and Public Works, to work together in making the infrastructure accessible to people with disabilities.

Apart from the challenges related to the physical environment itself, there are problems related to teacher-pupil ratio. It can be noted that teachers are already overloaded. Owing to this reality, being given classes of pupils with special needs in education makes them resentful at times. Most teachers have challenges in helping those who are able-bodied and find it even more difficult to help children with special needs regardless that they are morally obliged to help them. The challenge in this case is presented by the learning environment given that the authorised teacher pupil ratio is 1: 20 at Early Childhood Development (ECD) and 1: 40 from grade 1 to 7. For Secondary schools the teacher pupil ratio from form 1 to 2 is 1: 33 and 1: 30 from form 3 to 4 while at A' level the teacher pupil ratio is 1: 20 (Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education, 2016). It is

very difficult for teachers to give special attention to children with special needs given such big classes. This condition will always make parents with such children to resort to special schools where they can get the maximum attention possible instead of bringing such children in inclusive classes. Whilst the official teacher-pupil ratio at primary school in Zimbabwe is one teacher to forty pupils, in practice some schools have teachers with classes of well over sixty pupils. Against this background, the whole purpose of inclusive education is defeated and defied.

Another problem noted to be promoting exclusion at the school is lack of resources. These include both material and human resources. Whilst there are attempts in some schools to provide such equipment as wheel chairs, braille, computers, and furniture among others, in some instances, they are found to be inadequate except in such schools for children with disabilities. This is compounded by the fact that in Zimbabwe, inclusive education has never received treasury concurrence from inception. The government fiscal policy has done little to support this government intervention. In fact, there is no clear cut budget from the fescues to cater for such kind of children with disabilities in public education, yet these children need equal attention to ensure that they are nurtured accordingly in such a way that would enable them to contribute meaningfully to the development process of the Zimbabwean society and beyond.

Curriculum gaps

The term curriculum includes structures, practices and organisations within schools and social relationships which they foster and sustain as well as what is taught, the way teaching takes place and the way in which pupils are organised in learning (Apple 1995; Carr 1993). Although curriculum should cater for the able-bodied and the disabled in inclusive classes the main curricula is meant for the non-disabled. The Nziramasanga Commission of Inquiry into Education and Training (2000), which was unfortunately never implemented in Zimbabwean schools, recommended a community based curriculum (UNESCO International Bureau of Education, 2000). With community-based curriculum, inclusive classroom teachers need to select, adapt, and sequence learning

content to suit individual students (Dyson 1997). This is vital so that each student is treated as a unique individual. To assist inclusive classroom teachers cope with diversity of children in inclusive classrooms, the volume of work that inclusive classroom teachers have to teach is to be reconsidered and arranged in smaller chunks (Engelbrecht and Green, 2001). Small chunks make it easier for the students with developmental disabilities to understand concepts through the capability of lessening confusion. This brings up the need for teachers to task their pupils, analyse their pupils' work, and teach from simpler to more challenging concepts. The teachers have to present material in an enthusiastic manner and instil hunger in their students to learn more on their own (Rosenthal, 2006).

In contrast, the curriculum in Zimbabwe's public schools is a major challenge to the educational systems where teachers are supposed to cover the syllabi in prescribed times irrespective of performance of the learners in the classroom. Naturally, teachers would rush in their teaching to complete the syllabi. Some students with developmental disabilities may not come out successfully under such learning environments. Also, strict timetables in following daily lessons would never benefit students with developmental disabilities as they may have little to benefit in the inclusive classroom. Additionally, an examination oriented type of curriculum where the effectiveness of a teacher is measured by the number of students who excel in exams is counter-productive to the students with developmental disabilities in the inclusive classroom. Effectiveness of inclusive classroom teachers needs *not* to be measured through the number of students who excel in examinations as this may impact negatively on the students with developmental disabilities who may have problems in mastery of some skills and concepts during the teaching and learning processes in class. This may partly be a panacea of successful inclusive classroom practices.

It is unfortunate that in Zimbabwe's education system, teachers become enslaved by timetables while failure to follow timetables brings forth some "criminal" teaching characteristics in the eyes of some school administrators and education technocrats. Undeniably, the teacher has to have a timetable but left with some flexibility to do what is best for every individual student in the classroom. We, thus

argue that where flexibility is impermissible, the result is a hurried way of teaching at the detriment of the students with developmental disabilities in the inclusive classrooms. Rigidity in the education system needs to be discarded to allow necessary amendments. Timetables must be meant for the child and not vice versa. Classroom teachers always want to move over to the next lesson as the time table dictate without any consideration of the students' learning.

Students with disabilities need to be part of the education system through the pursuance of the national curriculum like everyone else. In the same way inclusive classroom teachers need to be aware that all curriculum adaptations have to be in tandem with the national curriculum. The national curriculum of each level has to be taken into consideration to come up with the individual one. Even the curriculum content planned at the macro level must be considered with flexibility at the micro level. In fact, we advance that teachers must realise that curriculum is meant for the learners and not the learners for the curriculum. The inclusive classroom teacher must do more than just simply follow a fixed and prescribed curriculum as individual needs determine the curriculum needs of the individual student. The teachers, therefore, have to adapt curriculum content to suit individual children with disabilities in the inclusive classroom. The individual curriculum content must enable every child with disability to implement the acquired knowledge at community level, hence enabling functionality in everyday life. Some curricula as those currently being used in the Zimbabwean public schools present some rigidity leaving no room for flexibility.

Perceptual and attitudinal concerns

According to Chivanga and Chimhenga (2013) an attitude is an organised predisposition to think, feel, perceive, and behave toward referent or cognitive object. We add that attitudes are normally a result of perceptions. In this view, attitude is an enduring structure of beliefs that predisposes the individual to behave selectively toward attitudes referent. In short, an attitude is a disposition to respond favourably or unfavourably towards an object, person, institution or event. Attitudes locate objects of thought on dimensions of judgment

(McGuire, 1985 in Lindzey and Aronson, 1985). This means that an attitude is in fact a belief that forms a capacity that is directed towards certain aspects in human life. Attitudes, thus, are organisations of beliefs about things out there that predispose individuals to behave or respond in a certain manner towards an attitude object. Attitudes take a positive or negative direction with very few cases being neutral (Kosslyn and Rosenberg, 2006).

It is apparent that when fostering inclusive education it is important to consider the attitudes of both society and that of the individuals with disabilities. According to Padden (1980), in most cases when people discuss negative attitudes towards inclusion they tend to look at the attitudes of able-bodied people excluding those of people living with disabilities. Inclusive education have become a rhetoric as people often take it for granted that people with disabilities want to be included in public schools, in regular clubs, and in regular communities. There is need for an inquiry from the needs of people with disabilities. According to Crocker and Major (1989), there are mixed feelings between people with disabilities. According to the social identity theory, inclusion weakens disability group identities. People with disabilities will no longer learn or live in communities of their own where they can forge strong similar disability-based identities. If they are to remain in segregated special schools and self-contained special educational units their disability based identity would remain strong. According to Paul and Quigley (1990), there is a group of deaf people who view deafness as a culture. To them they are culturally deaf. They share the same language (sign language), have similar norms and values. This group of the deaf community does not like educational inclusion. They advocate special schools for the deaf where their deaf culture can be enhanced. They view inclusion in schools as an attempt to destroy their culture. We argue, however, that while there are some seeds of truths in these ideas here presented the views to reinforce exclusion by some theories and scholars are normally a result of the failure at both school and community level to include people living with disabilities in the whole array of day-to-day activities. Such exclusion if internalised end up instilling a feeling in the people living with

disabilities to wanting to stay in environments isolated from the mainstream society.

Thus, in contrast to those who are for exclusion, the other group of deaf people are those that are culturally hearing people. They believe that deaf people should hear and talk or else they must speech read. They are against sign language and are not keen to join deaf clubs and deaf communities. They advocate for inclusion and want to be part of the mainstream society. It is against this background that it can be argued that without a full inquiry into the needs and attitudes of the people with disabilities the implementation of inclusive education will remain rhetoric and elusive. The basis for establishing inclusive education will be based on false hope and theories.

The hope for inclusive education is shuttered and will remain rhetoric because of the attitude of able-bodied people ranging from policy planners to the classroom practitioners and the general populace in societies. We, thus, argue that as long as there is no special training for teachers in Teacher Training Colleges and in-service training for practising teachers, inclusive education will remain a tantalising idea very difficult to implement. Practising teachers are passively resistant to include pupils with disabilities in the mainstream classes. For fear of victimisation and loss of jobs, most practising teachers will literally accept pupils with disabilities. There is passive resistance by most teachers owing to inappropriate and inadequate skills to accommodate pupils with special needs. Except for those teachers who graduated with Special Needs Education, teachers who graduated with Diploma in Education from Teachers' Colleges do not possess the rightful skills and credentials to accommodate pupils with special needs in their classes. A survey carried out in Zaka District (Zimbabwe) of Primary and Secondary school teachers by one of the authors of this chapter, revealed that most teachers are lagging behind in terms of the appropriate skills to include pupils with disabilities in their classes. The general attitude of teachers is that pupils with disabilities cannot be part of the mainstream. There is also a lot of ambivalence and scepticism from community members including the biological parents of children living with disabilities to take their pupils to the mainstream in public

schools. Thus, if no serious commitment is taken at national level to ensure that justice is done on the issue of perception and attitude towards pupils with disabilities, the country will continue producing useless liabilities who will never have the opportunity to contribute meaningfully to the nation's development processes.

Training deficiencies

Inclusion and integration demand that Special Education Teacher practices be brought in context of the regular schools. Special Education was found to increase the manageability of children with special needs. While most public schools do not seem to have teachers who are trained in Special Education, an inclusive teacher education programme can enhance the availability of such skills in inclusive settings. Warnock (1978) points out that it is vital that those teachers who have defined responsibility for children with Special Education Needs should have considerable expertise in special Education. In this context, it becomes imperative for every teacher to have an awareness of Special Needs Education. There is need for every teacher education college to provide comprehensive course or courses in special needs education on their training programmes. We thus argue that for inclusion to succeed, teacher education practices have to take cognizance of the need for a teacher who can manage the needs of students who are differently abled.

Teacher training in Zimbabwe teachers colleges do not afford to train all teachers on special aspects skills like braille, sign language, and leap reading to cater for the deaf, the visually impaired and those who cannot speak whereas in practice they are expected to cater for all students (inclusive education) they are likely to encounter during their teaching careers. On this note, we propose the need for an inquiry into education and training to establish how such kind of intervention can be instituted in Zimbabwe teacher training colleges. Lack of adequate knowledge and expertise has paralysed the intervention of inclusive education in Zimbabwe's public schools and ultimately fails to unlock the underdevelopment gridlock that is currently haunting the country and the continent of Africa at large. Skills, attitudes, and knowledge required for the successful learning of all students should be fostered in all personnel who work with

students through on-going professional development and adherence to professional standards. There should be a collaborative approach in staff-developing teachers in the area of Special Needs Education. Besides, there should be an improvement in the provision of resources to support inclusive education. These resources should include an improvement in accessing technology by teachers and pupils. The Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education Mission Statement carry inclusivity as a core value, yet there seems to be no zeal and conviction to implement it. The syllabi for subject areas taught at primary school, except that for Theory of Education and to a limited extent Sociology of Education, are silent on Inclusive Education. Teaching strategies which lecturers use and encourage their student teachers to use are meant for those with no special needs, surprisingly in a society where people living with disability exist. The University of Zimbabwe which certificates the students in sister Teachers Colleges' view is driven by the conviction that student teachers should do general teacher training at diploma level before specialising later at degree level. If student teachers wish to pursue studies in Special Needs they would do so after the diploma course and this is taken up by relatively few students owing to prohibitive tuition fees and the limited vacancies in the institutions concerned. Our researches on Special Needs revealed that teachers in schools though they are given some theoretical content on handling children with special needs, they lack the practical experience and adequate grounding in skills to deal with different forms of impairment.

Exclusion by language

According to Roy-Campbell and Gwete (1997) cited in Chivhanga and Chimhenga (2013), language planning in Zimbabwe started in the 1920s as an activity consciously tailor made by missionaries who embarked on translating the Bible into African languages, in order to reach the souls of Africans in the most effective way possible. The missionaries played a major role in the construction of what we have come to know as the Shona language. The arrival of missionaries in the 16th Century in Zimbabwe saw the beginning of the writing of Shona language in different dialects though arguably in a haphazard manner. According to Kahari (1986),

research into the nature and structure of the various dialects was conducted rather haphazardly at denominational levels by different missionaries. Men and woman who were involved in the study of these dialects worked independently and often without cooperation and coordination. Representations of the different missions, having failed in their own attempt to develop a common system of writing Shona, commissioned the South African linguist, C. M. Doke, to undertake a dialect survey in 1929 and make suggestions about a common writing system (Chimhundu 1992).

It is at this point that Doke took over the task and gave a full report in 1931. He selected the Zezuru dialect cluster as the basis for both standard spelling and grammar, with significant influence from Karanga and progressively less influence from Manyika, Ndau, and Korekore, while Kalanga was to be counted as a separate language altogether. In its written form, the “standard” Shona that we have today is mainly Zezuru-based, while Kalanga alongside other languages such as Chichangani, Nambya, Venda and Sutu, among others, is now classified as a minority language. This has not only had the negative effect of rendering other languages as unequal and second class languages, but has derailed progressive development processes in areas where the so-called minority languages are dominant. It was Doke who recommended that Shona and Ndebele be the two African languages that were to be recognised officially in the areas in which they were predominant and that all the other languages be basically ignored as minority languages, which is precisely what has happened since then. This new dispensation can be regarded as the beginning of exclusion in education and development processes by language. Indeed, very little attention has been paid officially to Zimbabwe’s fourteen “minority” languages which are Kalanga, Shangani, Cewa, Venda, Tonga, Nambya, Sotho, Chikunda, Sena, Xhosa, Tonga, Barwe, Hwesa and Tshwawo. This has been so simply because according to Doke (1931), four distinct dialects have been pushed into prominence which are Karanga in the Victoria Circle (Masvingo) Zezuru in the ‘Salisbury Circle’ (Harare), Manyika in Manicaland (Mutare), and Ndau in Melsetter (Chipinge). Sadly, the Zimbabwean government has gullibly accepted Doke’s findings as such and little effort has since been made to change the

status quo that he set. According to Chimhundu (1998), there was no mission headquarters for any denomination in the Korekore area of north-eastern Zimbabwe such that Korekore was not represented and, not surprisingly, this dialect was not seriously considered in Doke's union orthography. Also, the Kalanga dialect of the south-western area where the London Missionary Society was operating was presumed to be part of Matabeleland and was therefore excluded from union Shona partly for reasons of administrative convenience. The situation remained the same until Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980 and has indeed progressed as such only with minor changes here and there.

Chivhanga and Chimhenga (2013) opine that since independence in 1980 Zimbabwe does not have an Official Language Policy Document that specifically focuses on the use of African Languages as languages of instruction in education (see also Hadabe 1996). The legal status of language in Zimbabwe is stipulated in the 1987 Education Act part XII which states that: "The three main languages of Zimbabwe, namely Shona, Ndebele, and English shall be taught in all primary schools from the first grade as follows (a) Shona and English in all areas where the mother tongue of the majority of residents is Shona or (b) Ndebele and English in all areas where the mother tongue of the majority of residents is Ndebele". It further explains that from the fourth Grade, English shall be used as the medium of instruction. We argue that such changes are nothing than propelling the foreigner's language at the expense of indigenous languages which should inform both epistemological theorisation and development in the Zimbabwean society.

It is only until 2013 that the supreme legal document, the Constitution of Zimbabwe recognised the other 13 minority languages as official languages without the concurrence of the treasury to implement the teaching of these languages in schools. The UNESCO Regional Office for Education in Africa defines official language and national language as follows: Official Language: a language that is used for government business and other formal purposes within a country, for instance, English, French, and Portuguese or an African language like Swahili and, National language: maybe an African Language that is also an official language,

or a language that has been decreed to be a National language of a country (cf. Mkanganwi1992; Chivhanga and Chimhenga 2013). After independence, English continued to dominate in both the electronic and print media. In tertiary education and secondary schools, English trained teachers continue to outnumber the Shona and Ndebele trained teachers, not to mention other so-called minor languages such as Tsonga, Venda, Sotho, and Venda, among others. This has encouraged the development of English as a language and disadvantaged the development of African languages such as Shona and compelling teachers and learners of Shona to look down upon their languages let alone their capacity to steer and drive the wheels of progressive change and development. In fact, English has established itself in domains such as administration, education, jurisdiction and other government controlled and non-governmental institutions to the extent that it has become a major impediment, a brake or constraint on the promotion and development of African languages (such as Shona, Ndebele, Chichangi etc.), as argued by Mutasa (2003).

Responding to a question rose in Parliament on Wednesday 14 March 2014 by Kariba legislator Isaac Mackenzie (Zanu PF) on government's strategy on the recruitment of temporary teachers, Honourable Minister of Primary and Secondary Education, Dr Lazarus Dokora noted: "there are no trained teachers for minority languages, a development which has forced government to rely on temporary teachers. He added that government will rely heavily on temporary teachers in the foreseeable future I thank the honourable member for raising the question and correctly identifying the line ministry that has the mandate in Government to employ all civil servants including those that are yet to be trained. However, I am aware as a user ministry that there are areas where we have challenges to do with languages relating to the 16 languages that have been officially recognised in the new constitution. I think it is an open secret that we do not have the quantum of trained personnel to manage classes in those languages. Therefore, temporary teachers will be a feature for the foreseeable future. However, temporary teachers must present minimum qualifications that satisfy the employer requirements, which is the five subjects at 'O' Level and other

requisites that may be needed”. The current constitution recognises 16 official languages, some which were previously not mainstreamed in the education sector. In the past, there has been an outcry that the so-called “minority” languages were playing second fiddle to English, Ndebele, and Shona languages, which were Zimbabwe’s official languages before the inauguration of the new constitution. Chewa, Chibarwe, English, Kalanga, Koisan, Nambya, Ndau, Ndebele, Shangani, Shona, Sign language, Sotho, Tonga, Setswana, Venda and Xhosa are now recognised as official languages in Zimbabwe. However, we argue that the lack of well trained personnel to teach the other thirteen languages which were not previously taught is a clear testimony that language barriers excluded and will continue to exclude some Zimbabwean citizens in a manner that decapitates their best potentials in education and in contributing to the development process in their respective societies.

Viriri (2013) argues that Zimbabwe has attained independence more than three decades ago but there is no clear language policy. There has been no language planning debate as yet, but we have inherited British linguistic policies that derive from a colonial policy, which according to Mkanganwi (1992) emphasised on separate development for the different races, with a political counterpart in the theory and practice of indirect rule. English has continued to dominate the people’s social, political and economic lives. It has not only dominated as the language of business, administration, politics and the media but also as the language of instruction in the entire education system. According to Chimhundu (1993), the African languages continue to be downgraded in the schools and vernacularised outside in the community. This situation has been worsened by using English as the medium of instruction in the teaching and learning for the African languages yet the indigenous languages such as Shona and Ndebele are the right medium of instruction that ensure understanding and transfer of knowledge. African languages are not sufficiently developed to be used as the languages of science and technology. Language planning in Zimbabwe has affected the development of African languages with reference to their use as mediums of instruction in the teaching and learning of subjects in schools. The use of African languages is the

best way of ensuring active participation of the populations in the activities of national life and in particular in the planning and management of the education system of Zimbabwe. The important status of English globally undermines the status of African languages in the Zimbabwean education system. English as a high variety in Zimbabwe is used in business, commerce, parliament, and in schools as a medium of instruction. According to Kamwendo (1999), English is synonymous with the sound education whilst education through African languages is given second class rating.

In Zimbabwe many learners do not take the learning of indigenous languages seriously as there is neither a reward nor sanction for obtaining a pass in these languages. English is the gateway into employment in both the public and private sector. They are forced to use English even if they would want to use African languages in situations where they would be more appropriate if they had equivalent technical terms. It is not surprising then that Language planners in Zimbabwe downgrade the use of African languages as mediums of instruction for different subjects in the education system. Zimbabwe has 16 official languages as enshrined in the new constitution of 2013 but virtually all children are educated through the medium of English and are expected to study their mother tongue as a subject. English is being promoted as a supra ethnic language of national integration. The low status accorded to the African languages adversely affects their use in the education system and, thus, a means to exclusion. A report by the Nziramasanga commission of inquiry into education and training observes that language is very important in teaching and learning especially in Mathematics. Durkin (1991) cited in the Nziramasanga commission of inquiry report (1999: 339) advocates that Mathematics education begins and begins and proceeds in language, advances and stumbles because of language and that its outcomes are often assessed in language. For an average Zimbabwean child the use of English language in Mathematics education is far more complex than our education system has cared to admit. Many pupils have problems in English. If Mathematics is so inextricably related to language in this case English there can be no doubt that many pupils Mathematical development is being retarded on account of language and not lack

of Mathematical ability. There is premature application of English and an overdependence on English as medium of instruction neglecting the use of mother tongue which pupils will have mastered. This burdens children who have to go through the process of inner translation before the message is received (Wilson in Morris and Arora 1995).

As Viriri (2013) explains, the Inter-African Bureau of Languages, a board accountable to the Organisation of African Unity conclusively puts it that there are several advantages in using the mother-tongue as a medium of instruction: the development of critical powers, the fostering of effective communication, the enhancement of deeper cultural understanding and the increasing of national consciousness. This line of thought has been reiterated in the National cultural policy and was adopted by the Cabinet and Parliament of Zimbabwe in 1996 to state that:

Zimbabwe's indigenous languages constitute a rich linguistic and cultural heritage for all Zimbabweans and should provide fertile ground for enhancing national understanding and national unity (Ibid).

Using the mother tongue as a language of instruction in education will benefit the majority of the population as it is spoken by more than 80% of Zimbabwe's population. Education would become accessible to many who will in turn contribute to the development process in nation-building. We in fact argue that the deployment of English as medium of instruction in Zimbabwean schools restricts learners' performance and potential to contribute towards national development. Learning as well as creativity and innovation become easier if concepts are taught in one's mother tongue. This is because the mother tongue forms the basis of learning because mother tongue instruction facilitates understanding. Mother tongue accelerates learning and injects pride and independence while capacitate individuals with the relevant tools of creativity and innovation to further inform the development process at both community and national levels. The use of the mother tongue, thus, will further promote better understanding between the home and the

school (Chivhanga and Chimhenga 2013), and promote political and socio-economic development.

Learning in general occurs more effectively if the required cognitive development is taking place through the use of a first language as a language of learning. If Zimbabweans would want to make strides in both educational and economic development, we advise, children should participate actively using indigenous languages in the development of science and technology. This is in order because employment of the mother tongue in education ensures rejuvenation and revitalisation of African Languages and enhances their image when people realise that concepts and subjects formally reserved for English can be taught in their mother tongue too (Ibid).

In view of the preceding discussion, we advance that indigenous languages do not only provide knowledge for the improvement of the masses of the Zimbabwean society but provide the impetus for innovation and creativity in areas of technology and science. A language of instruction, such as Shona, which is one of the home language or mother tongue for majority of Zimbabweans, should therefore be seen as an instrument for the cultural, technological, political and scientific empowerment of people. In this view, cultural freedom and African emancipation can never be cultivated, expanded or developed where the language of instruction is different from the home language or the language people normally speak in their everyday lives (see also Mavesera 2009).

Educational exclusion as an impediment to national development

Development is notoriously understood due to its multidisciplinary and nebulous nature such that it has enjoyed a wide array of interpretations over the years. In this chapter we do not pursue the different conceptualisations of education conjured so far as this has been excellently done elsewhere including in other chapters of this volume. We only expand on Makumbe's (1996) interpretation of development as an event constituting a new stage in a changing situation to add that development as a process is ongoing and multi-dimensional to include both quantitative and qualitative

aspects of life. This makes development a process of political, economic, cultural, and social transformations that is based on complex cultural, political, and environmental factors and their interactions. We should underline that a development process will always result in people improving their life styles for the better by creating and opening new opportunities to enrich life. Yet, as a process, development will result in change, growth, and improvement overturn which cannot be achieved overnight but gradually. According to Mbeki (2010), Education as a fundamental human right is key to sustainable development and peace within and between countries and thus an indispensable means for effective participation in the societies and economies of the twenty-first century.

The ushering in of a new political dispensation in 1980 generated a lot of expectations and euphoria especially among the African indigenous populations of Zimbabwe who were looking forward to the reversal of the colonial inequalities with respect to access to resources, social services and social amenities. The new regime, in particular, prioritised the provision of health, education and sanitation, targeting especially the previously disadvantaged groups in the country. This led to the crafting and implantation of appropriate regulations, legislation, social and macro-economic policies, and entailed internal and external mobilisation of both human and financial resources. Success in resource mobilisation, especially from the international donor community and friendly countries supported the new administration's expressed desire to reach out to people who previously were excluded under the colonial rule. However, the policies and measures that were taken after independence in Zimbabwe did little to change the situations of the disadvantaged in some sectors such as those living with disabilities in areas such as education and development.

On this note, we argue that educational exclusions and economic deprivation are the major factors to make an individual or community lagging behind from the access to decision making and freedom of choice. This is because: How can one have access to decision making when s/he is excluded? How can one be free to make choice when excluded from the group that is given the opportunity to do so?

Educational exclusion in many parts of the world and in Zimbabwe in particular, results in lack of participation on issues of national development. According to Kofi Annan (2005), there is no tool for development more effective than education. If we are to succeed in our effort to build a more health facilities, peaceful and equitable world, the classrooms of the world have to be full of girls as boys regardless of their disability status, colour, creed, origin and economic status as affirmed in the 1981 African Charter on Human and People's rights. To this end, educational inclusion should remain a key determinant in our quest for national development.

Inclusive education ensures that all people have access to information and knowledge regarding their rights and obligations as a people. This includes both property rights, access to social protection, and environmental information. This will in turn contribute to their full participation and to the efficiency of environmental and sustainable development policies. Investing in inclusive education will enhance gender equality, promote cleaner and more equitable development and drive progress towards achieving millennium development goals and the post 2015 sustainable development agenda.

Educational exclusion also exacerbates poverty and the outcomes of multiple deprivations that prevents individuals or groups from participating fully in the economic, social, and political life of the society in which they live. Education is the key instrument in bringing change by creating level of awareness among the deprived and excluded people and communities. Gender, age, caste, geography, culture and religion are the sources of discrimination unless they use all these as assets. It also applies to a larger extend to the people with disability to minority, marginalised men and women of all races and age groups in the society.

As Klasen (2000) opines, increasing broad based economic development by promoting inclusive education, employment, economic and political empowerment is among the most promising strategies to ensure equitable and sustainable development. Empirical literature has documented that countries with low rates of economic inequalities in education and employment access have grown subsequently faster than those where inequality rates are high. A

broad based development approach requires gender sensitive growth strategies that invest in women and empower them to more effectively and equally contribute to the political and socio-economic development of the society. Eliminating gender inequalities in education and employment in particular has been associated with substantial growth and structural transformations. This will provide an excellent opportunity to further sustainability and inclusiveness of the growth agenda. Promoting women's agency not only boost economic growth but also promotes broader development with synergistic benefits to resilience, climate change and opportunities to adapt thus, making the world a better place to live in.

Educational exclusion is a threat to internal peace and stability besides it being a menace to political and socio-economic development. Educated women have contributed immensely in peace and reconstruction processes. This entails that women must be afforded the opportunity to contribute to the reconciliation and reconstruction and conflict prevention. Women's voices and active participation are very crucial in achieving successful conflict resolution processes and sustainable peace. In fact, conflict resolution processes that overlook the contribution of women forgo the benefits of their wisdom and insights. Addressing deep rooted barriers to sustainable development requires investing young girls and women. This is because conflict situations present women with a variety of burdens. Women are, for instance, frequent victims of multiple forms of violence and often bear the responsibility of ensuring the survival of the family and the sustainability of the community both during and post-conflict periods. Although women's individual and collective contribution to peace building processes are frequently underutilised and undermined, women play important and complex roles in peace building processes. Building sustainable peace means engaging women as well as men in the process of resolving conflict, rebuilding institutions and society and achieving sustainability. Conflict prone countries and especially those emerging from armed conflicts provide a key window of opportunity to transform conditions, institutions, policies and societal factors to advance the human rights of women as well as promoting gender equality more broadly.

The education for girls and women is very crucial as women play a key role in peace building and reconciliation and reconstruction process. After the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, for example, many war widows, and other single women who survived the genocide were saddled with the responsibility for caring for families singlehandedly, taking care of orphans and taking duties traditionally carried out in patriarchal Rwanda by men. According to Kagame (1999), the abrupt shift to monetary economy, formal education and modern technology played a key role in restructuring gender relations to the disadvantage of women: it addressed some of the imbalances that were prevalent in Rwandan society before the infamous genocide. These imbalances were not only an obstacle to the country's development but constituted a form of social injustice. According to Kagame (1999), the question of gender equality in the Rwandan society, however, still needs clear and critical evaluation in order to come up with concrete strategies to map the future development in which men and women are the true partners and beneficiaries. In the understanding of gender as encompassing good governance, good economic management and respect for human rights there is need for repeated effort and determination in educating boys and girls as both are key determinants in peace building, reconciliation and reconstruction.

Resulting from the disparities in education between men and women, women had not been major players in politics since time immemorial. The fourth World Conference on women held in Beijing in 1995 drew attention to the persisting inequalities between men and women on decision making in many parts of the world. The Beijing Platform for action reaffirmed that women's exclusion from formal politics in particular, raises a number of specific questions regarding the achievement of effective democratic transformations in practice. It undermines the concept of democracy which by its nature assumes that the right to vote and to be elected should be equally applied to all citizens both men and women. The absence of women from political decision making has always had a negative impact on the whole process of democratisation. Women's equal participation in decision making is not only a demand for justice or democracy but can also be seen as a necessary condition for women's

interests. Education for women is needed to ensure that women realise their strategic gender needs of ensuring women's equal access to and full participation in power structures and decision making.

The state of the Right to Education Worldwide highlights the abyss between the domestic policies of wealthy creditor and donor governments which keep compulsory education free, and their external policies which have made it for fee. While international human rights law requires progressive realisation of the right to education and anticipates that international cooperation will facilitate this, there is no global commitment in reality to share the burden of ensuring the core of the right to education – free and compulsory education – internationally given the disparities in different societies across the globe. The exclusion of international human rights law from international education strategies facilitates abuse of power by individual governments and by intergovernmental agencies (World Bank 2010).

In Zimbabwe as elsewhere in Africa, indigenous African women, had been highly discriminated against during the colonial era, perhaps more discriminated than their male counterparts. Upon this realisation, the first decade of independence in Zimbabwe saw the government promulgating legislation and put in place affirmative action programmes to redress gender disparities. The legislation included the Legal Age of Majority Act (1982), which gives women a majority status upon turning 18 years of age; the Labour Relations Act of (1985) that prohibited discrimination against women in employment and recruitment for employment; the Deceased Persons Family Maintenance Act (1987) that gave women inheritance rights; and the Maintenance Act (1983) that compelled financial support for children until they reached the legal age of adulthood. Formulation of these laws was largely influenced by several regional and international declarations, conventions, and protocols which seek to create an enabling environment for the attainment of equality between men and women.

Conclusion

The Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education through its representatives seems reluctant to assume a paradigm shift to inclusive education. We have underlined and noted with concern that infrastructural developments like renovations and improvements to buildings and grounds to accommodate those with different forms of handicaps are a reactive rather than a proactive undertaking. Inclusive Education shows no or little commitment to ensuring inclusivity. We have, for instance, argued that on leaving college as qualified practitioners, teachers are ill- equipped to effectively assist those with special needs to the extent that the purported inclusive classroom will be a *de facto* exclusion zone where the child with special needs is clearly left alone and ignored as others learn (see also Nyoni et al., 2012; Musengi and Chireshe, 2012). The mismatch between policy and implementation seems to work without particular benchmarks and timelines. It is baffling that critical stakeholders like educators and parents are not consulted for their input during policy formulation and yet they are supposed to implement and monitor programmes on the ground. Without active involvement and meticulously crafted and implemented policies in Inclusive Education, teachers do not fully appreciate the critical nature of inclusion. Also, if educators are not equipped with the necessary and requisite skills, Inclusive Education in Zimbabwe will remain a pie in the sky. This lack of proper consultation before enactment of policies explains why Zimbabwe's education landscape is littered with policy failures (Gatawa, 1998).

The current situation might be indicative of the sad reality that time, energy and money, among other critical resources, are wasted on policy formulation, workshops and seminars on Inclusive Education without directing energies towards real implementation. In line with achieving the post-2015 millennium development goals, inclusive education should be the starting point. Failure to recognise the role of inclusive education in the national development arena would mean consultation was not fully done to inform policy formulation. So was implementation. Policy makers, the government in particular, should ensure that the policy on Inclusive Education

clearly finds its way into the primary school teacher education curriculum. All college syllabi should clearly articulate inclusion in their content and teaching approaches. In addition to this, all support resources should find their way to teacher training colleges to boost the practical element of specialist training. Primary school teacher training colleges should go beyond mere possession of policy documents but should match policy with practice by making the concept of inclusion an institutional culture to indicate real commitment. This means that policy makers should put a monitoring mechanism which is tasked with assessing the effectiveness of Inclusive Education strategies implemented and recommending possible improvements. At the moment, it looks as if the policy planners simply end at policy formulation with no effective monitoring and evaluation. There should be a persistent and constant awareness campaign for inclusion at national level because the negative attitudes towards those with special needs and the very high numbers of children with special needs who do not attend school could be indicative of deep seated negative societal perceptions towards disability, sex and language. Education policy guidelines should have legal backing such as an Act of Parliament and Treasury Concurrence on the funding of Special Needs Education. The Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education through the Schools Psychological Services should also supervise the running of special education needs in schools and implement a compulsory programme of in-service education for administrators and ordinary school teachers to ensure that they abreast with latest developments on special needs education and ensure that inclusive education inform equality and development at all levels of society.

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Globalisation and Land-grabbing in Africa: The Implications of Large-scale Agricultural Investments for Rural Populations in Cameroon, Nigeria, and Tanzania

Semie Memuna Sama

“The Land is life. It is the basis of livelihoods for peasants and indigenous people across the Third World, and is also becoming the most vital asset in the global economy. As the resource demands of globalisation increase, land has emerged as a key site of conflict” (Shiva 2014: 39).

Introduction

Some rural Africans, a few decades ago, could boast of having land as the unique asset to guarantee a lifetime of security, environmentally, politically, and socio-economically, subject to customary land tenure regimes.¹ To some, this presumed life of security seems to have been shattered by corporate globalisation through foreign agricultural investments. Oxfam International (2011:2), an international confederation of 17 organisations working together to end the injustices that cause and perpetuate poverty, stated that since 2001 “227 million hectares of land—an area the size of Western Europe—has been sold or leased,” mostly to international investors. Thousands of people, as a result of these transfers, are currently being compelled to abandon their sources of livelihood, leading to mounting numbers of displaced and dispossessed families living without the security of food, water, housing, and employment.

Even though foreign agricultural investments are not solely an African phenomenon (Broughton 2013: 27), six of the top 10 countries targeted by transnational corporations for agribusiness are in Africa.² By the end of 2013, total large-scale land deals documented

in the African continent stood at approximately 40 million hectares (ActionAid International, 2014: 10), about the land area of Switzerland. Another report by the World Bank (2011: xiv) demonstrates that 70% of global land deals have happened in Africa. To be more specific, Graham Peebles highlights that three-quarters of all global land acquisitions have occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa (Peebles 2014: 64).

These statistics point to Africa as the continent where the land deals are predominantly taking place. Of concern is the fact that Africa is a continent where 60-70% of the population depend on land for their livelihoods, including access to food (FAO 2006: 28; Friends of the Earth 2010: 8; Hall 2011; Hoffmann 2011: 1). Moreover, these allocations are occurring on land that subsistence community members lived and farmed on, and harvested other natural resources from. Given the significance of land to Africa's rural populations in food production and rural development, these land acquisitions are of grave concern, as they are likely to reduce local access to farmland, hunting and fishing ground, and forest resources. Hence, this book chapter questions whether the global rush for Africa's farmland by corporate investors is an opportunity for development or land-grabbing—a phenomenon that is linked to dispossession and underdevelopment in subsistence communities in Africa.

This chapters focus exclusively on Africa because of the thematic focus of the book project to which it is part—the trajectories of underdevelopment, development and the future of Africa—by drawing on a literature review and qualitative case studies in Cameroon, Nigeria, and Tanzania. Comparatively, Africa is the most vulnerable to large-scale agricultural development³ that most often subordinate fundamental human rights of rural Africans, including the right to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural, and political development that is enshrined in Article 1 of the *Declaration on the Right to Development*.⁴ Thus, access to farmland is directly related to the right to development. Moreover, African countries are suffering from immense legal deficits and administrative weaknesses that have resulted in the inadequate engagement of vulnerable groups and limited capacity to enforce human rights and environmental safeguards (De Schutter 2011: 246).

The present chapter is critical for many reasons. Large-scale agricultural investments by multinational corporations and some rich governments in Africa and other developing countries are emerging,⁵ and their impacts remain little understood (Cotula *et al.* 2009: 3). It is likely that there is yet much uncertainty and limited data about the socio-economic and ecological ramifications of such investments. The absence of sufficient information on corporate-driven agriculture suggests that a small number of case studies are inflaming the global debate on land-grabbing.

This chapter will help to close this literature and research gap by producing a body of evidence-based knowledge that could be useful in discerning between those large-scale agricultural developments that can infringe the rights of local communities and marginalised groups to live in a safe, nurturing, and healthy environment and those that cannot. The outcomes and recommendations of this study, thus, will inform institutions interested in assisting researchers to help find solutions to land-grabbing and other local problems. On this note, the results will be useful to foreign governments that are interested in encouraging knowledge sharing with policymakers, researchers, and local communities in Cameroon and other parts of the world.

Besides the introduction and conclusion, the chapter is divided into two parts. Part two discusses the underlying drivers of large-scale land-based investments, in the name of globalisation, in Africa. A strong emphasis will be placed on the factors attracting foreign investors and some rich governments of food-importing and land-scarce countries to invest in plantation agriculture in Africa. Focusing on Cameroon, Nigeria, and Tanzania, part three of the chapter examines the initial impacts on land access for subsistence populations in these three countries by studying government reports, as well as reports from the private sector and civil society interest groups, in order to promote an honest debate among public and private actors.

The objective here is to underline how large-scale land-based investments by aliens can promote underdevelopment by depriving local farmers, hunters, herders, fishermen, gatherers, and other vulnerable groups of their livelihoods, especially those in an agricultural setting, and lead to landlessness, food insecurity, and

death from famine, hunger or starvation, among other related causes. The outcome, knowledge, and data deficits, as well as a few recommendations for policy and action, will be summarised in a brief conclusion.

Underlying drivers of large-scale land-based investments in Africa

The World Bank reported in 2011 that, in addition to the “global” financial crisis, the 2007–08 commodity price boom resulted in a “rediscovery” of the agricultural sector by many different investors.⁶ A similar report by Mann and Smaller indicates that the recent rush for farmland in developing countries is “driven by food, water, and energy security than a notion of comparative advantage in the large scale production of indigenous crops for global markets”⁷ These reports suggest that the desire of transnational corporations, foreign governments, and investment funds to ensure food, financial, and energy security, as well as water and land rights for foreigners, is driving large-scale land-based investments, which are all done in the name of globalisation. To place a hedge against food, energy, and financial crisis, agricultural investors and foreign governments have turned to farmland acquisition in Africa and other developing countries.

The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (2008:3), an agricultural research centre that receives its principal funding from governments and private foundations, noted that the price of almost every agricultural commodity brusquely increased in 2007 and 2008, generating “a global food price bubble.”⁴ In particular, world prices of wheat and maize, in 2008, “were three times higher than at the beginning of 2003, and the price of rice was five times higher” (IFPRI 2008:3). Regarding dairy products, the prices of butter and milk tripled between 2003 and 2008, and the prices of beef and poultry doubled.⁵ Even as African countries “have

⁴ Von Braun, J., *Food and Financial crisis: Implications for Agriculture and the Poor* (Food Policy Report No. 20) (Washington D.C.: IFPRI, 2008) 3.

⁵ *Ibid.*

an interest in increasing food production to improve their local food security,” (De Schutter 2011:252) oil rich Gulf States, for example, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, primarily seek to produce food to import the production, and thus to gratify the increasing demand of their citizens.

As Shepherd Daniel argues, countries with crop-producing potential have currently become “a valuable investment opportunity for nations who suffered from soaring prices of staple foods from 2006 to mid-2008” (Daniel 2011: 26). It is important to highlight that the “food security of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States rests almost entirely upon international trade, with imports typically accounting for 80–90% of food consumption”.⁸ The expectation is that the population in the GCC will double by 2030,⁹ suggesting a likely increase in the GCC’s reliance on food import. To avoid this from happening, the Saudi monarchs and their counterparts in the Emirates “opted for a faster solution: to produce the food they needed elsewhere” (Liberti 2011:10). That “impeccable” elsewhere seems to be Africa, considering the rush by Western imperialists, and food-insecure countries to grab African land done so far.

As the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, notes, “some rich or relatively better-off countries, lacking the farmland and water required to produce enough to cover their own needs, found that their interest was in outsourcing food production”(De Schutter 2011:252). To De Schutter, “in order not to depend on the international markets, they reasoned, they should acquire land abroad and produce for themselves” (De Schutter 2011:252). Investing in farmland abroad, therefore, is a measure that the Gulf States, among others, have adopted to cap their reliance on international markets and enhance the sustainability of their food security.

While the food price spike is, absolutely, bad news for every consumer, the underprivileged in Africa and other developing countries, in addition to consumers in food-importing and land-scarce economies in general, are likely to be the most affected. The reason is that, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) argues, “food makes up a much larger share of their total expenditures. They have little room to buy cheaper food items or to spend less on other

purchases.”¹⁰ Moreover, the rapid increase in internationally traded food prices demands more farmland: farmland acquisition by foreign investors and countries attempting to boost global food security and financial security has mushroomed.

A US billionaire, George Soros, is convinced that “farmland is going to be one of the best investments of our time” (GRAIN 2011:121). Among other investors, George Soros assumes that foreign direct investments in farmland are not only a measure to address global food security. He added that “eventually, of course, food prices will get high enough that the market will be flooded with supply through development of new land or technology or both, and the bull market will end...” (GRAIN 2011:121). Higher prices suggest better prospects to generate profit from agribusiness and, henceforth, improve agricultural funding, as it seems to be a less dangerous type of investment compared to bonds, cash, or stocks in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.

Organisations such as GRAIN, for example, have argued that investors that have been buying up farmland in Africa and other developing countries are less concerned about food security.¹¹ In other words, such investors are purchasing or leasing vast areas of African land to benefit from rising demand for food crops as a consequent of a rapid increase in the world’s population. As the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food also stated, large-scale investments in farmland are driven by “investors attracted by what now appears to be a new and rapidly expanding market of land and water rights, the result of an accelerated commodification of natural resources that are increasingly treated as mere economic assets” (De Schutter 2011:252).

Rune Skarstein (2011:65) said that global drive for biofuel production derived from two alliances, which quite frequently represent differing interests: “states that are concerned about their energy security and environmentalists who are concerned about environmental degradation due to carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions.” To Campbell and Price (2008:11), every fundamental issue that is currently confronting the US today, such as “climate change, the rise of China and India, Jihadist financing, an increasingly bellicose Russia, worrisome trends in Latin America...is either inextricably

linked to or exacerbated by decisions associated with energy policy” Campbell and Price (2008:11). These studies reveal that energy security and environmental sustainability concerns are additional causes of large-scale land-based investments in Africa.

Globalisation, according to Ibrahim (2013:85) is the term used to describe the changes in societies and the world economy that result from dramatically increased international trade and cultural exchange. In His Manifesto, Chimni also said, globalization is greatly facilitated by state action, and involves the creation of a “unified global economic space with appropriate international law and international institutions to go along” (Chimni 2006: 7). Even though its proponents perceive globalisation as a process that is connecting people, neighbourhoods, cities, regions and nations much more strongly together than ever before,¹² others perceive it as a mechanism to exploit Africa and enrich the North. Lere (2014:153), for instance, argue that globalisation “is another new method of recolonisation of African countries by those developed nations who were hitherto not part of the old colonisation to explore virgin land to operate and be part of the exploiters of the African countries”¹³

As Ibrahim (2013:85) has argued, Africa’s “position in the international system has been considerably weakened by the fact that it has been losing the race for economic development in general, and human development in particular,” to other continents of the world. He added that these poor performances by African nations are responsible in part for the social and political instability “rise of authoritarian regimes that have characterised much of postcolonial Africa, further weakening the ability of African countries to deal effectively with globalisation” Ibrahim (2013:85). Simply put, the proceeds of Africa in the international community are crisis, including economic, environmental, political, social, and cultural, permeating every community in the region. In other words, globalisation is a “false” gospel preached by the North to “catch” the South and to “address” global issues, food security, energy security, and climate change as illustration.

FAO reported that high energy prices, among other drivers including “... growing consumption rates and market demand for

food, biofuels, raw materials and carbon sequestration,” have triggered foreign direct investment (FDI) in feedstock crops for biofuels (FAO 2013:3). Strictly speaking, the fret of energy price hike has boosted the allocation of farmland for the cultivation of feed grain and resulted in a substantial growth in global biofuels production. Thomas Helbling and Shaun Roache are members of the International Monetary Fund’s research department. In the *Rise in Food Price Volatility*, they averred “high oil prices and policy support have boosted demand for biofuels, which are used as supplements in transportation fuels, particularly in the advanced economies and also in some emerging economies, including Brazil” (Helbling and Roache 2011:25).

Biofuels are a category of energy fuel acquired from feedstock (solid biomass) through biological or chemical processing (*Directive 2009/28/E*; Gasparatos et al. 2012). Unlike fossil fuels with high carbon content, biofuels are hailed as clean, renewable, and environmentally sustainable, with reduced carbon content. Because of these characteristics, biofuels are regarded, widely, as an important measure to tackle energy-related greenhouse gas emissions (hence, climate change). The European Union, among many other countries,¹⁴ has set mandatory domestic targets for the entire portion of energy that a Member State can derive from renewable resources for European Union countries. The Member States shall guarantee that the “share of energy from renewable sources, in gross final consumption of energy in 2020 is at least its national overall target for the share of energy from renewable sources in that year”¹⁵

Given its richness in farmland, Africa could have capitalised on this commandment to rise economically ahead of the European Union and other Western nations. This call could have been seen as an opportunity for promoting inclusiveness for local farmers and rural development, as well as guaranteeing that the profits of large-scale farmland investments in the continent are widely shared. Moreover, African governments should have taken advantage of this edict by concomitantly enhancing the continent’s food security and the living standards of its rural poor who depend on land and land resources for their livelihood.

Statistically, this call for biofuels has lifted the demand for energy crops and resulted in a significant increase in farmland acquisition for biofuel production in Africa. The Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) (2011:15) reported that biofuels-related activities constituted 2/3 of the overall land area obtained for industrial agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa, and industrial agriculture is known to be predominantly practiced by corporations. Specifically, 43% of the alienated land in sub-Saharan Africa has been envisioned solely for biofuels, 25% for export food production, 20% for both biofuels and export food, and approximately 9% for tree plantations (Schoneveld 2011: 9).

As far as one can see from these statistics the proportion of farmland acquired for energy crop, including jatropha, corn, rapeseed, and palm kernels production overshadows that for food crops. These figures point out that concern about energy security and environmental sustainability are central characters in the current scramble for African land. Can these objectives be achieved without adversely impacting on the livelihoods of local community members?

Implications of foreign agricultural investments for local Africans

Some organisations and researchers contend that large-scale land-based investments can create opportunities for socio-economic development and environmental protection in recipient communities and countries. A study conducted by the OECD and FAO (2015: 37), for instance, shows that “agricultural investment, including both domestic and foreign direct investment, can have transformative and positive impacts at local, national and regional levels.” Accordingly, “increasing agricultural investment is, in fact, one of the most important and effective medium to long term strategies for increasing agricultural production, promoting economic growth, reducing poverty and strengthening food security” OECD and FAO (2015:37). This argument signals that FDI in agriculture is a precondition to positively transforming African countries, among other developing countries that are suffering from food scarcity and underdevelopment. In other words, it may be difficult to adequately

address the issue of food insecurity in Africa without large-scale investments in farmland.

While assessing whether the recent rush for farmland in Africa and other parts of the world can result in equitable and sustainable benefits for host countries and local populations, the World Bank (2011:34-38) said small farmers and large investors can form mutually beneficial partnerships. It further contended that “there can be considerable potential for employment generation... is often a key avenue for local people to benefit from outside investment because for bulk commodities, it is at the production, rather than the processing stage that employment is generated” (World Bank 2011:34-38). According to the World Bank, FDI in agriculture can create opportunities that Africa and other land-abundant countries can use to foster political, social, and economic development.¹⁶

A 2008 report by FAO and IIED (2008:10)—*The Biofuels Boom and Poor People’s Access to Land*—shows that biofuels can increase long-term energy security for countries seeking alternative energy sources, create opportunities for rural development, and develop new export markets for land-rich countries. With regards to generating income, this report notes that the production of biofuels may offer income-generation opportunities in rural areas, and by so doing “help improve prospects for food security—namely, by enabling farmers to purchase food on the market” FAO and IIED (2008: 13). This proclamation intimates that even though FDI in biofuels can undermine local access to farmland, they should be embraced because, after all, biofuels developments can provide the dispossessed farmers with the money that they may need to address their food security concerns.

Although foreign governments, transnational corporate investors, and global financial institutions consider large-scale land-based investments as a recipe for world food security, economic opportunity for local populations, energy security, climate change, and sustainable development, some researchers and institutions are less enthusiastic about such investments. Its critics see large-scale land-based investments in Africa as a threat to local lives and livelihoods: such investments can promote impoverishment by

depriving local populations, especially those in an agricultural setting, leading to landlessness, food insecurity, and death.

The majority of large-scale land investments occur on farmland that subsistence communities—the backbone promoters of local food security—depend on to grow *subsistence crops*. As ActionAid International (2014: 10) research demonstrates, “very little land in Africa is truly idle, given pastoralist activities, traditional land management techniques in semi-arid regions, use of land for ritual/religion, and natural forests provide a source of many essential products.” Because these allocations concern not vacant or idle land, but land on which local livelihoods, food security, and cultures are base, they are likely to reduce local land access to farmland and forest resources.

IFAD notes that subsistence farmers manage about 500 million small farms and provide over 80% of the food consumed in most parts of the developing world, especially sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia, so contributing to the reduction of poverty and promotion of food security.¹⁷ Of concern is that the land allocated to foreign investors “is life [and] the basis of livelihoods for peasants and indigenous people” in developing countries (Shiva 2014: 39). By apportioning subsistence farmland, whether empty or vacant, to powerful corporations for export-oriented cultivation, a breeding ground for a petty rivalry for farmland and natural resources between poor environment-dependent populations and very wealthy governments and investors is created. These allocations can, furthermore, promote the widening of the gap between the poor and the rich.

In some African countries, industrial agriculture has resulted in the “erosion of traditional values and morality (including the observation of human rights and environmental responsibility)” (Peebles 2014: 64). It has also promoted the pervasive devastation of environmental resources, with accompanying cultural, economic, and social destruction, including local food insecurity and landlessness (De Schutter 2011: 264). As reported by Brennan and Künnemann, the consequence of violating the right to adequate food and nutrition is “hunger, malnutrition and related diseases, most of them affecting small scale food producers, marginalized urban and rural workers,

and discriminated social groups, the unemployed and their families” (Brennan and Künnemann 2013: 34). As demand for land and other natural resources has become the most vital asset in the global economy, “land has emerged as a key site of conflict” (Shiva 2014: 39) as will be exemplified with case studies in Cameroon, Nigeria, and Tanzania.

Some critics are cautiously calling the recent rush for farmland in developing countries “new colonialism” (Broughton 2013), “green grabbing” and “new appropriation of nature” (Fairhead *et al.* 2012), and “globalization and the foreignisation of Space” (Zoomers 2010). But, Margulis, McKeonb, Borrás (2013), among many different researchers, have out rightly, baptized it “land-grabbing”—a phenomenon that has been defined in a variety of ways. Hence, Borrás *et al.* (2011) argue the phrase “global land grab” “has become a catch-all to describe and analyse the current explosion of large-scale (trans-)national commercial land transactions.” For example, Olivier De Schutter in his article *How Not to Think of Land-grabbing*—gives more prominence to the huge opportunity costs—“a type of farming that will have much less powerful poverty reducing impacts”—of the land deals in host countries (De Schutter 2011: 249).

In *Towards a better understanding of global land grabbing*, Borrás *et al.* attached value to the justifications for such investments: how the land, in addition to water and labour of the Global South, are ‘increasingly perceived as sources of alternative energy production, food crops, mineral deposits, and reservoirs of environmental services.’¹⁸ FIAN International upholds the probable social injustice result of the land deals as a determining characteristic (Odeny 2010: 8). The approach by FIAN International is my preference because, in addition to being more comprehensive, it is more concerned about the social injustices that are associated with industrial agriculture. By way of illustration, FIAN International argues that land-grabbing involves “taking possession of and/controlling a scale of land for commercial and industrial agricultural production that is disproportionate in size in comparison to the average land holding in the region” (Odeny 2010: 8).

Perhaps because of concerns about local food security and the ways in which such investments violate acknowledged economic,

social, cultural, civil, political, and environmental rights standards of subsistence populations,¹⁹ the 2011 Tirana Declaration (2011).proclaims a large-scale land-based investment is a land-grab when it is:

In violation of [...] the equal rights of women; (ii) not based on free, prior and informed consent of the affected land-users; (iii) not based on a thorough assessment, or are in disregard of social, economic and environmental impacts, including the way they are gendered; (iv) not based on transparent contracts that specify clear and binding commitments about activities, employment and benefits sharing, and; (v) not based on effective democratic planning, independent oversight and meaningful participation (p. 3).

The Tirana Declaration was issued at an international conference organised by the International Land Coalition (ILC).²⁰ The conference, which was titled *Securing Land Access in Times of Intensified Natural Resource Competition*, was attended by over 150 public and private sector representatives from about 45 countries in Africa, America, Asia, and Europe. While denouncing the growing practice of “land grabbing” and arguing that land, in addition to other natural resources, is under threat, these actors reiterated the need “to actively promote pro-poor, people-centred and environmentally sustainable governance of land” (International Land Coalition 2011: 3).

The ILC, between 2012 and 2015, organized two more conferences, and these meetings culminated in two additional declarations:—the 2013 Antigua Declaration and the 2015 Dakar Declaration—and commitments. These commitments outline ILC members’ determination to implement the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Forest and Fisheries in the Context of National Food Security, the Land Policy Framework and Guidelines for Africa, and the *Conventions to Eliminate all forms of Discrimination Against Women*, among others (International Land Coalition 2011: 29). These guidelines/instruments are designed to promote the rights of subsistence communities, including women, men, and other susceptible populations. The conferences that ILC

has organised, as well as publications of ILC members and networks, including the Land Matrix, Land Portal, IIED and the IFAD, have, perhaps, played a significant role in enhancing access to information on land governance issues, and in agenda setting on the phenomenon of land-grabbing and people-centred land governance.

According to *The Great Land Grab*, a report prepared by Daniel and Mittal for the Oakland Institute (2009:1), land-grabbing “refers to the purchase or lease of vast tracts of land by wealthier food-insecure nations and private investors from mostly poor, developing countries in order to produce crops for export” The report of Land Matrix (a global and independent land monitoring initiative, and a member of the ILC) shows that to amount to land-grabbing, the track of land that is grabbed must cover 200 hectares or more.²¹ For the purpose of this chapter I define land-grabbing as the conveyance of access, use, and control rights over thousands of acres of land, through a transaction, grant or concession, from subsistence communities (smallholders, pastoralists, and indigenous populations) to foreign investors for profit-oriented purposes. Often, this occurs within the agricultural sector including food crops and agrofuels sold in overseas markets, with the result that local food security and environmental rights are threatened.

Dispossession and displacement in Africa

The World Bank estimates that addressing the global economic and food crisis that sent millions of people into malnutrition since 2008 would require an increase in FDI in agriculture, among others, by 50%.²² But does this talk of global food security mean local food security in Africa (the hungriest region of the world) or displacement and dispossession of local Africans that are most involved in local food security? The precise number of people that have been globally displaced/dispossessed through foreign land acquisitions is unknown (Twomey 2014:3). However, the following cases may provide some of examples of rural Africans that have been disadvantaged by such acquisitions.²³

Case study 1: Dispossession and displacement in Cameroon

On September 17, 2009, the Government of Cameroon and SG Sustainable Oils Cameroon Plc. (SGSOC) signed a 99-year contract (Establishment Convention) to establish an oil palm plantation and associated palm oil processing mills. SGSOC is the Cameroonian subsidiary of Herakles Farms, an American multinational, which happens to be the investor and operator of this project. The Project covers 80,506 hectares (300 square miles, or about the size of New York City) and is located in the South West Region of Cameroon (Herakles Farms 2011:13). The Establishment Convention allows Herakles Farms to enjoy a 10-year exemption period from all taxes and duties in Cameroon. At the end of this time, payment of rents to the host government will be at the rate of \$1.00/hectare/year for developed land and \$0.50/hectare/year for the undeveloped land.²⁴

The environmental impact assessment (EIA) report that was prepared for this project shows that the project site is situated within biodiversity hotspots. These hotspots include: the Korup National Park; Rumpi Hills Forest Reserve; Bakossi National Park, and Banyang Mbo Wildlife Sanctuary (Herakles Farms 2011:131-140). The establishment of a plantation in an environmentally sensitive area is an indication that the project will destroy forests that provide habitat for numerous species, including endangered plants and wildlife. The report also says subsistence agriculture, hunting, and gathering of forest resources are the traditional livelihood activities inside the company's concession, and that the project will adversely impact such activities.²⁵

In other words, any decision to prevent residents (farmers, hunters, fishermen, herders, indigenous populations, etc.) who previously occupied the project site from accessing the plantation area may threaten the local livelihood and encourage involuntary relocation. However, Herakles Farms has failed to incorporate a compensation plan into its environmental and social management plan as required by Cameroonian law. Cameroon's Environmental Code proclaims that an EIA report shall, among others, outline measures envisaged by the investor to eliminate or compensate for the harmful consequences of the project.²⁶ It contends that the

project will not require any involuntary resettlement and thus there is no need for a relocation plan (Herakles Farms 2011:171-173).

The EIA report says “no shrine or cultural site will be destroyed by the investor (Herakles Farms 2011:238). This is how the Company plans to prevent/mitigate the destruction of indigenous cultural values) and that there will be “some buffer zones left as patches” to compensate for the loss of land and forest products. (Herakles Farms 2011:238). Herakles Farms proposes to “make fire briquettes from the left-over fibres and shells to distribute them to its workers and the population” (Herakles Farms 2011:238). Unfortunately, the EIA report did not state how long this would last. The company plans to establish “a cow ranch to provide meat to the workers and villagers,” as a way to address the issue of food security (Herakles Farms 2011: 238). As can be seen, there is an inconsistency between the significance of the predicted effects and measures that the company has designed to prevent, mitigate, or compensate for such impacts.

According to the Rome Declaration on World Food Security, food security exists “when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO 1996). Simply put, food security is the ability to constantly achieve food needs and a healthy eating. Hamm and Bellows (2003:37-43) define food security as “a situation in which all community residents can obtain a safe, culturally acceptable, nutritionally adequate diet through a sustainable food system that maximises self-reliance and social justice”. If a “sustainable food system” is a key element in maximising self-reliance and achieving food security, it is debatable whether building a cow ranch to provide meat to the employees and villagers will address the issue of food security in the concerned communities as the EIA report indicates.

Besides, food safety may not be enhanced by food aid alone, for instance, the provision of meat to villages that seem to be largely self-sufficient in food production. The villagers are subsistence farmers. They may be regarded as marginally self-sufficient with maize, cocoyams, plantain, palm oil, cassava, and meat, as well as cash crops (cocoa and coffee) and forest products (bushmeat, fish, and herbal medicine for healthcare). Given suspicions about trustworthiness.²⁷

It is also hard to believe that the investor will fulfil its promise to provide an alternative source of energy (fire briquettes) to the thousands of villagers that are almost losing access to firewood in the concession.

As explained by Professor Carmen Gonzalez (2014:470), by attracting agribusinesses in the United States and the European Union, the livelihoods and environment of subsistence farmers in the developing world are being destroyed. The Cameroon Government, Oakland Institute, Greenpeace, Oxfam International, Farmlandgrab.org, Forest Peoples Programme, Centre for Environment and Development, among other public and civil society organizations have confirmed this in the context of the Herakles Farms' concession. The land in question previously provided livelihoods to thousands of Cameroonian farmers as well as biodiversity, including fauna and flora that, at the moment, are seriously at risk of extinction.

For example, the Government of Cameroon reported in 2013 that the company's concession involves land that some 56 villages with a population of about 16.000 indigenous peoples had access to, to sustain themselves.²⁸ The report indicates violations of fundamental rights of villagers in the project impact: some of the affected population can no longer access their cocoa farms and areas in the concession that produce forest products.²⁹ A European Union study reveals some environmentally destructive activities performed by Herakles Farms. The company has illegally logged, deforested, and opened roads in the rainforest on 60 hectares of land in Cameroon, in addition to commercializing the timber from its concession,³⁰ despite arguments that it had no intention to deforest the concession.³¹

It is worth noting that on 25 November 2013 there was an "amendment" to the Establishment Convention: three presidential decrees were signed granting Herakles Farms a temporal concession of 19,843 hectares of land for three years,³² reducing the plantation to a third of its previous size. The company, once bragging of its plans to create 9,000 direct/permanent jobs and promote socio-economic development, (Herakles Farms 2011:145), has laid off workers, many of whom were subsistence farmers who no longer

have access to their land because of the Herakles Farms plantation.³³ A 2015 report by Farmgrab.org shows that the concession area is currently a fraction of the former size, and the company is closing down most of its offices and turning to selling “illegally felled timber to raise revenue.”³⁴

Statistically, there has not been an equitable distribution or fair exchange of natural resources in the communities that have been affected by the Herakles Farms project. The information also shows that this project has not been directed by the Cameroon government to meet local needs effectively or enhance the quality of life in the affected villages. If environmental injustice is “any undue imposition of environmental burdens on innocent bystanders or communities not parties to the activities generating such burdens” (Adeola 2000:688), under these circumstances, the Herakles Farms project is not serving environmental justice.³⁵

Case Study 2: Displacement and dispossession in Nigeria

The decision by some Nigerian governments to set aside thousands of hectares of land for agricultural investment has, perhaps, attracted foreign agricultural investors, including PZ Wilmar, Cargill, and Dominion Farms to Nigeria. For illustration, the Government of Edo State has set aside 300,000 hectares of land for agricultural investment as part of its “effort to becoming one of the world’s developed agricultural states in Nigeria within the next two-three years.”³⁶ According to James Aniyom (Cross River’s Commissioner for Agriculture and Natural Resources), “the vision is to move Cross River State agriculture from government to private sector driven.”³⁷

Between 2011 and 2012, PZ Wilmar (Wilmar) purchased 26,000 hectares of plantation sites (with intentions to expand its holdings to 240,000 hectares) in Cross River State, Nigeria to develop palm oil plantations and processing mills.³⁸ Wilmar claims “to support the development of a sustainable, profitable and self-sufficient palm oil industry in Nigeria.”³⁹ This should be a newsworthy devotion to eradicating all forms of deforestation and violations of human rights resulting from production and distribution of its commodity. However, it is hard to imagine how Wilmar’s aim to prevent

environmental degradation will be reconciled with its developments in forest reserves.⁴⁰

Friends of the Earth and Environmental Rights Action (2015:15), an outspoken leader in the environmental and progressive communities, underscored that most land in Nigeria's Cross River State is either forested, in community usage, or already dedicated to commodity agriculture (Friends of the Earth 2015:16). It is doubtless that industrial agriculture in this part of the world will have unwanted impacts on the biodiversity and forests, and displace peasants from their livelihoods. Researchers have accentuated the horrible socioeconomic and environmental implications, including for community water sources, land, and non-timber forest product collection areas that this investment could have on vulnerable communities.⁴¹

A local Chief attests: "...We used to plant [food crops]...The community is over 7000 people, and the land was over 300 hectares, and 200 of this have been taken now." Friends of the Earth and Environmental Rights Action (2015:35).⁴² A Youth Leader also reports: "We had to dig an alternative source of water, because the river dried up."⁴³ In addition to Friends of the Earth's report, other researchers have reported the threats of Wilmar's operations to High Conservation Value areas containing areas used by peasants for farming and collecting forest resources (Schoneveld 2014: 23).

Approximations of the number of persons who have or will likely be physically displaced and/ or dispossessed of farmland, hunting and fishing grounds, and other non-timber forest resources by Wilmar's operations differ. Rainforest Resources Development Centre (RRDC) and Environmental Rights Action estimate that the livelihoods of 20,000 people may be adversely impacted, with about 10,000 people potentially facing eviction from their lands (Friends of the Earth 2015:19). Another study by the Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) shows that the company's plantations will impact farmland currently or previously managed by as many as 7800 households (Schoneveld 2014: 156). Despite divergence between results presented by RRDC and CIFOR, the fact remains that Wilmar's investment will promote the widespread destruction of

the environment, with accompanying economic, social and cultural destruction.⁴⁴

Nigerian land is also a top priority for Dominion Farms and Cargill.⁴⁵ These companies have each acquired 30,000 hectares of valuable land for the establishment of a cassava starch processing facility⁴⁶ and a rice plantation (GRAIN 2015:3) respectively. GRAIN is an international NGO that works to assist subsistence farmers in their struggles for “community-controlled and biodiversity-based food systems.” Information gathered by this NGO demonstrates that up to 45,000 people relied on the lands given to Dominion Farms for their livelihoods.⁴⁷ This number suggests that the land leased to Dominion Farms was previously occupied by smallholders, including farmers, fishermen, hunters, herders, and other disenfranchised groups.

A 2015 report by the Environmental Education and Development (CEED), Environmental Rights Action, Friends of the Earth, GRAIN, and Global Justice Now shows that Dominion Farms’ operations are imposing untold hardship on the vulnerable communities, including poverty. As claimed by a local: “we are speaking in one voice against Dominion Farms because we are opposing their activities. We have fish ponds... on that land.” But Dominion Farms has said, he added, that “they will sand fill the fish ponds to give them more farmland.”⁴⁸ With agriculture being crucial to economic growth and poverty reduction in sub-Saharan African countries,⁴⁹ grabbing the source of livelihoods of over 45,000 people will only help in increasing poverty and food insecurity in the region: this is social and distributive injustices.

The Environmental Justice Atlas (EJA), a teaching, networking, and advocacy resource that documents and catalogues social conflict around environmental issues, shows that in 2007, about 3,500 hectares of the Iguobazuwa Forest Reserve (Nigeria) were assigned to the French company Michelin to establish a rubber plantation. To EJA, this is “illegal” because it was executed without carrying out an adequate environmental impact assessment, says the land in question was home to a population of over 20,000 rural people, “85% of whom depend[ed] on the dense forest for their daily livelihoods.”⁵⁰ This argument highlights that adverse impacts of the Michelin project

on the environment and vulnerable communities were not assessed, and hence not considered in the planning, implementation, and decommissioning phases of the project. In the absence of an adequate environmental impact assessment, it may be difficult for negative environmental and social impacts to be mitigated. As Ortolano and Shepherd contend, “the most common positive outcomes of EIA are suggestions for measures needed to mitigate the adverse effects of a proposed plan.”⁵¹

The EJA report further states that the Iguobazuwa Forest Reserve is rich in flora and fauna species and was used for the cultivation of food crops, including cassava, plantain, yam, pineapple.⁵² Strictly speaking, this forest provided a wide array of benefits, environmental, social, economic, and cultural, to the indigenous populations of the affected area. The agrarian people, after the company bulldozed the 3,500 hectares of land, were left without compensation.⁵³ As can be imagined, this operation destroyed the sources of livelihood of the host communities when their forest and farmlands were grabbed,⁵⁴ a corrective justice concern.⁵⁵

Case study 3: Displacement and dispossession in Tanzania

Tanzania’s agriculture ministry reported that subsistence farming plays a significant role in food security and rural development, with local farmers producing over 90% of food in the country.⁵⁶ This high rate of local involvement in agriculture shows the substantial role that Tanzanian farmers play in local food security and socio-economic development in Tanzania. The fact that this African nation is not very rich in arable land⁵⁷ (a resource that local community members need to promote their food security) should encourage the government to restrict the size of land that foreign investors can lease for agricultural operations in the country. Notwithstanding the fact that Tanzania lacks sufficient farmland, the government, by 2013, had allocated millions of acres of land to large-scale investors.

IIED reported in 2009 that over 4 million hectares of farmland had been requested from the Tanzanian government for jatropha, sugarcane, and palm oil investments (Sulle and Nelson 2009: 18). Evidence suggests that by the end of 2008 640,000 hectares of the 4

million hectares have so far been allocated (Sulle and Nelson 2009: 18). IIED cites 23 biofuel investors that are currently operating in Tanzania, including European investors such as Bio-Massive (Sweden) Sun Biofuel (United Kingdom), BioShape (Netherlands), and SEKAB BT (Sweden) (Sulle and Nelson 2009:18). An often cited example is the over 325, 000-hectare arable land that the Government of Tanzania, in 2013, leased to US-owned AgriSol Energy (Agrisol) for 99 years (Oakland Institute 2011: 1). Needless to say that, this allocation is hurting the communities who earlier had control over the land and its resources, by violating their human rights.

The land in question comprises the former Lugufu Refugee Camp in Kigoma province (25, 000 hectares) and the Katumba (80, 317 hectares), and Mishamo (219, 800 hectares) abandoned refugee camps in Rukwa Province, Tanzania (Oakland Institute 2011: 1). Research by the Oakland Institute shows that in addition to Agrisol Energy, many different actors have a stake in this project, including Tanzania-based Serengeti Advisers Limited, a leading Tanzanian investment and consulting firm, Pharos Global Agricultural Fund (managed by a Dubai-based firm that specialises in emerging markets investment with returns of 13-20% for investors by acquiring agricultural land, among others). Summit Group (headquartered in Alden, Iowa) and Iowa State University, described as “one of the most respected land-grant universities in the nation” (Oakland Institute 2011: 1).

To persuade Tanzanian officials to support genetically modified crops, these actors argue that Tanzania has 25 million acres of farmland that is generating practically nothing (Ibid: 2). Their stated goal is to convert this African country into a “regional agricultural powerhouse” by combining Tanzania’s abundant agricultural land and other resources with contemporary farming practices (Ibid) They are determined to “unlock the potential” through the use of genetically modified technology, among others to increase yields and reduce labour-intensive agricultural methods. AgriSol claims that Tanzanian (non-GM) maize yields are 17.5 bushels per acre (bu/acre), while Iowa (GM) maize yields are 195 bu/acre” (Ibid). The annual rent for leasing the said land to Agrisol was fixed at 200

shillings/hectare/year, in addition to a 500 shillings (US 50 cents)/hectare/year payment to the district council in the affected area. AgriSol calls it “abandoned refugee land,” despite arguments by Broughton and the Oakland Institute that the land in question was home to over 160,000 refugees from Burundi who have, for 40 years, established homes, churches, farms, fields, and other community facilities (Broughton 2013: 26; Oakland Institute 2011: 3). The government of Tanzania started a naturalisation process in 2008: to grant citizenship to the over 160,000 refugees in April 2010 (Ibid). This notion of granting citizenship means that the villagers who have lived on, accessed the environmental resources on this land for over thirty years, and established their lives by farming, fishing, hunting, and animal rearing had to be evacuated against their will. As a consequence, the concerned community members will lose their villages and means of support, not forgetting their identity and security. Cultural degradation is a crime that the United Nations condemns.⁵⁸

While these former refugees may have been happy to become citizens of Tanzania, their citizenship was contingent on them surrendering their land holdings (including their homes, farms, rivers, forest resources, pasture land, as well as their cultures) to Agrisol and relocating to other parts of Tanzania.⁵⁹ The impact of Agrisol’s investment on the local peoples of Tanzania exemplifies how a host government can side with foreign agricultural investors against its citizens—subsistence communities whose role in local food security and rural development is indispensable.

The report of Farmlandgrab.org, a website containing news stories about the global rush to buy up or lease farmlands abroad, of May 22, 2015 shows that the Tanzanian government is in the process of breaking its agreement with AgriSol “over consistent violation of its terms.”⁶⁰ Tanzania’s Deputy Minister for Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives, Godfrey Zambi, says that the contract between the government of Tanzania and Agrisol stipulates that “the investment should begin within three years and the company should be reporting to Tanzania Investment Centre every six months.” The Minister added that the investor failed to implement “the agreed terms.”⁶¹ It is unclear whether the government resolved to terminate

its contract with AgriSol and search for another investor or offer the land to the refugees who previously had control over the property.

In 2008, Sun Biofuels, a British-owned agrofuel company, also established a jatropha plantation on a land area estimated at 8,211 hectares of land in Tanzania (Oakland Institute 2012:1). This plantation is on the land that 11 villages in the Kisarawe District in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania had access. In return, Sun Biofuels promised financial compensation, water wells, 700 jobs, improved schools, health clinics and roads to the affected households (Ibid). Although studies have shown that biofuels farming could, indeed, provide different forms of benefits to the host communities and countries,⁶² the Sun Biofuels project left lots of villagers in anguish, as they became landless and with no hope of their present and future generations.

To begin with, the land allocated to Sun Biofuels, according to the Oakland Institute, was forest and bushland that was used by the community to graze, produce charcoal and harvest forest products such as firewood, fodder, medicine, etc. (Oakland Institute 2012:4). About 80% of Kisarawe's 100,000 inhabitants were farmers and gatherers of non-timber forest resources (Ibid). These are additional activities that the villagers depended on, to enhance their food and income security beyond subsistence farming.⁶³ It was evident that, sooner or later, the establishment of this project on community land would marginalise rural farmers, fishermen, pastoralists, and grazers, and lead to landlessness and cultural degradation.

The Guardian Newspaper has reported that Sun Biofuels was unwilling to fulfil its promises, including the promise to compensate for lost wages.⁶⁴ After acquiring about one-quarter of the farmland in the vulnerable communities, the villagers were not (appropriately) compensated, constituting a corrective justice concern. For example, one family received barely 13 million Tanzanian shillings (£4,835) for 670 hectares of his farmland that was lost to Sun Biofuels.⁶⁵ The promise to construct roads, schools, water wells, and clinics, etc. to the affected communities was never adequately honoured (Oakland Institute 2012:3). For those who agreed to become agricultural workers, their wages were dishearteningly little to compensate for the loss of income previously received from subsistence farming.⁶⁶ But,

the £42-a-month salary promised by the company to employees seemingly turned out to be a scam.

To question why the guaranteed wage did not materialise, Saidi Abasi received this response from his employer (Sun Biofuels): “if you want to work, work. If you don’t, get out.”⁶⁷ One of the plantation workers claimed he was not paid the full severance pay due for his 18 months of service after his contract was terminated, and with others, the villagers described the tale of London-based Sun Biofuels’ disaster as “the return of colonialism” in the country.⁶⁸ To make complex the degrading situation, plantation workers were allowed to spray pesticides without protective equipment, an act that affects human health, according to the World Health Organisation.⁶⁹ Sun Biofuels seems not to be concerned about this allegation, as it has not reacted to it.

The establishment of the project led to a profound loss of access to water and other non-timber forest resources such that the affected community members were obliged to buy charcoal and water, (Oakland Institute 2012:4) resources which were generously accessible before the plantation’s establishment. It is crucial to mention that two years after the project went operational the business started facing a slow-down, and finally went bankrupt. The company’s shares were bought by 30 Degrees East, a company that, to mothball the project, laid off about 600 villagers that were employees of Sun Biofuels.⁷⁰ To the author’s knowledge, Mtanga Foods is currently managing the Sun Biofuel project in Tanzania.⁷¹

In considering all of the above facts, some of the affected community members might be in a more economically and environmentally perilous situation than they were in before the project came to a realisation. The media has also captured other abandoned biofuel schemes in Tanzania⁷² and Madagascar.⁷³ Although most of these projects appear to have harmed local people (by causing them to lose their farmlands, supply of potable water, access to non-timber forest products, and the promised employment opportunities and social amenities), the very people that these companies promised to assist, there seems not to be any signs on the part of the host governments to return the plantations to the villagers or to pursue the companies for compensation.

Conclusion

This book chapter made an inquiry into whether the global rush for Africa's farmland by corporate investors is an opportunity for development or land-grabbing—a phenomenon that is linked to human rights violations and underdevelopment in subsistence communities in Africa. The analysis shows that the globalisation-induced agricultural investments in Africa have the potential to place subsistence farmers, among other vulnerable groups, in a position of marginal influence and importance, and hence promote land-grabbing. In order to make way for foreign agricultural investments in Cameroon, Nigeria, and Tanzania, community members, including local farmers, fishermen, hunters, women, etc. were forced to abandon their villages, including their lands, rivers, and non-timber forest resources upon which they depended on for their livelihood. In cases where local populations were not evicted from their land, they were, nevertheless, denied access to a primary source of nourishment and left without adequate livelihood alternatives.

In other instances, the monetary compensations that were provided for the expropriated lands did not reflect the productive value for the former users (local community members). The cost of losing access to ecosystem goods (pasture, non-timber forest products or water) and ecosystem services (provisioning services, such as the regulation of the water cycle, sequestration of atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions, and recreational and cultural benefits) were not considered in the valuation process. The result: food security was threatened, and the environment upon which they depend on for clean water, fertile soil, clean air, as well as socio-economic and cultural development was impacted. By disposing people of their own land, depriving them of their sources of livelihoods, poverty and underdevelopment were exacerbated. It is, therefore, necessary and urgent that large-scale land investments be adequately regulated so that the rights of local Africans to land, food, and water, are acknowledged and protected.

End notes

1. In the developing world, generally, most women lack secure property rights and access to adequate resources than men, Munro-Faure, P., *et al.*, Land tenure and rural development (FAO, 2002) para. 3.8.

2. These include: South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Liberia, Sudan and Sierra Leone, Oram, J., *The Great Land Heist How the world is paving the way for corporate land grabs* (ActionAid International, 2014) 10 [ActionAid International].

3. This chapter will use the term large-scale land-based investments about agricultural developments in huge tracts (generally above 1,000 hectares) of land, either through purchase or leases (usually 60-99 years).

4. Declaration on the Right to Development UNGA A/RES/41/128, 4 December 1986, 97th plenary meeting 41/128.

5. It has increased rapidly in the years following the 2008 global food crises, and vitalized such actors to acquire large tracts of land beyond their borders in order to produce food and fuel.

6. It went further that “one of the more effects of the food and financial crisis was that it prompted some food import-dependent countries to reconsider their policies to reduce vulnerability from what is considered to be an “undue dependence” on imports.” Deininger, K. W., and D. Byerlee, *Rising global interest in farmland: can it yield sustainable and equitable benefits?* (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2011) 1.

7. Accordingly, these allocations are chiefly about ‘shifting land and water uses from local farming to essentially long-distance farming to meet home state food and energy needs. It is, in practice, purchasing food production facilities Mann, H. and C. Smaller, “Foreign Land Purchases for Agriculture: What Impact on Sustainable Development?,” 8 Sustainable Dev. Innovation Briefs 3 (2010) 1–2.

8. This heavy reliance by GCC on food imports has originated out of the alleged risk of trade sanctions that has continued to shape the politics of food in the GCC since the “threat of a food embargo against the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

following the 1973 oil crisis.” Bailey, R. and R. Willoughby, “Edible Oil: Food Security in the Gulf” Energy, Environment and Resources” November 2013, 2. Online: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Energy,%20Environment%20and%20Development/bp113edibleoil.pdf>

9. It is expected to double from 30 million to 60 million in the period 2000 to 2030, Lorenzo Cotula, *supra*, 57.

10. The International Monetary Fund. Online: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2011/NEW031711A.htm>.

11. They figured that farming could be a profitable venture, given “the world population is growing, food prices are bound to stay high over time, and farmland can be had cheaply.” Even with a limited degree of “technology and management skills thrown into these farm acquisitions, they get portfolio diversification, a hedge against inflation and guaranteed returns – both from the harvests and the land itself.” GRAIN 2011: 122.

12. Globalization. Online: http://www.unesco.org/education/tlsf/mods/theme_c/mod18.html

13. Lere added that globalisation ‘involves the use of exploitative instruments like World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, multinational corporations and other international financial institutions, in order to capture the world in the name of globalization under the umbrella of United States of America, (Lere 2014:153).

14. See for example, the Government of Oregon’ Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS)(Government of Oregon, Oregon’s Electricity Mix at: https://www.oregon.gov/energy/pages/oregons_electric_power_mix.aspx); Mandatory Green Power Options (MGPO) (Carley, S. “State Renewable Energy Electricity Policies: An Empirical Evaluation” (2009) 37 Energy Policy 3071: US *Energy Independence and Security Act* (Earley, J., and A. McKeown, “Smart Choices for Biofuels” (Washington D.C.: Worldwatch Institute/Sierra Club, 2009) 3).

15. Member States shall guarantee that the “share of energy from renewable sources, in gross final consumption of energy in 2020 is at least its national overall target for the share of energy from renewable sources in that year,” Renewable Energy Directive 2009, *supra*, Article 3.

16. The United States Institute for Peace identify three categories of employments: politically, employment opportunities give the population a stake in the peace process by providing young men and women with alternatives to violence. Economically, employment provides income to poor families, revives domestic demand for goods and services, and stimulates overall growth. Socially, employment can also promote social healing, encourage the return of displaced persons, and improve social welfare in the long run, United States Institute for Peace, “Employment Generation.” Online: <http://www.usip.org/guiding-principles-stabilization-and-reconstruction-the-web-version/9-sustainable-economy/employment>.

17. IFAD, Smallholder farmers key to lifting over one billion people out of poverty. Online: https://www.ifad.org/newsroom/press_release/past/tags/y2013/1894706.

18. Borrás *et al.* focus on the purposes or justifications of the land deals, in which a “The land— and water and labour—of the Global South are increasingly perceived as sources of alternative energy production (primarily biofuels), food crops, mineral deposits (new and old), and reservoirs of environmental services” Borrás *et al.*, *supra*, 209.

19. These rights have been acknowledged by both environmental justice and social rights activists, as well as inter-governmental organizations. These rights include, for example, the rights to adequate food, water, and housing that are recognized globally, *United Nations General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Resolution 217 A(III), UN Document A/810 at 71 (1948)* [Universal Declaration].

20. The International Land Coalition is the world’s leading alliance of civil society organizations promoting much-needed

knowledge-sharing, coalition building, and international dialogue on this foundational topic of land rights. International Land Coalition (ILC), *From Tirana to Dakar Report – Highlights of Achievements from the Strategic Framework 2011-2015* (Rome: ILC, 2015) [International Land Coalition].

21. According to Land Matrix, this implies “the potential conversion of land from smallholder production, local community use or important ecosystem service provision to commercial use.” Land Matrix. Online: <http://www.landmatrix.org/en/about/#what-is-a-land-deal>.

22. The World Bank emphasizes on an increase from some \$142 billion per year to \$209 billion, The World Bank, The World Bank Group on Land & Food Security” (2012). Online: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/10/02/world-bank-land-food-security>

23. The Land Matrix, an online public database of large-scale land deals, has reported only 40 cases with information on displacements. Of the 40 cases where displacement is reported to have occurred, 25 are reported to have led to evictions of not less than 1000 people, and ten to the eviction of more than 10,000 people, Anseeuw, W., *et al.*, *The State of Large-Scale Land Acquisitions in the ‘Global South’: Analytical Report Based on the Land Matrix Database* (Bern/Montpellier/Hamburg: CDE/CIRAD/GIGA, 2012) 41.

24. Establishment Convention dated as of 17 September 2009 by and between the Republic of Cameroon and SG Sustainable Oils Cameroon PLC., Article 13. Online: <http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/SGSOC%20Convention%20with%20the%20Government%20of%20Cameroon.pdf>.

25. It enumerates the potential human impacts to include: loss of land, habitats, and non-timber forest products; destruction of the rural economy; exposure to health risks; food security; and destruction of cultural values, Herakles Farms EIA Report, *supra*, 171-173.

26. *Environmental Code*, *supra*, Article 19(2).

27. Herakles Farms had not honoured its previous promise to pay the monthly villagers 50,000 francs (around US\$ 86) per month,

starting in 2010, World Rainforest Movement, Palm oil concessions for logging: the case of Herakles Farms in Cameroon. Online: <http://wrm.org.uy/articles-from-the-wrm-bulletin/section1/palm-oil-concessions-for-logging-the-case-of-herakles-farms-in-cameroon/>.

28. The report also indicates that Herakles Farms' operation and negotiations are executed with lot of "intimidation and bribery, targeting the chiefs and some few influential decision-making members of the communities, Dupuy, J., and M. Bakia "Report: Fact finding mission on Herakles Farms (SGSOC) oil palm plantation project," 1 and 6. Online: http://cameroonveritas.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/03_01_2013_report-fact-finding-mission-sgsoc.pdf.

29. Oakland Institute Film: The Herakles debacle. Online: <http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/land-deals-africa-cameroon>.

30. It was suggested by a European Union study that a fine of 24,506,000 FCFA be levied against the company for illegally degrading the environment. European Union, *Observateur Indépendant au Contrôle Forestier et au Suivi des Infractions Forestières au Cameroun: Rapport de Mission N°040/OI/AGRECO-CEW, Contrat EuropeAid/128055/D/SER/CM* (European Union, 2012) 3.

31. Cameroon has signed an agreement, Voluntary Partnership Agreement, with the EU to prevent illegal logging in Cameroon, Greenpeace," Licence to Launder: How Herakles Farms' illegal timber trade threatens Cameroon's forests and VPA" <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/publications/forests/2014/Licence-to-Launder.pdf>. Herakles Farms' deforestation activities within Cameroon's portion of the Congo Basin rainforests, therefore, subordinates this partnership agreement.

32. Modern Ghana, "Cameroon President Authorizes Herakles Farms to Destroy Forests". Online: <http://www.modernghana.com/news/505760/1/cameroon-president-authorizes-herakles-farms-to-de.html>.

33. Farmlandgrab.org, "Herakles Farms project rears its ugly head again". Online: <http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/25513-herakles-farms-project-rears-its-ugly-head-again> [Farmlandgrab.org].

34. *Ibid.*

35. The company's operations is in stark contrast to international law which prohibits the forceful assimilation, destruction of culture, and involuntary relocation without just and fair compensation of local communities, UNDRIP, *supra*, articles 7, 8, and 10.

36. Farmlandgrab-org, 'Edo State sets aside 300,000 ha of land for investment' <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/post/view/25301-edo-state-sets-aside-300-000-ha-of-land-for-investment>.

37. AllAfrica, Nigeria: Cross River State - Investment Yet to Yield Dividend, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201509210384.html>.

38. Ecologist (Van Schaik, A., and G. Ojo), "Deforestation, exploitation, hypocrisy: no end to Wilmar's palm oil land grabs". Online:

http://www.theecologist.org/News/news_analysis/2879965/deforestation_exploitation_hypocrisy_no_end_to_wilmars_palm_oil_land_grabs.html.

39. New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition," Cooperation Framework to Support the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Nigeria," 18-19. Online: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/208216/new-alliance-progress-report-coop-framework-nigeria.pdf>.

40. A research conducted by Friends of the Earth US and Environmental Rights Action (Nigeria) in 2015 shows that Wilmar's Obasanjo farms concessions, overlaps both Cross River National Park and the Ekinta Forest Reserve," Friends of the Earth, *Exploitation and Empty Promises: Wilmar's Nigerian land grab* (Washington D.C.: Friends of the Earth and Environmental Rights Action) 15 [Friends of the Earth].

41. A mapping analysis conducted by Friends of the Earth in 2015 shows that areas around Wilmar's concessions in Cross River State has been deforested, Urness, J., and A.Teaby, *Analysis of Forest Cover Loss in Palm Oil Concessions in Nigeria for Friends of the Earth: Update 2* (Friends of the Earth, 2015) 2; According to Friends of the Earth and Environmental Rights Action, 8% of the total land area within the concessions, has been deforested, Friends of the Earth, *ibid*, 15. This number probably consists of the cutting down of natural forest.

42. Chief Niufam Etim Itagbor of Mbarakom Village (Nigeria) continues that forest, with medicinal plants and wildlife, like antelope and monkey was lost to Wilmar, and that they now have to buy meat and fish which is “very expensive.” Friends of the Earth, *supra*, 35.

43. He went further that hundreds of people use this source, so people have to get up at 4 AM to be able to be the first person to fetch the water,” *ibid*, 37.

44. This is because the resources on which Wilmar’s concessions are established provided an important livelihood for an essential number of people to support domestic food sovereignty.

45. According to the vice chairman of Cargill, Paul Conway, the key to resolving the current global food crisis is “to make better use of the land in Africa ...,” Aljazeera, Food for thought. Online: <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/countingthecost/2012/09/20129167591879452.html>.

46. Cargill, Cargill in Nigeria. Online: <<http://www.cargill.com.ng/en/index.jsp>>.

47. Centre for Environmental Education and Development (CEED), Environmental Rights Action, Friends of the Earth, GRAIN, and Global Justice Now, “Dominion Farms’ land grabbing Nigeria Farmers in Taraba State refuse to give up their lands for massive rice plantation project backed by the G8” (2015) 4. Online: <<https://www.grain.org/article/entries/5126-dominion-farm-s-land-grab-in-nigeria>> [CEED].

48. He also said that “When they commenced work on the land they came with security personnel whom Dominion Farms mandated to evict all farmers who were working on their lands.” Here are some quotes from local farmers: “We do not subscribe to a foreign agricultural and farming system that we do not have knowledge. They came here to farm. The only story we hear is that our land is taken away and will be given out. We were not involved at any level. For the sake of the future and our children, we are requesting governmental authorities to ask Dominion Farms to stay away from our land” (Rebecca Sule and Mama Tina);”...Our land is very rich and good. We produce a lot of different crops here like rice, beans, Guinea corn, cassava, soya beans, millet, yam as well as fish farming and the rearing of animals like goats, sheep and cattle. But since

Dominion Farms people arrived with their machine and some of their working equipment we were asked to stop our farm work and even leave our lands as the land is completely given to the Dominion Farms project. Some of the farmers owned private tractors which they used for their farm work, apart from the Upper River Basic assets, that are still in place” (Mallam Danladi K Jallo); Dominion Farms Land-grab, CEED, *supra*, 6-7.

49. A World Bank study shows that agriculture is very crucial to economic growth, accounting for one-third of gross-domestic product (GDP) and three-quarters of employment in Sub-Saharan Africa, The World Bank. Online: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/agriculture/overview#1>.

50. Environmental Justice Atlas, “Michelin Rubber plantations, Nigeria”. Online: <https://ejatlas.org/conflict/michelin-rubber-plantations-nigeria>.

51. They described mitigation as including: renouncing environmentally destructive elements of a proposed development; reducing negative impacts by redesigning or scaling down a project; rectifying, rehabilitating, or reinstating those parts of the environment that are adversely impacted; and creating or acquiring environments similar to those negatively affected by an activity. Ortolano, L., and A. Shepherd, “Environmental Impact Assessment: Challenges and Opportunities” in Fischer, T. B. *Environmental Assessment* (ed) (London: Routledge, 2016), 66.

52. Environmental Justice Atlas, “Michelin Rubber plantations, Nigeria”. Online: <https://ejatlas.org/conflict/michelin-rubber-plantations-nigeria>.

53. *Ibid*.

54. In particular, Friends of the Earth reported that the creation of the rubber plantation “increased hunger, malnutrition, poverty and forced migration, as food became harder to find or produce after the company bulldozed the area,” Friends of the Earth, *For the land that feeds us: struggles and achievements in building food sovereignty and local diversity* (Amsterdam: Friends of the Earth International, 2011) 10.

55. As reported by Coleman, corrective justice is a principle involving “a duty to repair the losses for which one is responsible.”

Coleman, L. J., “The Practice of Corrective Justice” (1995) 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 30.

56. Research by the Guardian shows that of Tanzania’s 94.5m hectares, only half – 44m hectares – is arable land. The Guardian, “Tanzania takes major step towards curbing land ‘grabs.” Online: <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/dec/21/tanzania-major-step-curbing-land-grabs>. [Guardian].

57. *Ibid.*

58. UNDRIP, *supra*, article 11.

59. Media reports and phone interviews with the former refugees revealed that, although they had apparently received citizenship in 2010, ‘their legal status and actual certificates of citizenship were being withheld until they relocated to other areas of Tanzania’ Oakland Institute Agrisol, *supra*, 3.

60. Farmlandgrab.org, “Tanzania: Govt to freeze multi-billion shilling pact with US firm.” Online: <http://farmlandgrab.org/24935>. [Farmlandgrab.org].

61. Farmlandgrab.org, *supra*.

62. For instance, the FAO and IIED note that, biofuels can: increase long-term energy security for countries seeking alternative energy sources; create opportunities for rural development; and develop new export markets for land-rich countries, Cotula, L., N. Dyer and S. Vermeulen, *Fuelling Exclusion? The Biofuels Boom and Poor People’s access to Land*” (London: IIED and FAO, 2008) 10.

63. According to statistics, up to 70% of the household income of some of the affected household came from the land in question, (Oakland Institute 2012:4).

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65. *Ibid.*

66. *Ibid*

67. *Ibid.*

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69. According to the World Health Organization, “Pesticide poisoning is a global public health problem. An estimated three million acute poisonings occur worldwide each year” and occupational exposure to agricultural pesticides is a major source of pesticide poisoning, “World Health Organization, “Pesticide regulations and farm worker safety: the need to improve pesticide regulations in Viet Nam.” Online: <http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/90/6/11-096578/en/>.

70. At the time the Oakland Institute was conducting its research in 2012, 3D East had just 35 employees, Oakland Institute Tanzania, *supra*, 1.

71. Mikaelbergius, [Cattle to replace Jatropha in Kisarawe – MtangaFoods](https://mikaelbergius.wordpress.com/2016/02/23/cattle-to-replace-jatropha-in-kisarawe-mtanga-foods/)
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Troubling the Triadic Relationship of Gender, Development and Underdevelopment in Africa

Munyaradzi Mawere & Marshal Madambura

Introduction

One of the most contested grounds about Africa is the continent's causes of underdevelopment and possible pathway to development. The enduring grand question, thus, is on what exactly is contributing to the underdevelopment predicament of Africa. On attaining independence, many African leaders, due to the ubiquity of rich natural resources and the demise of colonial administration, were optimistic of Africa's development. Noted external constraints to Africa's development include factors such as unequal trade policies, unequal geo-political balance of power, debt crisis, meddling and muddling by developed world on the African affairs, and funding of opposition parties, among others. Internal factors include but not limited to policy inconsistency, corruption, dictatorship, natural disasters, and civil unrest to mention a few. These challenges are aggravated by deep-rooted gender inequality in most African countries. In Africa, it is only from the 1970s that the assumption of women as actors in development began to be interrogated but mainly from a feministic perspective. Approaches related to gender and development included Women in Development (WID), Women and Development (WAD), Gender and Development (GAD), and Gender Mainstreaming, among others. The quest for gender equity evolved to a point where gender considerations are a prerequisite in achieving "desirable" development.

It is arguable that gender inequalities contribute to disparities in development between males and their female counterparts, and also negatively affect the political and socio-economic development in Africa. As recent as 2011, the Human Development Report has revealed that the Gender Inequality Index (GII) for Zimbabwe is at

0.583 as compared to 0 which is the ideal. The GII is even higher in many other African countries such as Mozambique, Swaziland, and Malawi, among others. This indicates women's low status with respect to reproductive health, empowerment, access, control and ownership of economic opportunity and resources as well as participation in decision making. It is in view of the GII quoted above that some critics argue with reference to Zimbabwe and Africa at large that although women constitute 52% of the Zimbabwean population they remain marginalised as far as development is concerned. According to the International Planned Parenthood Federation, women's unpaid labour is estimated to contribute to 50% of GDP in many countries, especially in Africa.

In the light of the above, this chapter troubles the triadic relationship of gender, development and underdevelopment. It argues that gender inequality perpetuates Africa's development challenges. This prompts the need for prioritising the advancement of the status of women to development. It is against this backdrop that this chapter interrogates Africa's development challenges from a gender perspective recognising that gender disparities do not only disadvantage women but also reduce growth potential of the whole world. While speaking to global development concerns, the present chapter explores the causes of Africa's development challenges from a gender perspective, Zimbabwe being the case study.

Gender and [under-]development discourse and conceptualisation

In this section we problematise and interrogate the concepts of gender, development and underdevelopment. This will help to understand the triadic relationship of the concepts in the whole discourse of "positive change".

Gender refers to the attitudes, feelings and behaviours that a given culture associates with a person's biological make-up and sex and between groups of women and men. Gender can be defined as the set of characteristics, roles and behaviour patterns that socially and culturally distinguish women from men (SAT 2004). While people are normally expected to be born male or female, some are

born hermaphrodites, and trans-gender. However, in many societies people are, more often than not, taught norms and behaviours either in line with masculinity or femininity, including how they should interact with others within households, communities, and work places. Gender has to do with the differences that sex makes within a society, guiding how we are to think of ourselves, how we interact with others, the social opportunities, occupations and family roles. On this note, one realises that gender is a social construct which denotes the social changes between females and males throughout the life cycle that are learnt and deeply rooted in every culture. These social constructs are dynamic in so far as they are changeable over time and vary considerably both within and between cultures. In gender studies, people are neither interested in women neither as a group nor with men as a group but in the way they are socialised and the social relations between them. Despite this conceptualisation gender is often misunderstood and misconstrued as being the promotion of women only and at the expense of their male counterparts.

Like the conceptualisation of gender, the meaning of development is a contested one, chiefly due to the nebulous nature of development, multiplicity of the players in development, and the diverse approaches and perspectives they use. This makes development even more elusive, resulting in a wide array of definitions being conjured. Walter Rodney (1974), for example, conceptualised development as a multi-dimensional process. At individual level it implies increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and material well-being. Broadly, Musingafi, Dumbu and Chabaya (2013) argue that the term development is ambiguous and value laden; and the definitions and interpretations depict the influence of ideological, theoretical, discipline, intellectual, institutional, training, political, economic and historical orientations. Accordingly, it is consequently contentious whether listing the features of development is less beneficial than the quest for a more precise definition of the concept. Development can also be defined as how far a person, persons, societies and nations have gone in ensuring the provision of health services, safe water and

environments, political freedom, and equality (Human Development Report, 2010).

Confining development to the realm of economics, Easterlin (1968) conceptualises development narrowly as economic growth. From a sociological perspective, development can be determined by the availability of social indicators like more urbanised community, higher literacy level, mass media participation and higher opportunity for recreation and leisure, reducing inequalities, higher employment levels, and reduction of absolute poverty achievable within the context of a growing economy. This is one major reason why scholars like Swanepoel (2011) argue that development is the opposite of poverty.

Despite the diversity of views on development, Dudley Seers (2003) understands development as the reduction of poverty, unemployment and inequality. He argues that if these three variables decrease in a country then there is development. Seers' conceptualisation, therefore, suggests that development has to encompass the improvement of human livelihoods, economic factors, political environment, and socio-cultural aspects. In other words it comprises the improvement of every facet of human life. This has not been the case in most African countries whereby poverty, unemployment, and inequality have always been on the rise. Instead of poverty declining it has done the opposite and skyrocketed over the years. This is a clear indicator that the process of development in Africa is not only downscaling but facing serious challenges.

The challenges facing development in Africa imply underdevelopment, which is one major predicament that the continent has faced for too long a time now. We should, however, be quick to note that the presence of underdevelopment is not necessarily the absence of development. This is because, as Rodney (1973) rightfully argues, every people have developed in way or another and to a greater or lesser extent. Underdevelopment makes sense only as a means of comparing levels of development. Thus, the idea behind underdevelopment is a comparative one, and is never universal. For this same reason, Rostow cited in Haralambos and Holborn (2013) posits that to be westernised is to develop. This

means that for Rostow, as long as a society like Africa is not westernised, the implication is that it is not developed. But would this conceptualisation of development be the same for an Africanist who is proud of his/her heritage, dignity and persona? Possibly one can compare the economic conditions of two different periods for the same country and determine whether or not it has developed. More importantly, it is possible to compare the economies of any two sets of countries at any given period in time, but to say holistically that this society is more developed than that society would be bluntly absurd. This is because no country can be rich in all spheres of life. A good example is that of Zimbabwe and the United States of America (USA). While the Zimbabwe is culturally richer than the USA, the latter is also richer economically.

A second and even more indispensable component of modern underdevelopment is that it expresses a particular relationship of exploitation of one country by another. According to Rodney (1973), all of the countries tagged as 'underdeveloped' in the world are exploited by others and is a product of capitalism, imperialism, and colonialism. More so, many underdeveloped countries in Africa and elsewhere are becoming more underdeveloped in comparison with the world's great powers, because their exploitation by the metropolises is being intensified in many new ways, which include neo-colonialism and globalisation. From this whole discussion, what remains apparent is that there is a triadic relationship of gender, development and underdevelopment at all levels as the three variables negotiate positions in global politics. In fact, there is neither underdevelopment nor development taking place without implicating issues of gender in one way or another. This is so because there is no development or underdevelopment that occurs in a vacuum. But all underdevelopment and development take place in an environment with people, who are described and, in many cases, act on the basis of gender. We contextualise the discussion on gender in the ensuing section.

Gender in context: Reflecting on gender versus development in Zimbabwe

From the 1970s, feminist critiques and women's organisations made it noticeable that development architects disregarded gender. Women's roles as workers, owners of property, and entrepreneurs, as well as their contribution in subsistence and family production were often ignored. The critics furthered to argue that the outcomes of development policies were affected by already existing gender relations, including local notions of what was women's work. Women were differently affected by development, especially losing access to land and resources and taking additional work in the home and the society in general. As noted by the United Nations Children and Emergency Fund (UNICEF, 1989), the women of the developing world are responsible for most economic roles like production of crops, provision of water, provision of health care and hygiene, and for the education of the young. What has been worrying, however, is that much of the development assistance efforts, most of the education and training, the technology and the investments as well as the loans have been channelled towards men. Yet, for any society to achieve holistic development, women should not be excluded from the policies and projects of development.

Narrowing down the discussion to our case study, Zimbabwe, it is worth noting that as recent as 1998, the Human Development report referred to Zimbabwe as a "highly unequal society," which is an indication of the manifestation of gender inequality. The report reflected on the general low status of women in terms of access, control, ownership of economic resources and positions in decision making processes both at local and national levels. Despite the progresses made to date to address the gender logjam, women's representation in important decision making positions, especially in politics and economics remains quite low. Although the Zimbabwean political parties have adopted a quota system in women representation in politics, this is still below the SADC and AU set target of 30% and the 50/50 gender parity in the SADC Protocol on Gender. By the year 2005, for example, only 24 women were parliamentarians out of the total of 150 members of parliament in

Zimbabwe. However, the number of women representation increased significantly from 13% to 20% during the 2009 inclusive government (the so-called government of national unity [GNU]) and this included the then female vice-president Joice Mujuru, president of senate Edina Madzongwe, and the deputy prime-minister Thokozani Khupe.

In any country, education has become widely recognised as the gateway to economic security and opportunity – particularly for girls and women. In Zimbabwe, the enrolment of female students compared to their male counterparts in education shows some disproportionalities. While Zimbabwe boasts of 91.3% literacy rate, the disintegrated data points to the fact that males have 94.4 % of literacy rate, while their female counterparts have 88.7% (Zimstat: Poverty Income Consumption, 2013). The high illiteracy rate disparity shown here disadvantage women in getting public offices and participation in administrative roles. This explains why in Zimbabwe men continue dominating the public sphere. Comparing these statistics with those of 2002 Census, the number of women illiteracy rate has increased. The gap between the illiteracy rate of men and women has widened by at least by 4.7 %. It can be concluded that the economic meltdown of 2007 and 2008 impacted negatively on the girl child as compared to its impact on the boy child. The explanation might be that parents resorted to educating the boy child over the girl child during the economic turmoil of 2007 and 2008. The same trend was visible during the year 1992 when the historical southern African drought stroke.

Though somewhat relaxed, expulsions of the girl child from schools due to pregnancies are also factors that continue affecting their employability in the formal sector. It remains a reality that female students make the majority in Ordinary level dropouts in Zimbabwe (Mawere 2012; Makota 2013). In some cases in formal education, the girl child is expelled due to pregnancy while in most cases the boy child is usually left to attend school. The legislation has tried addressing this by allowing girls who fall pregnant to take maternity leave and continue with their studies after giving birth. However, most girls are shy to attend school after falling pregnant due to stigmatisation and discrimination they are likely to face at

school from their peers. This is aggravated by some “conservative” school administrators who seem to be paying a deaf ear to the amendment on the Bill on girl child expulsion.

We should note with concern that poor performance of the girl child in secondary schools in some cases is greatly compromised by rend seeking and male teachers who abuse their authority by engaging in illicit love affairs with female students (Mawere & Rambe 2011). The number of female dropouts at Ordinary level, thus, is undeniably higher than that of male students. This observation is collaborated by Zimstat Report (2013), which revealed that women are responsible of doing 61.0% of communal or resettlement farming while men does 39.0%. Sharma (2013) observed that access to education for girls is limited by the gender roles such cleaning the house; preparing the food, looking after their siblings, the elderly and the sick; grazing the cattle and collecting firewood which are neither recognised as attributing to development nor recorded as worth payable.

Gender-based approaches to development

From the preceding discussion, it is clear that gender inequalities contribute to disparities in development between males and females and also negatively affect the economic development in Africa. On realising the same, the quest for gender equity has evolved to a point where gender considerations are a requirement in development. The three approaches Women in Development (WID), Women and Development (WAD), and Gender and Development (GAD), and recently Gender Mainstreaming (GM), have been suggested throughout history of development to help guide development policies, research and practice. The Women in Development (WID) approach, for instance, anticipated to take women into development through providing them with prospects for employment or including them in income generating projects, thus, moving them from the private sphere into the public sphere. The WID approach argues for the need to publicise women’s concerns while bringing them into the policy arena. The concept of Women in Development was popularised during the period 1975-1985 which is commonly known as the United Nations Decade for Women. It came into being upon

recognising that women are being left out of economic development or are not benefiting significantly. As Moyoyeta (2004) notes, the WID approach viewed women as underprivileged, discriminated and passive beneficiaries of development. The approach aimed to design activities and strategies which incorporate women fully into existing structures of development as a way out to the problem. The WID approach focuses on advocacy approaches for more equal involvement of females in employment, education and other domains of the society the difference that is experienced by women and men on development. One of the weaknesses of the WID approach was that it does not challenge gender relations and assumes that these will change, as women become economic partners in development. The approach calls for women's inclusion in development but it does not demand for alterations in the social, cultural and legal structures that give rise to inequalities in society. Since the approach depend greatly on modernization theory, it assumes that western institutions have most of the solutions and it often ignores the possible contribution of indigenous knowledge. By exclusively targeting women, WID creates tension, suspicion and hostility (Mawere 2013 *et al*).

Criticisms of these approaches gave birth to the Gender and Development (GAD) approach whose focus is mainly on the inequality of relations between men and women. GAD, in fact, goes beyond seeing development as mainly economic well-being but also the importance of the social and mental wellbeing of a person. It is noteworthy that the biggest contribution of GAD is the inclusion of men into the approach. This approach comes in as a critique of the approaches which tended to focus exclusively on women in the developed world without articulating the underlying concerns of women. The approach considers the part played by some women in prolonging gender inequality when these women conspire with males to exploit, subordinate, and dominate young women in the third world (cf. Mawere 2013 *et al*).

The WAD concept, which was prompted by the criticisms of WID and the women participation in the independent movement movements, urged that women must join with men in building the newly independent nations. This approach is Marxist in content as it

borrowed from the dependency theory based mainly on critiquing the WID approach and seeks to create women only in projects which suit their interests (Rathberger cited in Mawere *et al* (2013)). The main focus of WAD is on the interaction between women and development processes rather than purely on strategies to integrate women into development. Making reference to the developing world, WAD sees both women and men as not benefiting from the global economic structures because of disadvantages due to class and the way wealth is distributed (Moyoyeta, 2004). Global inequalities have been viewed by WAD as the main problem facing poor countries and their citizens. The approach contends that economic growth and the industrialisation of the West have been based upon the exploitation of nations that have been subjected to colonial rule. WAD, thus, views global disparities as the main problem facing poor countries and their citizens and women are the most affected. The approach argues that economic advancement and the industrialisation of developed countries was due to the exploitation of former colonies. Through WAD, it has been deliberated and acknowledged that women play a significant role in development, not only in reproduction but also in production. The WAD approach has assisted in raising consciousness, publicising women's concerns and bringing them into the policy arena. However, its weaknesses include the fact that the approach sees women as a class and failing to recognise the differences among women themselves, especially along ethnic and racial lines (Mawere *et al*, 2013).

As a result of criticisms against both the WID and WAD especially their lack of progress of these approaches in changing women's lives and influencing the wider development agenda, Gender and Development (GAD) emerged. GAD's main objective was to eliminate social, economic and political inequalities between men and women in development. This approach combines lessons from the limitations of both the WID and WAD. GAD, thus, focuses on the impact of development on both women and men. It seeks to ensure that both women and men participate in and benefit from development and so emphasises equality of benefit and control. It is for this reason that Moyoyeta (2004) argues GAD recognises that women may be involved in development, but not necessarily benefit

from it. What is crucial about GAD is that it recognises women as agents of development, not merely as passive recipients of development assistance. With this focus, GAD brought about a gender perspective, thereby bringing under scrutiny the whole gamut of difference in power, legal rights, roles, constraints, opportunities and needs of women compared to men. The argument being to bring women into the centre stage of development, the existing gender relations need to be re-examined and wherever needed to be restructured (Mainstreaming Gender Equity, 2005). One of the accomplishments of GAD, thus, has been that it does not entirely emphasise the solidarity of women and its leading contribution is the inclusion of men into the approach. GAD also recognises that women devote a lot of time in undertaking domestic chores like cooking, washing, fetching water as well as caring for the sick and farming activities, among other duties. The approach therefore frees, empowers, and upholds partnership and justifiable distribution of resources and benefits. It transforms unequal relationships; challenges and changes gender insensitive traditions, institutions, policies and structures (cf. Mawere *et al*, 2013). However, GAD inherited some of the problems of WID and WAD. It has for example failed to make significant progress in changing women's lives and influencing the broader development agenda.

The critique to GAD and the previous approaches has resulted in yet another approach, gender mainstreaming (GM). The approach criticise the earlier approaches for generalising the subordinate positions of all women focusing on white and middle class women and failing to note that not all men are able to oppress all women. GM approach, thus, argues that the unjust social systems are embedded within cultural patriarchy structures, colonial, neo-colonial, and the globalisation process which impact on men and women differently depending on one's circumstances. With this approach the situation of women is analysed and traced from pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods, but without ignoring the situation of men. The most important contribution of GM is that it focuses on specific situations of both men and women, with the view of addressing development inequalities accordingly in a manner that promotes gender equality and "holistic" development.

Interrogating Africa's underdevelopment predicament

The debate on Africa's underdevelopment has been an on-going exercise for some time now. One of the arguments is that Africa has always been experiencing positive development in most of its societies and this was impeded by the colonisation process. Eyong and Foy (2006), for instance, argue that African dynasties and empires enjoyed sustainable development prior to Western contact and conquest. By using their own internal methods with no outside help Africa was getting there helping the poor and to benefit of all. Africa's development, thus, was arguably sustainable and holistic. Colonisation obstructed the internal process of state formation and indigenous frameworks of development in Africa. Worse still, colonialism exacerbated and in many cases, it planted the seed of authoritarianism, corruption and political instability. Thus, the exploitative relationship between Africa and a global economy changed the way the whole world perceived Africa. Africa began to be perceived as the inferior other. This negative perception of Africa by the global world marked the beginning of the process of underdevelopment on the continent.

While the talk on underdevelopment and development has always been pervasive in literature, the concept of development became prominent in the period following the Second World War when President Harry Truman took office as the post-war US President promising the improving and growth of underdeveloped areas (Esteve, 1993). This therefore formalised a distinction between "developed countries" and the poor countries which were deemed "underdeveloped". The modernisation theory and the Marxist theory of socialist development were the two broad development approaches which vied for supremacy (Phuhlisani 2009). The underlying assumption was that developing countries should adopt the modernisation theory and emulate the industrial growth path of the North. However, the post-war period development ideologies were highly contested and overlaid with the geo-politics of the cold war with the West advocating for capitalism while the East advocated for communism.

Rodney (1973) claims that unlike the West, Africa underwent slavery and colonialism, processes that negatively affected Africa's development. For this reason, Rodney argues that Africa cannot be expected to follow the same trend taken by the West to develop. Neither can Africa be expected to "grow" at the same pace as the West. The exact effects of colonialism are psychological as the domination by foreign powers generated a perpetual sense of dependency and suppression that hinders growth and innovative strategies to developmental (Frank 1969). Colonial institutions mercilessly exploited natural resources in the African continent at a low cost. No wonder Rodney (1973) advanced that colonial policies were directly responsible for Africa's underdevelopment besides damaging the African pride, self-worth and confidence. Thus, Africa's devastating historical experiences threw it into vicious circles of outright poverty. For example, the trading of slaves from Africa to Europe and the Americas to work in manufacturing industries and plantations deprived the continent of the able-bodied people who were supposed to fuel the political and socio-economic development in Africa. This means that while there are arguably a number of causes of underdevelopment in Africa, demographic loss associated with the slave trade as well as other related societal shifts, is one major one.

Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, and Hensinger who are some of the proponents of the dependency theory, argue that the relationship between the North and the South is the primary cause of Africa's underdevelopment. For them, the relationship between the South and the North is that of the core and the periphery and in order to develop the core largely depends on the periphery for their survival. The theory contends that dependence or underdevelopment is based on the central idea that it was the capital development of the now developed countries that had engendered underdeveloped structures in the Third World (Allen, 2000). During the colonisation era the core countries syphoned African resources free of charge to develop their own empires. The syphoned resources were flown to Europe to feed in the colonists' home factories in Europe where they were manufactured and sold back in Africa at higher prices. This principally affected the development of the continent as resources

meant to improve the continent were taken off to develop outside countries. Furthermore, human capital of strength and valour was taken away from Africa during the slave trade thereby depriving the latter of able-bodied and strong men. As a solution to the underdevelopment logjam in Africa, the dependence theory proposes that it is only through cutting ties with the north that Africa can be able to stand and develop on its own. However, the questions that arise are: How viable and practical is delinking? Also, will Africa be able to survive on its own given the protracted history of overdependence, plundering and pillaging on the continent?

Other scholars have tried to explain Africa's underdevelopment predicament in terms of the modernisation theory. Proponents of the theory who include Rostow argue that development comes in a linear fashion championed by the North, starting right from the traditional society through the preconditions for take-off/change, take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass consumption stages. These scholars argue that Africa is lagging behind development mainly because it did not modernise its societies in much the same way as the West. They further maintain that the advanced countries of the North passed the stage of take-off into self-sustaining growth, and the underdeveloped countries that are still in either the traditional society or the preconditions for take-off stage have only to follow a certain set of rules of development to take off in their turn into self-sustaining economic growth (cf. Todaro, 2003). On this note, the metropolis implicitly or explicitly implied that sub-Saharan Africa's development was lagging far behind other regions because of the obvious 'innate' inferiority of the "black" people to master the socio-economic and technological environment in order to improve their social and economic conditions (Matunhu, 2011). Modernisation and/or integration theorists of the brand of Rostow also believe that it is only through the intervention of the developed states that Africa can wean itself and develop. They call for the assistance of Africa through foreign aid and the help of institutions in developing the continent. In simpler terms, these theorists believe in external aid in helping the developing countries yet they fail to recognise that aid always comes with conditions, most of which are to benefit the mother countries of the donor organisations. In fact, instead of

breaking the “endless cycle of poverty,” foreign aid has been accused of causing untold suffering to the African people becoming the opiate of Africa (see for example, Barka 2012). This is mainly because donors have encouraged African governments to rely on hand-outs instead of themselves for development. For example, in Malawi 90% of its state annual budget is Western donor funded and this has greatly undermined its state sovereignty (Ibid).

Besides, the modernisation theory has been criticised for being too Eurocentric and for neglecting the fact that not all countries did not begin on the same line. In fact, it is on record that when other countries were being colonised, Europe was busy industrialising and exploiting the colonised states. Furthermore, the theory does not address that countries are different and their means of development does not necessarily have to follow a straight line in order to develop. It is for the same realisation that Matunhu (2011) points out that most economies in Africa invest in agriculture, manufacturing, and tourism thereby rendering null and void the modernisation theorists claim. Thus, it is worth noting that the modernisation theory lacks in explaining why Africa is facing more developmental challenges than other countries of the world. Instead it tries to come up with ideas that are detrimental to Africa and that further contribute to the underdevelopment of the continent. Matunhu (Ibid) is therefore right to note that theory of modernisation impoverished Africa as the theory failed to recognise the creativity and initiative of the Africans as it places value on externally sourced aid ignoring the fact that aid comes with ties and that these ties are being used to further underdevelop Africa. In fact, the modernisation theory does not address the real inequitable, unfair relationship between the developed nations and the developing nations: it actually adds to the controversy surrounding the underdevelopment of Africa.

It can also be argued that Africa’s underdevelopment logjam is exacerbated by the North’s unfair trading policies. It has become a reality that over-regulation in several African nations has prevented their own exports from becoming competitive in the international markets. African agricultural produces and mineral prices are determined by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) where Africans have no equal representative in the WTO decision-making board. In

Zimbabwe, the prices of diamonds are determined by Kimberley Diamonds which formulate and implement policies which are designed to ensure that the North remain the economic power house in the global arena. The Kimberly Diamonds determined whether Zimbabwe's diamond was good diamond or blood diamond. For example Zimbabwean diamond in 2008-2012 was labelled blood diamond and not fit for international market sale. Resultantly, African nations are often offered low prices. It seems the "Look East" policy recently adopted by many African countries such as Zimbabwe has not helped the continent much. China and India are increasingly important trade partners for Africa with 12.5% of Africa's exports going to China, and 4% are to India. However, China and India are on record for offering low prices for African natural resources, and sometimes for looting the resources (Mawere 2011). Africans are subjected to import and export restrictions exposing them to higher market volatility and fewer opportunities. Thus it is partly the case that Africa has remained poor despite the continued flow of aid due to unfair Western trading policies initiated by the WTO. More to that, export promotion through WTO has increased extractive activities, such as logging and mining, leading to deforestation and mining pollution (Wolassa 2009). The degradation of land has negatively affected the livelihoods activities of ordinary rural people. For example, in Zimbabwe, Mberengwa and Penhalonga were left ghost towns after extractive mining MNCs and TNCs left the areas due to the extinction of the mining resources. This clearly postulates that the empirical nature of aid has under developed Africa despite continued flowing to the continent.

Other scholars like Landes (1998) have also attributed the underdevelopment of Africa to natural disasters such as famine, floods, Ebola and HIV virus, worsening the war-torn economies. This is also partly true. In 2012, for example, approximately 1.07 billion people were living in 54 different countries in resource-rich continent of Africa but many people are poor they live below poverty datum line. Africa constitutes 33% of developing countries and 1/3 of unutilised land is in Africa in the world. However despite this foreign aid in March 2013, Africa was identified as the world's poorest inhabited continent. Climatic changes resulted in floods,

inconsistent rainfall patterns and drought which have brought more harm than good to marginalised groups like women and children have less access and control over essential resources (Rod 2004). While it can be argued that the developed countries of the North have caused and perpetuated Africa's underdevelopment by supporting despotic/authoritarian governments through aid and other means, corruption has been noted as another cause of Africa's underdevelopment. Corruption has impeded development in most African countries as it has a negative impact on social, economic and political realms. In many African countries, Zimbabwe included, positions of responsibility are usually determined by sex, race, and ethnicity rather than merit and executive capacity thereby undermining prospective national development. Consequently, the crippling effects of corruption is that the funds meant for the development of the respective countries and the continent at large have been diverted to the elites and used for luxuriant purposes at the expense of the African population. Some oil-rich countries such as Algeria, Nigeria, Libya, Gabon and mineral-rich Egypt and Zimbabwe emerged among the top economies since the 21st century. However, they have all sunk into the list of the world's poorest nations due to pervasive political corruption and extortion in various governance structures (see also, World Bank 2005). African leaders are very corrupt. They divert funds meant for sustainable development for self-aggrandizement. Mobutu Seseko of DRC Seseko, Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Fredrick Chiluba of Zambia are well recorded examples, among others. This has resulted in high unemployment rate, starvation, people wearing second hand clothes, warfare and brain drain of talented workforce for greener pastures. Only few countries such as Botswana remain the site of Africa's longest and one of the world's longest periods of economic boom.

We add that most African nations continue suffering from military dictators who are very corrupt and who have caused civil unrest, wars and abject poverty. In fact endemic warfare and political unrest remain amongst the top causes of the continued underdevelopment in Africa. Since the mid-20th century the cold war, increased civil wars and despotism have also contributed to

Africa's poor economy (Conwell 1998). Anani (1998) in his report of the UN Secretary General points out that since 1970s, more than 30 wars have been fought in Africa, the vast majority of them intra-State in origin. In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 countries of Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts, accounting for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and resulting in more than 8 million refugees, returnees and displaced persons. Africa has become a fertile breeding ground for civil wars for example in Libya, Somalia, Southern Sudan and Nigeria Boko Haram has undermined peace and sustainable development. Instead of using funds to help improve the continent funds have been diverted to cater for weapons and welfare of soldiers instead of uplifting livelihoods of people through investing in both human development and economic growth. Wars and political unrest chase away foreign direct investment resulting in unemployment and vicious cycle of poverty. The conflicts in the Central African Republic, eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo are mostly troubles with minerals sponsoring wars (Danni 2013). There are too many dictators in Africa (six have been in office for more than 25 years) and many elected leaders behave no differently (Habiba 1985). Recorded examples of African ruthless and military dictators include, Yoveri Museveni, Gbagbo and Gadhafi. Most of Africa's growth is based on oil, agriculture and mineral exports but this has not made a whit of difference to the lives of most Africans (World Bank 2005). For example, Uganda has recently discovered oil and gas deposits but has gone on a spending spree, reportedly ordering fighter planes worth \$300 million from Russia (New York Times 2005). Sadly, a quarter of school-age children are still not enrolled, and according to the World Bank statistics; many of those that are attending schools, are receiving a very mediocre education. To add on this, many Africans depend on agricultural productivity as the key to reducing poverty but it is essentially stagnant as it is underfinanced. Thus, militarisation and despotism have contributed significantly to the underdevelopment of Africa despite the flow of foreign aid and the ubiquity of mineral resources and human capital of quality and strength.

From the preceding discussion, it is clear that both internal and external factors are responsible for the underdevelopment

predicament of Africa. Some of the noted constraints to Africa's development include factors such as unequal trade policies, unequal balance of power, Debt crisis, Meddling and muddling by developed world on the African affairs and funding of opposition parties. Internal factors also include policy inconsistency, corruption, dictatorship, natural disasters, and civil unrest. Equally important has been an internal factor, particularly the gender inequality which has been perpetuated by religion, culture and adopted Western laws. We discuss this further in the ensuing section.

Historiography of gender-based development: Why gender is a development issue

The persistence of gender inequality at global level has prompted development practitioners to reconsider the importance and impact of gender issues in economic growth and development. These inequalities consequently result in the underestimation and underutilisation of the creativity and potential contributions of women to development. Yet for holistic and progressive development, it is vital to ensure full utilisation of the potential of both males and females to ensure equal contribution of Africa's development.

World development efforts and early theories of development – modernisation and dependency – have largely ignored the contribution of women to development. Despite many scholars and theorists of development's contributions in trying to unveil the causes of Africa's underdevelopment and the possible solutions thereon, the grand question on women's contribution to development has largely been overlooked. In fact one important point to note is that both classical and so-called modern theories of development have always been largely paternalistic. They have assumed that men are the most productive workers ignoring women's productive role and position in the formal and informal sectors of the economy. The assumption was that the benefits from economic development would cascade to women and children thereby decreasing poverty levels among people (Razavi & Miller 1995). Contrary to this misplaced understanding, Engel (1942) has

long argued that women are originally equal to, if not more powerful than men in communal forms of production. Why then the role and contribution of women has been underestimated in both classical and modern theories of development? The failure of early theories to provide sufficient answers to Africa's development quagmire and to provide space for women in development discourse, led to alternative ideas like the Afrocentric idea, feminism, and post development theory. It is also against the same backdrop that the present chapter interrogates Africa's development challenges from a gender perspective arguing that gender disparities do not only disadvantage women but also compromise growth potential of the whole world.

We argue emphatically that any strategy and process of development should encompass all members of society according to their individual capacity and needs regardless of gender. Any rights-based approach to development that neglects gender equity and equality is inadequate. This goes hand in glove with the vision for the Zimbabwe National Gender Policy which calls for: "A gender just society in which men and women enjoys equity and benefit as equal partners in the development of the country" (The National Gender Policy 2013-2017). Prior to this policy, most of the models of development deployed in Zimbabwe tended to be male biased with males benefiting more and women being excluded from participating fully in the development processes. This has been fundamentally attributed to the gender viewpoint that identifies men as main source of income and that works contrary to women. Most development paradigms have continued to disregard the realities of gender-based division of labour to the extent of ignoring the unpaid labour, the work that is mostly done by women. These development paradigms have been working on the assumption of uniform households as the decision making unit of the economy, assuming that the "rational" economic man is the one who is exclusively responsible for making decisions.

Gender became an issue of concern throughout the world after the 1995 Beijing Conference where the concerns of women in development discourse were seriously presented. Zimbabwe only responded to the call for gender equality by crafting the National Gender Policy which was instituted in 2003, nearly a decade after the

Beijing Conference. Since the Beijing Conference, considerable efforts by women to fight for their emancipation either as individuals or in feminist action groups like Women's Action Group (WAG), Affirmative Action Group (AAG) and Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA), and Msasa Project have been made in Zimbabwe. Globally, the UNDP has complemented these efforts by producing a Gender-related Development Index (GDI) as a measure of Human Development Index (HDI) which can distinguish differences in human development between men and women across the world. The index was produced on UNDP's realisation that women by nature play a fundamental role in the development process of any society by ensuring reproduction, their unwavering maintenance of the much needed labour force, and their execution of a variety of unpaid work that is not charged in terms of cost and which make use of limited resources. Specifically, the women fundamental roles and work that go unpaid include child care, domestic work like cooking, the generation of resources like fetching firewood and water as well as subsistence agricultural production. On noting such important roles, one wonders why women, more often than not, continue to be sidelined in some in the development discourse when they turn on the wheel of development.

According to the United Nations (2012), women account for two thirds of the 774 million illiterate adults, and their share has remained unchanged over the past two decades, with more than half of the 72 million children out of school are girls. Although women have made important gains in terms of accessing vital resources in Zimbabwe and the world-over, they are still socially disadvantaged as men continue to hold positions of relative privilege in many facets of life be it in the family, schools, religion, industry, mass media, politics, and the economy. This inequality is often thought by post-positivists to reflect on innate [biological] differences between the male and female sexes, but for them, it is actually a creation of society itself. In Zimbabwe and other developing countries that are patriarchal, gender inequality is evident as men enjoy most positions and property, especially land, houses, machinery, and capital which in most cases are registered in their names. This then entails that development should not be merely seen as incorporating women into

development programmes, but also as promoting fundamental structural changes in society so as to improve and enhance the role and the status of women overall (Tvedten, 2008). Women, thus, should be involved in development process at all stages right from planning through implementation and evaluation.

The feminisation of poverty in Zimbabwe manifests itself through a higher prevalence rate of poverty among female-headed households, with 68% of all female-headed households living under the Total Consumption Poverty Line (TCPL) as of 2003 (TCPL 2003). The economic crisis since the last decade disproportionately affected women informalisation of employment sectors such as food processing and the textile industry takes its toll amidst economic hardships bedevilling the nation. These sectors, which were dominated by women, all but collapsed during this period with competition also coming from their male counterparts who were failing to make it in the formal sector of the economy. Thus, in relation to poverty alleviation in Zimbabwe, gender has remained silent if not totally absent.

The gender and food security aspect has also not been adequately implemented in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe, once the “bread basket” for southern African region, is now a net importer of food. The proportion of people living below the Food Poverty Line (FPL) increased from 29% in 1995 to 58% in 2003 (Zim MDGs Report 2010: 6). Furthermore, the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee Report (ZIMVAC) (2010) report estimated that 1.3 million people, the majority of whom are women and children, were food insecure at the peak of food insecurity. This is the result of the drought situation that prevailed in the southern African region during the previous agricultural period. Women will continue to face the brunt of food shortages and drought as a consequence of climate change hence, their active involvement in development processes is critical.

Despite progress made in politics and decision making, the attainment of gender equality in these fields is seriously off the track. The Government of Zimbabwe MDG Report (2010) reveals that “the target of increasing the participation of women in decision-making in all sectors, and at all levels to 50:50 by 2015 has already

gone off-track”. Although approximately 52% of the population in Zimbabwe is female, women are disproportionately represented in politics and in other decision-making positions. While there is gender parity (equality) in primary school level, and near gender parity at lower secondary level, particularly in the lower forms (Forms 1 to 4), the gender parity decreases in upper levels, where there is low representation and completion rates amongst girls in Advanced Level and Tertiary level. More so, while both girls and boys have dropped out of school as a result of a decade of economic crisis, the percentage share is higher for girls where factors related to culture, religion and pregnancy impact (Mawere 2012). There is also a low enrolment of women in universities, particularly in the fields of mathematics and science (GoZ Status Report 2010: 17).

In the political domain, only a few countries in the sub-Saharan Africa (Angola, Burundi and Mozambique) had gotten the 30 % representation in the government by the year 2012. Despite ratifying various International and Regional legislations and conventions which foster equality between women and men in all aspects of life is they economic, social and political, women’s contribution to development in Zimbabwe remained largely undermined at least from an economic sense. In the present day for instance out of all the countries in the Southern part of the African continent only one country – Liberia – has a woman – Ellen Johnson Sirleaf – as the head of state. The representation of women in governments is mainly out of men’s generosity than based on the desire and quest to improve the standards of women and address development disproportions between men and women. The underrepresentation of women in politics also means less input in policies which are meant to improve the position of women in the society and the country at large resulting in underdevelopment. Although there are some strides in gender equality in most sectors of their livelihoods, women in the post-colonial sub-Sahara Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular, still have limited rights to property ownership. Consequently, women enjoy limited benefits of development as compared to their male counterparts. Conversely, patriarchy-biased approaches that are reflected in many sectors of the society have inhibited women’s autonomy as a result of lack decision making

power and access to the most important resources such as land thereby leading to food insecurity especially in the rural areas where most of the female population reside. According to Gaidzanwa (1994), in the post-colonial Zimbabwe only 2 to 15 % of women got permits to land in the A1 Model in the post-colonial resettlement areas, with most women only getting access to land through their husbands or male relatives. Even the recent Fast-Track Land Reform of 2000 in Zimbabwe hardly addressed the disproportionate land ownership. According to Second Gender Policy, only 18 % of the land beneficiaries under A1 were women and 12 % were given A2 farms. Custodians of land in rural areas are also mainly chiefs except in special cases and in matriarchal societies such as those of the Tonga of north-west Zimbabwe where both male and female traditional leaders are pervasive. In Zimbabwe there are only 6 female chiefs compared to more than 200 male chiefs. According Zimstat (2013: 42), “17% of women population access credit facilities compared to 68% of male population”. This clearly shows that women are still marginalised as far as ownership of land is concerned. Depriving women to access to land means crippling their economic muscle such that they [women] continue existing powerless in terms of decision making in the economic sphere.

The customary law which is being applied in Zimbabwean courts contributed to the downgrading of woman in terms of economic wellbeing. This indicates that African traditional cultural practices and patriarchy are taking precedence over the protection of women in the country, which sometimes relegate or deny women the opportunity to compete in economic terms with their men counterparts. In formal employment, sub-Saharan African women are in most cases occupying the shop floor levels in most formal organisations. According to the Women Watch (1999), among the 966 women interviewed in Africa, 60 % of the women who were working in top management have at one time been a victim of sexual harassment which was directed to them by their superiors and/or subordinates. This is accounting for the subjugation and oppression of the female subjects in most African societies.

According to the UNDP Report (2003), gender equality has a direct impact on economic growth and poverty reduction. This

necessitates the need to understand and address population dynamics, gender-determined constraints and opportunities for both women and men. It is for this reason that the Woman Watch (1999) notes people who reach the legal age of majority are capable of owning property, entering into contracts regardless of sex or gender. In most sub-Saharan countries women constitute over 51 per cent of the population and their exclusion from the development process entails not only thwarting of their potential contribution but also the under-utilisation or wasting of essential creative human resource. In Zimbabwe, for example, 52% of the total population are women. It is therefore highly imperative to fully integrate them in all development strategies for the good of the country. Overlooking gender would be detrimental since over 50% of the entire population will remain marginalised in terms of socio-economic and political advancement (Zimstat 2013). Such marginalisation is not only unique to Zimbabwe but prevalent in many other African countries. In Zambia, capable women have been left out of employment purely on account of gender ideology in preferences to incapable and unqualified men resulting in poor performance and corruption (Sikazwe 2006), yet the non- recognition of the unpaid work done by women ensures that the Gross Domestic Product does not reflect reality.

Gender demands for the full participation of both men and women in development activities. Women are subordinated with their power and labour exploited to enhance the position of the men in their economic base. Excluding women from fully participating in economic activities and access to resources in countries like Zimbabwe where women constitute 52 % of the population means that more than 50% of the potential contribution in the economic system is lost resulting in retarded development. If almost half of the country's population is institutionally marginalised from participating in political and economic decision making, then even the democratic system remains weak and this also affects other vitals of development. Exclusion on such a massive scale will also affect the development of political structures and systems (Gudhlanga *et al*: 2012).

In Zimbabwe where most of the male labour force is unemployed, women are actively engaged in productive work in both formal and informal sectors and are basically the de facto heads of the households as household incomes largely depend on their earnings particularly in urban areas. There is an increase in the feminisation of the labour force in factories and other work places partly because women are poorly paid and are generally considered as “non-trouble makers,” which works to the advantage of the employers. This has tended to make women work under severe conditions in order to maximise profit (Saje and Abu-Bakr 1997). In rural areas, women’s productive work has mainly taken the form of agricultural work. Women work in their husband crop farms but do not benefit much, at least economically, from subsequent earnings. In most cases, particularly in the southern part of Zambia for example, the man may decide to use the proceeds to marry another wife so that he can have enough labour-force to work on his farms during the next seasons. This is sometimes done without the consent of the man’s wife. Research in Zambia has shown that the total amount of labour time for both unpaid and paid work is more for women than men (Binta 1997). This observation is almost likely to be the same with Zimbabwe where women especially those in the rural areas spend more time working in the field and at home.

If the table of development can be turned upside down and women become the leaders and or the decision makers in politics and the economic arena, development might take another path to take Africa out of vicious cycle of poverty. This could be true even in view of the African cosmology where, for example, the Shona people of Zimbabwe believe that “*kudzidzisa mukadzi kudzidzisa rudzi* – *Lit.* to educate a woman is to educate a nation.” Inaccessibility of some of the financial institutions such as banks in the rural areas, further complicates the possibility of rural informal traders to invest economically, worse still to access loans from the banks. Prohibitive interest rates also make it difficult for women in informal trade to make a profit after loan repayment (FAO 2011). Therefore, in order to foster development in trade we need equal access to economic facilities as well as active participation of both women and men in trading activities. It is only from this understanding that Sen (1992)

argues that the equal rights and equal opportunities of both men and women equals to the progress for all – what in this chapter we call development. It is for the same reason that scholars like Sikazwe (2006) argue that the exclusion of women from full participation and leadership of women in development has led to high levels of food insecurity at both household and national levels as well as increased poverty levels. In Zimbabwe women are a major player in the informal sector, though there is lack of empirical data to expound on this. There is need for sex aggregated data to inform policy reforms (MDG Report Zimbabwe, 2010: 10). Although women play a central role in informal trading, in comparison to men they have less access to material and financial resources (such as land, means of production, or money in form of credit and loans) and decision making powers i.e. use of labour force.

In view of the above, we argue that active participation of women in the development process rather than perceiving them as simply recipients of development plans is significant as well as a fundamental basic right to the realisation of true and equitable development (WAD, second half of the 1970s). Therefore, this in line with Sen Amartya's assertion that the participation of women in the development work is of paramount importance, should be greatly considered. Ferguson (1991) argues that an ideal society would request both men and women to do the hitherto private unpaid work or at least ensure that the caring provided at home be compensated for by the family allowance. What remains a reality, however, is that women who are most often in the proletariat are absolutely dependent on the capitalist for wages or support from the men for their survival. Most women do not acquire property because they lack collateral security and access to bank loans. Besides, their wages are given immediately to their own subsistence and are too small to enable significant investments. Capitalism basically followed in most bourgeois societies depends largely on a preserve army of labour as an important at the bottom of the system. In such societies as in those that are patriarchal, women still must give priority to home and child-care duties and are therefore willing to accept part-time jobs and lower wages, leaving them behind as their male counterparts progress economically. Big items like cars and houses usually are registered in

the father/ husband's name and the children too, have the father's name. The reproductive role is not remunerated (at least in Western capitalistic sense) and these children are also the future labourers of the men on their land and in their firms. Yet even with all the shortcomings in gender related issues discussed above, it remains important to underline the milestones taken so far in Zimbabwe and elsewhere on the continent in an effort to incorporate and actively involve women in all development processes at all levels of society.

Milestones on Gender and development

While a lot might still be desired to be done, Zimbabwe has made some great strides in terms of upholding gender equality and women's empowerment. Since independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has become a signatory to different regional and international conventions, treaties, declarations and protocols which aim to uphold and create an enabling environment for the attainment of gender equality and women's empowerment in particular. These include, among others, the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Violence Against Women (CEDAW) (1991), the Convention on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR); the Global Platform for Action, the Beijing Declaration (1995). In 1997 Zimbabwe signed the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development as well as its addendum on the Prevention and Eradication of Violence against Women and Children. The Legal Age of Majority Act, the Matrimonial Causes Act, the Sexual Discrimination Removal Act, The Sexual Offences Act and the Domestic Violence Act are some of the legislation put in place to promote gender equality and protect women's rights. In 1995, the government created the Ministry of Women Affairs, Gender and Community Development (MWAGCD) to oversee coordination of all gender programmes and to facilitate gender mainstreaming in all sector ministries. This is testimony to the government's commitment to ensure gender is mainstreamed at all levels. We however underline that every effort should be made to consider gender and broaden women's participation at all levels of decision-making. Several African countries have seen the elevation of women to key positions

in Government and in decision making positions. The elevation of Joyce Banda as the interim President of Malawi and the first female president in Southern Africa bears testimony on how Africa seriously consider gender and the need to having women in key decision making positions. The elevation of Joyce Mujuru to first female Vice President between 2004 and 2014 in Zimbabwe and the election of Edina Madzongwe as Speaker of the House Senate is also evidence that Zimbabwe is showing full commitment in incorporating women in development by elevating them to key positions in government. Below, we highlight other areas where Zimbabwe has made significant strides towards empowering and incorporating women and the girl child in development:

- The WHO estimates that some 500,000 women –the majority in poor countries –die each year due to pregnancy-related causes. Child mortality rates are also linked to gender-related norms and customs. National policies such as the National Gender Policy argue that women cannot achieve empowerment and equality unless their reproductive rights are fully and legally. In view of HWO assertion, Zimbabwe has made major strides in improving maternal and child health. It [Zimbabwe] realizes that gender equality is key to improving maternal and child health and stemming the spread of HIV/AIDS and other diseases.

- The Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) MDGs Status Report (2010: 16) notes that the National enrolment Rate increased from 81.9% in 1994 and peaked at 98.5% in 2002. Currently, there is near equality in enrolment in lower secondary school by gender.

- According to the GoZ MDG Status Report (2010), literacy rates of 15-24 year olds for both males and females was 99% by 2003. Zimbabwe boasted high literacy rates, around 82% for women to 90% for men. This evidence clearly shows that gender sensitivity has played a major role in education towards the attainment of the respective MDG.

- Again, in Zimbabwe, female university enrolment increased from 23% in 2006 to 37% in 2007. Equal access to education for boys and girls and their retention at all levels of education, access to training opportunities for men and women to make possible their equal participation in the workplace, marketplace and in governance

structures has also been another stride. As a result of the literacy and education drive that the post-independence government undertook. The World Bank (2003) commends that an extra year of secondary schooling for girls can increase their future wages by 10 to 20%. And evidence shows that resources in the hands of women boost household spending in areas that benefit children.

- The GoZ MDGs Status Report (2010: 16) has also noted that percentage share of women increased from 14% in 1990–1995 to 16% in 2005, and again to 18.55% in the 2008 elections (14% in the Lower House of Assembly and 33% in the Upper House). Furthermore, the Percentage share of women in the civil service also rose significantly. In 2010 women comprised 20% of cabinet ministers and 26% of permanent secretaries. In government, 26% of principal directors are women, as are 33% of directors and 28% of deputy directors. Women constituted 30% of ambassadors and heads of mission, 29% of Supreme and High Court judges, 41% of magistrates.

- Zimbabwe has had a female Vice President from 6 December 2004 to 8 December 2014 and a female Deputy Prime Minister, President of the Senate, Deputy Speaker of the House of Assembly, and Judge President of the High Court between 2006 and 2010, which are all indicators of the country's full commitment to incorporate and promote women in national development.

Conclusion

This chapter has troubled the triadic relationship of gender, development and underdevelopment in Africa, but with more focus on Zimbabwe. We concluded that there are a plethora of the causes of Africa's underdevelopment jam, which include but not limited to policy inconsistency, poor governance structures, neo-colonialism, natural disasters, and others. This means that while African leaders have used adept at externalising blame of countries of the Global North for the underdevelopment of Africa implying that solutions are out of their hands, they are also to blame. As Asian countries have done, African countries have for example, failed to liberalise and turn-around their economies. As Cowen (1985) suggests, Africa must

embrace trade liberalisation and globalisation with the rest of the world. We however warn that this should be done wittingly and cautiously to avoid effects of neo-colonialism and continued exploitation of resources currently gripping Africa.

We underline in this chapter as well that from the study of Zimbabwean culture and economy, Africa's underdevelopment seems to be a paradox. Africa is endowed with abundant natural resources yet the continent continues reeling in poverty and under the wheels of underdevelopment. The response to the question on the reasons of Africa's underdevelopment can be two-pronged. Some experts explain Africa's underdevelopment through seeking out the relationship of exploitation between Africa and certain developed countries. Others prefer to interpret the causes of underdevelopment and learn the answers by looking inside the underdeveloped economy. In this chapter, we have argued for the need to examine both the external and internal factors if we are to clearly understand both the primary and secondary causes of Africa's underdevelopment predicament.

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Human Development-Based Hotel Managers’ Perceptions on Incentive Travel in Zimbabwe: Insights from Masvingo Province

Tendai Chibaya

Introduction

The tourism and hospitality industry plays a vital role in the employment of people across the globe. It is one of the sectors that contribute immensely to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of many economies and Zimbabwe is no exception. In this regard, tourism and hospitality sector is Zimbabwe’s third most significant industry. According to World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) (2015), the travel and tourism sector contributed to an approximate of 277 million jobs in 2014 across the globe. In 2015, the tourism sector in Zimbabwe employs an approximate of 180 000 people directly (World Travel and Tourism Council Data, 2016). This shows that the industry has the potential to create much needed employment to support the entire globe.

Among the ten tourist regions of Zimbabwe, this study focuses on Masvingo Province as one of the country’s resort areas. Masvingo Province houses some of the country’s premium resorts, including the Great Zimbabwe Monuments, Gonarezhou National Park, Mutirikwi Dam and Kyle recreational park, hence its use as a case study. The Great Zimbabwe monument is one of the draw cards for tourists in the country. To underscore this feat, the monument recorded 55 170 and 58 180 tourist arrivals in 2013 and 2014 respectively (Mandima, 2015). As a way of supporting both domestic and international tourism in the Province, the accommodation sector in Masvingo offers overnight accommodation as well as food and beverages. The hotel room occupancy in Masvingo in 2011 was at 49 per cent, 54 per cent in 2012, 45 per cent in 2013 and 37 per cent in 2014 (Zimbabwe Tourism Trends and Statistics Report, 2011; 2012;

2013 & 2014), thus sustaining other sectors of the economy as well as the employment of locals.

The human resources as internal customers of the hotels represent an important asset and constitute the lifeblood of the hospitality sector. The failure or success of today's hotels depends on the quality of performance by the employees. Largely, it has been established that many jobs in the hotel industry are labour intensive in nature (United Nations World Tourism Organisation, n.d) and that most hotels have a reputation of poor working conditions and for paying relatively low wages (Lucas & Keegan, 2007). Lo and Lamm (2005) add other factors that contribute to the bad reputation and to a high hotel staff turnover as working for long shifts, coming across difficult guests, experiencing work overload, persistent staff shortages and face time constraint because of the twenty-four hour service nature of the industry. These poor working conditions and poor remuneration generally encourage hospitality employees to look for alternative employment as this makes their work to be dissatisfying (Poulston, 2009). As such, there is greater need for the human resources to be constantly recognised and rewarded time and again. This was supported by Smith (2008) who argues that, hotel and tourism related organisations need to be competitive in the market in order for them to achieve maximum returns on their investments in their human resources. In turn, this will boost the corporate performance as well as gaining competitive advantage, among others, if the employers' management tools are encouraging.

In addition, many employees expect their employers to reward them accordingly after performing well or after surpassing pre-set business goals or after performing beyond the call of their duties. Also in some cases, the employees work under pressure for very long periods of time, especially during peak holiday periods which calls for employers to honour them for their dedication. The above speaks to Weaver's (2014) assertion that motivating employees is one of the vital elements in managing people or human resources in the organisation. Furthermore, as Maslow (1970) has highlighted in his theory of motivation, individuals are motivated by attaining a hierarchy of needs.

Within the wide range of the motivational strategies, incentive travel and paid vacation have been perceived as some of the most powerful methods of retaining profitable employees, attracting business, enhancing product awareness, increasing profits as well as improving employee productivity, among others (Deckard *et al.*, 2004; Davidson, 2003). Incentive travel, for example, is seen as luxurious and high spending and is therefore a lucrative form of tourism (Holloway & Humphreys, 2012: 307). Critically for the benefitting worker, incentive travel is not only attached to the physiological or biological needs of the employee (Oter, 2002), but also to status, achievement, education, adventure, recognition and novelty (Ricci & Holland, 1992). Taking a cue from Maslow (1970)'s hierarchy of needs, it can be discerned that incentive travel may either satisfy belonging and love needs, esteem needs or self-actualisation needs. In terms of love and belonging, incentive travel may reinforce togetherness and being part of the organisation, while under esteem needs, it may be a measure of achievement, status and reputation. On self –actualisation, incentive travel plays a major role in personal growth and fulfilment needs.

Many economies are using incentive travel as a motivational tool. To exemplify this, in the United States, 46 per cent of the businesses use incentive travel to motivate their employees and they spend approximately \$22.5 billion annually (Incentive Federation, n.d cited by Van Dyke, 2015 & Cummins, 2015). In 2015, a Chinese Chief Executive Officer, Li Jinyuan of Tiens Group, which specialises in biotechnology, finance, logistics, retail, international trade, e-business, tourism and education in India, allocated some 6 400 employees to go on incentive trips to Paris, Monaco and Cannes in France (TNN, *Times of India*, 2015). Because of the perceived merits surrounding incentive travel as a motivational strategy and as an internal marketing tool designed to elicit strong performances from the workers, the accommodation sector in Zimbabwe is catching up on the buzz and some hotels such as Cresta Hotels have deployed incentive travel as one of their workers' motivational strategies (Crestahotels, 2014).

Broadly, incentive travel is a motivational need in tourism and hospitality industry besides it being an inside marketing tool that

encourages hotel employees improve performance in executing their duties. However, polarising debate still rages on, particularly on the efficacy of utilising incentive travel as a motivational tool for employees, especially in the third World economies such as those of Africa. As such, this study wades into this debate using the case of Masvingo Province, Zimbabwe, through a hermeneutical and epistemic analysis of the hotel managers' views on incentive travel.

The other premise of this study is based on the general worldwide observation that the hospitality sector is an under researched area (Fenich *et al.*, 2015). This research is also unique in that it takes a different epistemic lens from the focus on the views of the traditional sales workforce (see, SITE; Jeffrey, Nummelin & Silbert's, 2007; Severt & Breiter, 2010), travel agents (Oter, 2002), as well as incentive planners (Celuch, 2014) to centralising the views of the hotel managers. Critically, also, the success of the hospitality sector contributes enormously to the economic development of Masvingo Province and the country, more generally.

The central question for this study is: "How do hotel managers in Masvingo Province perceive incentive travel?" The key findings of the research were that the respondents had a positive attitude towards incentive travel. Incentive travel as an award gave managers pride, made them feel valued and appreciated by their organisations, and it gave them opportunities for relaxation, networking, while exposing them to new cultures and other customer service excellence values. In addition to the above, other merits raised include the downplaying of employee absenteeism, reduction in employee turnover and costs, strengthening teamwork spirit, encouraging interpolation of ideas as well as improving flexible management styles to boost hotel sales and market share. The study concludes that incentive travel provides managers with something tangible to work towards. In order to fully ground the debates on incentive travel and to situate the current research problematic in its proper context, the next section critically reviews related literature and discourses on incentive travel.

Incentive travel discourses

Incentive travel is defined as travel provided by employers to employees in an effort to motivate them to increase or improve their performance or as a reward for excelling in their work (Pizam & Holcomb, 2008). Witt and Moutinho (1994) further argue that incentive trip offers a reward of a visit to a highly desirable destination in return for meeting clearly defined and attainable objectives within a fixed programme period. In addition, Wason (1990) as captured in Witt *et al.* (1992) argues that incentive travel uses the promise, the fulfilment and the memory of an exceptional travel related experience to motivate participating individuals or teams to attain exceptional levels of achievement in their places of work. In relation to this, Rogers (2013: 26) adds a component of the conference to the definition of incentive travel, where incentive travel is defined as “one of the business tourism trips to motivate and reward employees and dealers usually containing a conference element”. In this chapter, incentive travel is defined as a global management tool that uses an exceptional tourism travel experience to motivate and/or recognise hotel workers for their increased levels of performance and in support of organisational goals (The Society of Incentive and Travel Excellence (SITE), n.d; Beaver, 2005).

More so, Goldblatt and Nelson (2001) underline that the trip of an incentive travel has to be a corporate paid meeting or one to reward the employee effort and create company loyalty. To make incentive travel more relevant, Goldblatt and Nelson further caution, the meeting thereon should also be built around the theme of the employees' mother organisation. For instance, if the trip is celebratory in nature, it has to showcase the outstanding individual or team who or which meets or surpasses the sales or production goals set by the business. On this note, Severt and Breiter (2010) commend incentive travel as a critical motivational tool that enhances productivity or the achievement of business objectives in which participants earn the rewards based on specific levels of achievement set forth by the organisation. Earners are rewarded with a trip and a programme is designed to recognise earners for their achievements.

What emerges from the above discussion is that incentive travel is both a human resource management and motivational tool. As well, incentive travel combines both business and leisure motives and it therefore contributes to the development of the tourism and hospitality industry. It is also clear from the definitions discussed above that the employers are the ones who reward their employees for outstanding overtures and efforts. Besides, the trip awarded should be memorable for the one who is honoured. This would make the incentive a motivator to the human resources to achieve business goals as well as boost their personal growth. Put differently, the trip should have a motivational effect not only to the winner but also to the rest of the employees, to work extra-hard in their respective areas. It should be underscored that the criterion to choose the one who has to travel is premised on outstanding performance as compared to others. The period and the destination of the trip also vary among companies in different countries.

Holloway and Humphreys (2012) assert that the form of travel is mostly categorised within the business sector because the motive underlying their trip is most definitely connected to the participant's working life. Therefore, if the travel is analysed from the business travel perspective, it belongs to the Meetings, Incentive, Conference and Exhibitions (M.I.C.E) tourism. The segment is business oriented and involves non-discretionary travel. These M.I.C.E events are planned well in advance and the participants spend three times higher than the normal tourists (Chan, 2013). Incentive travel is said to represent an approximate of 5 per cent of the total M.I.C.E sector (CEIR, 2008 in Severt & Rutkowski, 2011). Compared to the other segments of M.I.C.E, incentive travel is regarded as the odd one out because it is offered to dealers or employees or distributors as a reward by the organisation (Gohil, 2016). Incentive travel also puts more emphasis on relaxation and at times adds a business element, while the meetings, exhibitions and conferences are more to educational or business related and engages some form of entertainment before or afterwards.

The above resonates with SITE (2013) who summarises the key elements of incentive travel as follows:

- a) The trip is carefully planned by the employer;
- b) The organisation is the one responsible for the payment of the trip;
- c) The trip is won by the employee through her/his outstanding performance;
- d) The traveller does not choose the destination for himself or herself;
- e) The trip should give a unique experience to the employee and;
- f) The traveller is considered to be a Very Important Person (VIP) client.

This connotes that the incentive travel in a way, is treated as a special way of saying ‘thank you’ to the employees for the job well done. According to Rogers (2013) and Goldsmith and Waigand (1990), incentive travel is therefore an all-expense paid travel by the employer to its outstanding employees.

Types of incentive travel

Different companies mostly use two types of incentive travel, namely (a) work-related incentive travel and, (b) leisure-based incentive travel (Bhatia, 2007). It is from these two types of incentive travel that companies can organise for either group travel or individual travel depending on the size or purpose of the award.

a. Work-related incentive travel

These are incentive trips which combine with work elements, which are usually one or more meetings that take place during the trip. As such, the events may be known as ‘concentives’- a combination of a conference and an incentive trip (Davidson & Rogers, 2006). Work-based incentive travel can be evaluated as part of a seminar or congress industry (Montgomery & Strick, 1995 in Oter, 2002). To this understanding Rogers (2013) adds an element of a conference in the travel experience. Bladen *et al.* (2012) opine that other work related incentives focus on staff development whereby employees are sponsored to travel and engage in training activities, team-building activities as well as away-days. The principal focus is

to motivate employees to achieve set organisational goals and enhance company's performance levels.

b. Leisure-based incentive travel

Leisure-based incentive travel can be defined as 'trips often held in exotic or lavish locations', and they may 'look like a holiday, and indeed they are designed to be highly enjoyable and memorable' (Davidson & Rogers, 2006:6). Holloway *et al.* (2009) highlight that leisure-based incentive can be in the form of a paid holiday when employers organise holidays which are funded by them and the employee will not carry their work duties with them on that holiday. Employers organise these incentive trip programmes for their employees to relax their body and minds away from all the daily office workloads or to escape the daily routines because some of the participants might otherwise not afford to pay for the trip for themselves. The trips are a good gesture to the employees that their employers are concerned about the overall health and wellness of their company. It should encourage and demonstrate that taking time away from work and de-stress is a vital part of work life (Incentivetravelsolutions, 2014) just like exercising and eating well. Employers can organise leisure based incentives through cruise incentives, sports incentives, recreational incentives as well as destination/hotel incentive. To elaborate this further, if an outstanding employee is recognised through a sporting incentive, the company books a seat on one of the sporting events such as Cricket World Cup for a cricket lover, Football World Cup for football lover, or tennis championships for the tennis lover, among others. This can be awarded to a corporate group, best salespersons or exceptional employees in the organisation depending on the type of the business and personal interests or group preferences.

If exceptional employees are recognised through a cruise incentive option, the company pays for the whole cruise package. The cruise experience can range from three days to more than three weeks when the employee has the opportunity to tour several destinations or nearby countries using ships. Another activity can be to engage in cruises at various lakes. For those honoured with a destination or hotel incentive, the employees are offered with an

opportunity for one or two nights stay in a hotel of their choice regionally or across the world. The hotel package includes buffet meals, tour services of the surrounding attraction centres as well as massage services among others. Recreation incentive can be organised by the employers to its employees as a getaway from the business environment where participants engage in their favourite activities in various recreational destinations. Some of the activities can include mountain climbing, whale watching on a sunset cocktail cruise, safari adventures in Africa, winelands discovery adventure, bungee jumping as well as snow skiing. All these efforts are designed to take away the employees from the everyday pressures of their workplaces. Employers can arrange these leisure based incentive travels as a group or as an individual incentive travel depending on the size of the company.

The merits of incentive travel over other non-financial and financial motivators

The incentive that comes in the form of travel is said to offer an exciting, glamorous, alluring opportunities to the selected employees and is considered highly appealing to the participants. This contrasts with cash incentives that can be used to settle debts (Lubbe, 2003; Holloway, 2015), for home improvements or used in other daily expenses (Holloway & Humpheys, 2012). This shows that people can use cash in whatever they wish or need, but they cannot share the experience with friends or colleagues on how they spend the money. The cash incentive has no 'trophy value' (Lubbe, 2003) while the trophy value is attached to incentive travel (Shinew & Backman, 1995). Lubbe (2003) further notes that cash is treated as part of the normal compensation an employee can receive and the one entitled to it cannot feel the difference among others or feel recognised. Furthermore, incentive travel is expensive in nature and many lower ranking employees usually cannot afford it using their own financial resources (Jeffrey, 2014 p. 124; Incentive Federation Inc, 2007). In addition, Jeffrey and Adomdza (2011) in their study found that non-cash rewards had strong positive effects on the motivation of employees unlike cash incentives. The outstanding performers do not

worry about their travel bills because the company is the one which arranges the accommodation, airfares/bus fares, food and beverages, as well as tours of better standards. The outstanding employees would spend their money on all the extras such as art, local crafts and shopping, among others (Chan, 2013).

Holloway and Humpreheys (2012) add that incentive travel allows employees to network with each other and their leaders. This gives them an opportunity to know each other, to share experiences, and to learn from others. In a way, they may also forge new relationships and build on existing ones (GMSevents, n.d). This is part of social reinforcement which in turn may assist in forging a strong team spirit when they return to work as they may have shared a lot of experiences, which are memorable and enjoyable. There is also personal growth through the new experiences learnt from different people.

Employees can purchase souvenirs and take photos during the trip. This acts as a long term tangible reminder when they return from the trip and share their memories. Jeffrey, Nummelin and Silbert (2007) aver that these tangible artefacts are long-term physical reminders which reinforce the feeling of being appreciated by the company. It is also a motivator to non- winners to work harder for the next trip when they hear/see their colleagues' artefacts obtained out of the trip. This may increase the relationship between the employee and the business.

In addition, incentive travel is more appealing than cash at encouraging non winners to work an extra mile and win the next trip offered by the company. The winners who will be absent from work will on return have a lot of stories to tell their work mates about the trip. Employees are often dissatisfied due to on-the-job stress if they are not taking their vacation, but when they take a rest through travel, they feel more relaxed, rejuvenated and reconnected to their personal life (EMG Events, n.d). Thus, the trip may make the employees feel more refreshed, reenergised and revitalised. If the employees are motivated and have more energy to perform their duties, they will be more productive, thus contributing more meaningfully to the success of the organization.

According to Holloway and Humphreys (2012), the company can utilise the time during the trip to inculcate the company values into its most valuable employees. Motivational speeches will be used to praise the winners of the incentive travel for their outstanding performance and honouring the company's qualities they are working for (Holloway & Humphreys, 2012). In turn, this can also reduce labour turnover and employees are retained in the organisation, thus contributing to the success of the business.

From the foregoing, it can be discerned that incentive travel has a powerful motivational effect (Joppe *et al.*, 2002) when compared to cash and merchandise rewards in today's companies (Gaia, 2008; Cottrell *et al.*, 1999). Incentive travel as an awarding technique contributes to at least 30 per cent increase in the sales on both sides of the sell and buys cycle (Deckard *et al.*, 2004). Jeffrey and Adomdza (2011) share the same sentiment and contend that incentive travel produced better outcomes as compared to cash incentives. It also makes it easier for the workforce to visualise their achievement (Fenich *et al.*, 2015). In view of the advantages, the next section discusses the value of incentive travel to the hotel sector, especially as viewed by the employers.

The value of incentive travel to hotel employers

From the preceding section, as is summarised by SITE (2013), the organisations use travel programmes to increase their sales, boost productivity, retain customers, hold on to top talent, promote teamwork and decrease turnover, among other results. As a way of tapping into these benefits, hotels across the globe are using incentive travels as a motivational tool to recognise the performance of their chefs, reservationists, front office managers, barmen, food and beverage managers, general managers as well as managing directors, among others. The employees of the hotels are motivated to work towards seamless service delivery to their guests as well as maintaining competitive hotel occupancies in their respective hotels all year round. Hotel employees are using incentive travel programmes to get their regular guests to purchase the rooms they might not otherwise have purchased during the off-peak season. In a

way, incentive travel is also used to reinforce the marketing message in the hotel.

The use of incentive travel avoids the pricing or compensation issues raised by the use of cash (Takacs, 2008; Weaver, 2013). Cash is treated as a compensator when it comes to incentivising employees in the organisation (Amy *et al.*, n.d). Wharton (2011) adds that the financial incentives encourage unethical behaviour and at the same time carries the cost of creating earning inequalities. The inequality in earnings can lead to jealousy, frustration, resentment, disappointment and envy which can lead to a high turnover and may undermine performance, retention and collaboration (Wharton, 2011).

Weaver (2013) and Takacs (2008) cite several benefits of incentive travel such as the employees from the hotels get to know other destinations as well as other hotels. When hotel employees return from the trip, they can tell everyone about their sponsored trip with the company, thus spreading good word of mouth about their hotel. It also increases the loyalty of the hotel as well as strengthening the working relationships of the working teams (Takacs, 2008). As such, this is a strategy that can be used by the hotel to foster commitment amongst its employees. Incentive travel helps to retain some of the key employees who might otherwise look for greener pastures for more advantageous employment. It also fosters a corporate culture and social interaction with the hotel (Lubbe, 2000). This is because a sense of belonging is generated during the trip sponsored by the hotel.

Lubbe (2000) and Holloway (2015) add that employers use these incentive programs to facilitate communication and create networking opportunities. The top hotel executives may take this opportunity to go on the same trip with lower ranking hotel personnel. This promotes collaboration among members. To this extent, the hotel executives may seek and utilise new ideas as well as marketing intelligence from their top performers (Lubbe, 2000).

However, the strategy of offering incentive travel to employees may be costly to the hotels, especially those in the initial stages of launching of the incentive scheme (Lubbe, 2000). Lubbe (2000:226) notes that this is of relevance when the hotel is targeting non-sales

employees where additional financial benefits to the company, such as increased sales through improved productivity are not easily measurable.

The incentive travel programme needs more time before it is implemented. Also, due care has to be maintained throughout the running period. Lubbe (2000) avers that it should not be planned, organised and implemented in a very short time frame because its' main purpose is to motivate the workforce over a particular time period and the award is given when the targets have been met, at the end of the period. This implies that for the employees to be motivated, the incentive scheme should be kept alive over that time period (Lubbe, 2000:226). Moreover, if the incentive scheme is not well planned or organised or coordinated, with fair and attainable goals, it can cause disharmony to the entire workforce. This is most likely to damage the reputation of the company.

The value of incentive travel to hotel employees

According to Lubbe (2000), employees get a chance to network with other high achievers from other different destinations. The incentive trip also gives different team members from different departments or countries an opportunity to interact away from the pressures of work, thereby improving communication and giving opportunities for bonding among the different categories of workers (Thornley-Brown, 2015).

In some cases, if the travel includes family members too, it is a way of gaining back some time with families and gives a payoff for the family (Thornley-Brown, 2015). This was found to be true in Maritz's (2011) research which found that participants were interested in gaining back quality time with their families. If kids are excluded from their trip, it means that there is deprivation of time together with them. If the trip includes the accompaniment of family members, those parents with kids no longer look for someone to take care of the kids while they are away on a paid holiday. This would reduce stress on planning necessary itineraries for the remaining kids. In some way, this is a way of reinforcing the support of the spouse and the children whom they have less time with.

Methodological issues

The research used a survey research design. The design assisted the researcher to collect detailed information on incentive travel as reported by the participants. An open-ended question interview technique was used to gather primary data from the respective hotel Departmental Managers, General Managers and Managing Directors. Thus, yielding more candid information and provides unique insights from different respondents about incentive travel. The method allowed the researcher to build a better picture of how the managers perceived incentive travel. The researcher targeted Masvingo Province as the study area because it is the oldest town in Zimbabwe which houses a much visited world heritage site, Great Zimbabwe Monuments. Besides, this research site was convenient for the researcher. The province is an under researched area in the discipline of tourism. Four hotels located in Masvingo Province were targeted as the study population. These were Lees Inn hotel, Regency Chevron hotel, Regency Flamboyant hotel and Great Zimbabwe Hotel. In this study, department heads and top management staff were selected from food and beverages, front office, housekeeping, human resources, finance and functions departments. Their job titles include executive chefs, front office managers, restaurant managers, housekeeping executives, human resources managers, reservations managers, finance managers, functions managers, sales and marketing managers, general managers and managing directors. This is captured in table 1.

Table 1: Demographic data of the managers who participated in the study

Job titles	Total number	Gender		Actual respondents
		Female	Male	
Reservations managers	4	3	1	4
Executive chefs	4	0	4	3
Functions Managers	4	2	2	4
Front office managers	4	2	2	3
Human resource managers	4	1	3	0
General managers	4	1	3	3
Sales and marketing managers	4	4	0	4
Managing Directors	2	0	2	2
Housekeeping executives	4	4	0	2
Finance Managers	4	0	4	1
Restaurant Managers	4	1	3	4
Total	42	18	24	30

On the whole, the researcher targeted 36 Departmental Managers, 4 General Managers and 2 Managing Directors. However, the researcher interviewed 30 respondents who got the opportunity to be honoured with a travel incentive in their respective hotels as shown in table 1 above. This represented 83 per cent of the targeted responses. The research focused on answering the following open-ended questions which included:

- a) How would you perceive incentive travel as a way of recognising employees as compared to other motivational strategies in your hotel?
- b) Which destinations were visited during their incentive travel?
- c) Which type of accommodation was mostly used during their incentive trip?
- d) What were the benefits of incentive travel to them as managers of hotels?
- e) What were the challenges faced during the trip?
- f) Was their incentive travel packaged the same across the board?
- g) How did they feel about their hotel after the incentive travel?

h) Do you have any comments that you wish to put forward regarding incentive travel?

Research data-based findings

The researcher asked the respondents about their perceptions on incentive travel as a way of recognising them as compared to other motivational strategies in their hotel set ups. 73 per cent (22 out of 30) of the respondents had positive attitude towards the travel award because with the economic hardships in Zimbabwe, respondents felt that they could not afford to budget for a memorable travel on their own. The respondents pointed out that they were motivated as well as inspired to keep on working harder in their respective departments as a result of the previous memorable experiences they had. However, 27 per cent (8 out of 30) of the respondents had a negative attitude towards incentive travel and they preferred cash incentive to cater for their families. They argued that under the prevailing harsh economic conditions in Zimbabwe, they would rather accumulate all the monies possible than to go on holiday and return to the same harsh reality after say a week or two. They felt cash rewards went a long way to make them and their families happy in the short term than paid up holidays. The departmental managers who did not welcome the idea of travelling also cited the disappointments they faced on their previous trips. They also complained about the poor choice of the incentive domestic destinations as some preferred to travel to other countries in Africa and abroad rather than the local destinations that they were sent to.

Considering the revenue obtained from their hotels in 2014 and 2015, 60 per cent (18 out of 30) of the respondents were excited to travel out of Masvingo to destinations such as Victoria Falls, Eastern highlands and Kariba as the most cited destinations in Zimbabwe which departmental managers had an opportunity to visit on their incentive travel awards. The respondents pointed out that they used three or four star hotels for their accommodation in the company of their spouses for two nights on average. To elaborate this, one of the respondents, Micheal, said:

It was great to spend that luxurious time with my spouse in faraway destinations. I really forgot all the pressures at work as well as at home. It was time to relax and enjoy ourselves as if we did not have any dependants.

Furthermore, Michael felt that the short break through incentive travel did wonders to his life as well as to his hotel. To him, the travel helped to relieve stress as well as boosting his confidence upon his return to work because he and his family travelled to and from Victoria Falls by road. This mode of transport enabled them the opportunity of sight-seeing along the way and as they passed through the wildlife sanctuary at the Chipangali Wildlife Orphanage and at Hwange National Park.

In support of the above, the majority (23 out of 25) of Departmental Managers pointed out that it was a good experience to visit some of the Zimbabwe's preeminent tourist centres. As well, the 92 per cent of the Departmental Managers further argued that it was a great experience because it afforded them an opportunity to learn new cultures from different hotels and people and was also a god-sent opportunity to taste different local foods of the rival destinations.

The above views were succinctly encapsulated in the words of one of the respondents, identified as Roby who had this to say:

I am proud to be one of the managers who travelled to the Eastern Highlands in 2013. Through the travel, I got an opportunity to refresh and mingle with other people. I got an opportunity to taste the Nyanga trout fish. More so, I bought apples and potatoes from Nyanga, which I sold to other workmates and my neighbours in Eastvale, Rhodene, Rujeko and Mucheke residential areas, thus obtaining a lot of sales.

This showed that if employees were happy, they would also be physically and mentally motivated thus helping to improve their performance, which also helped in reducing absenteeism from work. This would also save a lot of money for the hotel in the long run.

The respondents were also asked if their incentive travel package was the same across the board. 100 per cent of the respondents

pointed out that the incentive trip package varied according to grades at work. To this end, there were incentive travel packages for departmental managers, general managers and managing directors. The Departmental Managers were allowed to have their spouses on the trip while the General Managers and Managing Directors were accompanied by their families. General Managers and Managing Directors were given airfares, fuel coupons, five star accommodation option, unlimited tour activities, food and beverages and a choice of one of South Africa destinations. Nonetheless, Departmental Managers were given a choice of three or four star accommodation, food and beverages, fuel coupons to travel within Zimbabwe, and their touring activities were limited as compared to General Managers and Managing directors. This showed that the incentive trip packages were allocated differently on different ranks of the personnel. Incentive travel can also be tailor made to suit any budget of the hotel.

The researcher also asked the respondents on how they felt about the hotel after they were given an award to travel out of their working environments. 83 per cent (25 out of 30) of the respondents felt highly appreciated by their hotels. This spoke to the findings by Jeffrey's (2014) study in which 88 per cent of the respondents strongly agreed that they felt appreciated when they earned the travel award. This was a sign of showing that the hotel owners were doing something to honour their employees for their outstanding performance. In return, the managers had a feeling of belonging to the hotel and were motivated to work very hard to keep their hotels on the map in the country. If managers felt appreciated, it fostered a good working environment and they became more dedicated to their work. The hotels could take advantage of this and improve their occupancies and their market share. Other Departmental Managers (18 out of 25) and the top managers (5 out of 5) pointed, too, that they were now more loyal to their hotels and that they were not thinking of looking for other hotels to work for in the country. They felt to be part and parcel of their hotels and that their absence from work would negatively affect the operations of their respective departments. This showed that they were more committed to

supporting the operations of their hotels for the best interests of their organisations.

Furthermore, two hotels awarded their managers a group incentive travel to Victoria Falls in 2012. From the responses the researcher gathered that the respondents were excited as they got time to intermingle with each other. It was also an opportunity to learn about how other hotels were treating their guests in popular destinations of the world. These managers were also guests in Victoria Falls hotels where they were not known, which gave them an opportunity to learn about what their competitors were doing in their hotel establishments. Their trip was accompanied by a seminar on customer service improvement wherein they exchanged information on how best they could improve customer service excellence in their establishments. In a way, it helped to forge stronger team dynamics in the two hotel establishments. It also created strong relationships between the owners and the management and offered an informal forum for frank discussions about their hotels' operations. These findings speak to Lubbe's (2000) ideas on the merits of creating forums with employees outside the normal working environment. It was then envisaged that the incentive trips would engender a strengthened team spirit and the use of flexible management styles to boost hotel sales and market share.

On their return from different destinations, all of the managers brought souvenirs back home and took photos as part of the memories of the trip. This was critical because as Jeffrey, Nummelin and Silbert's (2007) study concluded, souvenirs provide long-term tangible artefacts of the incentive trip. The managers also shared word of mouth experiences with their families and friends about the company's rewards. In the process, they helped to create positive public relations for the hotel as well as creating a positive working environment for other colleagues in the hotel. On the whole, therefore, one can reasonably conclude that the memories of the fantastic trip lasted longer as compared to cash rewards, thus fostering a feeling of long-term gratitude towards the hotel.

However, some 32 per cent (8 out of 25) of the Departmental Managers pointed out that the issue of travelling was good for the single professionals or young people but for the employees with

families it was not a good idea to them in Zimbabwe. One of the respondents, popularly known as *baba* Grace said:

I have five children who are going to school. One of them is at tertiary education level, two are at the secondary level and the last two are at primary level. All of these children need school fees and also I am the bread winner of the family. My meagre salary cannot cater for all these children's needs at one time. It is wiser and enjoyable to travel while you know everything at home is catered for. Therefore, I think incentive travel should be given to young employees with fewer responsibilities.

Recommendations

From the findings, it seemed as if people with big families preferred to be given extra cash, food handouts or school fees vouchers to supplement their perceived low salaries. These findings revealed that the social and economic factors have to be considered when choosing the motivational strategies to be used in the Zimbabwean context. A one-size fits all approach should not be used where the hotel is having a different group with different needs. In addition, these incentives may also discourage the employees if their primary needs are not met.

Going forward, it has been revealed that the incentive travel package should be fairly awarded to outstanding employees, regardless of the grades they possess at work. If the packages are designed according to the position held by the employee, it may result in feelings of injustice. Unfairness in designing the package might negatively affect the operations of the hotels. If it means, an incentive travel for destinations outside Zimbabwe's borders or within the borders, the selected outstanding performers should receive the same all-inclusive travel award.

In the Zimbabwean context, I also felt that the views of chefs, waiters, bedroom hands, cashiers as well as barmen working in the rooms and food and beverages department should be heard since they are working in revenue centres of the hotel in regard to incentive travel. Their departments are operational departments which contribute a lot of revenue to the hotel. Therefore, they need to be

highly motivated for them to deliver the best service. In addition, the Masvingo Province hotels should look for different ways to keep their human resources motivated, productive, as well as engaged in their work considering the economic hardships in the country.

Conclusion

This study focused on Departmental, General Managers and Managing Directors of different hotel establishments based in the Masvingo Province on their views about incentive travel as a motivational and marketing tool. The study took a different lens of getting the views of non-sales workforce unlike the previous studies who looked on the traditional sales workforce. The findings showed that even where it is difficult to measure the output, it is also possible to award employees accordingly especially in the hotel industry.

Incentive travel as a motivational award played a vital role in motivating employees and employees felt to be part and parcel of the hotel. The sense of belonging made managers to become committed to their duties and work an extra mile to raise the profile of the hotel regardless of the hotel's operating environment. Employees who were motivated were likely to foster guest satisfaction and were likely to stay longer in the hotel. This may reduce recruitment costs of the hotels. Furthermore, in the context of the economic hardships in Zimbabwe, winning an incentive trip was an opportunity that most respondents felt could not be missed as most of the individual hotel workers would not afford to sponsor themselves for such enjoyable trips. The cash rewards seemed to be easily forgotten once the money is finished. Therefore, employees should go for incentive trips as it results in experiences and the memories go a long way after unpacking the suitcase.

However, there were fears expressed including the possibility that the employees may not have the freedom to choose their own destinations as the employers had the discretion to choose the destination for their employees. There is no flexibility unlike using cash rewards. In addition to that, an employee might impose a lot of pressure on her/himself in order to achieve higher results thus increasing stress and frustrations if the target is not met.

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“A New Form of Imperialism?” Interrogating China-Africa Relations and Development Prospects in Africa

Munyaradzi Mawere & Costain Tandi

Introduction

The claim that China has an impact on the economic development of Africa cannot be dismissed by a wave of a hand. No issue is more central in the ongoing debate on Africa's development than the role played by China. Her growing presence in Africa and subsequent ascent in the recent past is one of the biggest stories; it is a story that even seasoned analysts and academics cannot precisely determine, especially whether this booming relationship is opportune or disastrous for Africa. The accelerated growth of China's trade and investment in Africa has stirred controversy among academics and policy makers in terms of the nature of opportunities and challenges for the continent's development. Also, whether a neocolonial pattern of relationship with Africa akin to the one with the West is likely or has already developed is a question yet to be answered. China's supporters argue that the Asian superpower is strictly neutral and business-oriented, preferring to generate economic growth and mutual benefit not a dangerous dependency on aid. Nevertheless, some critics opine that, Chinese strategy is entirely self-promotional, aimed at maintaining access to Africa's precious mineral resources even when that means propping up odious governments. They have voiced concern that the imbalance in trade and investment relations, partly due to economic asymmetries, and China's failure to condemn the repressive African governments and poorly managed economies point to a foreign economic policy which is self-serving and influenced by immediate short-term gains. The gist of this chapter, therefore, is to assess the nature of the impact of Sino-Africa relations, whether it comes mainly from trade in cheap manufactured goods and the quest for mutual benefit or from China's seemingly

insatiable hunger for oil and minerals as well as other such resources? Besides, the chapter will further interrogate the role of Chinese companies operating in Africa and the merits/demerits of Chinese aid and/or international cooperation.

It is indeed a truism that the recent growth of Chinese influence and enterprise across Africa has drawn world attention. Owing to this, it is important to note that both economic and political implications are emerging at the global level, raising concerns among actors in the world economy. Attempts to acquire energy sources, such as oil, and to locate natural endowments to meet increasing demands of China's domestic industry have spawned an abundance of publications on China's presence in Africa, attempting to address potential effects on the African continent. By all accounts, it would appear that Africa is allowing China free reign. Kalu (2012:7) opines that, "in 2008, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows to Africa have increased from USD\$74.8 million in 2003 to \$5.5 billion a 7,239 percent increase. Simultaneously, the percentage of China's outward FDI allocated to Africa rose from 2.6 to 9.8, a 277 percent increase. Obviously, Chinese FDI to Africa is rapidly accelerating, with more and bigger investments from Chinese enterprise. In 2007, FDI to Africa tripled from \$519 million in 2006 to \$1.6 billion, and then more than doubled in 2008 to \$5.5 billion." Nevertheless, this assumption has not been proven empirically and no substantive literature looks at Africa's China policy. It is the objective of this chapter to further explore African motivations in allowing and increasing Chinese engagement. Clearly, China's investment in Africa is changing the face of global economics. As Richard Behar (2008:33) writes:

In just a few years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has become the most aggressive investor-nation in Africa. This commercial invasion is without question the most important development in the Sub-Saharan Africa since the end of the Cold War – an epic, almost primal propulsion that is redrawing the global economic map.

As Kalu (2012) went on to note, China's foray into Africa is a cause for alarm, primarily because of its potential consequences on the global stage. In particular, how China's entry affects demand and supply of sub-Saharan African resources as well as regional political development. This scepticism about China's involvement in Africa is aptly presented by Hillary Clinton, the former United States Secretary of State, in 2011:

Well, our view is that over the long run, investments in Africa should be sustainable and for the benefit of the African people. It is easy – and we saw that during colonial times – it is easy to come in, take out natural resources, pay off leaders, and leave. And when you leave, you don't leave much behind for the people who are there. You don't improve the standard of living. You don't create a ladder of opportunity. We don't want to see a new colonialism in Africa. We want, when people come to Africa and make investments, we want them to do well, but we also want them to do good. We don't want them to undermine good governance. We don't want them to basically deal with just the top elites and, frankly, too often pay for their concessions or their opportunities to invest (Clinton, 2011; Cited in Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013:264).

This concern as the one shared by Clinton and Kalu has played out in the academic world, where scholars and political scientists are beginning to grapple with such questions as:

- 1) What, if anything, has been the impact of recent Chinese engagement in Africa?
- 2) What might be the long-term impacts of this Chinese "invasion?"

It is these questions that have prompted us to interrogate the current political and socio-economic relationship between Africa and China commonly understood as Sino-China relations.

Contemporary Sino-African relations

How and when China did come to Africa at list for an economic motive? It is important to note that, the contemporary Sino-Africa relations began during the 1950s (Gregusova 2010; Uchegara 2009; Drummond and Liu 2013). It is in fact worth noting that economically, the Chinese presence was certainly already in place in the late 1950s following the demise of colonialism in Africa, but this was very small in magnitude and scale and confined only to a handful of African countries (Drummond and Liu 2013). During the same time, Africa enjoyed a period of respectable economic and political growth supported mainly by strong Western rather than Asian investments. At that time, China was still struggling with its own economic and political problems. Its [China] focus on Africa was therefore very limited.

The genesis of the first diplomatic meeting between China and Africa was however the Bandung conference of 1955 which was marked by the welcome reception given to the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser by the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. This meeting of 29 Asian and African states aimed at promoting economic and cultural relations between the two continents. The topics that were on the agenda included colonialism, imperialism and the hegemonic position of the Western powers. During the conference, China and the African states adopted the five principles of “Peaceful Coexistence” that had earlier been formulated by India and China. According to Uchegara (2009), these include: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Following the conference, China supported African countries with economic, technical and military support in an attempt to restrain the dominant western powers and create a new political and international order. Thereafter during the 1950s and 1960s, China established diplomatic relations with 17 countries and supported liberation and anti-colonial movements (see Fernando 2007; Beri 2007). China commenced to offer interest-free loans and extended grants to its partner countries. Nevertheless, after the outburst of Cultural Revolution in 1966, all Chinese ambassadors

returned back to China. China continued to provide loans for infrastructure and agricultural projects and signed agreements on Economic and Technical Cooperation. According to Fernando (2007), in the 1970s, 19 countries formed relations with China. In the 1960-70s, the recognition of China in the UN emerged as the prime motivation for Chinese involvement in Africa. In 1971, the People's Republic of China was recognised as the legitimate representative of China and it was for the most part due to the support of African countries (Zheng 2010). During the 1980s and 1990s, new diplomatic relations were established with 9 countries (Fernando 2007). Owing to the economic Asian crisis in the 1990s, China implemented 'going-out' policy in 2001 to foster economic growth and increase exports. As Canigila (2011) notes, by the end of the 1990s, the state-owned enterprises were restructured and Chinese companies started to invest abroad in order to become more competitive.

Theorising Sino-Africa relations

The acceleration of Chinese business investment into Africa has been heatedly accompanied by debates of epic proportions, particularly about China's real intentions for China's presence in Africa. Some critics contend that China's arrival on the scene is nothing less than a new form of imperialism typical of the West in the last century which intended to secure a monopoly of raw materials, extracting surplus wealth and undermining local people's rights (Southall and Melber, 2010). Melber (2007: 6) has, for instance, bluntly argued that "the Chinese penetration only presents the ugly face of predatory capitalism and the imperialist nature of Chinese expansion into Africa". On a similar note, French (2015) has called Africa 'China's second continent' basing on his observation of the pattern of Chinese population movement into Africa where one million of them [Chinese] have so far moved to Africa since 2000. For this major reason, French charges that it is the Chinese rather than Africans who are bringing about limited economic change in Africa, and that the Chinese government itself is encouraging migration to Africa for imperial purposes. The former Nigerian

central bank governor, Lamido Sanusi, recently wrote in the *Financial Times* (2 March 2013):

In much of Africa, they [the Chinese] have set up huge mining operations. They have also built infrastructure. But, with exceptions, they have done so using equipment and labour imported from home, without transferring skills to local communities. So, China takes our primary goods and sells us manufactured ones. This was also the essence of colonialism.

In fact, according to dependency theory, Africans are engaging with China because China wants to engage with Africa.

Nevertheless, a number of scholars and analysts continue to stress that, while the Chinese may be driven by their own domestic demands, their activity is defined by the African governments and institutions with whom they wish to interact (Brautigam, 2009; Alden, 2007). They positively stress the reciprocity potential between China and Africa which can only be good for both the African and Chinese economies. China is, for example, seen as able to supply the continent with scarce capital, improve chronically degraded infrastructure, and stimulate local business culture while Africa offers raw materials as well as market for finished products (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009; Kitiissou 2007). As such, African motivations matter because they are at the core of Sino-Africa relations. African states and their institutions are taking a more active role than current literature gives them credit for. The reasons Africans seek relations with China affects the nature and levels of Chinese engagement within states' borders. Besides, levels of monitoring and types of domestic policies play a key role in defining the character, impact and implications of China's presence in African states.

Unfortunately, the literature lacks explanations of African perspectives and offers minimal discussion of African actors' roles in permitting and controlling China's engagement. The cases of Zimbabwe and Sudan are alluded to as representative of African agency in Sino-African relations (See Alden, 2007; Manji and Marks, 2007). Robert Kagan (2006:32) goes so far as to argue that China is buttressing authoritarian rule and creating an "informal league of

dictators” in Africa. However, not only are the cases of Zimbabwe and Sudan atypical of the rest of the continent. Alden (2007) asserts that Chinese engagement in Sudan and Zimbabwe has not provided the levels of support to authoritarian regimes that many scholars claim. While Zimbabwe’s autocratic President Mugabe has publicly attempted to woo China with proclamations of a “looking east” policy, China’s response to his advances has actually been minimal. Some studies claim that the impact of Chinese engagement in Africa, whether positive or negative, whether on a comprehensive scale or a small scale benefiting the elite, will be determined by African governments and their policies regarding China (Askouri in Manji and Marks (2007) ; Zhu 2010; Brautigam, 2009; Alden, 2007). While it is clear that African states have found a new partner for trade, aid and perhaps even political and diplomatic support to resist Western initiated policies and interventions, it is also apparent that to accrue any sort of lasting benefit, African states must actively manage their relationship with China. Existing research has yet to adequately address the motivations of Africans who choose to engage with China and African perspectives on this growing relationship.

Motivating factors for Sino-Africa relations

The multi-million dollar question academics should answer is about the motivating factors are for Sino- Africa relations. It is important to note that from China’s perspective, it has two elements: China’s foreign policy strategy and Africa’s strategic importance. China’s “going global” foreign policy has an inherent goal of building political and economic cooperation with states that could supersede earlier Cold War models of great power relations based on unmitigated struggles for power and domination (Fantahun 2013). According to Pere (2007), the Chinese African strategy is believed to be guided by six factors. First, the need to nurture and expand its geopolitical influence aiming at promoting its national interest. Second, the need to sustain access to the African continent’s rich natural resources. Third, the need to make inroads into an African market of over a billion people that is expanding rapidly. Fourth, the need to enhance its own political legitimacy and standing in Africa

on the basis of the one China policy in an attempt to marginalise the Taiwan dilemma. Fifth, to craft new axes for South-South Cooperation, with Africa as one of the key pillars of forces in building a bloc under the championship of China within the calculation of a global political balance. Sixthly, from a strategic perspective, it is important to note that China sees Africa as a strategically important force in its global policy. This has however met some mixed feelings in academic circles with some critics arguing that China's primary motive in Africa is to siphon or plunder Africa's natural endowments especially resources oil and other minerals in order to feed its growing economy, and challenge the global power of the United States in Africa. This resonates with Mawere (2014:142) who laments that "a relationship where one exports only finished goods while importing only raw materials from the same trading partner is exploitative." As Mawere went on to note, "it is exploitative because finished products are always more expensive than unfinished goods or raw materials".

Looking at the characteristics of the relationships, the Africa-China relationships have entered into a new area of development beginning 1990s with significant consequences for both sides. There is no colonial history between the two and no psychological bias against each other. Politically, Africa sees an opportunity to build an alliance with a growing world power which can support and advocate the African agenda on international scene. For China it sees an opportunity to obtain an African alliance for legitimacy of its global influence as a growing power. Economically, Africa views China as an alternative source of investment and support to its economic development. So, it becomes clear that the Africa-China relation is based on mutual interest and development. It has been evident that the Africa-China relations have developed for the last decade with the spirit of partnership, where the cooperation has expanded in all areas of development: trade, investment and science and technology. Different policy mechanisms have also been designed to forge the partnership and make it fruitful. However, there are some critics who are questioning the motive of China's engagement in Africa, and argue that it is neocolonial in nature not partnership, in a relation they argue that China has a decisive control on the outcome of the multiple engagements.

Interrogating the nature of Chinese capitalism in Africa

It can be noted that the recent Chinese engagement in Africa builds on the foundation established by Sino-African relations during Africa's independence period in the 1960s (see Kalu 2012). According to Shelton and Paruk (2008), China's recent effort to woo African leadership and the general populace has included making significantly larger investments in education and infrastructure. Some scholars suggest that the emergence of China in Africa insinuates a larger campaign for world dominance, and that China has entered Africa in the role of neo-colonialist (see Mawere 2014; Kagan, 2006; Tull 2006; 2008). Others argue that China's presence is no different than Western predecessors in misappropriating natural resources (Mawere 2014; Segal, 1992; Chan-Fishel, 2007). Mawere (2014:145) went further to argue that:

The interest of China in Africa is highly suspicious: it is a relationship: it is a relationship that should be handled with caution especially by the African governments, otherwise, it mirrors the Euro-African relationship during Europe's colonial adventures in Africa.

Kagan expresses concerns that China is striving to develop and support a global network of autocracies and like-minded dictators (2006). In support of Kagan's view, China's Beijing Consensus has been well received by African elites in light of the abject failure of the Washington Consensus. Yet many other scholars disagree, maintaining that China is only interested in Africa's abundant natural resources, most specifically oil (See Mawere 2014; Pan, 2006; Taylor, 2006; Rocha, 2007; Taylor, 2007; Brookes, 2007; Alves, 2008). Alden and Marks suggest that, while some aspects of China-Africa relations may lead to neo-imperialist interaction, Chinese efforts may simultaneously lend equal voice to their African partners and has potential to establish a more equitable partnership (See Alden, 2007; Marks, 2007). Thompson (2004) opines that Chinese relations are the result of persuasion rather than through the heavy-handed approach of Western colonialism and more recently Western-directed

international financial institutions. Certainly African states have their work laid out for them should they attempt to manage their relationship with China to maximise benefits to their constituents (Thompson, 2004).

Despite the claims of a neo-imperialist China in Africa, substantial differences exist in China's approach to Africa, noted by Snow and Marks, when compared to the West and these differences have been entrenched over time (see Snow, 1988 ;Marks, 2007). Snow (1988:29) makes the argument that when the Chinese (Ming Dynasty) first came to Africa in the Middle Ages they sought a "gesture of symbolic acquiescence in the Chinese view of the world" different from the Europeans who came to conquer Africa. Along these lines, according to Tull and Kagan this increased interaction between China and Africa appears to threaten Western interests on the continent (See Tull, 2006; Kagan, 2008). However, Richard Behar (2008) points out that, while others paint China in Africa as a greater evil than its Western predecessors (namely the U.S. and British and French colonial powers), there may be little difference in terms of the end game for China and the West in Africa. Ultimately, Behar (2008:34) states:

The sub-Sahara is now the scene of one of the most bare-knuckled resource grabs the world has ever seen... In describing China's exploits, it's tempting to evoke the image of a benign, postcolonial West being outfoxed by a ruthless and unscrupulous neo-communist power...The American track record in modern Africa has been deplorable -- a half-century of backing strongmen, turning a blind eye, and taking what we can get with little or no regard for the health and welfare of the locals.

Behar supports the view that today's global economy has an insatiable need for raw materials. That is true for China's rise as it is true for the maintenance of America's economy (Behar, 2008). Carmody and Owusu agree, noting that as Chinese engagement has increased, so has the American presence in Africa, and China's recent economic expansion appears to be a somewhat obvious aim to dilute the power and influence of U.S. hegemony in the region, as much as

to acquire African resources (Carmody & Owusu, 2007). This upturn appears to resonate with Klare (2005)'s claim of the geopolitical revival in the rush to secure scarce resources (2005). No doubt, Africa presents a new and interesting battlefield for Western and Eastern global politics.

It is interesting to note that trade is already shifting from a "Global North" to a "Global East" orientation. Not only is China flooding the African market with goods, it is also buying up oil, minerals and various other raw materials from African states. Carroll (2006), observes that, with the continued expansion of China's industry and economy, China's demand for industrial resources continues to climb, and resource-rich Africa has the potential to meet this need. While oil remains a central focus of the literature addressing China's African resource grab, Rocha points out that the Chinese have been just as diligent in their pursuit of base metals: aluminium, copper, iron ore, nickel and zinc to name a few .

Nature of Chinese aid to Africa

A growing area of focus in the literature on Chinese engagement in Africa is aid, now attracting attention because it differs sharply from Western aid (Brautigam, 2003). Western aid with policy prescription seeks to shape African states within a certain framework; it affords a form of legitimacy but also constrains and limits states' behaviour. In contrast, the Chinese express their interest in empowerment and emancipation of African states (Carmody, 2007). Chinese aid pales in comparison to Western aid in terms of dollar amounts; Western aid to Africa is much larger (Brautigam, 2009). A profound difference in Chinese versus Western aid is its secrecy; China's aid is not subject to the transparency standards Western aid imposes (Brautigam, 2003). This shrouding of aid packages means that very little is truly known and therefore understood about the nature of Chinese aid to African states. As such, a number of unsubstantiated claims have been made. For instance, Chinese aid has been characterised as "untied aid" because it is not subject to standards of governance and Western human rights principles, while Western aid is contingent upon certain conditions (Moyo, 2009).

Additionally, Chinese aid is typically supplementary to trade agreements and political manoeuvrings, again free of Western contingencies, including transparency (Brautigam, 2009). This difference is likely due to Chinese political preferences. Aid and trade with African states is predicated on their recognition of the One China policy, which symbolises respect for China's right to determine its own domestic policy, and China reciprocates with its policy of non-interference (Brautigam, 2009). Brautigam argues, with merit, that Chinese aid is a function of Chinese foreign political policy more than economic policy.

China's policy of non-interference and absence of policy conditionalities has earned it the label of "rogue donor". However, Brautigam posits that Chinese aid's differences from Western aid does not equate it as rogue (2009). The Chinese do not claim to understand policy problems in Africa, nor do they claim to know what is necessary for African development; Chinese aid and policies reflect this. On the other hand, Western aid policy is notably prescriptive, with policy solutions that have a track record of failure in Africa (Brautigam, 2009). Perhaps the most significant difference between Western and Eastern aid in Africa has been the demand-driven versus donor driven dynamic. Western aid in Africa has been largely donor-driven (Brautigam, 2009).

Western countries and policy makers outside of Africa decide to donate aid to African states, yet in many ways are out of touch with the circumstances that Africans is facing. Still, Western donors persist in determining aid policy objectives and designate aid accordingly. A marked example of this disconnection is in the agricultural sector. The Western practice of agricultural dumping under the banner of aid and humanitarian principles has not always found a welcome mat (Easterly, 2006). Zambia, for instance, drew great criticism from the global community from an executive decision in 2002 to ban genetically modified maize, a decision that kept U.S. food "aid" out of Zambia (Manda, 2003; Henriot, 2010). China, in contrast, has worked with African states to dispense aid in ways that African elites see fit, often investing in infrastructure development (Shelton & Paruk, 2008; Gadzala & Hanusch, 2010). Chinese aid also differs from Western aid in scope. Western aid is often associated with

grand, large-scale projects across Africa. The Chinese often engage in smaller projects: building a single hospital or clinic staffed by Chinese professionals, constructing a school or road, providing professionals to consult with African counterparts on specific issues (Brautigam, 2009). The argument can be made that these smaller-scale, community-specific projects are more likely to result in sustainable change. “Chinese aid is often dispensed in such a way that corrupt rulers cannot somehow use it to buy Mercedes Benzes.... [It] is often in the form of infrastructure, such as a railroad network. Or in the form of doctors and nurses to provide health care to people who otherwise would not have access. China provides scholarships for African students to study in its universities and, increasingly funds to encourage its businessmen to invest in Africa

Chidaushe (2007:67) cautions that, because the general public has no access to these aid agreements, the possibility of hidden conditionalities exists in Chinese aid, rather than the widely exhorted “no conditionalities” or “untied aid”. In this case, Chidaushe is correct; it is erroneous to assume that compounding political conditionalities in Western aid therefore means that Chinese aid lacks conditionalities. While Chinese aid does veer away from political conditionalities, the fact that it is often attached to larger trade and economic agreements indicates that it is laden with economic conditionalities (Brautigam, 2009). These economic conditionalities mean that some Chinese aid tends to appear more often in the form of debt cancellation and loans as opposed to the Western system of grants (King, 2007; Brautigam, 2009). Farzad (2007) argues that loans are perhaps better suited for African needs. Chinese loans are notably cheaper than Western loans and China offers Africans the opportunity for payment-in-kind arrangements, a ‘working off’ of their debt (See Carmody and Owusu, 2007; Chidaushe, 2007). Logically, grants and donations can create a situation of dependency that undermines the capacity of Africans to develop the systems and programs necessary to fend for themselves in the long run. Some of the blame for increased poverty in Africa has been cast on development aid and its ineffectiveness (Easterly, 2006; Chidaushe, 2007). The veiled nature of Chinese aid makes it difficult to assess or predict the full impact of aid agreements, but Shelton and Paruk

(2008) argue that in general, Chinese engagement--perhaps due to its differences from Western activities in Africa--plays a positive role in Africa's development.

Controversies over Sino-Africa relations

The Sino-Africa relations over the past decades have been met with mixed reactions in scholarly circles. Scholars have debated on whether China is really an all-weather ally of Africa or a hindrance to development, that is, a force surging its own interest in the continent. A plethora of scholarly written articles and books, political commentators and experts in the field of international relations and development studies have frequently presented China as both a predator and ally of Africa. Many positively view China as an opportunity for Africa in the changing structure of current international relations in the form of South-South cooperation that will be politically and economically beneficial to Africa, a continent that has been socially, economically, politically and geographically marginalised from its status quo for a long time by the Global North from real development. But others consider China as the same wine in the new bottle, similar to the roles what the West has been playing in Africa. They even tend to call it 'the new neo-colonialist' (Mawere 2014; Fantahun 2013).

China has also been accused of plundering natural resources in Africa. Critics have raised concern as China's investments in extracting industries have increased at a sporadic pace countries such as Angola, Nigeria, Sudan Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and new prospects under Chinese explorations are underway in a number of countries in the continent. China has also been accused by the West for its dubious activities in Darfur, Sudan. It is alleged that China is blocking the UN Security Council resolution of possible economic sanctions against the Sudanese government owing to her interest in oil resources in the country. Besides, China is accused of supplying weapons to the regime in Khartoum (Fantahun 2013). China's soft policy of non-interference, mutual respect of political system is working against efforts to build democracy and good governance and help to protect dictatorship in countries like Zimbabwe and Sudan.

Besides, one of the most contentious and controversial issue surrounding the Sino-Africa relations involves the export of cheap manufacturing goods from China to Africa, which is resulted in a decline in African exports (Mawere 2013). China is in fact dumping products of cheap and poor quality in the African markets, mainly such as footwear, textile, clothing, electronics goods, machines, plastic products and drugs. African traders are also complaining that local factories particularly textile, clothing, plastic and footwear industries, are on the brink of closer due to Chinese competition with their low-cost imported goods. Traders in some African countries, like Zambia, Senegal and South Africa have experienced social unrests boycotting Chinese products. African critics claim that Chinese are both cornering the global market in sectors where African exporters compete for share and flooding the continent's own market, crowding out locally produced goods (see Taylor 2010). Strong condemnation is seen coming from some African trade unions and civil-society organisations as well as from African producers. According to the Business Day, September 27, 2005 cited in Fantahun (2013), all these have made some to claim that the trade pattern between the African continent and China is becoming colonial in character, with African countries export raw materials to China and importing finished products. Mawere (2014:144) states that "...what China gives to Africa is much less than what she harvests and takes away from Africa"

Additionally, conflict over differing labour practices has surfaced between Sino-African enterprises. Chinese entrepreneur rarely employ local professionals in major fields of management positions (Fantahun 2013). This resonates with Mawere (2014:142) who notes with concern that, " While China is helping Africa in building infrastructure, the disappointing thing is that most of the workers involved in the construction of the infrastructures come directly from China." Thus, in most cases Chinese companies employ their own nationals even in jobs that can easily be filled by local labourers. The Chinese view that it is economically more efficient and technically more advantageous to recruit Chinese professionals and labourers as they are more familiar with the technologies and face fewer language and cultural obstacles in communicating with their work force.

Nevertheless, from the African perspectives, the Chinese labour employment practice is not contributing enough to local economies and employment. Consequently, the Chinese approach does not help to transfer knowledge and technology to Africa as a strategy to build local capacity.

How can Africa benefit from engagement with China?

So what else could Africa and China do so that Africa benefits more from its growing relationship with China? For a start, African countries could diversify their economies as much as possible away from supplying unprocessed natural resources to China. This will make them less dependent on the vagaries of both the Chinese economy and the ups and downs of global commodity prices. Trade with China may have helped insulate Africa from the full impact of the 2008 financial crisis, but Africa still looks vulnerable to China's economic slowdown. Meanwhile, African nations should also prepare for the day when they no longer have natural resources to sell. At the Africa Progress Panel, we talk about transforming natural resource wealth into human capital, by investing revenues into health and education.

Second, African countries need to encourage Chinese investment into more labour intensive sectors. Africa's population is growing faster than anywhere else in the world, and job creation is a top priority. If Africa cannot create jobs to keep up with the growth of its workforce, then we can expect to see a large and growing population of frustrated, jobless youth. As China's relationship with Africa shifts from being essentially government-to-government to business-to-business, **some analysts** see enormous potential in the manufacturing industry, especially for clothing and textiles. Rising Chinese wages in this sector may lead Chinese manufacturers to export jobs to African countries where labour prices are lower.

Third, African countries could negotiate better terms with Chinese investors, including quality control and better linkages with local economies. African governments could urge China to improve market access for African goods overseas, for example, in trade fora such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In fact, a mutually

beneficial China-Africa relationship can only be possible if investors and African political leaders re-orientate their current thinking and ways of cooperation. The Sino writers Lin and Wang (2014: 23) express present drawbacks as follows:

China needs to learn to become a better development partner, by listening to the voices from Africans and interacting with partner governments, NGOs, and civil societies, and China needs to be more open and transparent in providing accurate data on international development financing activities.

Forth, Africa could keep working to make itself as attractive a business environment as possible. At the Africa Progress Panel, they must consider further regional economic integration to be a priority. Africa's population will one day represent the world's largest consumer market. If they can get increased market access by investing in a single country, Chinese businesses will want to invest much more. Analysts see more Chinese businesses coming to Africa, meaning that the Africa-China relationship is diversifying away from simply government-to-government relationships. This makes it harder to characterise the relationship as either good or bad. However we view it, China's growing presence in Africa is part of a rapidly changing reality that presents enormous opportunity. Mawere (2014: 114) is apt to advise that "African countries should be critical of their relationship with China. Otherwise Africa will continue losing more resources to china through poaching and other illegal dealings".

Conclusion

There are a number of reasons why the relationship between China and many African countries is deepening. That is not to say that it is tension free. Indeed, there are signs that like most dynamic relationships, there are points of disagreement. There are worries in Africa that the Chinese are flooding African markets with low-priced goods that undercut nascent indigenous industries, for example in the textile sector, especially with the expiration of the multi-fibre

agreement in 2005. There are additional concerns that trade tends to be one way, with Africans as consumers, and that this hurts African producers. Moreover, China's stepped-up lending to African countries risks saddling them with additional debt, just as some are easing that burden through the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program and other initiatives. Next, while the Chinese are engaged in large infrastructure projects across Africa, there is little transfer of technology. There is also little local job creation; Chinese projects typically employ Chinese workers. China's general unwillingness to coordinate its aid programs with other donors may also reduce their overall impact. Some Africans worry that the Chinese ignore environmental and labour standards, which has potential negative implications for Africa over the long-term. Furthermore, the Chinese preferred hands-off approach to human rights and democratic governance increasingly puts China at odds with the African consensus that these are important matters. The approach adds to the perception that China is willing to coddle authoritarian regimes, including that of Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, whose misrule and political repression has led to seven consecutive years of economic decline amid egregious human rights conditions. The emphasis on good governance by the African Union and the New Partnership for African Development shows that Africans themselves see democracy, transparency, and respect for human rights as foundations for sustainable development. In addition, China-African trade and aid relations have implications for African countries. One advantage is the increased room for manoeuvre for African states now that they are no longer totally dependent on the West. Finally, increasing oil production has boosted the revenue of African states. On the other hand, the Chinese way of doing business with African countries does not take into account human rights, the environment or good governance, though this is also not uncommon among Western countries when dealing with Africa.

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Environmental Activism from Below: The Case of the subaltern against Commercial Diamond-mining Companies in the Chiadzwa Area of Zimbabwe, 2009-2013

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Introduction

Commercial diamond-mining in Zimbabwe's rural area of Chidzwa which began in 2009 posed serious threats to sustainable development as evidenced by, among other things, extensive land dereliction, deforestation, and siltation and contamination of water bodies. These jeopardised livelihoods and made the ordinary Chiadzwa villagers to question the environmental sustainability of commercial diamond-mining activities in their area. They sought remedy in various ways such as confronting mine administrators, litigation; and seeking interventions from political leaders, environmentalists and the press. Utilising a broad range of sources which include the print and electronic media, environmental reports and oral interviews, this chapter explores environmental nationalism by the subaltern against the abuse of their environment by companies jointly owned by foreigners and the national elite. Indeed, the efforts by governments and civic organisations to achieve sustainable development are unquestionable, but environmental activism (environmentalism) of ordinary people (those from below) should not be underestimated.

Mining, by its very nature, can be a threat to sustainable development because it ravages the environment in several ways if it is not properly managed (Kitula, 2006). Commercial diamond mining operations in the Chiadzwa area under Chief Marange in Zimbabwe's Manicaland Province, which this chapter focuses on, for example, have caused environmental deterioration and land dereliction through extensive excavations, destruction of vegetative cover,

siltation, and the disruption of the ecosystem as a result of the careless dumping of mine waste in water bodies. The situation has been exacerbated by the failure of mining companies to embark on meaningful environmental rehabilitation.

Environmental degradation resulting from mining activities is a serious threat to sustainable development and this has prompted the Zimbabwean government, corporate bodies and environmentalists to institute measures in an attempt to address the situation. Similar interventions have also been made across the globe (Kameri-Mbote, 2011; Papu-Zamxaka, Harpham and Mathee, 2010; Warhurst, 2006). While the role of governments and other elite organisations in combating environmental degradation caused by mining activities is well documented in the academic literature, it is quite apparent that environmental activism for sustainable development by the subaltern is conspicuously underrepresented.

This case study of environmentalism among local communities in the Chiadzwa area and its vicinity is an attempt to address this gap in the literature. Drawing from a range of sources which includes oral interviews, and print and electronic media sources, it contends that the ordinary people are not passive onlookers who sit idly and mourn their predicament while their local environment is being ravaged by fortune-seekers namely, foreigners in joint ventures with the state and the national elite. The ordinary people, it should be stressed, may not be able to articulate the technicalities of some chemical and biological processes related to environmental degradation by commercial mining activities. It should be noted, however, that they can, with some justifiable degree of certainty, attribute the erosion of their livelihoods to environmental degradation caused by some irresponsible mining practices. Thus, even though the common people could not come up with convincing scientific explanations why they developed skin rashes after bathing in rivers that flowed through the diamond fields, why their domestic animals were getting sick and dying in large numbers after drinking from local water bodies, and why the local rivers were drying up, they noted that these problems began from 2009 when commercial diamond mining activities began in the Chiadzwa area. Indeed, these allegations were

authenticated by a scientific investigation carried out by the University of Zimbabwe (2012).

Faced with such threats to their livelihoods caused by fortune-seeking institutions in which they had no stake, local communities from Chiadzwa and surrounding areas engaged various platforms to express their environmental concerns. Besides directly confronting the managements of mining companies and sometimes taking them to court, they often made representations to local traditional leaders, politicians, environmental organisations and the press.

Background to the Conflict: Ownership of the Marange Diamonds by Foreign Companies in Partnership with the Zimbabwean Government and the National Elite

The diamond rush in the Chiadzwa area began in September 2006 and intensified during the next two years as ordinary Zimbabweans sought livelihoods at a time when the country was engulfed in socio-economic hardships characterised by hyperinflation, unemployment and poverty (*Encyclopedia Tfode*, 2012). In an attempt to regularise diamond mining, the Zimbabwean government cordoned off the Chiadzwa area and unleashed the police and the army on civilian miners from 2008. The Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC), a wholly-owned government company, went on to approach foreign companies to organise joint mining ventures in Chiadzwa (Mambondiani, 2012).

In 2009, the ZMDC created Marange Resources as its subsidiary company to represent its business interests in Chiadzwa. The ZMDC handpicked two companies for joint diamond mining operations. These were Core Mining Resources, a small diamond mining company based in Kimberley, South Africa, and Grandwell Holdings, a Mauritius-registered company with connections to New Reclamation Group, a South African scrap metal company. Grandwell and Marange Resources merged to form Condurango, which began to trade as Mbada Diamonds. Core Mining Resources formed a new company, Canadile Miners Private Limited. Mbada and Canadile began commercial mining operations in Chiadzwa in 2009 (*Encyclopedia Tfode*, 10 December 2012; Partnership Africa Canada,

June 2012). In May 2010 Anjin, a joint venture involving Matt Bronze, a Zimbabwean company, and a Chinese firm, was given rights to mine diamonds in Chiadzwa. Its board of directors included senior officials from the Zimbabwean civil service, army and police (Diamond Intelligence Briefs, 16 May 2012; Mambondiani, 2012). In November 2010, Canadile operations were ceased amid allegations of fraud and the ZMDC took over its claims (New Zimbabwe, 2010). In August 2011 Diamond Mining Corporation, a joint venture between the state-owned ZMDC and Pure Diamonds, a Dubai-based firm, began operations in Chiadzwa (Mangundla, 2012; Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, 18 December 2011). It should be noted, therefore, that large-scale commercial mining and processing of diamonds in Chiadzwa began in 2009 and intensified from then on being monopolised by foreign-owned companies in joint ventures with the elite-run state-owned ZMDC. From the onset of commercial diamond mining in Chiadzwa, as Veronica Zano of the Zimbabwe Environmental Law Association (ZELA), a local non-governmental organisation, observed, some traditional leaders and their communities were “not happy because of the disrespect of their rights since they stay in a rich land but are not benefiting from their ancestral land resources” (Moyo, 2012: 3).

Aggravation of the Conflict: Pollution and Environmental Degradation emanating from Commercial Diamond Mining

Research carried out by the University of Zimbabwe on behalf of ZELA in July 2012 questioned the environmental sustainability of commercial diamond mining at Chiadzwa. It identified chemical and heavy metal pollution of the Odzi and Save Rivers resulting from commercial diamond mining in Chiadzwa. The study revealed that the water in the two rivers had high concentration of iron, chromium and nickel, which are the major components of ferrosilicon, a chemical used in the extraction of diamonds. The report informed that diamond-bearing gravel was being processed using technology called dense medium separation in which ferrosilicon, an alloy of silicon and iron, was used as the dense medium separation material. Diamond ore was placed into a ferrosilicon mix, scrubbed, cleaned

and processed and the waste dumped. At the end of each process, the ferrosilicon was retrieved using a magnetic separator and recycled, but losses of ferrosilicon could occur leading to contamination when the waste was discharged into water bodies. The study noted that the Odzi River had an iron content of 2.8 milligrams per litre, which exceeded the World Health Organisation's average of 0.1 milligrams per litre. The research indicated that a high concentration of iron in water reduces its palatability and consequently its consumption. Excess consumption of iron affects health by increasing reactive oxygen species (oxidative stress) which damages cell membranes and disturbs various biological processes in the body and may result in the weakening of immune functions especially in livestock (Fluoride Alert, 2012; Mambondiyani, 2012; Mushanawani, 2012; University of Zimbabwe, 2012). In addition, chromium and nickel are cancer-causing agents while high concentration of iron in water exposes people to dental and skeletal fluorosis, an ailment related to bone diseases and poor development of the teeth (University of Zimbabwe, 2012).

The pollution of the Odzi and Save Rivers was also caused by the overflowing of slime dams and failure by mining companies to raise their slime dam walls. The mining companies had, however, begun to rectify these anomalies in November 2012 due to the heavy fines imposed by the Environmental Management Agency (EMA), a government environmental watchdog (Mushanawani, 2012). It should be noted, therefore, that the pollution of the Odzi and Save Rivers was mainly caused by the inability of mining companies to put in place proper waste water treatment infrastructure. To aggravate the situation, the government declared Chiadzwa a prohibited zone and even barred environmental agencies and the media from operating in the area (Manyati, 2012). On 9 March 2012, for example, four Zimbabwean journalists were arrested in the Chiadzwa area while investigating river pollution caused by diamond mining companies (Karimakwenda, 2012).

The pollution and degradation of the environment by diamond mining companies had devastating effects on the lives of ordinary people in Chiadzwa and surrounding areas. By its very nature, mining "is very destructive and can cause much environmental degradation,

especially where it is practised without elaborate rehabilitation plans in place” (*Standard*, 27 February 2012: 4). Mining operations involving heavy earth-moving equipment and the dumping of mine effluent caused massive siltation of the Save and Odzi Rivers and threatened the livelihoods of people and livestock in the districts of Chipinge, Chimanimani, Mutare and Buhera. Commercial mining activities destroyed the landscape in Chiadzwa and rendered the land virtually useless. Even cemeteries in the area were dug up (*Newsday*, 22 June 2011). In May 2011, reports from Chiadzwa stated that a lot of dams in the area and along the Odzi River had been silted by mine waste dumped by Canadile Mining Company (*Zimbabwean*, 12 May 2011). By April 2012 the Save River had dried up partly because of siltation caused by diamond mining operations thereby jeopardising many communal livelihood activities it supported such as gardening, smallholder irrigation projects and bricklaying (*Irin News*, 25 April 2012).

The pollution of the rivers deprived communities of clean water for drinking, gardening, fishing and bathing. Itching skin sensations were experienced by many people after bathing in the two rivers (University of Zimbabwe, 2012). In May 2012, an official from a health centre in Marange reported a surge in skin rashes since the beginning of large-scale diamond mining (Mambondiyani, 2012). In July 2012, villagers from the wards of Bangwe, Maunganidze, Goko, Taona, Mutema, Chipangayi and Maronga in Chipinge district were forced to look for alternative sources of safe water for fear of contracting diseases from the Save River which had been contaminated by commercial diamond mining operations (*Newsday*, 2 July 2012). By November 2012, skin diseases had become the order of the day for many people in Chiadzwa (Moyo, 2012). Commercial diamond mining activities therefore became “a constant source of pain” for many communities in Chiadzwa and downstream along the Odzi and Save Rivers (Moyo, 2012: 1).

Concerns from Government and Non-governmental Organisations over Pollution and Environmental Degradation caused by Commercial Diamond Mining

Local non-governmental organisations were quite vocal over threats to sustainable development posed by diamond mining firms at Chiadzwa. In July 2012 Shamiso Mtisi, the co-ordinator of ZELA, quoted by Saize (2012: 4), lamented the massive water pollution that was caused by diamond mining companies: “Water in Odzi is not the same as before. We used to swim and drink this water from years back. The water is now dirty which can be seen even before carrying any experiments. A simple observation tells you the water is dirty”. These sentiments were echoed in September 2012 by the Chiadzwa Community Development Trust (CCDT), another Zimbabwean non-governmental organisation monitoring human rights violations in the Marange diamond fields, which complained that mining companies were ruining the environment and did not have the welfare of people at heart (Fluoride Alert, 2012).

During a workshop of civic society groups and parliamentarians organised by ZELA on 19 November 2012 Sibonile Nyamudeza, the Chipinge South Member of Parliament, complained that he had approached EMA “on various occasions concerning water pollution around Chiadzwa, but we are given various excuses yet people are sitting on a potential time bomb” (Manyati, 2012: 4). Concern was also expressed at the deaths of cattle in the Chiadzwa area after drinking contaminated water from the Odzi and Save Rivers (Zharare, 2012). During the same month the Centre for Research and Development, another local non-governmental organisation that had been calling for transparency in the mining and selling of diamonds, pressed the government to penalise mining companies for polluting rivers, a development which had endangered the lives of people in Chiadzwa and surrounding areas (Moyo, 2012).

Zimbabwean politicians and senior government officials also joined the environmental outcry, obviously in order to gain political mileage among the local inhabitants given the fact that the ZMDC, a state-owned company, was involved in joint mining ventures with foreign mining companies and was partly responsible for the

environmental catastrophe. Mike Madiro, the Zimbabwe African People's Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) chairman of Manicaland province, in his annual report for 2012, urged the government to prosecute diamond mining firms for discharging waste into the Odzi River which was responsible for the deaths of cattle belonging to villagers downstream. He also charged that some villagers had developed skin problems as a result of using the polluted water (Madiro, 2012). Munacho Mutezo, a senior ZANU-PF official, reiterated these concerns and urged the government to address the pollution of the Save River by mining companies which had killed several cattle in the Hot Springs area of Chimanimani district (Mushanawani, 2012). It was largely due to these concerns from various stakeholders that EMA fined three companies during the period 20 February 2012 to 23 November 2012 for discharging mine effluent into the Odzi River. The companies and their respective fines, according to Mushanawani (2012), were Diamond Mining Corporation (DMC) (US\$3000), Anjin (US\$30 000), and Marange Resources (US40 000).

The Outrage of Local Communities over Health Hazards posed by Mine-waste Water Pollution

Even though this article acknowledges the concerns raised by the elite (for example, intellectuals, environmental watchdogs and politicians) over threats to sustainable development caused by the depletion of the environment from commercial diamond mining activities in Chiadzwa, similar cries from the subaltern should not be overlooked. The outrage of the ordinary people, as confirmed by the findings of this study, became so manifest when their livelihoods were directly threatened by environmental degradation.

Some villagers complained of health problems resulting from the use of water contaminated by mine waste. On 9 March 2012, for example, some enraged parents from the Chiadzwa area told journalists that their children had developed skin rash as a result of bathing in the Odzi River whose water was contaminated by the mine waste dumped by the commercial diamond companies (Karimakwenda, 2012). In August 2012, a delegation of villagers

from the area visited the offices of the Centre for Research and Development in Zimbabwe's eastern border town of Mutare to express their disgust at the health hazards that the dumping of mine waste in rivers exposed them to. They alleged that their children had developed skin rash after bathing in the Save and Odzi Rivers. They also urged the non-governmental organisation to approach state officials with a view to punish those diamond companies that polluted the rivers thereby putting the health of the ordinary people in jeopardy (Moyo, 2012).

In September 2012 villagers living in Chiadzwa along the banks of the Save River, with the assistance of ZELA, sought a court order barring the commercial diamond mining companies in Marange from polluting water bodies. In a High Court application, the villagers charged that Anjin Investments, Marange Resources and Diamond Mining Corporation were polluting the Save, Odzi and Singwizi Rivers with sewage, chemicals and metal deposits which exposed them to diseases such as cancer, cholera and typhoid (Chimhete, 2012). Reuben Mujee, a villager from Ward 5 in Chiadzwa, complained in November 2012 about the pollution of the Odzi River: "We are now having health problems as we are developing rashes. Women are the most affected as they are complaining of itching private parts...soon after taking a bath in the Odzi River" (Mushanawani, 2012: 1). In an interview with journalists during the same month Pius Mutovhoti, a villager from Gudyanga ward in Chimanimani district, charged that most villagers had developed skin rash after bathing in the Save and Odzi Rivers, adding that many people had become reluctant to swim, wash or bath in the two rivers. He fumed: "The diamond mining companies are emptying the waste especially toxins into the Odzi River thereby contaminating it. The major culprits are Anjin and Marange Resources diamond mining companies" (Moyo, 2012: 1).

In a cell-phone text message sent to the *Manica Post* on 6 December 2012, Joe Nyangani of Tonhorai village wrote: "One of the diamond mining companies operating at Chiadzwa is polluting Save River by discharging raw muddy water in the river. All the communities along the river are affected. We now have no water for laundry...Quick action must be taken to solve the problem. We are

suffering” (Mushanawani, 2013: 6). This agitation of local communities against diamond mining firms was aptly captured by Rodrick Nyauyanga, a Chiadzwa villager, in February 2013: “These diamonds are supposed to make us happy, but they have brought misery to people in Marange” (*Daily News*, 26 February 2013: 14).

Complaints over Water Pollution and its Devastating Effects on Home Industries and other Communal Livelihood Activities

Local communities also registered their concerns over the critical erosion of their livelihoods as a result of environmental degradation and the dumping of dangerous pollutants into water bodies by mining companies. Villagers from the Buhera South District of Manicaland Province complained in September 2011 over threats to their livelihood activities after several kilometres of the Singwizi River, a tributary of the Save, and the Save River itself turned murky and oily-black due to dangerous pollutants allegedly discharged by Anjin. As Albert Chimweru from Chishanyi village near the diamond fields complained to a journalist:

This river (Save) not only provides drinking water, but also irrigation which allows the cultivation of crops and the raising of animals...Now we have these mining companies being built close to river banks and dumping their waste into the water. Save has become so polluted, filled with toxic materials, and we have stopped using the water for home purposes. As a first step, government should raise awareness about the hazards of indiscriminate waste disposal. Secondly, tighter laws should be legislated and existing laws amended to curb illegal dumping of toxic chemical waste into water sources (Sibanda, 2011: 1).

Theresa Samuriwo, a small-scale farmer from Samuriwo village in Marange, also complained about the devastating effects of mining activities on agriculture in the area during an interview with the *Daily News* (26 February 2013: 14): “Most of the farming here is done by women, the majority of whom are single mothers. We can no longer sufficiently look after our children, whom the mines have failed to give employment. We used to grow and sell crops at irrigation

projects, but the dams have been polluted and silted-up by the mines”.

Fishing, which had been an important economic activity that sustained the lives of considerable numbers of people along the Save and Odzi Rivers and their tributaries, became impossible in Chiadzwa and areas downstream as a result of the contamination of these water bodies by commercial mining operations. In an application to the High Court in September 2012 Marange villagers, with the advice of ZELA, charged that pollution of the rivers had threatened their livelihoods by destroying riverine systems and aquatic life like fish (Chimhete, 2012).

In February 2013 Melanie Chiponda, the project manager of CCDT, clearly articulated the displeasure of the local communities over the erosion of their livelihood options as a result of water pollution by diamond mining companies: “The people of Marange believe that the discovery of diamonds is a curse. Of course, they at one time enjoyed the fruits of the diamonds but they were happier before the minerals were discovered. People are suffering in the midst of plenty” (*Daily News*, 26 February 2012: 14).

Concerns of Local Communities over the Deaths of Livestock after drinking Contaminated Water

There was outrage among communities in Marange and surrounding areas over the deaths of livestock, particularly cattle, as a result of the disposal of mine waste in rivers. To the local communities since the pre-colonial period, “cattle were...the most important form of permanent wealth...” (Bourdillon, 1976: 41). Villagers in Buhera South district of Manicaland Province were furious in September 2011 after dangerous mine waste from the Chiadzwa diamond mines deposited into the Singwizi River, a tributary of the Save, had killed a considerable number of their livestock. Albert Chimweru, one of the villagers, complained that several goats and cattle had died after drinking water from the two rivers (Sibanda, 2011). On 9 March 2012, during their investigation of water pollution caused by the dumping of mine effluent in Chiadzwa along the Save and Odzi Rivers, a group of journalists

identified carcasses of dead cows and goats along some river beds which angry villagers attributed to the contamination of water by commercial diamond companies (Karimakwenda, 2012).

In May 2012, Zakeu Nhachi, a villager from Chiadzwa, complained to a journalist during an interview that as a result of the pollution of the Odzi River by diamond mining waste, "...many people and livestock have been affected. Affected animals lose their fur and ultimately die. We tried to engage the companies, but we have not succeeded" (Mambondiani, 2012:1). During the same interview, Richmond Maramba, a villager from the same area, stated that two of his cows had died earlier in the month after drinking from the Odzi River. He estimated that more than 100 cattle from nearby villages had died in 2011 after drinking Odzi water. "We do not know what these diamond companies are discharging into the river," he lamented, "But whatever it is, it is not good for us and our livestock" (Mambondiani, 2012: 1).

In November 2012, villagers in the downstream area of the Odzi River accused diamond mining companies at Chiadzwa of discharging huge quantities of mine waste into the river resulting in the death of several of their livestock (Mushanawani, 2012). Throughout 2012, villagers from the Wengezi, Chakohwa, Nyanyadzi, Marange, Hot Springs, Tonhorai and Gudyanga areas of Chimanimani District, most of whom had depended on the Odzi River for survival complained about the pollution of the river by mining companies which had resulted in the deaths of their cattle thereby robbing them of draught power (*Manica Post*, 23-29 November 2012). Aleck Mutsago, a community leader from Chiadzwa, told a news reporter in November 2012 that three of his cattle had died earlier on in the month after drinking from the Odzi River. He blamed Anjin for dumping mine effluent into the river (*Zimbabwean*, 30 November 2012). In an interview with the *Manica Post* in November 2012 Reuben Mujee, an affected villager from Ward 5 in Chiadzwa, appealed to the responsible authorities to deal with mining companies which had polluted the Odzi River resulting in health problems for their livestock:

...our cattle are giving birth to small and sickly calves that are dying a few days after birth. They are too small to reach the cow's udder and are dying as a result. I am not the only one affected. Mrs Kareyi lost eight beasts, Mr Casper Mashava nine beasts, Mr Dzingayi Chibuwe 13 beasts. Before dying, the cattle bleed heavily as if they were attacked by ticks. Goats are also being affected. The situation is desperate because our livestock are our wealth. The diamond mining companies should find a lasting solution... (Mushanawani, 2012: 1).

These bitter experiences were also articulated by Headman Rombai of Chibuwe Village B in Chipinge District during an interview with members of ZELA in November 2012. He bemoaned the deaths of livestock in the area as a result of drinking from the polluted Save River: "Our cattle are dying and there are so many people who have lost their livestock in this area. I used to work at some of these companies and I know dirty water is being discharged into the rivers. I lost three cattle and my neighbour...lost eight cattle" (Zharare, 2012: 1).

These environmental concerns from villagers should be viewed against a background of poverty, unemployment and hyperinflation that characterised the Zimbabwean economy from 2000. With more than 80% of Zimbabweans unemployed in 2008, and the Zimbabwean currency almost valueless (United Nations, September 2008), livestock became a symbol of wealth for most villagers as was the case during the pre-colonial period. In addition, cattle provided the villagers with the much needed draught power for them to earn livelihoods through agriculture.

Outcry over Deforestation

Marange communities also castigated commercial diamond companies for embarking on environmentally unsustainable mining practices that destroyed vegetation and threatened their livelihood opportunities in several ways. Simon Chigunda from Mutsago village complained that the destruction of vegetation during mining operations destroyed the habitat of wild animals such as rodents and

rabbits which they used to hunt and either eat or sell in order to survive. He also lamented that some insects which used to be an important part of their diet such as cicadas and caterpillars had disappeared because the trees on whose leaves they fed were uprooted by commercial mining operations (interview with Simon Chigunda, Wengezi Business Centre, 10 November 2012).

Some villagers also lamented the extinction of wild fruits in the Chiadzwa area as a result of the destruction of trees by mining companies. As stated by Theresa Gomo, wild fruits were an integral part of the diet of the local inhabitants given that Marange is a drought-prone area not very favourable for agriculture in the absence of irrigation facilities. Most people in the area used to survive on baobab fruits which they ate and sometimes ground into mealie-meal to prepare sadza. The fruit was also an important source of income for villagers who used to sell it to motorists along the highway linking the cities of Mutare and Masvingo (interview with Theresa Gomo, Nyanyadzi Business Centre, 14 January 2013).

Some Chiadzwa villagers were also furious at mining companies for depriving them of vegetation, particularly shrubs, which had medicinal properties. Herbs from the immediate environment became an important remedy for various ailments especially from 2000 when the country experienced a serious socio-economic crisis during which many impoverished Zimbabweans could not afford to buy modern medicines. Simon Chigunda complained that several inhabitants of Chiadzwa developed skin rash after bathing in rivers polluted by mine waste yet most *pterocarpus angolensis* trees which treat this ailment had been uprooted by the diamond firms during mining operations (interview with Simon Chigunda, Wengezi Business Centre, 10 November 2012).

The frustrations of the villagers over the destruction of the vegetation were summed up in February 2013 by Melanie Chiponda of CCDT:

...villagers who used to harvest and sell wild fruits along the roads can no longer do so since the mines have cut down the trees, while small wild animals that locals hunted for sale have disappeared. The villagers who used to depend on herbs as an

alternative to modern medicines no longer have access to trees and shrubs that the mines have also razed (*Daily News*, 26 February 2013: 14).

Protests by Villagers over the Violation of Cultural Rights by Environmental Degradation

Speaking at a workshop in Harare in April 2012, Veronica Zano of ZELA said some traditional leaders from Chiadzwa had complained to them that the environmental degradation caused by diamond firms was violating their cultural rights:

Traditional leaders say these miners are violating cultural rights during operations in their communities. These miners include the Chinese, Russians and Lebanese. They come into communities, displace the villagers and pollute their environment. Villagers are suffering. Some are now attributing the lack of rainfall to the violation of their cultural rights (Moyo, 2012: 3).

In August 2012 villagers from Marange accused Anjin's Chinese managers of senselessly digging up the land for diamonds and "throwing aside bones of people buried in the area now currently being mined and refusing them a decent burial" (*New Zimbabwe*, 28 August 2012: 1). In February 2013 they confronted Anjin authorities and demanded compensation for desecrating the graves of their relatives during mining operations. They argued that the company's mining activities had violated African cultural rights by tampering with graves and failing to properly exhumate their relatives' remains. Gordon Chipepera, one of the villagers, said the affected families were demanding US\$900 compensation for each grave that was disturbed and demanded that Anjin meet reburial expenses. The villagers took their case up with Chief Marange and the Mutare District Administrator after Anjin had failed to meet their demands. During an interview with *Newsday* on 19 March 2013, Chief Marange echoed the concerns of his subjects and promptly sought the intervention of Manicaland local government authorities: "I met the

affected villagers and got their side of the story. We then agreed to engage the assistant district administrator...What this mining company is doing is not cultural and we have to solve this as soon as possible” (Manyati, 2013: 5). In response, the community was supposed to have directed the problem to us and now without our involvement, it is difficult to intervene. The company and the community should have come to us so that we see Manicaland Provincial Administrator blamed the villagers for violating protocol:

if the company is complying with values of the Marange community. As it stands, this creates extortion tendencies on the part of the villagers and they should not approach the company on their own (Manyati, 2013: 5).

Johannes Taremedzwa stated during an interview (Sakubva Beit Hall, Mutare, 30 March 2013) that it was taboo in traditional African culture for someone to open up a grave without consulting the families concerned. He argued that they had to confront Anjin directly because state officials were interested parties since the government-owned ZMDC was involved in joint mining ventures with the foreign company and would not be genuinely sympathetic to their concerns. These concerns from the villagers clearly demonstrate how environmental degradation and cultural erosion became two sides of the same coin. What fuelled the ire of the villagers was that a foreign company in which they had no stake was exploiting their resources and violating their cultural rights by depleting the environment.

Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated that concerns over threats to sustainable development are not a monopoly of environmental agencies, politicians, geographers, scientists and other elite stakeholders. Indeed, as Duri and Mapara (2007) have shown, environmental awareness and activism among the subaltern in Africa dates back to the pre-colonial period. This study has argued that while the awareness to create a balance between development and

the material environment has always been inherent in subaltern communities, environmental activism among such societies becomes so manifest when their livelihood initiatives are threatened. The study has noted that environmental degradation and the reckless disposal of mine waste by diamond companies jeopardised the survival options of Marange and surrounding communities in various ways and also violated their cultural rights. What further irked the villagers was that they had no stake in the diamond companies, all of which were jointly owned by the state and foreigners, a dispensation which brewed a nascent form of environmental nationalism. It is the contention of this chapter, therefore, that while environmental activism 'from above' is acknowledged, that 'from below' should not be underestimated.

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Not so long ago, the Economist Newspaper described Africa as a hopeless continent. This damning description specifically referred to the development status of Africa. While the debate on the political and socio-economic [under-]development of Africa had been raging on prior to the Economist's daring but controversial pronouncements, it intensified from thereon. Many concerned people from within the continent and elsewhere have reproved the proclamation but mainly in newspapers and the broadcast media. Not enough has been done by development scholars to critically reflect on the description and status of Africa's development condition in a nuanced and systematic fashion. Yet, it is through incisive reflections and systematic engagements with Africa's situations and circumstances that directions and solutions to the African development predicament could be forged. The present volume is an attempt to open up a constructive dialogue between the Global North and the Global South on the African [under-]development conundrum. The book is an eye opener to African governments, social scientists, policy makers and development scholars concerned with the urgent need to rethink, reimagine and retheorise Africa's development gridlock.

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